

Asiatic Russia

Although the Russian Empire has traditionally been viewed as a European borderland, most of its territory was actually situated in Asia. Imperial power was huge but often suffered from a lack of enough information and resources to rule its culturally diverse subjects, and asymmetric relations between state and society combined with flexible strategies of local actors sometimes produced unexpected results.

In *Asiatic Russia*, an international team of scholars explores the interactions between power and people in Central Asia, Siberia, the Volga-Urals, and the Caucasus from the 18th to the early 20th centuries, drawing on a wealth of Russian archival materials and Turkic, Persian, and Tibetan sources. The variety of topics discussed in the book includes the Russian idea of a “civilizing mission,” the system of governor-generalships, imperial geography and demography, roles of Muslim and Buddhist networks in imperial rule and foreign policy, social change in the Russian Protectorate of Bukhara, Muslim reformist and national movements.

The book is essential reading for students and scholars of Russian, Central Eurasian, and comparative imperial history, as well as imperial and colonial studies and nationalism studies. It may also provide some hints for understanding today’s world, where “empire” has again become a key word in international and domestic power relations.

UYAMA Tomohiko is professor at the Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University. He specializes in the history of the Russian Empire and contemporary politics in Central Asia, and is the editor of *Empire, Islam, and Politics in Central Eurasia* (2007) and co-editor of *Japan’s Silk Road Diplomacy* (2008).

New Horizons in Islamic Studies (Second Series)
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This second series of “New Horizons in Islamic Studies” presents the abundant results of the National Institutes for the Humanities (NIHU) program for Islamic Area Studies (IAS) carried out in Japan from 2006 to date. This program emphasizes multidisciplinary research on the dynamism of Muslim societies, in both Islamic and non-Islamic areas around the world. By taking a historical approach and adopting regional comparison methods in the study of current issues, the program seeks to build a framework of empirical knowledge on Islam and Islamic Civilization.

Islamic Area Studies is a network comprised of five research centers, at Waseda University, the University of Tokyo, Sophia University, Kyoto University, and the Toyo Bunko (Oriental Library). As of 2008, this network has been brought into the fold of a Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) program, with the Organization for Islamic Area Studies at Waseda University serving as its central office. As research centers recognized by the MEXT, we aim to promote the development of joint research institutions in the human and social sciences, thereby further developing fruitful joint research achievements.

This publication of the results of our IAS joint research has and will have been made possible through the collaborative efforts of the five IAS centers, and with the financial assistance of the NIHU and the MEXT.

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Since the publication of the last volume in the series, the original editor Prof. SATO Tsugitaka has passed away. His dedication and vision for the series will be missed by all who were privileged to work with him.

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Preface

The growing scholarly interest in the history of the Russian Empire, especially in that of its borderlands, has prompted a number of conferences in various parts of the world for at least the past decade. The international symposium held at the Slavic Research Center of Hokkaido University from December 5 to 7, 2007, where the chapters in this volume originated, was one such conference. It was unique, however, in gathering not only scholars of Russian history in the narrow sense but also specialists in Oriental and Islamic studies belonging to various generations and working in Japan, Russia, the United States, Kazakhstan, and Germany. This event was made possible by the generous support of the 21st Century COE (Center of Excellence) Program, “Making a Discipline of Slavic Eurasian Studies,” which ran from 2003 to 2008 under the auspices of the Japanese Ministry of Education and Science. Editing of the volume, including English proofreading and translation from Russian, was funded by the projects “Comparative History of Empires in the Contexts of Modernization and Globalization” (grant-in-aid for scientific research from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, 2009–13) and “Comparative Research on Major Regional Powers in Eurasia, Group 4: Imperiology” (grant-in-aid for scientific research on innovative areas from the Japanese Ministry of Education and Science, 2008–13).

Of the nineteen papers presented at the symposium, six are not included in this volume, although they were also very helpful to the editor in developing the concept of this volume.¹ Eight delegates at the event made comments that were useful for improving the chapters. As always, staff members of the Slavic Research Center gave extremely effective support in organizing the symposium. We are deeply grateful to the publications committee of the Islamic Area Studies Program, especially to professors Yukawa Takeshi and Komatsu Hisao, for enabling this volume to be published by Routledge in the New Horizons in Islamic Studies series.

In this volume, where the authors use multilingual sources, the problems involved in transliteration are considerable. Transliterations from Russian in Cyrillic script and from Arabic, Persian, and Turkic languages in Arabic script follow the system of the Library of Congress, with some minor changes. However, because the orthography of Turkic languages began to change around the turn of the twentieth century, two authors chose different systems: James H. Meyer spells Tatar and Azeri words in a way similar to modern Turkish, and Uyama Tomohiko


transliterates Kazakh words from Arabic script using the orthographic principles of modern Cyrillic-Kazakh and the romanization system of Edward Allworth's *Nationalities of the Soviet East* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), with some modifications. Japanese names are written with the family name first.

Note

- 1 Three of the six papers have been published elsewhere: Virginia Martin, "Kazakh Chinggisids, Land and Political Power in the Nineteenth Century: A Case Study of Syrymbet," *Central Asian Survey* 29, no. 1 (2010): 79–102; Sugiyama Kiyohiko, "The Qing Empire in the Central Eurasian Context: Its Structure of Rule as Seen from the Eight Banner System," in Matsuzato Kimitaka, ed., *Comparative Imperiology* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2010), 87–108; Asano Toyomi, "The Collapse of the Japanese Empire and the Normalization of Its Relations with South Korea (1945–1965): Repatriation, Reparations, and External Assets Reconsidered," *ibid.*, 109–129. An earlier version of another paper was published before the symposium: Michael Khodarkovsky, "Colonial Frontiers in Eighteenth-Century Russia: From the North Caucasus to Central Asia," in Marsha Siefert, ed., *Extending the Borders of Russian History: Essays in Honor of Alfred J. Rieber* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2003), 127–141. The other two paper-presenters were Dmitrii Pavlov (Moscow) and Irina Erofeeva (Almaty).



Map 1 Asiatic Russia, ca. 1900



Map 2 Central Asia, ca. 1900

Introduction

Asiatic Russia as a space for asymmetric interaction

UYAMA Tomohiko

I hold it as a principle that in Asia the duration of peace is in direct proportion to the slaughter you inflict upon the enemy. The harder you hit them, the longer they will be quiet afterwards.

– Mikhail Skobelev, 1882¹

Russia unquestionably possesses a remarkable gift for enlisting the allegiance and attracting even the friendship of those whom she has subdued by force of arms, ... The conquest of Central Asia is a conquest of Orientals by Orientals, of cognate character by cognate character.

– George N. Curzon, 1889²

Although the Russian Empire has traditionally been viewed as a European borderland, about three-fourths of its territory was in Asia. Of course, this fact is not new to researchers, and a number of books have been published on the geopolitical relevance of Asia to Russia, Russian perceptions of Asia, and Russian colonial expansion into Asia.³ However, the significance of Russian rule to Asian regions has been studied with strong ideological biases for a long time: during the Cold War, Western scholars tended to emphasize the negative consequences of such rule (as many Central Asian scholars do now), whereas Soviet scholars asserted its progressive nature.

In the 1990s, when ideological constraints largely disappeared and more sources became available to historians, research on the interactions between imperial Russia and its Asian subjects saw much progress. A significant leap in this direction was a collective volume published in 1997, *Russia's Orient*, which combined the approaches of Russian history, colonial studies, and Oriental studies.⁴ However, the “archival revolution” – the extensive use of materials from the archives of former Soviet countries that became accessible after the fall of the Soviet regime – led many scholars to rely on sources written or arranged by imperial administrations. True, archival materials have proven useful, not only for studying governmental policy but also for exploring interactions between the state and society through institutions on a local level, as demonstrated by Robert Crews’ monograph *For Prophet and Tsar* (2006).⁵ Nevertheless, over-reliance on Russian sources has a risk of inducing researchers to idealize harmony under imperial rule and to write

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a history from the colonizer's viewpoint, as Jeff Sahadeo warned against in his review of *Russian Empire* (2007), a volume otherwise successful in investigating various aspects of imperial governance.⁶

Our volume is an attempt at a dialogue between Russian studies and Oriental studies, as was *Russia's Orient* more than a decade ago; however, ours relies more heavily on primary sources, including both Russian archival materials and non-Russian-language manuscripts and periodicals, than earlier scholars did. We especially focus on Muslims, a core of the non-Russian population in Asiatic Russia (*Aziatskaia Rossiia*), putting them in the context of the history of the wider Muslim world. This is why we are publishing this volume in the New Horizons in Islamic Studies series. Another feature of our collective work is that, unlike many other English-language volumes predominantly written by North American, European, and Russian scholars, our authors include scholars from Japan, where the historical study of Asiatic Russia has become well developed in recent years, and from Central Eurasia, the region we study. In this respect, the volume is a part of the efforts of the Slavic Research Center at Hokkaido University, which has a tradition of promoting joint research by Japanese, Western, and former Soviet scholars.⁷

Russian eastward expansion began with the conquest of the Kazan Khanate in 1552, but it was not immediately evident whether this was an expansion of a European empire into Asia. Europeans in the Middle Ages identified the Don River as the line of demarcation between Europe and Asia, placing Muscovy in Asia. However, after the Petrine reforms that saw Russia enter into inter-imperial rivalry in Europe, it became important for Russia to portray itself as a European empire with a large Asian domain. Through the endeavors of Russian scholars, most notably Vasilii Tatishchev (1686–1750), a famous historian who also played a prominent role in pacifying the Bashkirs, the Ural Mountains were internationally recognized by geographers as a new border between Europe and Asia.⁸ Thus Russia became a Eurasian state, albeit asymmetric in a double sense: its Asian part was much larger than its European part in size, even though the core of the empire was firmly situated in the European part. This transformation in geographic image was concomitant with Russia's adoption of the concept of its "civilizing mission" with regard to Asian peoples, which was also a result of inter-imperial competition in Europe, as Ricarda Vulpius argues in this volume (Chapter 1).

The relatively low Ural Mountains were a nexus rather than a clear dividing line between European and Asiatic Russia, and many administrative units and ethnic groups spread over both sides. Moreover, although it was west of the Ural Mountains and constituted an important part of European Russia, the Middle Volga region (with Kazan as its center) had significant Asian features, with a sizable Muslim Tatar population. It served both as a foothold for Russia's eastern expansion and as a center of Muslim networks. Therefore, this volume often includes Tatars and the Middle Volga in its accounts of Asiatic Russia. Hamamoto Mami's chapter (Chapter 2) details the history of Kargala (Qarghali), an outpost of Volga Tatars in the Southern Urals that began serving as a center of trade between Russia and Central Asia long before the former's conquest of the latter. Even when

it enforced a fierce Christianization policy in the Middle Volga, the Russian government valued the role of Tatar merchants in Kargala and guaranteed their religious freedom, making the city a model of cooperation between Tatars and the Russian state.

The Tatars' role as intermediaries between Russia and Central Asia was not limited to commerce. Gulmira Sultangalieva (Chapter 3) shows how Tatar scribes, mullahs, and teachers bridged the gap between the Kazakhs and the Russians in the period when the Kazakhs repeatedly rose in revolt. They not only worked as agents and informants for the Russian authorities, but also provided a career model for the Kazakh elite who wished to serve the empire. While much has been discussed about the role of local elites as mediators of British colonial rule in Africa and Asia since Ronald Robinson sketched the theory of collaboration in 1972,⁹ the Tatars had a special advantage as intermediaries, being century-old Russian subjects who were close to Central Asians in religion and language. In the mid-nineteenth century, however, the Russian authorities drastically changed their attitude toward the Tatars, calling them fanatical and dangerous, and depriving them of their role as intermediaries.

The change of attitude toward the Tatars reflected not only Islamophobia, but also the development of governmental apparatuses in charge of Asian policy from the early nineteenth century. Interestingly, these apparatuses did not always clearly separate internal and external affairs. Thus, the Asiatic Department (*Aziatskii departament*) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, established in 1819, dealt not only with foreign states in Asia, but also with Caucasians, Kalmyks, and Kazakhs, who had already become Russian subjects but over whom Russian rule had not yet been consolidated. The inter-ministerial Asiatic Committee that worked from 1820 to 1847 also discussed Asian affairs in general, with special attention to the Kazakh Junior Juz (Little Horde) and the Khiva Khanate. But as the peripheries of the Russian Empire became more effectively controlled, the demarcation between internal administration and foreign diplomacy became clearer. The Kalmyks were removed from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1824, followed by the Kazakh Junior Juz in 1859.¹⁰

Still, administration of the Asian regions of Russia continued to be seen as requiring special systems because of their distinct natural and ethnic characteristics as well as Russia's strategic concerns. The Asiatic Department (*Aziatskaia chast'*) of the General Staff, established in 1863, had the dual functions of intelligence-gathering on Russia's Asiatic frontiers and internal administration of military districts in Asiatic Russia. Many of the heads of the military districts served as governors-general concurrently, and especially in areas such as Turkestan, where the whole administration was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War. The influence of military specialists in Asian affairs was enormous and the General Staff, especially its Asiatic Department, accumulated geographical and Orientalist knowledge and vision, with some prominent officers producing maps and scholarly works.¹¹

While "otherizing" Asiatic Russia in many ways, the government also endeavored to enhance governance throughout the empire. As Matsuzato Kimitaka

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demonstrates in Chapter 4, the governor-generalship was introduced as an institution for governing both the eastern and western peripheries of the empire, although opinion among bureaucrats was divided over whether this institution, with its quasi-federalist characteristics, promoted or weakened the state unity. Although the system of governor-generalships was basically the same in the western and eastern peripheries, governors-general had different functions between these regions. While those in the west profited by manipulating local interethnic relations, their counterparts in Asiatic Russia prioritized geopolitical and economic considerations, although religious and ethnic problems in Central Asia could not be neglected.

Asiatic Russia was also an important place for agricultural colonization. Although Russian peasant migration to Siberia and Central Asia began spontaneously, it was incorporated into official discourses, as described in detail by Anatolii Remnev in Chapter 5. Officials, scholars and thinkers saw peasants as Russifiers of the peripheries and guarantors of the unity and indivisibility of Russia, praising their ability to adapt to a new environment without losing their ties to central Russia. Peasants also served as an advance guard for Russian expansionism, settling foreign territories just beyond Russian borders, such as the Astrabad region, Tannu Uriankhai, and northern Manchuria, which were barely controlled by the central governments in Tehran and Beijing.

Asiatic Russia attracted more and more interest in the final years of the Russian Empire, when the government strongly encouraged peasant migration to kill two birds with one stone: on the one hand, it aimed at alleviating land shortages in European Russia to thwart the spread of revolutionary movements in villages; on the other, it pursued a balanced development of land within the empire. It was the Resettlement Administration of the Main Administration of Land Management and Agriculture that published the famous comprehensive three-volume outline of the administrative structure, population, natural conditions, agriculture, and industry of Asiatic Russia in 1914.¹² Aleksandr Krivoshein, the head of the Main Administration from 1908 to 1915, was nicknamed “Minister of Asiatic Russia” for his zeal in settling Russian peasants in Siberia, the Russian Far East, and Central Asia.¹³ Remnev’s chapter contends, however, that the empire could not find a balance between the desires to lessen the intensity of the agrarian crisis at the center, to settle the Asian borderlands, and to preserve the loyalty of the local populations there. Peasant migration, after all, often destabilized Russian rule in Asia.

Remarkably, while it was often ambiguous whether the Caucasus was a part of Asiatic Russia or of European Russia, there was almost no question about excluding the Caucasus from Asiatic Russia when the focus was on peasant colonization. The Caucasus was already densely populated by the late nineteenth century and could not accept a large amount of new migrants, although Russian peasants occasionally arrived in some parts of the North Caucasus, Abkhazia, and Azerbaijan (the Mugan Steppe). In contrast, many Western authors, interested in the geopolitical significance of the Caucasus, which bordered on the Ottoman Empire and Iran, included the region in Asiatic Russia.¹⁴

If peasant migration was not always controllable, determining the populations of newly acquired territories was even more elusive for the Russian authorities. Sergei

Abashin details how Russian statistics showed varied population figures for the provinces and ethnic groups in Central Asia. These differences were due not only to technical shortcomings, but also to local people's attempts to conceal their real numbers and different approaches to statistics taken by the Ministries of Interior and War. The classifications of ethnic groups were also contested by Russian administrators, statisticians, and native officials. Elaborating and revising recent historiography's view on demography as a part of imperial knowledge indispensable to effective governance, Abashin's chapter (Chapter 6) highlights how the interests of various actors, both Russians and Central Asians, intersected with demography.

Asiatic Russia was important not only for the Russian Empire's domestic policy, but also for its foreign policy. From there, the empire projected its power beyond its borders by using local human networks, although this did not necessarily lead to results the empire hoped for. Noda Jin (Chapter 7) investigates how Russia, from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century, gradually undermined the restrictive trade system set by Qing China. It opened new trade routes through Central Asia with the participation of Muslim merchants and the connivance of Qing frontier officials. Muslim merchants who mediated Russo-Chinese trade included Kazakh caravans and Kokandi-Bukharan merchants, but as was the case with Russo-Central Asian trade, Tatars were the most powerful supporters of Russia's trade hegemony.

Robert Crews (Chapter 8) illustrates the complexity of Russia's intervention in Qajar Iran. On the surface, Russia had huge leverage over Iran. The Treaty of Turkmanchai of 1828 granted privileges and immunities to Russian subjects, and consulates often functioned as shadow local governments with broad judicial and police authority. In practice, however, Russians were obliged to rely on local Islamic courts and Qajar agents to resolve commercial disputes. Russian authorities expected merchant networks that connected Iran with the Caucasus to amplify Russian imperial influence, but merchants put their own interests before imperial loyalty, claiming Russian, Qajar, and British subjecthood in different contexts to enjoy protection and rights under the laws of each state.

Kimura Satoru (Chapter 9) discloses the unexpected social and political changes that Russian imperial power brought to one of its protectorates. Being a Sunni Islamic state, the amirate of Bukhara was hostile to Shi'ism, but a number of Shi'is – enslaved Iranians and forced migrants from Khurasan – lived there. They concealed their faith, and amirs promoted some of them to high-ranking positions as officials and army commanders. After Bukhara was defeated by Russia and became its protectorate in 1868, however, many Shi'is, emboldened by the Russian policy of abolishing slavery, stopped concealing their faith. Shi'i officials became even more influential than before by establishing good relations with the Russians, and they supported Shi'i religious activities. This frustrated the Sunnis, eventually leading to bloody sectarian conflict in 1910.

In Chapter 10 Nikolay Tsyrempilov ponders what Buddhism, Asiatic Russia's most important non-Christian religion after Islam, meant to imperial diplomacy. In particular, he elucidates the role of Agvan Dorzhiev, a Buriat monk, in Russo-Tibetan relations by using recently discovered letters of the Dalai Lama. While

Tibetans expected Russia to help them achieve independence, Russia was more interested in Mongolia than in Tibet. After the revolution, Soviet Russia sent missions to Tibet, but the repression of Buddhism in the Soviet Union soon brought their enterprise to naught. Despite the image of the Great Game as a game between empires, Tibet was a more fervent, albeit often helpless, game player than Russia and Great Britain. Dorzhiev, himself an independent actor, should be viewed more as an agent of Tibet in Russia than as an agent of Russia in Tibet.

Toward the end of the tsarist period, non-Russians who received modern education began actively appealing to Russian authorities for more political and social rights. Intellectuals formed networks extending over regions and across ethnic groups, and Asiatic Russia became an arena for national and reformist movements. Salavat Iskhakov examines how Russian Muslims, having been basically supportive of the Russian state, gradually became discontented with the tsarist regime and politically active. Muslim intellectuals were dissatisfied with despotism and the Russification policy, but they kept their distance from radical revolutionary movements, pan-Islamism, and interethnic enmities. Despite their moderate progressivism, the Russian government harshly oppressed them, and some Muslims appealed to European countries for support of autonomy, drawing upon the emerging concept of self-determination.

Muslim reformist movements were not always dominant forces in their own ethnic and regional communities, and they had to fight internal enemies. In Chapter 12 James H. Meyer reveals that conflict between Muslim reformers and traditionalists was related not only to ideology, but also to money (teachers' income) and power (representation in religious and political institutions). In particular, traditionalists in the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly contacted tsarist security officials to denounce reformers as pan-Islamists and pan-Turkists. Meyer thus points out a negative aspect of interaction between the tsarist state and Muslim society. The greater the degree of state intervention in the lives of Muslims in a region, the more divided that region's Muslims were.

National movements, which developed in the environment created by the empire, continued to be affected by imperial legacies even after the fall of the empire. Uyama Tomohiko (Chapter 13) addresses the Kazakh national movement during the Russian Revolution and Civil War, and specifically analyzes imperial legacies that influenced relations between the Alash Orda autonomous government and political forces in surrounding regions. These legacies included the memory of Muslim institutions, imperial political geography, notions of *inorodtsy* ("backward" non-Russian peoples) and "great Russia," and the presence of the Cossacks. The Kazakhs sometimes suffered from these legacies and at other times profited from them. In the long run, however, the Kazakh national movement contributed to the formation of a new political geography based on ethnic division, which was later consolidated under the Soviet Union.

Our authors' work portrays the Russian Empire neither as a "prison of nations" nor as a benign protector of its subjects. The empire, especially its Asian part, was a space where representatives of official and unofficial institutions, and local

people of every stripe, interacted. Sometimes, as was the case with the Tatars helping the expansion of Russia's Asian trade and mediating Russian rule in the Kazakh Steppe, the interests of imperial power and Muslim subjects coincided. Yet interaction was not always harmonious and was deeply asymmetric. Imperial power could easily abandon intermediaries when it perceived them as unreliable, like the Tatars after the mid-nineteenth century, and when it put a low priority on the mediator's goal, as we see in the case of Dorzhiev in Russo-Tibetan relations.

At the same time, the Russian Empire was not an omniscient panopticon. Not only Russia but every empire is characterized by the desire to expand its territory or sphere of influence well beyond the boundaries within which it has enough information and resources for effective administration, and it plays games with incomplete information. There appear margins where imperial or foreign subjects can manipulate rules set by the imperial power. This applied not only to peripheries and foreign territories where Russia had not established full-fledged and well-controlled administrative systems, but also to areas close to the center of the empire, where institutions were developed but knowledge of local affairs was either insufficient or distorted. This is why some Muslims were able to use police to purge enemies in their own communities by labeling them as pan-Islamists.

Although this volume does not narrate the history of Russia's wars of expansion and anti-Russian revolts, frequent wars and revolts gave complex nuances to Russian rule. On the one hand, Russia showed off its military strength and brutally suppressed resistance. Although such outright praise of slaughter as that given by General Skobelev, cited in the beginning of this introduction, was not common, belief in military power as the pivot of Russian rule in Asia was widespread. Fear of rebellion and treachery, combined with an obsession with the phantoms of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism, led to the rejection of intermediary roles for intellectuals, merchants, and religious figures. On the other hand, the possibility of future wars and the awareness of the fragility of Russian rule at the peripheries compelled authorities, albeit in inconsistent ways, to compromise with local elites and to be tolerant toward former enemies, as George Curzon observed.

In the early twentieth century, nationalism of both Russians and non-Russians became an important factor in state-society relations in Asiatic Russia. This phenomenon should be understood not simply as importation of the Western-born idea of nationalism, but also as a consequence of the ethnicization of imperial rule that gradually proceeded over the course of the nineteenth century. Distinctions between Russians and non-Russians, between Tatars and Kazakhs, came to be perceived as ethnic, rather than as differences in religion or modes of life. Obligations and rights, including military service and land use, were assigned differently according not only to social estates but also to ethnicity. Such a particularistic way of administration was supported by quasi-scientific Orientalist knowledge.¹⁵ Toward the end of the tsarist period, Russian nationalists claimed with increasing assertiveness the hegemony of ethnic Russians in the empire ("Russia for Russians"), but this claim backfired by stimulating an ethnic consciousness among non-Russians. Eventually, erosion of the tsar's authority, which had cemented various categories of multi-ethnic subjects, made the fall of the empire inevitable.

As a failed model of rule, the Russian Empire does not present an alternative to the nation-state, whose defects have been much discussed over recent decades. Still, it provides rich examples of asymmetric interactions between state power and local society that often produced unexpected results. Diverse and flexible strategies of local actors, especially Muslims, are helpful to us in ridding stereotypes of Muslims either as violent fundamentalists or as passive victims of imperialism.

Notes

- 1 Charles Marvin, *The Russian Advance towards India: Conversations with Skobelev, Ignatieff, and Other Distinguished Russian Generals and Statesmen, on the Central Asian Question* (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, & Rivington, 1882), 98–99.
- 2 George N. Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question* (London: Longmans, 1889), 388, 392.
- 3 To name but a few, Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., *Russia and Asia: Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian Peoples* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1972); Michael Rywkin, ed., *Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917* (London: Mansell, 1988); Milan Hauner, *What is Asia to Us? Russia's Asian Heartland Yesterday and Today* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990); David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, *Russian Orientalism: Asia in the Russian Mind from Peter the Great to the Emigration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).
- 4 Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzerini, eds., *Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700–1917* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997).
- 5 Robert D. Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). Crews' view on close interactions between the state and Muslim society does not always hold true for Central Asia, where imperial authorities intentionally avoided developing official religious and local institutions.
- 6 Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen, and Anatolyi Remnev, eds., *Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007); Jeff Sahadeo, "Visions of Empire: Russia's Place in an Imperial World," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 11, no. 2 (2010): 381–409.
- 7 To cite two examples related to the subject of this volume: Uyama Tomohiko, ed., *Empire, Islam, and Politics in Central Eurasia* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2007); Matsuzato Kimitaka, ed., *Imperiology: From Empirical Knowledge to Discussing the Russian Empire* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2007).
- 8 Mark Bassin, "Russia between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of Geographical Space," *Slavic Review* 50, no. 1 (1991): 2–8.
- 9 Ronald Robinson, "Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration," in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe, eds., *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism* (London: Longman, 1972), 117–142.
- 10 *Ocherki istorii Ministerstva inostrannykh del, 1802–1902* (1902; repr., Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2002), 89–93, 131, 160–161.
- 11 Alex Marshall, *The Russian General Staff and Asia, 1800–1917* (London: Routledge, 2006), 25–30, 163–186. Maps produced by officers at the General Staff include Aleksei Il'in's "Karta Aziatskoi Rossii" (6th ed., 1868) <<http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gmd/g7115.mf000025>> and Mikhail Veniukov's "Etnograficheskaia karta Aziatskoi Rossii" (1870s?) <<http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gmd/g7116e.mf000008>>.
- 12 *Aziatskaia Rossiia: Izdanie Pereselencheskogo Upravleniia Glavnogo Upravleniia Zemleustroistva i Zemledeliia*, in 3 vols. (St. Petersburg: A. F. Marks, 1914). A fundamental atlas (*Atlas Aziatskoi Rossii*) was published together with these volumes.
- 13 Willard Suderland argues that a colonial ministry (the Ministry of Asiatic Russia) might

have been established if the Russian Empire had continued to exist a little longer, but it is obvious that an attempt to create such a ministry would have met strong resistance from the Ministries of Interior and War, which administered the regions of Asiatic Russia. Willard Suderland, "The Ministry of Asiatic Russia: The Colonial Office That Never Was But Might Have Been," *Slavic Review* 69, no. 1 (2010): 120–150.

- 14 E.g., Alexis Krausse, *Russia in Asia: A Record and a Study, 1558–1899*, 2nd ed. (1900; repr., London: Curzon Press, 1973); George Frederick Wright, *Asiatic Russia*, in 2 vols. (London: Eveleigh Nash, 1903). M. Philips Price's book, *War and Revolution in Asiatic Russia* (New York: Macmillan, 1918), overwhelmingly focuses on the Caucasus and its neighboring areas in Turkey and Iran.
- 15 Uyama Tomohiko, "A Particularist Empire: The Russian Policies of Christianization and Military Conspiration in Central Asia," in Uyama, *Empire, Islam, and Politics*, 23–63, esp. 59–63.

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Part I

Russia's eastern expansion

Its “mission” and the Tatars’
intermediary role

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1 The Russian Empire's civilizing mission in the eighteenth century

A comparative perspective

Ricarda VULPIUS

Research on Russian history has experienced a boost from the concept of empire and an enriching interest in the complexities of its multinational and multiconfessional character. However, while the focus has mostly been on the empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Russian eighteenth century as an imperial century, framed by the shadows of Peter I and Catherine II, is still often neglected. The eighteenth century has traditionally been seen first and foremost in terms of the “Westernization” of the Russian state and society; the changes in status and behavior of Russia as an *empire* and its underlying ideology have only recently become an important topic of research.¹

This chapter aims to profit from the methods of cultural history and to look for Russian perceptions and expressions of imperial identity in this crucial period from a comparative perspective. More precisely, I intend to explore Russian imperial politics and notions as they developed, from the very moment when Russia embarked on a new journey, that is when the country consciously took its place on the global stage. The secondary literature leaves no doubt that, by the end of the eighteenth century, the fundamentals of Russia's imperial status and conception had been established. However, the decisive stage for the *formation* of the imperial consciousness that was so evident at the beginning of the nineteenth century has scarcely been studied.² Excellent books and articles have been written by Andreas Kappeler, Michael Khodarkovsky, Willard Sunderland, Yuri Slezkine, and Nicholas Breyfogle.³ They are the pioneers in this field. However, their focus lies more on Russia's behavior in a certain periphery or on its relation with certain ethnic groups. It is my larger project on the imperial identity of the Russian elite in the eighteenth century that frames this chapter, which aims to focus exclusively on the Russian side of encounters with other ethnicities and to answer the general questions of *when*, *why*, and above all, *how* thinking in imperial categories came into being and in what relation those categories stood to imperial concepts and notions in other European countries.

The lack of natural borders among the imperial center and the peripheries of the Russian Empire marks the decisive difference between continental and maritime empires, and brings forward the two central questions of my study: How and why were the Russian elite able to develop a feeling of superiority towards non-Russian ethnic groups when they had known many of them for centuries as a conse-

quence of fluid borders? And how much did the notion of a “civilizing mission” apply to eighteenth-century Russia? Significant scholars such as Jörg Baberowski, a specialist on late Imperial Russia and on the Soviet Union, and Jürgen Osterhammel, a scholar writing on civilizing missions in global history, stated that Russia did not develop a civilizing mission until the nineteenth century.⁴ In the following, I try to show another perspective and draw the attention of scholars of late imperial Russia to the eighteenth century.

Generally speaking, the search for Russian expressions of imperial identity touches upon the fundamental question of when Russia became an empire. Was it with the conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan in the middle of the sixteenth century, and thus with the rule of Ivan IV over a non-Slavic and non-Christian ethnic group? Or was it not until the establishment of what is known in German as a *herrschaftskolonie* (a colony in the classic sense) in Central Asia, in the late nineteenth century?⁵ It is problematic to use the term “empire” to describe the early modern period in Russia, because the very notion of empire hardly existed before the early eighteenth century. There are also no indications showing tsars or elites to have been conscious of ruling an “empire” as understood to mean a state that could be subdivided into a center and peripheries. It seems that distinctions between different ethnic groups of subjects did not play a great role. Instead, documents show the tsarist government as referring to the country, with its very diverse population, as one united patrimony (*votchina*). According to the principles of a patrimonial state that stem from the time of the Kievan Rus', all subjects appear to have been roughly equal in their relation to the tsar. While the conquest of Siberia down to the border of China and the incorporation of Left-bank Ukraine had further enlarged the imperial body in terms of different peoples, religions, and even semi-independent political units, the state had not yet adopted an imperial language. The Russian historian Aleksandr Filiushkin therefore proposed to speak of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Russia as a “*neonatal'naia Imperiia*” – an empire in its infancy.⁶

It is only against this background that the turning point of the eighteenth century for the development of Russia as an empire becomes fully understandable. It was not until this century, as I see it, that the gap between “empire” as a category of academic analysis and “empire” as a category of contemporary sources was closed. Only in the eighteenth century, forced by interaction with other European empires and by competition with their imperial politics and ambitions, did the Russian Empire start to develop an identity that was imperial in the modern sense of the word. So far, the debate on empires has not resulted in a generally accepted definition of the notion. Only recently, John LeDonne has proposed that we avoid calling Russia an empire before its expansion to those regions where less fertile soil prevented Russian peasants from settling.⁷ Only then, that is in the nineteenth century, did the Russian settlements, and thereby the endeavor to build a unitary state, come to an end and – according to him – the building of an empire (with clearly separated territories) begin. This idea seems to connect the notion of empire with the imperial elites’ political visions for the future rather than with their perception of their state entity at the time. It neglects to take into account the

given imperial character of their politics in the eighteenth century regardless of how integrative their measures were.

In contrast, and in analogy to the study of nation-building, I would like to use contemporaneous perspectives, the language of self-description, as a yardstick for the definition of modern empires. In what terms and according to what notions did the ruling elites of the eighteenth century describe and perceive their state, the Russians and the non-Russians? Did the “Westernization” brought about by Peter and his entourage have any impact on imperial identity, and if so, what were the changes like? The focus on imperial elites results naturally from the history of empires. As Jürgen Osterhammel put it, “Empires have always been the creatures of elites.”⁸ Empire-building and empire-maintenance were provided by limited groups within the political, military and administrative apparatus in the center as well as at the periphery. In Russia, they tried to entice elites from indigenous ethnic groups to enter tsarist service by granting them all kinds of privileges.⁹ The “change of sides” was frequently achieved within a single generation. That is why the notion of “imperial elites” is here applied to all those who represented the empire and served the tsar. This could include a minister in St. Petersburg as well as a commander of the Imperial Army in Warsaw, a governor in Orenburg or a geographer sent out on expeditions to the Far East. The notion of “imperial elites” will be applied as well to those who wrote in the sciences or in public life on the Russian Empire and who shared the Russian imperial identity.

The formation of an imperial discourse

The impact of the writings of Thomas Aquinas, the Spanish discovery and conquest of the “New World,” and the experience of Europe’s thirty-year war in the seventeenth century had led to a certain set of rules in war and peace that were shared by most Western European statesmen and lawyers of international law and were based on the concepts of so-called natural law. The Muscovite state remained isolated from these experiences and influences. In seventeenth-century Russia there were no lawyers able to work with the terms of international moral philosophy and law, and, needless to say, they could not develop them any further. Iurii Gasparovich Krizhanich (1618–83), a historian and philosopher with Croatian roots, was able at least to introduce the phrase “international law” (*jus gentium* or *narodnaia pravda*) into seventeenth-century Russian vocabulary.¹⁰ However, the widespread distrust towards any foreign influences hindered the transfer of Western writings and the adoption of Western ideas. The most significant texts of early international law were not translated until the reign of Peter I, but then they were translated rapidly. Here one has to mention the fundamental work of the Dutch lawyer and statesman Hugo Grotius (“*De jure belli ac pacis libri res*,” 1625), the writings of the German lawyer and historian Samuel von Pufendorf (“*Juris naturae et gentium*,” 1672) and the introduction to diplomacy by Abraham de Wicquefort (“*The Ambassador and His Functions*”). From then on, thanks to a new tsar who was searching for acceptance of Russia’s new status by the powerful states of Europe, European notions of law entered the Russian legislative and diplomatic lexicon.¹¹

A book by Petr Shafirov (1669–1739) serves as an example of the transformation of Russian political discourse as a direct consequence of increased European influences. Shafirov had accompanied Tsar Peter as a translator on his journey to Western Europe, and because of his talents he remained in close contact with the tsar afterwards. In 1717, he was appointed vice-chancellor of the College of Foreign Affairs. In the same year, Shafirov paved the way for a completely new culture in Russian politics: he composed a historical justification to legitimize the Russian war against Sweden. Not only did he address, at length, the diplomatic history of both states, but he also demonstrated Russia's "natural" involvement with European diplomacy. He also, from the Russian point of view, elaborated on Sweden's violations of international law, thus leaving seemingly no chance for the Russians to avoid war. He suggested that Russia had fully complied with international law and had done nothing but follow the international code of behavior. In the text, requested and revised by the tsar himself, European notions of law were consciously applied, and the designation for Russia even in the sixteenth century was frequently "the Russian Empire" (*Rossiiskaia Imperiia*).¹²

As a matter of course, Shafirov counts his own country among the circle of the so-called *politichnye narody*. This new notion imported from the Polish at the beginning of the eighteenth century was significant. It not only quickly found broad acceptance among Russia's elite, but it also was a symbol in miniature for the new way of thinking. A German–Latin–Russian Dictionary published in 1731 translated *politichnyi* as "learned, civilized"; other works defined it more narrowly as "political" or "polite."¹³ The immediate context of the passage in Shafirov's text with the term *politichnyi* suggests a translation of the new notion as "well-behaved peoples" or "civilized peoples." It was clearly the author's intention to subsume the Russian Empire under those states of the international community that felt dedicated to international law. At the same time, the expression *politichnye narody* indicated indirectly the idea that there were peoples not belonging to this circle. While Shafirov did not elaborate on this thought, his introduction of an "in group" to which Russia belonged marked the beginning of a feeling of civilizational superiority that was to become so important in the eighteenth century in general.

Shafirov's work was not comparable to the publications written by Grotius or Pufendorf. Its significance stemmed from the linguistic and conceptual adoption of principles, practices, and notions of international law long ago accepted in the West. A contemporary of Shafirov translated the book into English and thereby fostered the Russian endeavor of legitimating Russian policy in the eyes of foreign observers. In the English version, the expression *politichnye narody* was translated as "civilized nations."¹⁴

Shafirov's book was among the first of many signs of great changes in semantics and discourse in Russia. A few years later the tsar won the Great Northern War against Sweden and signed the "Eternal Peace" in 1721. Given the tsar's great reputation, which was spreading throughout Europe, Russia's elite saw new chances to strengthen the country's position among the major powers. Following the requests of the Senate and the Holy Synod, the tsar agreed on October 22 to adopt – in addition to the titles "Father of the Fatherland" (*Otets otechestva*) and

“Peter the Great” (*Petr Velikii*) – the significant title of “All-Russian Emperor” (*Imperator Vserossiiskii*).¹⁵ This title was to be a signal to foreign countries. Long before, Peter and his predecessors had tried in vain to gain recognition of the tsar's title as being equal to the title of emperor in the West. Now, they gave up the former plan and introduced the notion of an *imperator* being granted in all of Europe only to the elected head of the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation.” Russia, however, for the first time ever, linked the notion to a specific country and thereby declared the country itself to be an “empire.”¹⁶

As Richard Wortman and Olga Ageeva have shown, signs and symbols of the holy ceremony conducted for the bestowal of the tsar's new titles strongly borrowed from imperial coronations in ancient Rome while at the same time not completely neglecting Byzantine traditions.¹⁷ Ranking himself as a second emperor in Europe, Peter tried to combine two strategies: he looked for recognition from the European powers while at the same time demonstrating his independence and stressing the existence of a bipolar Europe with two Christian imperial centers.

Obviously, the official imperial status came into being as a result of foreign policy ambitions. But it remains unclear what this meant for domestic politics. What did the contemporaries of Tsar Peter think their country was changing into? What did they imagine the title of emperor to mean? The speeches held on the occasion of the title's bestowal ceremony reveal that none of the aspects typically linked to the notion of “empire” today prevailed in the minds of the contemporaries: they did *not* stress Russia's great territory, and they did not hint at the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional composition of the state nor at the plurality of political organization. Instead, the speech of praise to Peter I given by Chancellor Count Golovkin showed a different understanding of the semantics of emperor. First, he praised the great services Peter had rendered to his country, whereby the *fame* and *glory* of the state had been multiplied. Second, Golovkin stressed the *strength* and *stability* of the state. Third, and most interestingly, he acknowledged that, by his deeds, Peter had led his faithful subjects “from the darkness of ignorance to the theater of glory of the whole world and thereby from non-existence to existence.” Choosing the word *politichnyi*, Golovkin continued by saying that Peter had led his subjects into “the community of civilized peoples.”¹⁸

Here, the formation of a consciousness for civilization becomes even more obvious than in Shafirov's book. Golovkin expressly presents two possibilities: either one belongs to the “darkness of ignorance,” which is close to “non-existence,” or one enters the “theater of glory of the whole world” and belongs to the “civilized peoples.” This dichotomy reveals the full dimension of the Russian elites' new way of thinking: those not belonging to the “civilized peoples” have received a description of their situation as “darkness” and “non-existence.” The language reveals a feeling of superiority adopted from the West vis-à-vis non-civilized peoples. However, since Russia herself had only recently taken its place on the new stage, it also conveys the idea that “civilized peoples” do not present a closed community, but are open to new “members.”

This idea of permeability was crucial to the tsar's vision for Russia. According to the reports from Christian Friedrich Weber, a diplomat from Hannover, Peter

believed in Leibniz's Eurocentric concept of a cultural circle where sciences and arts came into being in Greece, were transferred to Italy and then spread to all the European countries. Now, it was Russia's turn to become the center of a flourishing culture.¹⁹ Dmitrii Kantemir, a philosopher in the early eighteenth century, had addressed similar historiosophic thoughts that had been discussed in Europe for centuries. In his book on the nature of monarchy, he predicted that Russia would be the fourth monarchy (after the eastern-Persian, the southern-Macedonian and the western-Roman monarchies) to become a center of "civilized peoples." Finally, in the 1720s an unknown author explicitly linked the theory of four great monarchies to the tsar's adoption of the title of emperor. As the author wrote, "the fourth Nordic monarchy has begun: that is the Russian Empire" ("*nachalo vospriiala chetvertaia monarkhiia severnaia, to est' Rossiiskaia imperiia*").²⁰

Obviously, it was not only the international position of the country that was altered by Peter's great victory against Sweden. The adoption of the new title changed the former *tsarstvo* into an empire expressing its (desired) status of belonging to the group of "civilized peoples" and becoming a center for the world. The adjective *vserossiiskii*, used only sporadically in the century before, now became a constant pillar of official rhetoric and indicated the beginning of a new political identity. Though not consistently, in most cases its usage emphasized the emperor's rule over many peoples (in contrast to *russkii*).

Analytically, thinking in terms of civilization – though, in the Petrine era, no noun had been introduced for such thinking – has to be differentiated from the feeling of the necessity to "civilize others," to pull them out of their darkness. However, for Peter, as will be shown below, they were two sides of the same coin.

Inter-imperial religious competition and the politics of religious intolerance

The selective adoption of European standards in international law and the translation of important philosophical works served as decisive impulses for the formation of an imperial identity based on a feeling of superiority, but these were not the only impulses. Russian sources suggest that another form of global interaction, the perception of imperial competition, played a big role as well. Although already described in part by Andreas Kappeler, Hans-Heinrich Nolte, and Michael Khodarkoysky, the changes in religious policy at the turn of the eighteenth century deserve special attention here.²¹ Again, Peter's break with former political ways of thinking can be understood only by studying the religious policy towards non-Christians in the pre-Petrine era.

Since 1580, the Cossacks around Ermak had been penetrating the vast expanses of Siberia in the name of the tsar. For 200 years, they did not rename the newly discovered territories, nor did they try to destroy or transform the way of life of the indigenous peoples. The inhabitants were not called "wild," "barbarous," or "pagan." All that was expected of them was that they stay foreigners (*inozemtsy*), continuing to worship their gods, speak their languages, keep their names, and of course, pay tribute to the tsar.²²

In the Volga Region and in the steppes, things looked slightly different. But if one looks closely at the Christianization policy pursued until the end of the seventeenth century, it becomes obvious that the incorporation of Orthodox elements by the different ethnicities was mainly due to the ethnic-cultural contact with Russian Orthodox settlers.²³ To be sure, here and there the state provided support for the church's efforts to Christianize pagans and Muslims. The government gradually developed incentives for the Islamic population to convert to Christianity. And in the second half of the seventeenth century, under Tsar Fedor Alekseevich, some of these incentives transformed into threats for the first time. However, it was only under Tsar Peter and his successors – tsarinas Anna (1730–40) and Elisabeth (1741–61) – that the government not only decided to support massive conversions of non-Russians but also relied on forceful and enduring measures never before taken in the history of Russian expansion and colonization. Only a few years after Peter's famous manifesto on tolerance in 1702, referring only to Christians, the tsar ordered the Siberian metropolitan of the Russian Orthodox Church “to search for false idols of God, to burn and to chop them up, to destroy pagan temples, and to put up chapels and holy icons instead of them.”²⁴ Local people resisting these measures were to be punished by death. And it was not only announcements that were made: compulsion and bloody attempts at conversion determined the picture in Siberia.²⁵

What had happened? What had made Peter change his policy of pragmatism and compromise so dramatically? Again, Peter's endeavor to take his place on the global stage brought in Western influences that decisively determined the formation of an imperial identity. The tolerance of the Catholic courts of France, Poland–Lithuania, and Bohemia, and of the Habsburg Empire in the second half of the seventeenth century, came to an end. Tolerance and pragmatism were no longer valued as positive, not with respect to the non-Christian religions, especially Islam and Buddhism, and not even with respect to non-Catholic Christian denominations, as evidenced, for example, by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. On the contrary, the opinion became prevalent that it was the secular authorities' task to see to the “orthodoxy” of their subjects, and achieving this task enhanced their reputations.²⁶ In this way, from the late seventeenth century, the Russian government saw itself confronted with accusations by foreign travelers of not caring about the conversion of pagans and Muslims living within its state. The former pragmatic religious policy of the Muscovite state was more and more seen as a sign of the empire's backwardness. Several times, the German philosopher and scholar Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz addressed admonishing memorandums to Peter I, reminding him to lead the Russian Empire's peoples “to science and good customs.” Toward achieving this he reminded the tsar to spread piety and Christianity. When Peter launched large-scale missionary campaigns, Leibniz praised his work, saying the tsar was carrying out “one of the most useful and praiseworthy things that could be done by such a great monarch.”²⁷

At the same time, thinking in categories of inter-religious competition spread. In 1708 in London, the archdeacon D. Standley warned the “current tsar” to be tolerant with the “papists.” The Catholics would definitely abuse any tolerance;

yes, they even had already abused it.²⁸ In 1719, Ivan Pososhkov, a freethinking contemporary of Peter, demanded in a treatise that the animists in the Far East not be left to the Jesuits' Catholic mission and that missionaries be sent to the Kamchatka Peninsula: "If the Catholics find out [that pagans still live there] they will send a mission." He was one of the first Russians to strongly criticize the lax religious policy that was practiced by the Russian Government and Russian Orthodox Church. He confronted them with the rigid methods used by the Catholic European powers. For nearly 200 years, Mordvins, Cheremis, Chuvash and Votiaks were under Russian rule, and "although they don't live far but in the middle of our Russian state, at the Volga and Kama, neither the secular authorities nor the clergy have cared the least for their enlightenment." In contrast to this, Pososhkov continued to rail that the Catholics had launched missions as far as China and North America. "Looking at their efforts," he wrote, "shouldn't we be ashamed of ourselves?"²⁹

Quotations from intellectuals such as Leibniz and Pososhkov show the kind of thinking that spread. From Peter himself it is known that he felt particularly uneasy observing the Jesuit mission in China. Siberia directly bordered China, and the ties binding the animist Siberian peoples to the Russian Empire seemed to him endangered. Given the significant contribution of these tribes to income from furs, religious missions that worked through compulsion were seen as a necessary counterweight to the Jesuit mission on both sides of the Russian borderlands.³⁰ In consequence, Voguls (Mansi) and Ostyaks (Khanty) were converted to Orthodoxy partly by material incentives and partly by brutal force. In 1721, the senate and the Holy Synod sent a bishop on a mission to China. His rank and name remained confidential, in order to prevent the enemies "of our Christian belief, in particular our main enemies, the Jesuits" from putting obstructions in his way.³¹

Pososhkov's demand for statist intervention went far beyond the measures undertaken by Peter. According to Pososhkov, children of non-Russian parents were to be taken away by force and to be engaged in the service of Russians. Adults should be forbidden to use their mother tongue in order "to Russify them all: as long as their languages were not wiped out they could not be real Christians but remained half-believers."³² Pososhkov's attitude reveals that there was more at stake than religious eagerness. Religion was part of the Russian way of life to which the "correct" language belonged as well. Both were to be imparted to the ignorant in Russia, in order to lead them from their darkness into the light.

The tsar's way of thinking was not much different. It is well known that Peter I was not the closest friend of the Russian Orthodox Church. Instead, wherever possible, he tried to push back the influence of the church and successfully force the secularization of the state. Therefore, his missionary campaigns followed the same logic as expressed by Leibniz: paradoxically, secularization, understood as fostering reason in terms of science and good customs, was to be achieved by Christianization. Missionary thinking was not yet secularized: Christianization meant education, and education meant becoming Russian.

As mentioned before, the increased efforts for the conversion of non-believers were no less intensively continued under the tsarinas Anna and Elisabeth. While

Peter already shared the idea of a state intervening for the sake of education, Anna and Elisabeth broadened the community of those that had to be “civilized.” If Peter had given the order to punish by death those indigenous people who did not comply with the measures for Christianization, measures such as the burning of false idols and the destruction of pagan temples, he still thought in terms of individuals. Under Anna and above all under Elisabeth, the “wild people” (*dikie liudi*) were more and more seen as a community who could only be “civilized” through measures targeting the whole ethnic group. If one might apply Leonid Taimasov’s notion of “territorial Christianization” to the Petrine era, then the reign of Elisabeth could best be described as the “ethnologization” of the notion of civilization.³³ Conversions of non-orthodox subjects now became the task of a specially established “Agency for the Affairs of Converts.” The period of its existence – 1740–64 – encompassed the most violent attacks on non-Christians, be they Muslims or pagans.³⁴

To sum up, for more than half a century, the Russian government pursued an aggressive policy of Christianization even though it severely depleted the state budget (the tax exemptions for “Newly Converted” could not fully be compensated for by non-Christians). The new feeling of belonging to the “civilized peoples” since the Petrine reforms and the tsar’s remarkable victory against Sweden found its expression in an intolerant religious policy and in a massive, violent and unprecedented campaign of Christianization. Stimulated by competitive missionary activities worldwide, the Russian Orthodox Church’s confession received the status of a binding model for all non-Russian ethnicities in the empire’s south and east.

Yet, how legitimate is it to speak of Peter’s change in imperial policy as a fundamental break with a past where patrimonial pragmatism and compromise prevailed? At first glance, the notion of a “break” seems questionable when looking at the policy pursued in the second half of the eighteenth century. From 1755 the Russian government gradually turned away from its former aggressive methods towards Islam and the conversion of pagans. The forcible measures had led to severe uprooting, and the goal of integrating the newly subjugated people was endangered. The additional burden on “non-believers” was abolished, Archbishop Luka from Kazan who was famous for his missionary fanaticism had to move to Belgorod, and the instructions for resettlement of Tatars were significantly eased.³⁵ The enthronement of Catherine II reinforced the change in religious policy. Robert Crews convincingly showed that the new policy was not limited to a return to pragmatism towards pagans and Muslims. Moreover, the government started to use Islam and its functioning religious institutions for its own purposes. Now, the institutions were turned into pillars of the empire and the Muslims into important agents contributing significantly to the functioning of the multi-ethnic Russian autocracy.³⁶

However, Catherine II continued to attack the traditional social systems and values of those non-Russians who were perceived to stand on a lower level of civilization than “the Russians.” What had been a religion for Peter, Anna, and Elisabeth became a way of life for Catherine II: hunters and nomads had to be

transformed into sedentary peasants. Much as her predecessors did, Catherine used all kinds of incentives and threats to transform her subjects' ways of life.³⁷ Also, Catherine's shift in religious policy did not signify the introduction of religious tolerance in the Western sense. Russian law forbade Christianized people from returning to previous beliefs. When many "new converts" attempted to use Catherine's new pragmatism as an opportunity to return to Islam or paganism, the government saw itself as challenged to intervene harshly.³⁸ Religious pragmatism was not to be mistaken for acceptance of "ignorance" and "inexperience." The Russian government proved to be tolerant in cases of differences only when it was believed that the Russian core of the empire could profit from the subject's lifestyle (as, for example, was seen in the Baltic territories).³⁹

Therefore, the changes in religious policy cannot be seen as a dismantling of the newly established imperial identity. The shift to a new concept of intervening in and transforming foreign cultures within the empire was done and could not be reversed. All that changed were the fields where the new conception found its expression. The feeling of superiority that originated in the West was maintained. Obviously, the idea of intervention and transformation of foreign cultures that had prevailed since the regency of Peter I underwent a process of secularization. For Peter, belonging to the "civilized world" was necessarily connected with the conversion to (Orthodox) Christianity. From the middle of the century onwards, this was seen more and more as one of various possibilities. Yet, the secularization of missionary thought did not mean a fundamental change in the pattern of argumentation. The adjectives "wild" (*dikii*), "thoughtless" (*legkomyslennyi*), "arbitrary" (*svoevol'nyi*), and "unrestrained" (*neobuzdannoi*), which were applied to those who ought to be civilized, presented a leitmotiv throughout the eighteenth century. In contrast, for the Russian Empire, the positively connotated notions of "security" (*bezopasnost'*), "reason" (*razum*), and "freedom" (*vol'nost*) prevailed.

Civilization and a civilizing mission

When looking at the semantics used for expressing the feeling of superiority, it is striking that people mostly refer to the adjective *politichnyi*. As shown above, *politichnyi* had entered the Russian vocabulary by the beginning of the eighteenth century. The notion of civility or civilization as an upward stage of development spread only slowly. However, it was still in the Petrine era that the term *liudskost'* entered the vocabulary. At first, it was only used for describing the nobility's new social behavior as it was demanded by the tsar: politeness, modesty, human kindness. Only in the middle of the eighteenth century did the meaning of the relatively new notion broaden and form more and more into an antonym to barbarism. It seems that by then, that is the middle of the century, Russia's elite had become conscious of its need to develop a civilizing mission. Interestingly in this context, the new notion of *liudskost'* was not derived from the notion of "civilization" that was gradually being introduced in France and Great Britain at about the same time. Instead, the new word derived from the Polish *ludzkość*. This is evidence

that the Russian idea of civility, and thus of a civilizing mission, developed independently from those in the West.

An example of how the notion was used by the tsar's advisers and civil servants is given by Aleksei Tevkelev, who reached the rank of major general, and Petr Rychkov, a high-ranking civil servant. In 1759, both reported to the tsarist government on the situation of the Junior and Middle Juz (Hordes). Describing the state of the Kazakhs, they stated that "particularly among the possessors of land and among the elders, one can find people who have come to such a state of reason (*razum*) by their short-lasting contact [with the Russians] that it could be seen to them to have acquired civility (*liudskost'*) and common sense (*dovol'noe razsuzhdenie*)."⁴⁰ Even when looking at the Bashkirs, who in the beginning, did not provoke the impression that one "would be able to successfully lead them to civility and to most humble obedience" (*privedenie v liudskost' i v poddannicheskoe poslushanie*), one could gradually observe that the people achieved a state of civility (*liudskost'*).⁴¹

The emerged consciousness of civility (or civilization⁴²) seen as a stage of development for all societies was one thing, but the desire to bring it to others was another. Up to that time, the notion of a "civilizing mission" did not exist. On the contrary, "mission" as an idea did not appear until the nineteenth century.⁴³ Even then, for a long time its usage was limited to religious contexts. It was not until the mid-nineteenth century that intellectuals explicitly wrote about Russia's "civilizing mission" in Asia. In 1881, Fedor Dostoevskii wrote in his diary the often cited passage, "In Europe, we were Tatars, yet in Asia we are Europeans as well. Our mission, our civilizing mission in Asia will tempt our minds and pull us there, if only the movement has started."⁴⁴ While this conviction, including the nationalist impetus with its corresponding vocabulary of the late nineteenth century, were still far from eighteenth-century thinking, its basis was clearly laid in the century before.

Jürgen Osterhammel put forward two criteria for the definition of civilizing missions, establishing a yardstick for Russian thinking and forms of behavior also in the eighteenth century. First, according to Osterhammel, the civilizers' conviction of their own superiority has to be clearly expressed. Second, the civilizers' expectation of a certain receptivity on the side of those to be civilized has to be felt. This means the civilizers must ascribe a potential to the uncivilized that can be developed if only they entrust themselves to the benevolent tutelage of the civilizers. This is a decisive point, because in contrast to racist thinking, the belief in civilizing activities exactly presupposes the people's ability to be educable and to come to their senses.⁴⁵

Although Osterhammel, in referring to secondary literature on Russian history, assumes that Russia did not develop a civilizing mission until the first half of the nineteenth century, this chapter tries to show another perspective. With regard to Osterhammel's first condition, as has been shown above, Russia's elite had shown clear signs of feelings of superiority since the beginning of the eighteenth century. Artemii Volynskii, governor of Astrakhan from 1718 to 1725, was one of the first to spread the thinking and language of arrogance that was prepared by

Peter's change of imperial discourse and imperial policy. When addressing the people of the steppes, even in official correspondence, Volynskii used to address the Kalmyks as "my children."⁴⁶ The semantics by Tevkelev and Rychkov cited above gives evidence for the fulfillment of the second condition. When reporting on the Bashkirs in 1759 they not only stressed the "improvements" the Bashkirs had achieved through contacts with the Russians, but they also ascribed to them the ability to be led to civility (*privedenie v liudskost'*). Here, traces of the Enlightenment's universal pattern of thought as it spread in Western Europe in the late eighteenth century are clearly felt: it was believed that everybody principally had the same chances. Some were ahead, and others lagged behind. Russia's elite saw itself far ahead and felt capable of "helping" other people to catch up.

In the early 1760s, the simple dichotomy of "civilizers," on the one hand, and "wild people," on the other, gradually changed into a much more subtle view of the process of civilization. In 1763, Dmitrii Volkov, the governor of Orenburg, explained to his guest, the Kazakh Khan Nurali, that in earlier times also "in this [Russian] state" people had been migrating as nomads from one place to the other as the Kazakhs did today. Gradually, however,

wise rulers and God's providence led the Russian people into such a state that it [the people] has now acquired the luck of being in complete calmness. In other words, in the beginning, the situation of the people here was very similar to human growth. If for example a man has come into the world, then at first, he is a small child, then a young person and after that an accomplished man. Such are the Russian (*rossiiskie*) people. At first they were like little children, then like young people and in this way they climbed up the steps and in the end, they reached the stage of today, and above all, a suitable obedience helped them to achieve this.⁴⁷

Russian imperial discourse had achieved fine nuances in its picture of people's development. Now, it was expressed that everybody had to pass through different stages. In consequence, no longer were whole "civilizations" compared with each other. Instead, historically precise cultural stages of people were compared. This idea of a scale of civilization implied that those who were ahead could recognize themselves in the peoples who lagged behind. An understanding of "the great chain of human things" came into being.⁴⁸ Also, Volkov left no doubt that he believed in the Kazakhs' ability to rectify their lack of civilization. When the Kazakh Khan pitifully admitted that, given Volkov's description, his Kazakhs were in fact very similar to little children, Volkov tried to cheer him up by saying, "But of course [the Kazakh people] will be able to achieve the perfect state of humankind."⁴⁹

Volkov's remarks to the Kazakh Khan show striking similarities to arguments put forward in Western Europe. However, following the same lines of thought, there they are to be found only about two decades later.⁵⁰ Friedrich Schiller, for example, then one of Germany's most famous poets, formulated his idea of the history of human beings in 1789.

The discoveries made by our European seafarer in distant seas and on remote coasts give us a spectacle being as much instructive as entertaining. They show us ethnicities, layering around us on the most diverse stages of education, like children in different ages standing around an adult and reminding him by their example what he has been before himself and from where he came.⁵¹

Obviously, thinking on the scale of civilization became universal. But there are striking moments in Russian development whose analysis suggests the hypothesis that Russia's elite had detached their imperial discourse from its origins, that is from the need to catch up with Western civilization in order to be accepted as a full member among Europe's powerful empires. First, it is remarkable that the sources illuminating the conviction of being able to help others show no signs of an urgently felt need to compensate for the perception of being backward in regards to the West. This kind of discourse obviously only developed in the 1830s.⁵² Second, the early rise of a consciousness for the idea of civility and its possible transfer to other peoples, the evolvment of a notion of Slavic origin, and the comparatively early refinement of the theory of civilization further strengthen the thesis.⁵³

In this context, it seems worthwhile not only to look for similarities, however independently evolved, but also for differences between the understandings of civility and civilization in Russia versus in Western Europe. The assumption is obvious that these differences directly affected how the empire's civilizing missions were realized. This question deserves, of course, a much more thorough examination than is possible in the framework of this chapter. Here, I briefly sketch the concept's change in the West and its subsequent collision with Russian ideas.

An interesting point for the analysis of the Western European concept of civilization is the changed perception of Russia's efforts to become a civilized and civilizing nation itself. As described above, after Peter's reforms and military victories, Russia's elite presented the country to the Western world as a civilized nation. Undoubtedly, Peter received great attention and admiration in the West, too. His efforts to form a powerful empire, to acquire new territories, to introduce arts and trade, and to subordinate the church were highly regarded. In the first half of the eighteenth century, the impression was paramount that by civilizing his own country Peter had led Russia to the first rank of European empires.⁵⁴ After half a century, however, the attitude towards Russia became more and more critical. The most striking point was that Russia lost its image of being an empire that consisted of a civilized center and peripheries that were to be civilized. Instead, Russia in total was now perceived as an object that strongly needed civilization. The Petrine reforms were seen as a failure, and Catherine's endeavors to attract foreigners for permanent settlement in Russia were discussed in terms of how much these colonists could generate "civilizing effects" for the whole of Russia.⁵⁵

What had changed? Above all, the emphasis on rather external features determining the perception of a "civilized nation" in the beginning of the eighteenth

century had given way to a focus on the inner state of a society's affairs. Civilization meant more and more the unfolding of a society based on private property and civil freedoms. Of course, the usage and definitions of "civilization" widely varied within Western Europe itself. The moral emphasis, for example, was much more widespread among French intellectuals than in England. There, in contrast, the right to private property dominated the other aspects of a "civilized nation." Yet, in dealing with Russia, all these French and English discourses made no distinction between the newly incorporated peoples by Russia and the Russian people itself, because the Russian Empire as a whole – the conqueror as well as the newly conquered – was seen as an object that needed to be civilized by the West.

The self-understanding among Russia's imperial elite even under Catherine II could hardly have diverged more from the judgment of Russia by other countries. Based on the pride of Russia's greatness and power, the feeling of civilizational superiority towards most of the empire's ethnicities, whether in the southern steppes or in the Arctic north, was omnipresent. Until the end of the eighteenth century, the outstanding dominance of the autocratic state in the process of expansion and colonization made it unthinkable that civilization could be associated with freedom or civil rights. What did the difference in the understanding of civilization between Russia and its imperial counterparts mean for their civilizing missions?

The answer becomes more obvious when comparing the behavior of the Russian Empire with that of British expansion in India. For the Russian imperial elite of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the mission of civilizing the peripheries meant sedentariness and orthodoxy in the first place. It further implied the spreading of Russian language and culture, and thereby the overall attempt to accustom foreign peoples to the Russian way of living, including food, trade, and sexual mores.⁵⁶ This kind of civilizing mission, aiming at the full integration of the newly incorporated peoples, meant a deliberate fusion of the Russian core with the territory of the whole empire.

Given an imperial mission based on the ideology of freedom and trade, this kind of fusion could hardly be attractive. The British expansion into India in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, for example, did not result only from originally pure financial and trade interests. It was also part of the logic of the English ideology of freedom and of the dominant doctrine of free trade to believe that, at some time in the future, government was to be transferred back into the hands of the Indians. It did not mean, of course, that the British were reluctant to intervene cruelly in India's affairs. However, it meant that the British followed far more a strategy of segregation and the reinforcement of the given differences between them and the Indians. In the Russian case, the approach of integrating ethnicities that were perceived to stand on a lower level of civilization was dominant until at least the mid-nineteenth century.⁵⁷

Of course, this difference of segregation versus integration was not only a consequence of the different concepts of civilization. Of greater importance was the fact that the pre-modern nation-states of the West had more or less been consolidated before empire-building started. In contrast, Russian nation- and empire-building

occurred at the same time. However, the policy of integration was possibly the great speciality of Russia's empire-building and subsequently of its civilizing mission until the middle of the nineteenth century. It led to the fact that racist thinking as the epitome of the politics of segregation did not play the same prominent role in imperial Russia as it did in other European empires – at least not at an official level.⁵⁸

As this chapter has tried to show, the eighteenth century was the decisive formative period of Russia's imperial identity. By referring to the perspective given by eighteenth-century Russian contemporaries, we have seen that, starting with Tsar Peter, Russia's elite gradually adopted a feeling of civilizational superiority towards non-Russian subjects. Western influences of thought and inter-imperial religious competition increased the overall bias toward a policy of brutal conversion and religious intolerance for more than half a century. This policy was not limited to religion. Instead, it reflected a fundamental turn in politics aimed at intervening and transforming other peoples' cultures, which were regarded as standing on a lower level than one's own. By the middle of the eighteenth century, Russia clearly had developed a civilizing mission. However, though the new politics arose as a result of transfers from the West, Russia gradually detached its concept of civilization from its origins. The early rise of a consciousness for the idea of civility, the adoption of a Slavic notion, and finally the comparatively early refinement of discourses on civilization underline this process, a process that still awaits further study of the sources.

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Notes

- 1 Elena N. Marasinova, "Imperskaia doktrina rossiiskogo samodержavii v XVIII veke," in A. N. Sakharov et al., eds., *Sud'ba dvukh imperii. Rossiiskaia i Avstro-Vengerskaia monarkhii ot rastsвета do krusheniia* (Moscow: Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 2006), 149–175; Idem, "Gosudarstvennaia ideia v Rossii pervoi chetverti XVIII v. (K istorii formirovaniia poniatii i terminov)," in Sergei Ia. Karp and Sergei A. Mezin, eds., *Evropeiskoe prosveshchenie i tsivilizatsiia Rossii* (Moscow: Nauka, 2004), 129–149; O. G. Ageeva, "Imperskii status Rossii: k istorii politicheskogo mentaliteta russkogo obshchestva nachala XVIII veka," in A. A. Gorskii, ed., *Tsar' i tsarstvo v russkom obshchestvennom soznanii: Mirovospriatie i samosoznanie russkogo obshchestva*, vyp. 2 (Moscow: Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 1999), 112–140.
- 2 Mark Bassin, *Imperial Visions: Nationalist Imagination and Geographical Expansion in the Russian Far East, 1840–1865* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), esp. 37–48.
- 3 Andreas Kappeler, "Formirovanie Rossiiskoi imperii v XV – nachale XVIII veka: nasledstvo Rusi, Vizantii i Ordy," in Aleksei I. Miller, ed., *Rossiiskaia imperiia v sravnitel'noi perspektive: Sbornik statei* (Moscow: Novoe izdatel'stvo, 2004), 94–112; Idem, *Rußland als Vielvölkerreich. Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall* (Munich: Beck,

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- 4 Jörg Baberowski, "Auf der Suche nach Eindeutigkeit: Kolonialismus und zivilisatorische Mission im Zarenreich und in der Sowjetunion," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 47 (1999): 482–504; Jürgen Osterhammel, "'The Great Work of Uplifting Mankind': Zivilisierungsmission und Moderne," in Boris Barth and Jürgen Osterhammel, eds., *Zivilisierungsmissionen. Imperiale Weltverbesserung seit dem 18. Jahrhundert* (Konstanz: UVK-Verlags-Gesellschaft, 2005), 363–426, esp. 392–396.
 - 5 *Herrschaftskolonien* are distinguished from "colonies of settlement" (*Siedlungskolonien*). The term "colony of settlement" suggests that representatives of the titular nation have settled in newly incorporated territories and disregarded the rights and interests of indigenous populations in such settlement and in their way of life. In the case of *Herrschaftskolonien*, no settlement by representatives of the titular nation takes place, but the territory serves either as a strategic safeguard of imperial policy or for economic exploitation. See Jürgen Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus* (Munich: Geschichte-Formen-Folgen, 1995), 17–18.
 - 6 Aleksandr Filiushkin, "Problema genezisa Rossiiskoi imperii," in I. Gerasimov et al., eds., *Novaia imperskaia istoriia postsovetskogo prostranstva* (Kazan: Tsentri issledovaniia natsionalizma i imperii, 2004), 375–408.
 - 7 John LeDonne, "Building an Infrastructure of Empire in Russia's Eastern Theater 1650s–1840s," in *Cahiers du Monde russe* 47, no. 3 (2006): 581–608.
 - 8 Osterhammel, "The Great Work," 370.
 - 9 See the fundamental work by Kappeler, *Rußland als Vielvölkerreich*.
 - 10 On the notion of international law, see W. E. Butler, "Introduction," in P. P. Shafirov, *A Discourse Concerning the Just Causes of the War between Sweden and Russia: 1700–1721* (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publication, 1973).
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 - 14 Shafirov, *A Discourse Concerning*.
 - 15 For the full title of Peter I since 1721, see PSZ (*Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii*), sobr. I, no. 3850 (vol. 6, p. 453).
 - 16 Isabel de Madariaga, "Tsar into Emperor: The Title of Peter the Great," in Robert Oresko, G. C. Gibbs, and Hamish M. Scott, eds., *Royal and Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe: Essays in Memory of Ragnhild Hatton* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 351–381.
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- 22 Yuri Slezkine, "The Sovereign's Foreigners: Classifying the Native Peoples in Seventeenth-Century Siberia," *Russian History* 19 (1992): 475–486.
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- 28 D. Standley, *Treuhertzige Warnung an die Muscowitische Kirche, für den Nachstellungen der römischen Kirche sich zu hüten* (Berlin: Blatt A, Rückseite, 1708). Cited in Nolte, "Verständnis und Bedeutung," 494.
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- 32 Pososhkov, "Zaveshchanie otecheskoe," 322, 326.
- 33 Taimasov, "From 'Kazan's Newly Converted'," 116.
- 34 See, for details, Khodarkovsky, "The Conversion of Non-Christians," 132–134.
- 35 Kappeler, "Rußlands erste Nationalitäten," 284.
- 36 Robert Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russian and Central Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
- 37 PSZ, no. 15991 (vol. 22, pp. 142–144); no. 16292 (vol. 22, pp. 494–495); no. 16400 (vol. 22, p. 604). See also Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, and Slezkine, *Arctic Mirrors*.

- 38 Taimasov, "From 'Kazan's Newly Converted'," 126.
- 39 Kappeler, *Rußland als Vielvölkerreich*.
- 40 *Kazakhsko-russkie otnosheniia v XVI–XVIII vekakh: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov* (Alma-Ata: Izd-vo AN KazSSR, 1961), 571–591 (no. 225, 22.1.1759).
- 41 *Ibid.*, 575.
- 42 Here, the two terms can be used interchangeably as long as "civilization" is not connected to a whole set of Western values such as private property, civil rights, and urbanity. It is still necessary to elaborate in detail what the Russians themselves understood by "*liudskost'*." In any case, it clearly was connected to having the right faith, to proper behavior, and to education. Also, it will be an interesting task to examine how far "*liudskost'*" presented a predecessor to "*grazhdanstvennost'*," which did not develop until the nineteenth century. See Dov Yaroshevski, "Empire and Citizenship," in Brower and Lazzerini, *Russia's Orient*, 58–79.
- 43 Khodarkovsky, *Russia's Steppe Frontier*, 188–189.
- 44 Fedor M. Dostoevskii, "Dnevnik pisatel'ia za 1881 god," in *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 27 (Leningrad: Nauka, 1984), 33. Here cited according to the German edition: Fedor M. Dostoevskij, "Tagebuch eines Schriftstellers 1881. Fragen und Antworten," Übertragung und Nachwort von E.K. Rahsin, in Fedor M. Dostoevskij *Sämtliche Werke in zehn Bänden*, vol. 5 (Munich: Piper, 1977), 589–596, 591.
- 45 Osterhammel, "The Great Work," 365. Racism or racist thinking is understood here in a narrow sense, i.e. in the sense that one denies other people's ability to change because of the belief in racial determinism.
- 46 Khodarkovsky, *Where Two Worlds Met*, 177.
- 47 *Kazakhsko-russkie otnosheniia*, 652–659 (no. 256, 9.10.–7.11.1763), here 653–654.
- 48 The expression stems from Hugh Murray (1808). Cited by Jürgen Osterhammel, *Die Entzauberung Asiens: Europa und die asiatischen Reiche im 18. Jahrhundert* (Munich: Beck, 1998), 397.
- 49 *Kazakhsko-russkie otnosheniia*, 654 (no. 256).
- 50 See Osterhammel's sketch of Western discourses on the scale of civilization in Osterhammel, *Die Entzauberung Asiens*, 396–398.
- 51 Friedrich Schiller, "Was heißt und zu welchem Ende studiert man Universalgeschichte?" in Friedrich Schiller, *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 4, *Historische Schriften* (Munich: Hanser, 1966), 754.
- 52 Bassin, *Imperial Visions*, 45–47.
- 53 The quite common use of the notion of *liudskost'* since the late 1750s stands in contrast to the slow spreading of its Western corresponding term "civilization." See Joachim Moras, *Ursprung und Entwicklung des Begriffs der Zivilisation in Frankreich, 1756–1830* (Hamburg: Seminar für romanische Sprachen und Kultur, 1930); Lucien Febvre, "Zur Entwicklung des Wortes und der Vorstellungen von 'Civilization'," in Ulrich Raulff, ed., *Das Gewissen des Historikers* (Paris, 1953) (German edition Berlin: Wagenbach, 1988, pp. 39–76); Pierre Michel, "Barbarie, Civilization, Vandalisme" (trans. Anette Höfer), in Rolf Reichardt and Ekehard Schmitt, eds., *Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680–1820*, vol. 8 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1988), 2–49; Jörg Fisch, "Zivilisation, Kultur," in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhard Koselleck, *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, vol. 7 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992), 679–774.
- 54 S. A. Mezin, *Vzgliad iz Evropy: Frantsuzskie avtory XVIII v. o Petre I* (Saratov: Izd-vo Saratovskogo universiteta, 2003); Anthony G. Cross, *Peter the Great through British Eyes: Perceptions and Representations of the Tzar since 1698* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); L. Kopelew, ed., *Russen und Rußland aus deutscher Sicht: Die Zeit der Aufklärung (West-östliche Spiegelungen)* (Munich: Fink, 1987); N. V. Riasanovsky, *The Image of Peter the Great in Russian History and Thought* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); et al.

- 55 S. A. Mezin, "Petr I kak tsivilizator Rossii: dva vzgliada," in S. Ia. Karp and S. A. Mezin, eds., *Evropeiskoe Prosveshchenie i tsivilizatsiia Rossii* (Moscow: Nauka, 2004), 5–15; Dzhaneluidzhi Godzhi [D. Goggi], "Kolonizatsiia i tsivilizatsiia: russkaia model' glazami Didro," *ibid.*, 212–237; Zhorzh Diulak [George Dulak], "Ribeiro Sanches o politike kolonizatsii i koloniiakh v Rossii (1765–1766)," *ibid.*, 264–280.
- 56 For a brilliant analysis of how the Russians perceived the differences between the indigenous peoples and themselves, see Yuri Slezkine, "Naturalists versus Nations: Eighteenth-Century Russian Scholars Confront Ethnic Diversity," in Brower and Lazzarini, *Russia's Orient*, 27–57.
- 57 Peter J. Marshall, *The Great Map of Mankind: British Perceptions of the World in the Age of Enlightenment* (London: Dent, 1982); Peter J. Marshall, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. 2 (The Eighteenth Century), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Andrew Porter, ed., *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. 3 (The Nineteenth Century) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
- 58 In contrast, racist thinking in Spain had developed already in early modern times and strongly determined imperial politics in expansion to America. See the recent study on Spain: Max Sebastián Hering Torres, *Rassismus in der Vormoderne. Die "Reinheit" des Blutes im Spanien in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 2006). In British India, too, imperial policy based on racist assumptions became more and more dominant over the course of the nineteenth century. Porter, *The Oxford History*, vol. 3.

2 Tatarskaia Kargala in Russia's Eastern policies

HAMAMOTO Mami

From the mid-eighteenth century, Tatar merchants were immensely successful in trade between Russia and Central Asia, and contributed a massive amount of wealth to mosques and educational facilities for Muslims in Russia. It was such religious and cultural activities that laid the groundwork for Jadidism, which significantly influenced Central Eurasia from the end of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century. In this way, Tatar merchants undoubtedly played an important role in modern Central Eurasian history.

A group of Tatar merchants that emigrated in 1745 from Kazan province to Tatarskaia Kargala, or Qarghali (*Qārghālī*),¹ a suburb of Orenburg, were trailblazers among these Tatar merchants, and established strong commercial relations between Russia and Central Asia.

Tatar merchants emigrated to Qarghali on conditions that included religious freedom and exemption from the poll tax and conscription, all of which were guaranteed by the Russian government. Aidar Khabutdinov states, “The model of cooperation between Tatar society and the Russian state was for the first time built on the example of Qarghali.”² Such an example of cooperation between the upper stratum of Tatar society and the Russian state can also be found in pre-eighteenth-century history;³ thus, Khabutdinov's statement seems to somewhat exaggerate the importance of Qarghali. However, we can at least say that the foundation of Qarghali was an epochal event in the relationship between Tatar society and the Russian state, given that their new relationship was established on the basis of commerce.

Qarghali was outstanding enough for its commerce, but it was also important in the education of Russian Muslims, as it had many Islamic educational facilities.

Because Qarghali was a town of such significance, many articles and books concerning Russian Muslims have mentioned the name, but little serious historical research has been undertaken on the town. After Rida' al-Din b. Fakhr al-Din published the book *Sa'īd* (Kazan, 1897),⁴ which describes in Turki the history of mosques in the town, perhaps the first work to specifically address Qarghali as a historical topic was the article by Gul'sum Mikhaleva written in 1980.⁵ In English, Grigorii Kosach published a long article concerning the Tatars of Orenburg in 1998, of which a significant amount is dedicated to an analysis of the role of Tatars in Qarghali.⁶ Recently, however, research on Qarghali has been advancing. Denis

Denisov has been publishing articles concerning the history of Qarghali, utilizing many archival documents.⁷ In 2005, Rashit and Anvar Iskandarov published a book concerning the complete history of Qarghali,⁸ and also in 2005 a collection of papers was published as a result of a conference held to commemorate the 260th anniversary of Qarghali.⁹ The book consists of papers that deal with many different topics relevant to Qarghali. Consequently, a historical profile of Qarghali is emerging.

The aim of this chapter is to shed light on how Qarghali was established, a process that highlights the changes in Russia's Eastern policies in the middle of the eighteenth century, by focusing on the town as a commercial and educational center, and to consider the place of Qarghali in the context of these policies.

Establishment and development of Qarghali

As was clearly asserted in 1734 by Ivan Kirillov, chief of the Orenburg expedition, one aim in the construction of Orenburg was to boost trade between Russia and Central Asia, including with the Kazakhs. The government hoped that Orenburg would become a center for commerce between Russians and Kazakhs, and draw Russian merchants from middle Russia, Povolzhie (the Volga region), and Siberia, as well as others from Tashkent, Bukhara, and Eastern Turkestan, while also opening Russian trade with India and China. Thus the government, at the outset, tried to attract immigrants to Orenburg by promising various privileges. For immigrants who traded commercially, the government granted them exemption from the poll tax and customs duties.¹⁰ And "European foreigners and people from Asian nations" were permitted unrestricted movement between their motherlands and Orenburg, religious liberty, and the right to have their own clergy.¹¹

However, at the initial stage of Orenburg's foundation it was not easy to attract merchants to Orenburg from inner Russia. Vasilii Urusov, head of the Orenburg Commission, proposed to the government in 1740 that immigration of merchants from inner Russia to Orenburg should actually be made compulsory, in order to increase the number of merchants in the town.¹² Also, in a Senate decree issued in 1744, it is noted that, "applicants for immigration to date are very few because of Orenburg's newness and distance," despite the various privileges available to the immigrants.¹³

It was under such circumstances that a man from Kazan province proposed that he migrate to a suburb of Orenburg; he proposed this to Ivan Nepliev, chief of the Orenburg Commission and from 1744 the first governor of Orenburg province. The man was Sa'id Khayalin (1695–1763/64), from the village of Mametova pustosh' in Kazan district.¹⁴

The relationship between Khayalin and the officials in Orenburg began no later than autumn 1735, when he visited several Bashkir villages and, at the request of Aleksandr Rumiantsev, tried to dissuade the Bashkir people from rioting. Khayalin carried out this mission faithfully, while Rumiantsev commanded the army in suppressing large-scale rioting.¹⁵ Thus Khayalin apparently had been on the side of the Russian government even before he applied to emigrate to Orenburg.

Khayalin's intention to emigrate to Orenburg was noted in a report written by Nepliuev on 25 February 1744 for the Senate,¹⁶ and the decree of the Senate on 8 March in the same year allowed up to 200 wealthy Kazan Tatar merchant households to emigrate to a suburb of Orenburg. The decree also decided that immigrants would be exempted from conscription, and that they could build a mosque outside of the town.¹⁷ Soon afterwards, Nepliuev tried to make the decree known to Tatar merchants in Kazan province and in the fortress of Orsk.¹⁸

Khayalin came to Orenburg in September 1744, and he found a place to settle, perhaps by himself,¹⁹ 18 km north of the town, where the upper Kargarka river joins the Sakmara river. Nepliuev and other officials also inspected the place, and they decided on 19 September 1744 that broad areas on both sides of the Sakmara river would be given to immigrants as arable land and land whose usufructuary rights (*ugod'e*) they would be entitled to.²⁰

On 20 November 1744 a report that included Khayalin's petition was submitted by Nepliuev to the Senate.²¹ The report included six additional articles of conditions for immigration besides the above-mentioned exemption from conscription and the construction of a mosque. Some were only confirmations of the privileges for immigrants to Orenburg. These conditions were basically accepted by a decree issued by Empress Elizabeth on 8 August 1745, but with several restrictions. The essentials of the six articles by Khayalin and the restrictions by the government were as follows:

- 1 Article 1. According to Khayalin, it was difficult to collect 200 wealthy applicants for immigration; thus, he asserted that less wealthy people, that is, those who could at least engage in trade, and their clerks, should be included as immigrants.

The decree acceded to this request, with the condition that Khayalin would submit a list of applicants to the Orenburg local government with information on each applicant's assets and with their signatures.

- 2 Article 2. Khayalin claimed that immigrants would be allowed to have land with usufructuary rights (*ugod'e*), including rights to meadows, woods, water-wheels, and fishing around the domicile, and arable land along the Sakmara river. And he stated that the immigrants themselves would be obliged to build up defenses for the settlement.

The decree acceded to this request, after detailing the area of land put aside for the immigrants and the extent of their rights on the land, with the condition that they made clear the borders of their lands in order to avoid conflicts with Cossacks residing around this area. As for defense of the settlement, it said:

As for the settlement, immigrants are allowed to build one wooden mosque outside of the citadel and the village. It shall be built by them. Tatars shall have the obligation of reinforcing the mosque for their security, in order to make the mosque useful for precaution in the case of sudden danger.

- 3 Article 3. Khayalin insisted on the right of immigrants to build factories, such as leather plants, and to be exempted not only from conscription but from all civilian duties.

The decree acceded to these rights without restriction.

- 4 Article 4. Khayalin required that applicants for immigration be given two years to prepare, during which period they would be exempt from any tax, especially the poll tax, and would be excluded from the jurisdiction of Kazan province, and be put under the jurisdiction of Orenburg province soon after they applied to emigrate.

The decree agreed to give immigrants two years to prepare for immigration with the condition that immigrants should establish within that time not only houses but also all other facilities needed for living. Concerning the jurisdiction and the poll tax, after Khayalin submitted the list of who was going to emigrate and from where, immigrants were to be excluded from the imposition of a poll tax in Kazan based on the new census. But while the present census was valid, they had to pay poll tax in Kazan province before they emigrated.

- Article 5. Khayalin stated that immigrants should be allowed to hire people from Tashkent, Bukhara, and Khiva, and employ Kalmyks, Qaraqalpaqs, and Bashkirs²² as workers and artisans, and allow them to reside in immigrants' houses.

The decree allowed settlers to hire various people other than Russians. Regarding Russian servants, settlers would have to obey orders from the government.

- Article 6. Khayalin claimed that *abyzs*²³ and *akhunds*²⁴ should judge private problems between Tatars.

The decree stated that the Russian government had not forbidden disputes from being resolved in courts of arbitration (*treteiskii sud*), not only for Tatars but for anyone. Anyone who did not want to use the arbitration courts could sue in the "real court (*nastoiashchii sud*)."²⁵

From these restrictions that were placed on Khayalin's six conditions by the government, we can recognize the latter's intention to encourage immigration as much as possible without relinquishing control over the immigrants.

Article 1 shows that Qarghali was planned specifically as a commercial town. This article also indicates that in order to achieve the aim of recruiting 200 immigrant households, the government compromised over the minimum capital each immigrant was required to have. On the other hand, the government considered 200 families to be enough to form the core of a new commercial town, and when it appeared in 1767 that more than 200 families were registered among the privileged families in Qarghali, the government tried to revoke those privileges for the additional families.²⁶

As for Article 2, it should be noted that the decree refers to permission to build a mosque with respect to the security of the settlement. With this, the Russian government was granting a major concession to the immigrants, in light of the situation in the 1740s in Povolzhie, where the policy of ardent Christianization was proceeding and many mosques were being destroyed. When we consider the background, it is not surprising that the government decree did not permit a mosque to be built inside the settlement and did not describe a mosque as a place for religious assembly, but did underline the function of a mosque as securing the safety of the settlement, as though it were a watchtower.

According to Article 5, the government did not clearly ban the hiring of Russians, but, in fact, Muslims in Qarghali were forbidden to hire people of the Orthodox religions, such as Russians, Baptized Cheremis, and Votyaks. Residents of Qarghali petitioned to abolish the ban in 1767, promising to allow any hired Orthodox people to observe fasts and go to church if they were permitted to employ them.²⁷

Apart from these six articles, it is remarkable that a salary (*oklad*) of 40 altin was also promised to immigrants in Qarghali.²⁸ The government even gave financial support to the immigrants. In addition to that, the government provided a convoy for Khayalin when he solicited applicants in Kazan province for immigration to Orenburg and when he moved to Qarghali.²⁹ We can see from these that the migration was, in fact, a national undertaking.

In 1747 there were 173 households and 996 males in Qarghali. Of all the immigrants, 73.6 percent were from Kazan district and, of these, 48.9 percent were specifically from Arskaia *doroga* (an administrative area whose name derives from the Mongolian word *daruga*), where Khayalin himself came from. From these figures, as Denisov has pointed out, it is certain that emigration to Qarghali was realized on the basis of Khayalin's personal network in his homeland.³⁰

After 1747 the population of Qarghali sharply increased. By 1760, 300 households and 1,158 males were found in Qarghali and, at that time, the merchants of Qarghali accounted for more than half of all the Tatar merchants in Orenburg province.³¹ In 1792 there were 686 peasants, 168 townspeople, and 1,820 merchants in the town.³² And by the end of the nineteenth century, 11,000 residents were living in the town.³³ As the number of residents grew, Qarghali was upgraded from a village (*sloboda*) to a town (*posad*) on 7 November 1784, and a town council (*tatarskaia ratusha*) was established; this was only two years after the *tatarskaia ratusha* of Kazan was formed in 1782.³⁴

Through the overview of the establishment of Qarghali, it has become clear that Qarghali was founded as a result of Khayalin's extraordinary endeavors and the strong support for him by Nepliev, who had considerable political power. Such a cooperative or complementary relationship between the Russian government and Tatar merchants can also be seen continually in the development of Russo-Central Asian trade, one of whose centers was Qarghali.

Orenburg and Qarghali as a center of trade with Central Asia

The center of Russian Eastern trade until the mid-eighteenth century was Astrakhan, although there were also trade routes connecting Russia and Central Asia through Tobol'sk.³⁵ Astrakhan thus had several communities of foreigners. While the main foreign communities in Astrakhan were Armenians and Indians, the Bukharan community also had a substantial number of residents. For example, 469 males were living in the Bukharan community at the end of the 1740s, 25–30 percent of whom were merchants.³⁶ Foreign merchants in Astrakhan were granted various commercial privileges as well as religious liberty. Besides foreign communities, there were two Tatar communities there (Kazan Tatars and Iurtovskii Tatars, that is, a group of Astrakhan Tatars).³⁷

Russo-Central Asian trade at Astrakhan through the Caspian Sea was flagging in the 1740s because of the unstable political situation between Iran and Central Asia.³⁸ Moreover, the chaos after the death of Nadir Shah in 1747 caused grave damage to Russo-Iranian trade, the center of which was Astrakhan. This, we might assume, helped the development of Orenburg as a commercial city and as a center of Russo-Central Asian trade at its early stage.

Orenburg had been developing remarkably since its foundation. The number of domiciles (837 in 1747) rose to as many as 2,866 in 1760.³⁹ The annual trade was 28,009 rubles in 1738, 900,000 rubles in 1740, and 1,700,000 rubles in 1751.⁴⁰

The Eastern trade in Orenburg can be divided roughly into trade with Kazakhs and that with Bukhara, Khiva, and Tashkent. Tatar merchants played a significant role in both types of trade, because of the similarities of language and a common faith with Kazakhs and the people of the Central Asian khanates. According to Natal'ia Apollova, "it was Tatars from Qarghali and Kazan that played an important part in commerce in Orenburg."⁴¹ The commercial activities of Tatars were protected by the government: ordinary Russian merchants were prohibited from conducting commerce with merchants from Central Asia, except for registered Russian merchants with large capital, that is, members of the first guild.⁴²

Russian merchants utilized Tatars as agents in their trade with Kazakhs because Tatars spoke a Turkic language and were used to speaking with Kazakhs.⁴³ Of the merchants who were trading with Kazakhs in 1767, Tatars from Qarghali accounted for the highest number: 38 out of the 109 merchants.⁴⁴

On the other hand, Central Asian merchants who came to Orenburg often hired Tatars as agents in the Russo-Central Asian trade, too. Central Asian merchants, for whom the many above-mentioned privileges were proposed by the Russian government, began to come to Orenburg soon after the city was founded. In 1735, aware of the plan to build Orenburg, merchants from Tashkent went to Ufa, and proposed to Kirillov, head of the Orenburg Expedition, that they should visit Orenburg every year, and that Russian merchants should visit Tashkent.⁴⁵

The first governor of Orenburg, Nepliuev, actively attracted Central Asian merchants to Orenburg. He stated in his autography, "I invited Kazakhs, people from Khiva, Tashkent, Kashgar and Bukhara, and Turkmens for commerce, and sent

letters abroad, guaranteeing the profits.” His letters were sent to Central Asia by Tatars from Qarghali.⁴⁶

Nepliev’s efforts proved to be worthwhile. As early as 1745, just after immigration to Qarghali began, there were at least two Bukharans in Qarghali. In 1750 six Bukharans who had married Tatar women lived in the town.⁴⁷ The number of people from the East in the town increased to 130 in 1825.⁴⁸ As for Orenburg, 60 merchants from Bukhara, 14 from Tashkent, and 13 from Khiva came to the city in July 1756.⁴⁹

Archival records from 1808 indicate the presence of 29 merchant families in the city of Orenburg and 25 families in Qarghali who came from Central Asia, most of whom were Bukharans. It is noteworthy that while there was only one household with a Tatar wife among 29 households in the city of Orenburg, there were 20 households with Tatar wives out of 25 households in Qarghali. The average length of stay in Russia for Central Asian families in Qarghali was much longer than that for Central Asian families in the city of Orenburg.⁵⁰

A decree promulgated in Qarghali in 1750 mandated that people from Asia could marry citizens of Russia only after they swore to remain indefinitely in the Russian Empire, after which they were given government permission to marry. Once they received permission, they and their wives and children were forbidden to go back to their motherlands without special permission. Instead, they were granted the privileges given to the 200 families that had immigrated to Qarghali in 1745; moreover, these privileges were heritable.⁵¹ Thus, it appears that Qarghali was a residential place for merchants from Central Asia who spent long periods of time in Russia.

The commercial activities of Central Asian merchants were in part regulated by the Russian government. As of 1 December 1755, such merchants in Orenburg were prohibited from visiting various towns and cities in Russia, except for Moscow and St. Petersburg where they could buy and sell precious metals and stones.⁵² Tatar merchants’ importance as agents for Central Asian merchants increased after this decree. Central Asian merchants in Qarghali avoided paying customs duties by using Tatars from Qarghali as agents in various places in Russia. In order that customs duties could be collected properly, Orenburg officials required that Central Asian merchants be excluded from residing in Qarghali.⁵³

The objective of the 1 December 1755 decree was to protect the profits of Russian merchants. Moreover, Russian delegates proposed in Catherine II’s legislative commission in 1767 that all peasants, especially non-Orthodox people, be banned from trading, because Tatar merchants were hampering the commercial activities of Russian merchants.⁵⁴ In the discussion of this problem, Tatar merchants in Qarghali were cited as an example of non-Orthodox merchants.⁵⁵ Russian merchants also tried to confine Tatar merchants in Qarghali to the status of Russian merchants in order to restrict their commercial activities. But the government rejected the petition from the Russian merchants in 1769.⁵⁶

The discontent among Russian merchants with the activities of Tatar merchants cited here shows that the business of the Tatar merchants around Orenburg was so successful that it threatened Russian merchants in the 1760s. The government

enacted decrees to protect the profits of Russian merchants out of regard for their discontent, but it did not grant all of their wishes, and it left in place the advantages that had been granted to the Tatar merchants. It would be safe to say that the Russian government's policy of utilizing Tatar merchants as mediators between Russia and Central Asia was not overturned by pressure from the Russian merchants.

Besides inviting Central Asian merchants, Nepliev began to send Russian trade caravans from Orenburg to the Central Asian khanates. At first, 'Abd Allah Khayalin, a son of Sa'id Khayalin, sent a small caravan with merchandise valued at 3,000 rubles to Khiva and Bukhara in 1749. The caravan returned to Orenburg with more than 7 pud (115 kg) of silver. In 1750, 'Abd Allah Khayalin again sent a caravan with merchandise valued at 5,000 rubles to Central Asia. The Orenburg regional government ordered the caravan to go, if possible, beyond Bukhara to Balkh, Badakhshan, and Kabul. A member of the caravan returned to Orenburg in 1751, and he informed Aleksei Tevkelev, the right-hand man of Nepliev, that Nadir Saferov, a member of the caravan of 1750, and Ya'qub, a member of the caravan of 1749 and an assistant manager of 'Abd Allah Khayalin, were going to leave Bukhara for Balkh and Badakhshan. After that, the Orenburg regional government obtained information that the caravan of Nadir and Ya'qub had reached India and then departed for Mecca.⁵⁷

There is an interesting document, *Siyāhat nāma* and written in Turki by Isma'il Begmuhammad, concerning this caravan. According to the document, the caravan consisted of five members: Mullah Nadir, Mullah Nadir's servant, Mullah Ya'qub, Isma'il (the author), and 'Abd al-Rahman. They departed from Qarghali for Bukhara in 1751 on orders from Sa'id aga, the head of Qarghali (i.e., Sa'id Khayalin). Isma'il Begmuhammad depicts his journey to Bukhara and then to India, Mecca, and Istanbul, and he mentions the deaths of each of his companions on the way. After staying in Istanbul for about 25 years, he returns to Russia and writes an account of his long journey.⁵⁸

Recently, Michael Kemper has published an article on *Siyāhat nāma*. After comparison of this material with various other documents, he has suggested that the descriptions of *Siyāhat nāma* were not records of his journey, but, on the basis of various sources, counterfeit.⁵⁹ At the very least, however, the information on three members of the caravan in *Siyāhat nāma*, including that on the author Isma'il Begmuhammad, corresponds with census information on Qarghali in the eighteenth century. According to the 1747 census records for Qarghali, Isma'il Begmuhammad (Ismail Bikmukhamedov) was 17 years old, and his father Bekmet Nurkin (or Kurkin) was 42 years old.⁶⁰ The census records for 1762–64 report that Isma'il Begmuhammad was “sent to Bukhara and other places according to a passport given to him by the Orenburg regional government [*gubernskaia kantse-liariia*] for trade in 1750, but until now he hasn't come back from there.”⁶¹

The two other members of the caravan whose information was included in the census records are Nadir and Ya'qub. Nadir was 35 years old in 1747. He was sent to Bukhara and other cities in 1750 on a passport from the Orenburg regional government, and he died before returning to Orenburg.⁶² Ya'qub was 29 years old

in 1747. He was sent to Bukhara and other cities in 1749 (?) on orders given to him by the Orenburg regional government, and he also died before returning to Orenburg.⁶³ As for ‘Abd al-Rahman, we cannot identify him in the census records of Qarghali for 1747, nor for 1762–64. One reason for this is, presumably, the incompleteness of the census records. The census records of Qarghali for 1747 include several lists that are illegibly blurred, and the census records for 1762–64 have information on only about 154 families in Qarghali.

Thus, it is certain that at least the author and two of his companions in *Siyāhat nāma* were not imaginary but were real human beings, although it is possible that *Siyāhat nāma* by Isma‘il Begmuhammad includes, as Kemper has shown, fictional information of the journey. They were inhabitants of Qarghali, and they did go to Bukhara and then to other cities. It is noteworthy that for the years 1762–64, government officials had information on the deaths of Nadir and Ya‘qub outside of Russia (information that corresponds to that of *Siyāhat nāma*), and concerning Isma‘il Begmuhammad the census records only state that “so far, he has not come back from there.” These cases show that the Orenburg regional government carefully tracked the activities of Tatar merchants in the East and enthusiastically collected information on them.

After the departure of the caravan of Isma‘il Begmuhammad, Nepliev sent the Russian merchant Danil Rukavkin to Khiva with merchandise valued at 20,000 rubles in 1753. His caravan was prohibited from trading in Khiva and their commodities were even confiscated by the khan, but he returned to Orenburg safely.⁶⁴ Furthermore, archives indicate that Tatars from Kazan asked permission to go to the Central Asian khanates in 1752 and 1753, and, in the same period, a Tatar who had gone to Bukhara from Astrakhan came to Orenburg from Bukhara.⁶⁵ It is reasonable to conclude from these examples that caravans originating in Russia were travelling back and forth between Orenburg and the Central Asian khanates from the 1750s.

Many Tatar merchants were included in caravans originating in Russia and heading for the Central Asian khanates, because they were Sunni Muslims, as were the people of the Central Asian khanates, and they could trade without paying the customs duties required of Russian merchants.⁶⁶ Still, Russian merchants had more favorable trade conditions with the Central Asian khanates than with Xinjiang until the mid-nineteenth century, where strict trade regulations implemented by the Qing Dynasty were in force, as described in Noda’s article in this book. However, preferential customs treatment for Muslims in the Central Asian khanates had almost the same meaning for Russian merchants as the trade regulations had in Xinjiang. Thus Russian merchants tended to hire Muslims, especially Tatars, as agents (*prikazchik*) to trade in Central Asia,⁶⁷ just as the Russian merchants did in Xinjiang.

The Tatars’ Russo-Central Asian trade developed so much that, by the end of the eighteenth century, they had built many bases in Central Asia and on the Kazakh Steppe,⁶⁸ and it was reported in the nineteenth century that “Tatar merchants go to Bukhara and Kokand much more often than well-known genuine Russian merchants.”⁶⁹

In this way, trade between Russia and Central Asia in Orenburg progressed with the increase of trade by caravans both from Russia and Central Asia. Custom duties collected from Russo-Central Asian trade increased fivefold from 1745 to 1774.⁷⁰

Concerning Qarghali, only merchants with large capital in the town could participate in Russo-Central Asian trade, and most of the residents usually traded in the South Ural region or in other Russian cities, and every summer they bought from and sold to Kazakhs and other ethnic groups in the barter trade centers in Orenburg and Troitsk.⁷¹ Even so, the merchants from Qarghali were “considerable capitalists” (*nemalo kapital'nye*), as Aleksei Tevkelev asserted.⁷² In 1799, of the 248 owners of shops in the summer trade center in Orenburg who had Russian citizenship, there were 100 Tatar merchants from Qarghali.⁷³

The Tatar merchants of Qarghali accumulated a considerable fortune through this long-distance and daily domestic trade, as is clearly seen from the fact that they built factories in the town with their money.⁷⁴ Some of their profits from trading were spent on Islamic religious and educational facilities,⁷⁵ as we will see in the next section.

Qarghali as a religious and educational center

As was stated in the first section of this chapter, strict Christianization policies were being established in Povolzhie in the mid-eighteenth century, especially in the 1740s. In 1731 a special organization to baptise non-Orthodox people was established in Sviiazhsk, and it was funded with a large sum of money. This organization was named the “Department of New Converts’ Affairs (*Kontora Novokreshchenykh del*)” in 1734.⁷⁶

These Christianization policies were strengthened in the 1740s. A decree issued on 11 September 1740 promised that all those who accepted the Orthodox religion would receive 0.5–1 rubles and be exempt from taxes for three years as a reward, while non-Orthodox people had to pay an extra tax to cover the tax exemption for new Christians.⁷⁷ On 19 November 1742, the government ordered the destruction of mosques in Kazan province. Consequently, 418 mosques out of the 536 in Kazan district, 98 out of the 133 in the Tobol'sk and Tara districts of Siber province, and 29 out of the 40 in Astrakhan province were destroyed.⁷⁸ The government also ordered Orthodox military priests to Christianize non-Orthodox people in the Russian army on 6 April of the same year.⁷⁹

These were the circumstances surrounding the construction of the first mosque at Qarghali in 1746, soon after Sa'īd Khayalin emigrated there.⁸⁰ Petr Rychkov, a prominent scholar and a specialist on the region at the time, described the mosque as being “large and excellent, and placed on a stone base. They say there is no mosque to equal it in Kazan province now.”⁸¹ It seems that Khayalin's offspring looked after the mosque until the beginning of the twentieth century.⁸² A madrasa was established next to the mosque in the 1740s.⁸³

However, Rychkov misdated the settlement of Qarghali, suggesting that it occurred in 1755, and based on this date, Vasiliĭ Bartol'd assumed that the reason

the Russian government approved the construction of the mosque in Qarghali was because the government changed its religious policies after a large uprising by Bashkirs in 1755.⁸⁴ In fact, the mosque was constructed at the height of the Christianization movement in Povolzhie. Thus the religious tolerance of the Russian government towards the immigrants in Qarghali was particularly notable, even if we take into consideration the fact that none of the residents of Qarghali were Orthodox and the government did not have to be concerned about the Islamic influence on new converts, which was traditionally the major concern of the Russian authorities regarding Christianization policies.

Strict policies like those in Povolzhie were not applied in the South Ural region in this period, although there were some tendencies towards Christianization especially around Nogaibaks.⁸⁵ As for mosques in the region, the following decree was issued in February 1744:

As is well known, there are no dwelling places for new converts around domiciles of Bashkirs. And Bashkirs are under specific laws. Consequently, the Tatar mosques that already exist in domiciles of Bashkirs in the Ufa region will be preserved until a new decree is issued.

It was only the construction of new mosques that was forbidden.⁸⁶ Thus permission for the construction of a mosque in Qarghali was exceptional, even for the South Ural region.⁸⁷

Large-scale Tatar migrations from Povolzhie to the South Ural region occurred from the end of the seventeenth century to the mid-eighteenth century.⁸⁸ One reason for the migrations was the difference in religious policies between Povolzhie and the South Ural region.⁸⁹ Immigrants from Povolzhie to the South Ural region included many mullahs, and their presence in the South Ural region reinforced the influence of Islam in the region.⁹⁰

The establishment of Qarghali can be considered as an example of these trends in Tatar migration and in the reinforcement of the influence of Islam in the South Ural region. Rida' al-Din b. Fakhr al-Din regarded Qarghali as not only a village established out of pragmatic necessity for the Volga Tatars in the economic development of the Russian Empire, but also as a place in which officially recognized Islamic religious life was reconstituted for the first time since the fall of Kazan.⁹¹ The fact that Qarghali, which was built in an era of fierce Christianization, became, as is shown below, one of the centers for Islamic culture in Russia, symbolizes the contradictions and distinct differences between regions in policies of Christianization by the Russian government.⁹²

The building of new mosques was permitted in 1756,⁹³ after which mosques and madrasas were constructed one after another in Qarghali. According to Rida' al-Din b. Fakhr al-Din, the second mosque in Qarghali was built in 1760, but it later burned down.⁹⁴ The second madrasa in Qarghali was also built in 1760, next to the second mosque. Records from 1834 concerning mosques show that there were eight mosques in Qarghali at that time. All but two of these mosques were financed by merchants; the financiers of the remaining two mosques are unknown.⁹⁵

In Qarghali, there were nine madrasas in 1869, and eleven at the end of the nineteenth century.⁹⁶ These madrasas were modeled after those of Bukharan. It is remarkable that the examinations to determine official *akhunds* began at the latest in 1771 in Qarghali. A man who was chosen as an *akhund* from his community had to pass the examination in Qarghali in order to be approved by the authority and to begin to work as an *akhund*. It seems that this function of madrasas in Qarghali continued until the Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly was established in 1789.⁹⁷ The official role of the madrasas in Qarghali in the legal system indicates the reciprocal relations between the Russian government and the people in Qarghali with respect to religion and education.

Soon after the establishment of Qarghali, several scholars moved to Qarghali from Kazan province to teach in the madrasa. These included ‘Abd al-Salam b. Uraz Muhammad (1700–after 1763),⁹⁸ who was not only an outstanding scholar, but also a Tatar poet. Ishniyaz b. Shirniyaz al-Khwarazmi (1725?–90/91), the author of several juristic works, is also said to have taught in Qarghali.⁹⁹ He instructed two pioneering reformists among Russian Muslims: ‘Abd al-Rahim b. ‘Uthman al-Utiz Imani (1754–1834/35)¹⁰⁰ and ‘Abd al-Nasir b. Ibrahim Qursawi (1776/77–1812).¹⁰¹ The tomb of Ishniyaz b. Shirniyaz al-Khwarazmi is preserved in Qarghali to this day.¹⁰² Outstanding scholars who lived in Qarghali include ‘Abd al-Rahman b. Muhammad Sharif (1743–1826/27)¹⁰³ and Wali al-Din b. Hasan al-Baghdadi (1755/56–1831/32).¹⁰⁴ The former won such fame that some exaggeratedly described Qarghali in the era of his presence as a center for Islamic religion and scholarship comparable with Bukhara.¹⁰⁵

At the end of the eighteenth century many imams and *mudarrises* came from Povolzhie to Qarghali for higher religious knowledge.¹⁰⁶ Tatars as well as Bashkirs, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz studied in madrasas in Qarghali. The madrasas played an important role in spreading Islamic culture, especially among Bashkirs.¹⁰⁷ Four hundred and sixty-nine Bashkir, Tatar or Kazakh students were learning in the madrasas in Qarghali in 1869. By 1903, the number had risen to 2,085 (1,346 Tatars, 687 Bashkirs, 52 Kazakhs).¹⁰⁸ A. S. Budilovich, a high-ranking Russian official who visited Qarghali in 1904, called the town one of the centers of Tatar scholarship in Russia.¹⁰⁹ Qarghali was a stronghold of Islamic education also in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, along with Kazan and Sterlibash.

It is true that education in the Russian language was not introduced in madrasas in Qarghali because of opposition from conservative ulamas, and education in this town was obsolete in some respects.¹¹⁰ Even so, a movement for educational reform appeared here at the beginning of the twentieth century. A school for girls and a teacher’s school were built here by the Husainov brothers, eminent traders from Qarghali, and these promoted the spread of Jadidism.¹¹¹

The first three muftis of the Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly (the first mufti Muhammad Jan b. al-Husayn (1756–1824),¹¹² the second mufti ‘Abd al-Salam b. ‘Abd al-Rahim al-‘Abdari (1765–1840)¹¹³ and the third mufti ‘Abd al-Wahid b. Sulayman al-Arbashchi (1786–1862)¹¹⁴ were educated in madrasas in Qarghali, although they had also studied in madrasas in other places. The fact that the first

three muftis studied in madrasas in Qarghali does not seem to be unconnected to the character of Qarghali as a pro-government educational center. However, in terms of the Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly, we notice that Kazan province was much more important than Qarghali. Three members (*qāḍī*) of the Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly would be chosen from ulamas in Kazan province.¹¹⁵

In this way, Qarghali also developed steadily as one of the centers of Islam in Russia. A petition to prohibit the building of drinking establishments around Qarghali submitted to Catherine II's legislative commission in 1767 by the residents of Qarghali suggests a taste for piety among the residents.¹¹⁶

The Pugachev Rebellion and Qarghali

As described above, the reciprocal relations between the Russian government and Qarghali were obvious, especially in the commercial area. But this does not mean that the residents of Qarghali were always obedient to the government.

In the early stages of the Pugachev Rebellion, Qarghali became a base for rebel troops, and it was named "the rebels' St. Petersburg."¹¹⁷ Sadiq Sagitov, a famous commander of the insurgent army, was from Qarghali. Residents of Qarghali who joined the insurgent army included merchants such as Musa Uleev, a commander of the rebel troops, but it is said that many of them were newcomers to Qarghali. Roughly 300 of the wealthiest merchants in Qarghali fled for refuge to Orenburg before the rebel army arrived at Qarghali, thanks to an arrangement with Orenburg officials.¹¹⁸ So it can be considered that the richest stratum of Qarghali society in general did not take part in the rebellion.

After the first occupation of Qarghali on 1 October 1773, when the rebels began to lose ground, merchants who remained there along with the Cossacks of the town arrested 40 of the most active adherents of Pugachev in Qarghali. But in the second occupation of Qarghali by the insurgent army on 26 March 1774, some of the anti-Pugachev residents were executed by the rebels. After the retreat of the army on 1 April 1774, punishments for allies of the insurgent army in the town began again.¹¹⁹ This shows that there was no consensus among the residents of Qarghali on the Pugachev Rebellion.

These movements against the government by some of the residents of Qarghali, however, seem to be isolated examples. From the end of the eighteenth century, the Tatars of Qarghali served the government not only as merchants but as mul-lahs, translators, and emissaries in the process of annexing the Kazakh Steppe.¹²⁰

Conclusion

When the establishment of Qarghali is regarded as part of Russia's Eastern policies, that establishment indicates that the Russian government gave priority to Eastern policies over religious policies, at least around Orenburg. The Russian government permitted Muslim immigrants to enjoy religious freedom amidst the strict Christianization policies of the 1740s. In other words, the development of Qarghali as a Muslim educational center was the inevitable cost for the

government to gain profit from the Eastern trade. The government reluctantly paid the cost, as is clearly shown in the permission for Sa'īd Khayalin to build a mosque beside the village.

The tendency of the government to protect Tatar merchants can be observed also at the end of the seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth century in Kazan,¹²¹ and it was the emerging Tatar merchant class in Kazan province that produced the merchants of Qarghali.

Some may consider the foundation of Qarghali, one of the centers of Islamic culture in Russia in an era of religious persecution, to be an exception. However, it should be recognized as a precursor to the full-scale commercial and religious, if uneven, cooperation between Tatars and the Russian government, for the Tatars formed a full-scale partnership with the government in the period of Catherine II until the mid-nineteenth century, as is clearly shown in Sultangalieva's chapter in this book (Chapter 3).

On the other hand, when the case of Qarghali is placed against the whole picture of the Christianization policies of mid-eighteenth-century Russia, one can understand more clearly that the policies of Christianization were applied on the basis of region (Povolzhie or the South Ural region), and not of ethnicity (Tatars or Bashkirs). The difference between the policies can be attributed to the character of the Russian administration in the South Ural region, which was essentially colonial.¹²² This explains why the Russian government did not apply a strict Christianization policy in the South Ural region. But why did the Russian government begin to apply this policy in Povolzhie?

As is clearly elucidated in Vulpius's chapter in this book (Chapter 1), one reason for the Christianization policy of this period could be the notion of the duty of civilization introduced from Western Europe to Russia in the Petrine era. It seems difficult, however, to explain the difference in the Christianization policy between Povolzhie and the South Ural region by applying the notion of civilization, when we note that many Tatars lived in the South Ural region and that Tatars in Qarghali enjoyed religious tolerance. Apart from the Russian government putting a priority on Eastern trade over religious policies, one answer to this question could be the difference in perception of these two regions by Russians. According to Miller, Povolzhie was completely included in the image of "Russian national territory" no later than the end of the nineteenth century.¹²³ In his article, Miller does not mention when Povolzhie began to be included in that image. When we think of the harsh Christianization policy in Povolzhie in the first half of the eighteenth century, it is possible to consider that Russians began to regard Povolzhie as "Russian national territory" in an "imaginative" geography, perhaps from around the first half of the eighteenth century.¹²⁴

If we pay attention to the role of Kazan province in establishing Qarghali, we easily realize that the attempt by the government to use Tatars from Kazan province in the South Ural region was found not only in the example of Qarghali, but also in the case of three members (*qāḍī*) of the Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly, as mentioned above. These two examples show that part of the function of Kazan as a center of Muslim commercial and religious activities was shifted to the South

Ural region by government initiatives. Fundamentally, this chapter has dealt only with matters concerning Qarghali, and any assumption of the role of Kazan needs to be proven in detail in subsequent discussion. However, there is a good likelihood that Povolzhie and its center, Kazan, played a part in incorporating the new peripheries of the Russian Empire during the process of change in its own status from periphery to central area.

Acknowledgment

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Notes

- 1 This place has had various names. When the village was built, it was called "Seitovskaia sloboda" in Russian and "Sa'īd qaşabası" in Turki, after the founder of the village, Sa'īd Khayalin, or "Qārgḥālī" in Turki, after the river which the village faced. In 1784 the Russian name "Seitovskaia sloboda" was changed to "Seitovskii posad." The name "Tatarskaia Kargala" in the title of this chapter is currently the common name of the place. The author of this chapter mentions the current name in the title to indicate the place accurately. However, the name "Tatarskaia Kargala" is not a historical name. In this chapter, the name "Qarghali" is generally used to refer to the place under discussion.
- 2 A. Khabutdinov, *Millet Orenburgskogo dukhovnogo sobraniia v kontse XVIII–XIX vekakh* (Kazan, 2000), 6.
- 3 There were many Tatar soldiers (*sluzhilye tatory*) in the army of Muscovy, and they received feuds and salary in return for military service from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries.
- 4 The author thanks Dr. Allen Frank for providing a copy of this book.
- 5 G. A. Mikhaleva, "Seitovskii posad Orenburga i ego rol' v razvitii rusko-sredneaziatskii torgovli (vtoraia polovina XVIII–nachalo XIX veka)," *Obshchestvennye nauki v Uzbekistane*, no. 12 (1980).
- 6 G. G. Kosach, "A Russian City between Two Continents: The Tatars of Orenburg and State Power," in N. Schleifman, ed., *Russia at a Crossroads: History, Memory and Political Practice* (London, 1998).
- 7 D. N. Denisov, "Uchastie tatarov orenburgskoi prigranichnoi torgovle XVIII veka," in *Orenburg vchera, segodnia, zavtra: Istoricheskii i sotsial'no-kul'turnyi opyt* (Orenburg, 2003); idem, "Osnovanie Tatarskoi Kargaly," in *Iz istorii tatar Orenburzh'ia (K 260-letiiu Tatarskoi Kargaly): Sbornik materialov oblastnoi nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii. Seriia «Mnogonatsional'nyi mir Orenburzh'ia»*, vol. 19 (Orenburg, 2005); idem, "Prikhodskie mektebe Seitovskogo posada (Kargaly)," in *Tatarskie musul'manskie prikhody v Rossiiskoi imperii: Materialy Vserossiiskoi nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii g. Kazan', 27–28 sentiabria 2005 g.* (Kazan, 2006); idem, *Istoriia zaseleniia i etnokul'turnoe razvitie tatar Orenburgskogo kraia (XVIII–XX vv.)*, (Orenburg, 2006).

- 8 Rashit Iskandarov and Anvar Iskandarov, *Seitov posad: Ocherki po istorii Orenburgskoi (Tatarskoi) Kargaly* (Kazan, 2005).
- 9 *Iz istorii tatar Orenburzh'ia*.
- 10 N. G. Apollova, *Ekonomicheskie i politicheskie sviazi Kazakhstana s Rossiei v XVIII–nachale XIX v.* (Moscow, 1960), 97–98, 233, 100; G. A. Mikhaleva, *Torgovye i posol'skie sviazi Rossii so sredneaziatskimi khanstvami cherez Orenburg* (Tashkent, 1982), 16.
- 11 PSZ (Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii, Serii I, St. Petersburg), vol. 9: 344–349 (no. 6584); Apollova, *Ekonomicheskie i politicheskie sviazi*, 100, 234; Mikhaleva, *Torgovye i posol'skie sviazi*, 15, 39.
- 12 Denisov, “Osnovanie Tatarskoi Kargaly,” 13.
- 13 PSZ 12: 40 (no. 8893).
- 14 Today's Bogatye Saby in Sabinskii raion of the Republic of Tatarstan.
- 15 *Materialy po istorii Bashkirskoi ASSR*, vol. 6 (Ufa, 2002), 64, 76, 81, 84, 85, 88; Denisov, “Osnovanie Tatarskoi Kargaly,” 15.
- 16 *Ibid.*, 13.
- 17 PSZ 12: 41 (no. 8893).
- 18 Denisov, “Osnovanie Tatarskoi Kargaly,” 13–14.
- 19 Denisov, *Istoriia zaseleniia*, 181.
- 20 *Orenburgskie gubernskie vedomosti*, 10. 10. 1870 (no. 41): 176; Denisov, “Osnovanie Tatarskoi Kargaly,” 15.
- 21 *Ibid.*
- 22 Tatars of Qarghali actually hired these people. For example, in 1752 a Bashkir was hired by a Tatar merchant in Qarghali “to learn how to do commerce.” *Materialy po istorii Bashkirskoi ASSR*, vol. 4, no. 1 (Moscow, 1956), 58–59 (no. 14).
- 23 A title for *ulama* and the Muslim intelligentsia in Russian archives of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Probably a corruption of *hafiz*. See *Islam na territorii byvshei Rossiiskoi imperii: Entsiklopedicheskii slovar'*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 2006), 21–22.
- 24 A title for specialists in Islamic law in the Volga-Ural region and Siberia. Until the Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly was established in 1789, *akhunds* were the highest-ranking religious people. After 1789, their status gradually declined. *Ibid.*, 288–289.
- 25 *Orenburgskie gubernskie vedomosti*, 10. 10. 1870 (no. 41): 176–177.
- 26 GAOro (State Archive of Orenburg Oblast), f. 3, op. 1, d. 82, l. 179.
- 27 RIO (*Sbornik imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva*), vol. 147, *Materialy Ekaterininskoi zakonodatel'noi komissii*, chast' 14 (Petrograd, 1915): 221–222.
- 28 Denisov, “Osnovanie Tatarskoi Kargaly,” 16.
- 29 *Ibid.*, 16; GAOro, f. 3, op. 1, d. 7, l. 7ob.
- 30 Denisov, “Osnovanie Tatarskoi Kargaly,” 17.
- 31 P. I. Rychkov, *Topografiia Orenburgskoi gubernii* (Orenburg, 1767; repr., Ufa, 1999), 181.
- 32 K. Stepanov, “Kargala, ili Seitovskii posad,” *Russkii arkhiv*, 1897, no. 8: 606; M. A. Usmanov, “Tatarskoe kupechestvo v torgovle Rossii s vostochnymi stranami cherez Astrakhan' i Orenburg v XVII–XVIII stoletiiakh,” *Russian History* 19, nos. 1–4 (1992): 512.
- 33 G. S. Sultangalieva, “Seitovskii posad v novoi istorii Kazakhstana,” in *Iz istorii tatar Orenburzh'ia*, 56.
- 34 PSZ 22: 241 (no. 16089). The town council in Qarghali was abolished in 1828 because of a lack of knowledge of the Russian language among residents of Qarghali. Iskandarovs, *Seitov posad*, 82.
- 35 Many privileged Bukharan merchants lived in Tobol'sk, and they played a considerable role in Russo-Central Asian trade until the mid-eighteenth century. See M. Iu. Iuldashev, *K istorii torgovykh i posol'skikh sviazei Srednei Azii s Rossiei v XVI–XVII vv.* (Tashkent, 1964), 81.

- 36 A. I. Iukht, *Torgovlia s vostochnymi stranami i vnutrennii rynek Rossii (20–60-e gody XVIII veka)*, (Moscow, 1994), 57.
- 37 Ibid., 54.
- 38 Ibid., 153.
- 39 Mikhaleva, *Torgovye sviazi Rossii*, 22.
- 40 Ibid., 28; V. N. Vitevskii, *Nepliuiev i Orenburgskii krai v prezhnem ego sostave do 1758 g. Istoricheskaia monografiia*, vol. 3 (Kazan, 1891), 841.
- 41 Apollova, *Ekonomicheskie i politicheskie sviazi*, 295.
- 42 Mikhaleva, *Torgovye i posol'skie sviazi*, 40.
- 43 Apollova, *Ekonomicheskie i politicheskie sviazi*, 234, 243.
- 44 Ibid., 240.
- 45 Vitevskii, *Nepliuiev i Orenburgskii krai* 3: 673.
- 46 I. I. Nepliuiev, *Zhizn' Ivana Ivanovicha Nepliuieva* (St. Petersburg, 1893; repr., 1974), 138.
- 47 GAOro, f. 3, op. 1, d. 25, l. 25ob.
- 48 Mikhaleva, “Seitovskii posad Orenburga,” 40.
- 49 Apollova, *Ekonomicheskie i politicheskie sviazi*, 238.
- 50 GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 443.
- 51 GAOro, f. 3, op. 1, d. 25, l. 11–14 ob.; GAOro, f. 6, op. 2, d. 2170, l. 5.
- 52 Apollova, *Ekonomicheskie i politicheskie sviazi*, 240; Mikhaleva, *Torgovye i posol'skie sviazi*, 39.
- 53 Apollova, *Ekonomicheskie i politicheskie sviazi*, 240.
- 54 RIO, vol. 8. (St. Petersburg, 1903), 291–292; *Islam v Srednem Povolzh'e: Istorii i sovremennost'. Ocherki* (Kazan, 2001), 95.
- 55 RIO 8: 98–99; S. F. Tashkin, *Inorodtsy Povolzhsko-Priural'skogo kraia i Sibiri po materialam Ekaterininskoi zakonodatel'noi komissii*, vol. 1, *Inorodtsy povolzhskopriural'skogo kraia* (Orenburg, 1921), 81.
- 56 PSZ 18: 989–990 (no. 13357); A. Nogmanov, *Tatary Srednego Povolzh'ia i Priural'ia, v rossiiskom zakonodatel'stve vtoroi poloviny XVI–XVII vv.* (Kazan, 2002), 95.
- 57 *Russko-Indiiskie otnocheniia v XVIII v.* (Moscow, 1965), 280 (no. 137), 342 (no. 180); Mikhaleva, *Torgovye i posol'skie sviazi*, 29.
- 58 M. A. Usmanov, “Zapiski Ismaila Bekmukhammedova o ego puteshestvii v Indiiu,” in *Blizhnii i Srednii Vostok: Istorii, ekonomika* (Moscow, 1967); *Puteshestvie Ismaila Aga v Indiiu* (Kazan, 1993); Ismail Bikmukhamedov, *Putevye zapiski* (Orenburg, 2005).
- 59 M. Kemper, “Ismails Reisebuch als Genremischung,” in *Istochniki i issledovaniia po istorii Tatarskogo naroda* (Kazan, 2006).
- 60 RGADA (Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts), f. 350, op. 2, d. 2450, l. 73.
- 61 RGADA, f. 350, op. 2, d. 2452, l. 147.
- 62 RGADA, f. 350, op. 2, d. 2452, l. 49a.
- 63 RGADA, f. 350, op. 2, d. 2452, l. 120.
- 64 The travel report by Danil Rukavkin was published in *Moskovskii liubopytnyi mesiat-seslov na 1776 god* (Moscow, 1776). See also Mikhaleva, *Torgovye i posol'skie sviazi*, 29.
- 65 GAOro, f. 3, op. 1, d. 29.
- 66 This is according to Nebol'sin, who described the Russo-Central Asian trade in the nineteenth century, whereas Sunni Muslims had to pay 2.5% customs in the Central Asian khanates, Christians and Iranians had to pay 5%, and in some situations 10–20%, even though Islamic law (Sharia) set a 5% customs duty for non-Muslims. See P. I. Nebol'sin, *Ocherki torgovli Rossii so stranami Srednei Azii, Khivoi, Bukharoi i Kokanom* (St. Petersburg, 1856), 33–34, 151–152. This information pertains to the nineteenth century, but it is assumed that the situation in the latter half of the eighteenth century was not so different from that of the nineteenth century.
- 67 Mikhaleva, *Torgovye i posol'skie sviazi*, 36.
- 68 Usmanov, “Tatarskoe kupechestvo,” 512.

- 69 Nebol'sin, *Ocherki trgovli Rossii*, 20.
- 70 Mikhaleva, *Torgovye i posol'skie sviazi*, 33.
- 71 RIO 147: 215–216.
- 72 Apollova, *Ekonomicheskie i politicheskie sviazi*, 242.
- 73 Denisov, *Istoriia zaseleniia*, 146.
- 74 Mikhaleva, *Torgovye i posol'skie sviazi*, 22.
- 75 M. N. Farkhshatov, *Narodnoe obrazovanie v Bashkirii v poreformennyi period, 60–90-e gody XLX v.* (Moscow, 2004), 18–19.
- 76 F. G. Islaev, *Islam i pravoslavie v Povolzh'e XVIII stoletii: Ot konfrontatsii k terpimosti* (Kazan, 2001), 61.
- 77 PSZ 11: 254–255 (no. 8236).
- 78 PSZ 12: 157–158 (no. 8978); 14: 609 (no. 10597).
- 79 PSZ 11: 592 (no. 8540).
- 80 Ridā' al-Dīn Fakhr al-Dīn, *Sa'īd* (Kazan, 1897), 16.
- 81 Rychkov, *Topografiia Orenburgskoi gubernii*, 242.
- 82 Denisov, "Prikhodskie mektebe," 181.
- 83 *Ibid.*, 173; *Islam na territorii*, 44.
- 84 P. I. Rychkov, *Topografiia Orenburgskoi gubernii*, chast' 2 (Orenburg, 1762), 28; V. V. Bartol'd, *Sochineniia*, vol. 9 (Moscow, 1977), 410.
- 85 D. D. Azamatov, "Russian Administration and Islam in Bashkiriia," in M. Kemper, A. von Kūgelgen, and D. Yermakov, eds., *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries* (Berlin, 1996), 98.
- 86 PSZ 12: 26 (no. 8875).
- 87 However, the new mosque in Qarghali was not the only exception to the mosques built between the 1730s and 1750s. According to a record made in 1834, there were 155 mosques in the Orenburg and Buzulugskii districts at that time, and two of these mosques had been built in the 1730s and five had been built between 1750 and 1756, although no mosques had been built in the 1740s. One mosque was built in 1709, and 108 mosques were built after 1756, while there is no information about the date of the construction of 39 mosques. GAOrO, f. 6, op. 4, d. 9958, ll. 205–225.
- 88 D. M. Iskhakov, "Rasselenie i chislennost' tatar v Povolzhsko-Priural'skoi istoriko-etnograficheskoi oblasti v XVIII–XIX vv.," *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, no. 4 (1980); U. Kh. Rakhmatullin, *Naselenie Bashkirii v XVII–XVIII vv.* (Moscow, 1988).
- 89 *Ibid.*, 33–34.
- 90 Azamatov, "Russian Administration and Islam," 94.
- 91 Kosach, "A Russian City," 49.
- 92 The notion of "territorial Christianization" introduced by L. Taimasov might be effective in illuminating the difference, although he himself applies the term to the Christianization policy in the latter half of the sixteenth and seventeenth century. See L. Taimasov, "Mezhkonnessional'nye otnosheniia na nachal'nom etape khristianizatsii narodov Kazanskogo kraia (vtoraia polovina XVI–XVII vv.)," in *Die Geschichte Russlands im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert aus der Perspektive seiner Regionen* (Wiesbaden, 2004). For the differences of policies according to the situation of each region in the Russian Empire, see T. Uyama, "A Particularist Empire: The Russian Policies of Christianization and Military Conscription in Central Asia," in T. Uyama, ed., *Empire, Islam, and Politics in Central Eurasia* (Sapporo, 2007).
- 93 PSZ 14: 607–612 (no. 10597).
- 94 Ridā' al-Dīn Fakhr al-Dīn, *Aḥmad Bāy* (Orenburg, 1910), 13.
- 95 GAOrO, f. 6, op. 4, d. 9958, l. 205–225.
- 96 M. G. Gafarova, "Iz istorii sela Tatarskaia Kargala," in *Nauchno-prakticheskaia konferentsiia "Tatary v Orenburgskom krae": Avtorskii proekt* (Orenburg, 1997); *Islam na territorii* 1: 45.
- 97 D. D. Azamatov, *Orenburgskoe magometanskoe dukhovnoe sobranie v kontse XVIII–XIX vv.* (Ufa, 1999), 20.

- 98 He was a *mudarris* of a madrasa in Tashkichu village in Kazan province. Before coming to Qarghali, he taught Batyrsha, the leader of the Bashkir uprising in 1755. See Fakhr al-Dīn, *Sa'īd*, 17; idem., *Āthār* (Kazan, 1900), 42; Şehabeddin Mercani, *Müstefad'ül-Ahbar fi Ahval-i Kazan ve Bulgar*, vol. 2 (Kazan, 1900; repr., Ankara, 1997), 127; A. N. Kurat, "Kazan Türklerinin 'Medeni Uyanış' Devri (1917 Yılına kadar)," *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi* 24, nos. 3–4 (1966): 110–111; M. I. Akhmetzhanov, "O musul'manskikh epitafinykh pamiatnikakh sela Tatarskaia Kargala," in *Iz istorii tatar Orenburzh'ia*, 51; Denisov, *Istoriia zaseleniia*, 140.
- 99 Mercani, *Müstefad'ül-Ahbar*, 216; Ridā' al-Dīn Fakhr al-Dīn, *Āthār*, vol. 1, part 2 (Orenburg, 1901), 59–60; Akhmetzhanov, "O musul'manskikh epitafinykh pamiatnikakh," 51; M. Kemper, *Sufies und Gelehrte in Tatarien und Baschkirien, 1789–1889: Der islamische Diskurs unter russischer Herrschaft* (Berlin, 1998), 220 [Russian trans.: *Sufii i uchenye v Tatarstane i Bashkortostane: Islamskii diskurs pod russkim gospodstvom* (Kazan, 2008), 307–308].
- 100 He was born in Chistopol' province. After receiving his education in Bukhara, Samarkand and Afghanistan, he came back to Russia. He valued the humble style of life and was dismissive of modern European devices and culture. See Mercani, *Müstefad'ül-Ahbar*, 239–241; Ridā' al-Dīn Fakhr al-Dīn, *Āthār*, vol. 1, part 6 (Orenburg, 1904), 300–316; Kurat, "Kazan Türklerinin 'Medeni Uyanış' Devri," 100; Kemper, *Sufies und Gelehrte*, 172–212 [*Sufii i uchenye*, 248–298]; Denisov, *Istoriia zaseleniia*, 140.
- 101 He studied in Bukhara twice, and after that he taught in Russia. He is famous for his call for opening the door of *Ijtihād*. See Mercani, *Müstefad'ül-Ahbar*, 168–175; Ridā' al-Dīn Fakhr al-Dīn, *Āthār*, vol. 1, part 3 (Orenburg, 1903), 95–130; Kurat, "Kazan Türklerinin 'Medeni Uyanış' Devri," 101; Kemper, *Sufies und Gelehrte*, 225–307 [*Sufii i uchenye*, 314–420].
- 102 Akhmetzhanov, "O musul'manskikh epitafinykh pamiatnikakh," 51.
- 103 Mercani, *Müstefad'ül-Ahbar*, 231; Fakhr al-Dīn, *Sa'īd*, 17; idem., *Āthār*, vol. 1, part 5 (Orenburg, 1904), 241–246.
- 104 Fakhr al-Dīn, *Sa'īd*, 30; idem., *Āthār*, vol. 1, part 6: 272–275; Mercani, *Müstefad'ül-Ahbar*, 233–234; Denisov, *Istoriia zaseleniia*, 140.
- 105 Farkhshatov, *Narodnoe obrazovanie*, 19.
- 106 Mikhaleva, *Torgovye i pošol'skie sviazi*, 24; *Islam na territorii* 1: 45.
- 107 A. N. Kurat, "Rus Hâkimiyeti altunda Idil-Ural Ülkesi," *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi* 23, nos. 3–4 (1965): 111.
- 108 Sultangalieva, "Seitovskii posad," 58.
- 109 Farkhshatov, *Narodnoe obrazovanie*, 60–61.
- 110 Denisov, "Prihodskie mektebe," 179–180.
- 111 Ayyüb b. İbrâhîm, "Qārg'hālīda 9ncī mahallanīng madrasasi. Mu'allimlār ichūn jaygi sinflārī. Qārg'hālīda qizlar maktabi," in Burhān Sharaf, ed., *Ganī Bāy* (Orenburg, 1913), 216–229; Denisov, "Prihodskie mektebe," 176. The author thanks Prof. Komatsu Hisao for lending his *Ganī Bāy* and other materials.
- 112 He studied in Qarghali and Orenburg, and then went to Bukhara and Kabul. While studying in Bukhara and Kabul in the 1770s, he worked as a secret agent of the Russian government, and after coming back to Russia, he became an officer in Orenburg. See Ridā' al-Dīn Fakhr al-Dīn, *Āthār*, vol. 1, part 4 (Orenburg, 1903), 181–200; Kemper, *Sufies Gelehrte*, 50–66 [*Sufii i uchenye*, 88–109]; Azamatov, *Orenburgskoe magometanskoe dukhovnoe sobranie*, 23.
- 113 After receiving education in his native district, 'Abd al-Salam b. 'Abd al-Rahim al-'Abdari went to Kazan and then to Qarghali to study. After that, he was appointed to the post of imam at the Friday mosque in Orenburg in 1799 and was granted the title of *akhund* and *mudarris* in 1805. See Ridā' al-Dīn Fakhr al-Dīn, *Āthār*, vol. 1, part 7 (Orenburg, 1904), 341–410; Kemper, *Sufies und Gelehrte*, 66–79 [*Sufii i uchenye*, 110–128]; Azamatov, *Orenburgskoe magometanskoe dukhovnoe sobranie*, 51.
- 114 After receiving education in several madrasas in Russia, 'Abd al-Wahid b. Sulayman

- al-Arbashchi went to St. Petersburg to work under a Tatar merchant. He continued his religious activities in St. Petersburg while working, and he was appointed to the post of imam and khatib at the Friday mosque in the city in 1822. He became a teacher of theology for Muslim cadets in Tsarskoe selo. See Riḍā' al-Dīn Fakhr al-Dīn, *Āthār*, vol. 2, part 13 (Orenburg, 1907), 368–389; Azamatov, *Orenburgskoe magometanskoe dukhovnoe sobranie*, 53–54; O. N. Seniutkina, *Gabdulvakhid b. Suleiman b. Sadiuk* (Nizhnii Novgorod, 2006).
- 115 PSZ 20: 1167 (no. 16710); Azamatov, *Orenburgskoe magometanskoe dukhovnoe sobranie*, 22.
- 116 RIO 147: 224. However, they also wrote in the petition that they could buy wine, beer and mead in the neighboring village some 10 km from Qarghali “as has always been done in the past,” if someone in Qarghali needed them. This suggests that some of the residents of Qarghali drank alcohol.
- 117 Stepanov, “Kargala, ili Seitovskii posad,” 402.
- 118 Iskandarovs, *Seitov posad*, 85.
- 119 *Ibid.*, 86–87.
- 120 Sultangalieva, “Seitovskii posad,” 58–59. See also her chapter in this book (Chapter 3).
- 121 Kh. Khasanov, *Formirovanie tatarskoi burzhuaznoi natsii* (Kazan, 1977), 19–34.
- 122 A. J. Frank, *Islamic Historiography and ‘Bulghar’ Identity among the Tatars and Bashkirs of Russia* (Leiden, 1998), 25.
- 123 A. Miller, “The Empire and the Nation in the Imagination of Russian Nationalism,” in A. Miller and A. J. Rieber, eds., *Imperial Rule* (Budapest, 2004).
- 124 It should be noted that many Russians were living in Povolzhie already at the beginning of the eighteenth century. See S. I. Bruk and V. M. Kabuzan, “Ėtnicheskii sostav naseleniia Rossii (1719–1917 gg.),” *Sovetskia etnografiia*, no. 6 (1980): 26. Concerning the discussion about Russian immigrants and Russification of one territory, see Remnev’s chapter in this book (Chapter 5).

3 The Russian Empire and the intermediary role of Tatars in Kazakhstan

The politics of cooperation and rejection

Gulmira SULTANGALIEVA

The incorporation of the Kazakhs of the Junior Juz (Little Horde) and part of the Middle Juz into the Russian Empire in the 1730s presented the Russian state with the task of finding an optimal way of integrating a population distinguished by its economic and cultural way of life (nomadic pastoralism), its language (belonging to the Kipchak Turkic group), and religion (Sunni Islam) into the imperial organism. The situation was aggravated by the Russian administration's lack of adequate information about the economy, culture, customs, and language of the Kazakhs, as well as about the natural and geographical conditions in which they lived.¹ Therefore, the efforts of the first administrative heads of the region in mastering the new territory and in establishing cooperation with representatives of the Kazakh elite met with distinct difficulties.

First of all, members of the Kazakh aristocracy did not know the written Turkic literary language, not to mention Russian, which naturally hampered official correspondence with them. State representatives viewed such correspondence as one of the levers of control and a tool of "essential utility" in spreading the "influence necessary to bring the Kirgiz [Kazakhs] into a state of complete subjection."² Second, the task of supplying the administration of the new territories with the requisite number of translators, interpreters, and clerks from among Russian officials was impossible in light of both their ignorance of the Kazakh language and the absence of salaries sufficient to compensate them for work in the empire's borderland zone, which was considerably more onerous than service in Russia's internal provinces. In light of this situation and the role of the region in the eastern policy of the empire, the first administrators of the Orenburg region – Ivan Kirillov, Aleksei Tevkelev, Vasilii Tatishchev, Ivan Nepliev – considered it necessary to enlist Tatars, who knew the language and culture of the Kazakhs, professed the same religion, had a fairly long historical experience of intercourse with Kazakhs, and thus could naturally serve as intermediaries in the process of the steppe's political integration into the imperial system.³

Official correspondence of the eighteenth and nineteenth century uses such terms as "Tatar mullahs," "teacher of Tatar literacy," "translator of Tatar," "Tatar clerk," and "Tatar merchant." In this context we must address the question of precisely who was considered to be a "Tatar." Mishars, Bashkirs, and Teptiars – that

is, Turkic-speaking peoples of the Volga-Ural region already under Russian rule – who set out for the Kazakh Steppe together with Volga Tatars were typically defined as “Tatar” mullahs, even if they were of a different ethnic origin. Here, in fact, we see the conflation of ethnic conceptions with religious ones. The important thing for the authorities was not ethnic origin, but rather the fact that Bashkirs, Mishars, and Teptiars were Turkic speakers and – most importantly – Muslims. According to Aidar Nogmanov, up until the end of the eighteenth century Volga Tatars were the only face of the Muslim religion for Russian authorities,⁴ and thus that ethnonym – “Tatar” – was a general label to signify the bearers of an alien faith, language, and mentality.

A sign of the confusion in the authorities’ conception was the name of the school under the Orenburg Expedition (an early administration for the Orenburg and steppe regions) for the preparation of translators from Tatar and other eastern languages. It was called a “Tatar” school, but not because Tatar children studied there – on the contrary, this school was designed for Russian pupils, the children of parents with military rank. It is striking that even in the second half of the nineteenth century official documents granting permission for the construction of mosques in the Kazakhs steppe deploy the term “Tatar mosque” with regard to the Kazakh population.⁵ Likewise, the language of correspondence with the Kazakh aristocracy was defined unequivocally as “Tatar” – more precisely, the old Tatar language known as “Tiurki”⁶ – which was used in diplomatic correspondence with the Kazakh Steppe and was taught in institutions of learning in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In short, Tatar was a term broadly used to signify religious and linguistic difference, and seems often to have been used essentially as a synonym for “Muslim.”

Having recognized the broad connotations of the term “Tatar,” we may now turn to the main questions of this essay: Which factors were central to the definition of the intermediary role of “Tatars,” and what was the nature of the cooperation of “Tatars” with the state and the Kazakh elite? What were the consequences of their activity for the Kazakh people? These questions constitute the basis for the present analysis of the imperial policy of drawing Tatars into the role of intermediaries and of their activity in the development of political, economic, and socio-cultural ties between the empire and the Kazakh Steppe.

The penetration of “Tatars” into the Kazakh Steppe

In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Russian authorities called upon “Tatars” to serve as a kind of buffer that could help to secure the integration of the Kazakh population into the imperial system.⁷ In this regard, one can identify two major phases in the penetration of “Tatars” into the Kazakh Steppe.

Characteristic of the first period, covering the 1730s to the 1780s, was a growing experience of interaction between the regional administration and “Tatars,” though without a real legislative foundation for the recruitment of such “Tatars” into the role of intermediaries. Tatars thus served as partners of the state in the spread of its political authority into the Kazakh Steppe. State authorities in

Orenburg always ensured the presence of a “Tatar” mullah and translator when officially administering the oath of allegiance by representatives of the Kazakh elite from the Junior and Middle Juz (in 1738, 1740, and 1742). In the mid-1730s the chancellery of Orenburg province already had in its employ “Tatar” interpreters Araslan Bekmetev, Roman Urazlin, and Urasai Abdullin, who were repeatedly sent into the steppe in order to clarify the situation prevailing within the two Juz. At the same time, until the end of the 1740s there was no government decree concerning the appointment of “Tatars” as mullahs and clerks to members of the Kazakh elite. It was for good reason, then, that the khan of the Junior Juz, Abulkhair, emphasized that the “Tatar” mullah Al'mukhammet Nurmukhammetov was serving as a scribe for him “not by decree and not by request of the generals”; rather, the khan himself had transferred that mullah from Bashkiria to his nomadic encampments in 1737.⁸ Only with imperial confirmation of the title of khan for sultan Nuraly on 13 April 1749 did the College of Foreign Affairs officially decree that mullah Al'mukhammet be appointed to the khan of the Junior Juz as a clerk.⁹ Here one can see a basic principle of imperial rule in practice: having been legitimated by imperial power, Kazakh khans needed to have a scribe who would organize their bureaucratic affairs, and would conduct and translate correspondence with the Russian administration.

In a parallel fashion, Russian authorities enlisted Tatars for intermediary roles in the realm of trade. As evidence, one can point to a Senate decree of 8 March 1744, “On the settlement of Kazan Tatars in Orenburg and permission for them to construct a mosque outside the city,” and to the protective customs policy of the Russian government (decrees of 11 February 1736 and 22 November 1776), which allowed Tatars “to conduct trade throughout Russia” without hindrance.¹⁰ The paradox of such actions by the state derives from the fact that they coincided with a violent campaign of “Christianization” of the Tatar population in the neighboring territory of the Middle Volga.¹¹

The policy of drawing “Tatars” into an intermediary role between the state and the Kazakh Steppe acquired an organized character from the start of Catherine II's reign. This allows us to identify a second phase of “Tatar” penetration into the steppe, extending from the 1770s to the 1850s. Catherine II now produced legislation to define the role of “Tatars” as an instrument in the spread of imperial laws into the steppe and in the realization of extensive foreign-policy plans involving Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Here, one can note as evidence the decrees “On the appointment of translators and interpreters in Orenburg province” (29 July 1770); “On the Toleration of all faiths . . .” (17 July 1773); “On the construction of mosques . . .” (8 July 1782); “On measures for the curbing of the willfulness of the Kirgiz-Kaisaks” (2 May 1784); and “On supplying various Kirgiz clans with mullahs . . .” (25 November 1785 and 21 April 1787). A final important step in the realization of this program was the decree of 22 September 1788, “On the appointment of mullahs and other ranks of the Muslim Religion and on the establishment in Ufa of a Spiritual Assembly for the management of all spiritual figures of that religion in Russia,” which was accompanied by the appointment of Mukhamedzhan Khusainov as mufti.¹² Simultaneously, the printing house of the imperial Academy of Sciences printed a full Arabic version of the Koran.¹³

One important aspect of all of these legislative acts merits our attention – namely, the “summoning” of precisely “Kazan” Tatars to various functions. Thus, the Orenburg mufti and the three members of the Spiritual Assembly were to be elected specifically from among Kazan mullahs, and mullahs sent into the Kazakh Steppe were explicitly to hail “from Kazan province.” These requirements were not always respected, but such insistence testifies to the Russian authorities’ purposeful tactic of enlisting Volga Tatars as partners in the empire’s Central Asian policy. There were now definitive conditions for their entry into state service. Thus decrees of Catherine II provided Volga Tatars with the possibility of entering the noble estate, and of receiving compensation for service in the ranks of the Orenburg administration.¹⁴ Russian authorities clearly believed that Volga Tatars, as representatives of settled agricultural life, could facilitate the inclusion of nomadic Kazakhs into a supposedly more advanced – that is, settled – way of life, which in turn would make them more “peaceful and governable.” In essence, then, Tatars were to offer Kazakhs the opportunity of peaceful conversion to settled life by providing them with a good example. It was presumably for this reason that Nikolai Il'minskii later noted that if a Kazakh “decides to adopt the convenience of settled life, he always does this by adopting not the Russian way of life, but the Tatar or, more rarely, the Central Asian.”¹⁵

Catherine’s plan of developing new forms of cooperation with “Tatars” and drawing them into an intermediary role was a product of several concrete circumstances. The first involved the resistance of non-Russian peoples in the region to state authority, most notably their participation in the Pugachev uprising of 1773–75 and the national liberation struggle of Kazakhs of the Junior Juz under Srym Datov in 1783–97. Second, the activities of Central Asian mullahs in the Kazakh Steppe and their spreading of anti-Russian sentiments compelled the Russian government to take measures to assert more direct control over religious officials for the empire’s Kazakh subjects.¹⁶ Third, in April of 1783 Crimea became part of the Russian Empire, and this peninsula, whose population was principally Muslim, became an important bulwark on the Black Sea during Russia’s long wars with the neighboring Muslim state of Turkey. Naturally, the Russian state had to react to this fact and needed to find a more flexible mode of cooperation with Muslims in the last quarter of the eighteenth century.¹⁷

Therefore the Russian authorities, having recognized Islam as a tolerated faith, now counted on the active participation of their Muslim subjects in the Volga-Ural region and the Spiritual Assembly in their foreign-policy projects in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. As the well-known pre-revolutionary scholar Aleksandr Dobrosmyslov wrote, “Tatars and mosques constituted the bridge that the Kirgiz [Kazakhs] would initially cross in the process of rapprochement with Russians.” Evaluating the results of this policy later, Dobrosmyslov expressed himself more openly: in the Kazakh Steppe “Tatars” ultimately accomplished what the Russians proved incapable of doing.¹⁸ At the same time, one should note that mullahs were more limited in terms of their rights than were the religious officials of the non-Orthodox Christian confessions, for example those of Catholicism or Lutheranism. The first to note this fact was Aidar Nogmanov, who investigated the relation

of the state to Muslims of the Volga-Ural region through the prism of legislation.¹⁹ Tatar mullahs had a low social status, were ascribed to the category of state peasants, and were subject to both the soul (or poll) tax and military service (until 1850), while Christian clerical figures constituted particular clerical estates and enjoyed definitive privileges.

In documents concerning the history of the Kazakh people in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries it is difficult to separate the activity of a “Tatar” clerk from that of a “Tatar” mullah or teacher. Often these were all one and the same person. One reason for this situation was the lack of funds sufficient to supply each member of the Kazakh aristocracy with his own clerk. Furthermore, the Kazakh elite held that a “Tatar” mullah, in light of his “learning” [*uchenost*], was needed not only as a spiritual figure, but also for “the reading of directives of the frontier authorities on various affairs and for writing responses to them,” and furthermore for the teaching of “Tatar literacy and the Mohammedan law [religion]” to their children.²⁰ For their part, Russian authorities saw no necessity of specially appointing clerks, since the Orenburg Assembly, as part of the Russian Empire’s state apparatus, was expected to prioritize “reliability and assistance in furthering the government’s worthy goals” in its selection of candidates who would serve as “Tatar” mullahs. This imperative defined the character and essence of the activity of such mullahs in the Kazakh Steppe. Aside from fulfilling their primary duties as religious officials, mullahs were also supposed to promote submission to the empire’s laws among their co-religionists, to aid in terminating their “predation and raids” [*khishchnichestvo i nabegi*] on the frontier line, to instill “peace and tranquility” among the Kazakh clans, and – most importantly – to keep tabs on the mood of the Kazakh aristocracy and to “provide information” on events in the steppe in a timely fashion.²¹ Russian authorities, in turn, promised a system of benefits and privileges “depending on the degree of loyalty and ardor” [*po mere vernosti i tshchaniia*] of their service.²² In principle, this was a mutually advantageous arrangement: the fact that “Tatars” could not expect such well-being and career advancement in Russia’s central provinces would presumably induce them to serve in the Kazakh Steppe.

It is difficult to determine the specific number of mullahs living in the Kazakh Steppe. Despite Catherine’s decrees, the Orenburg provincial board could not completely control mullahs’ departure for that region. Petr Essen, who became Orenburg governor-general in 1817, drew attention to the purely formal character of confirmation of “Tatar” mullahs, who lived not only among the well-known Kazakh clan leaders, but also among the “entirely unknown and insignificant” elders. He came to the conclusion that, in the steppe, “Tatar” mullahs were engaged not with fulfilling their formal obligations, but “more with promoting their own profits” through trade.²³ These observations were based on the postulate that the principal purpose of “Tatar” mullahs was to reconcile the interests of various groups in nomadic Kazakh society to the policies of the empire itself.²⁴

The collection of information now began in response to the demands of the Orenburg governor: How many mullahs and clerks were sent into the Kazakh

Steppe, and with whom were they to be affiliated there? All the received data was accumulated in the archival file “On the assignment of mullahs and clerks to the Kirgiz [Kazakh] Horde, their retirement and awards.”²⁵ This file includes lists of those mullahs who were assigned to influential Kazakh sultans and elders and who were confirmed in those positions by the Orenburg Assembly and the local provincial board. There were over twenty such persons, five from the third Mishar canton, and seventeen from the ninth Bashkir canton. Naturally, there were actually many more of them in the Kazakh Steppe, since “Tatar” mullahs and clerks were assigned in response to the private requests of Kazakh khans, sultans, and elders, and such appointments were not always handled in a strictly formal fashion. Usually members of the Kazakh aristocracy requested mullahs who enjoyed “particular respect before their peer religious officials of the Mohammedan law” and were familiar with the laws of the Russian Empire, which would allow them to better understand the decrees and directives of the authorities.²⁶ Their petitions often pointed to a particular person with whom they were already familiar.²⁷ In 1809, Khan Vali of the Middle Juz requested appointment of “Tatar” mullahs specifically from the first Mishar canton, based on the proposition that the clerks for his father, Ablai Khan, had been Mishars from the Cheliabinsk district who “were distinguished by zeal and knowledge,” and that the sultans of the Junior Juz, who had acquired “learned” mullahs from Russia, were in many respects enjoying greater success than the sultans of the Middle Juz.²⁸

“Tatar” mullahs were also needed in conjunction with the establishment of the first administrative entities in the Kazakh Steppe, the border councils [*pogranichnye raspravy*]. These were appointed as clerks with a salary of 100 rubles and travel funds of another 15 rubles.²⁹ With the elimination of the councils in 1804, these mullahs became confidants of the Orenburg Border Commission “for missions into the steppe on secret and important affairs,” since they had both experience and established contacts with representatives of the Kazakh elite.³⁰

Among other steppe regions, the Inner Horde was notable for the role and influence of “Tatar” mullahs. In 1853, Orenburg governor-general Vasiliĭ Perovskii wrote, “The administration of Dzhangir was most harmful for Russia on account of its propagation of Mohammedanism. An entire falange of mullahs, the most zealous instigators of insubordination to Russian authority and Russian law, appeared. Numbering 127, those mullahs were appointed by Dzhangir on his own authority.”³¹

An analysis of documents of the Orenburg Provincial Chancellery reveals the geographical origins of the appointed mullahs and clerks. They were Tatars from Kazan, Ufa, and Orenburg provinces; Mishars of the first and third Mishar cantons; and Bashkirs from the sixth, ninth, and twelfth cantons of the Bashkir host (these were close neighbors of the nomadic Kazakh clans of Tabyn, Tama, Zhagal-baily, and Zhappas).

The status of “Tatars” in the steppe was also a function of social origin and educational levels. “Tatar” mullahs, clerks, and traders were primarily from the state-peasant estate, while the posts of interpreters and translators in the regional frontier administrations were held by representatives of the titled Tatar aristocracy

(hereditary nobles or *murzas*). This circumstance was connected to the fact that by imperial Russia's order of estates, a candidate's selection for state service and placement in the service ranks presumed that he belonged to one of the country's privileged groups. Of course there were exceptions, but the local administration tried to place them in the first rank, since according to the Table of Ranks each person promoted out of the first and lowest rank was entitled to personal nobility.

Different levels of education were conditioned by the particular functions that these "Tatars" were called upon to fulfill. For mullahs and clerks the main requirement was a basic literacy in the Tatar language, so that they could properly read correspondence and produce a response.³² The activities of interpreters and translators, meanwhile, were conditioned by the role of the Orenburg region in the eastern policy of the empire: they needed to know not just Kazakh or Tatar, but also other eastern languages. Thus the chairman of the Orenburg Border Commission, Gavriil Veselitskii, in requesting the appointment of Abdulla Amirov – a Tatar from the village of Sterlibashevo who knew Persian and other languages – as a translator, underscored that the local administration "needs people who know eastern languages, especially for written translations."³³

Beyond this, in the course of their duties interpreters and translators produced detailed accounts of a political, economic, and military character for St. Petersburg and Orenburg, which required a certain level of education, the capacity to analyze information, and a certain set of intellectual horizons. As a rule, "Tatar" translators were graduates of Tatar schools and the Orenburg Military College.

In essence, in the eighteenth and nineteenth century a dynasty of "Tatar" scribes, interpreters, and translators formed. These were people with well-known surnames – Biglov, Batyrshin, Aitov, Enikeev, Subkhankulov – who began their work as registrars and junior interpreters and then attained high rank and reward. The formation of this dynasty testifies to a clear tendency involving the creation of a distinct professional group of translators. More than this, service records show that marriages were concluded within this social group, which was distinguished by a certain level of education, way of life, and system of values. I. M. Gvozdkova has noted the emergence of even a new social category of chancellery clerks "from the children of translators."³⁴ Adopting the theory of the American historian Gregory Freeze, one may say that these new layers of society that had adapted to the existing order took on the form of traditional hereditary estates, or *sosloviia*.³⁵

"Tatars" as informants for the Russian authorities

From the perspective of the Russian authorities, the activity of "Tatar" mullahs and clerks entailed "not so much the discharge of primary duties," but rather the provision of "intelligence about circumstances [in the steppe]" and the promotion of a spirit of loyalty to the Russian Empire among their co-religionists there.³⁶ Thus the ensign I. Muravin, who was situated with Khan Abulkhair of the Junior Juz in 1742–43, reported that mullah Al'mukhammet, "in accordance with his oath to H[is] I[mperial] M[ajesty], serves zealously and quickly reports what he

learns.³⁷ On 8 July 1747, in a report to the College of Foreign Affairs, Orenburg governor Ivan Nepliuev likewise highlighted Al'mukhammet's merits, in light of his provision of "necessary" information. In Nepliuev's opinion this information was very valuable, since Al'mukhammet "has access to all of the secrets" [*vo vsekh sekretakh upotrebliaetsia*] of Khan Abulkhair. For his "loyalty and zeal" in providing information, the clerk received 20 rubles in 1747,³⁸ and two years later, for providing the Orenburg administration with a copy of a letter from Khan Nuraly to the Jungar ruler, he received a reward of 35 rubles as well as an annual pay increase "of fifteen rubles, secretly from the others."³⁹

A mullah of the first Mishar canton, Munasyp Mashmetov, upon his appointment to Khan Ablai of the Middle Juz, "promised to provide, and does provide, information about the actions of the Kirgiz [Kazakh] leadership," among other things about the relations between sultan Ablai and China. He reported that sultan Ablai "disingenuously appears zealous towards the Chinese, only for the sake of profit," and that his relation to the Russian Empire "benefits significantly from his status as a subject here [i.e., in Russia]." More than this, the informant emphasized that sultan Ablai "wishes to send his son to the Troitsk fortress as a hostage [*amanat*]."⁴⁰ For Mashmetov's consistent provision of detailed information, the College of Foreign Affairs granted him a salary of 12 rubles, which were dispensed "secretly" so that Kazakhs "cannot have suspicions of the scribe."⁴¹ In all fairness, these were minimal sums, since by being in the steppe such officials often endangered their lives. Thus the scribe Al'mukhammet informed the regional authorities that he "lives in fear for his life [*v smertnom strakhe zhivet*]," was frequently "abused" by Khan Abulkhair, and "can save himself only by leaving." However, governor Nepliuev exhorted him "to continue his loyalty," and imposed upon him to remain with the khan at least "until the next summer," in 1748.⁴²

There were also cases of "Tatar" interpreters being taken into captivity by Kazakhs. Thus from November of 1746 until June of 1747 Usman Araslanov, an interpreter for the Orenburg Chancellery, was in captivity under Khan Abulkhair, having become a hostage of worsening relations between the khan and Orenburg governor Nepliuev. Abulkhair demanded the return of the son of sultan Kozhakhmet, who was then in Kazan as a hostage, in return for which he would release the interpreter from the steppe.⁴³

The information that "Tatars" provided was of varying sorts,⁴⁴ from data on relations of the Kazakh elite with neighboring people and countries to the situation among the Kazakhs themselves, the location of nomadic encampments, and so on. The "declarations," "résumés," and reports provided by translators, clerks, and mullahs were handled in a special division of the chancellery of the Orenburg governor-general, which testifies to the particular significance and secrecy of the information in question.⁴⁵ On the basis of the sorted data, more substantive reports were produced, and an effort was made to produce a generalized picture of the internal political situation in the Kazakh Steppe, as well as to sketch out the contours of further actions and possible future orientations of imperial policy. The Orenburg provincial board often made the following resolution on such dispatches: "Commend [the authors] for their composition of thorough reports,

promise [them] the kindness of the authorities, and so on . . .”⁴⁶ It is important to note that the activity of “Tatar” translators and interpreters was divided up among different parts of the steppe. If, for example, the “Tatar” translator Roman Urazlin gathered information on the activities of the khans and sultans of the Middle Juz,⁴⁷ then Usman Araslanov and Araslan Bekmetov collected data on the Junior Juz.⁴⁸ The dispatches of the authorities in the Orenburg region to the College of Foreign Affairs were based on the information that they provided. At the same time, the dispatches that Nepliev sent to the Senate were distinct in that he described in a detailed fashion “for what purposes and with which instructions” he had dispatched the translators and what information he had accordingly received.

The dispatches of Ufa and Simbirsk governor-general Osip Igel'strom to St. Petersburg on the introduction of a new system of administration and on the Kazakh movement under Srym Datov (1783–97) were generally based on the reports of collegial assessor Mendiiar Bekchurin and the *akhun* Mukhamedzhan Khusainov of the mosque in Seitov Posad, the latter of which later became mufti. It was presumably for this reason that their careers flourished in the 1770s–1790s.

With the introduction of supervisors [*pristavy*] over the khans in the first half of the nineteenth century, and then over ruling sultans, and with the creation of guardianships [*popechitel'stva*] among the Kazakhs along the empire's defensive line, reports began to acquire a fuller and more systematic character. As an official representative of the Russian government and an advisor to the ruling sultan, the supervisor had extensive authority, and he “thoroughly and vigilantly” oversaw the morals and customs of the Kazakhs under his jurisdiction, guided the ruling sultan towards orientations beneficial to the empire, and gathered detailed intelligence. It was primarily translators – officials of the Orenburg Border Commission – that were appointed to this post. Often such officers had at their disposal confidants, whom they would send out into the steppe for the collection of information. As Dobrosmyslov emphasized, such “confidants were Tatars as well.”⁴⁹ One of the first to have taken the position of a supervisor's confidant in 1818 was Utdin Rakhmetullin, a Bashkir of the Ninth Bashkir canton, “who has tuned out to have a talent for this position.”⁵⁰

“Tatars” as representatives of the Russian authorities

The activity of “Tatars” in the steppe was shaped by the fact that in the process of interacting with the Kazakh population they conferred legitimacy on the actions of the Russian administration. They frequently served as arbiters of disputes both among Kazakh clans and between Kazakhs and the Russian population. Thus the mullah Zhamaletdin Gismatullin, who was assigned to sultan Algazy (the brother of Khan Shirgazy of the Junior Juz), helped to terminate the “internecine accusations and disagreements” that had appeared between two large tribal confederations of the Junior Juz, Baiuly and Zhetyru.⁵¹ Mullah Iskhak Isbulatov, affiliated with sultan Shigai Nuralikhanov, resolved disputes between Russians and Kazakhs along the defensive line, “attaining justice for the offended group.”⁵² Mullah Asfendiiar Abdukhakinov, under sultan Medetgali, made “a special effort to locate Bashkirs’

stolen horses in the steppe and to secure their return to their owners.”⁵³ Mullah Gabdulsamat Buliakov, assigned to Khan Shirgazy of the Junior Juz, showed “zeal in securing the return of Russian prisoners” taken by Kazakhs, for which he was promoted to the rank of officer [*uriadnik*]. Mullah Seifulla Faizullin, affiliated with sultan Seidaly Nuralin, sorted out the mutual accusations of Kazakhs and Russians. And *akhun* Nigmatulla Suiundykov, of the Ninth Bashkir canton, was able to convey to Kazakh clans migrating along the Ural river “an understanding of Russian laws,” and thus facilitated “the maintenance among them of peace and tranquility.”⁵⁴

These cases once again confirm the intermediary role of “Tatars” in the resolution of problems that were important to the Russian administration at the turn of the eighteenth century into the nineteenth: the return of prisoners; the regulation of relations between Russians and Kazakhs along the defensive line; land disputes between Kazakhs and Bashkirs, Kazakhs and Kalmyks, Kazakhs and Cossacks, etc. Many of the actions undertaken by “Tatar” mullahs produced the desired result. But how was this attained? By means of “admonitions,” “exhortation,” and “suggestion” [*uveshchevaniia, nastavleniia, vnusheniia*] in the course of everyday interactions with representatives of the Kazakh aristocracy and population, and of course also by the real power that had been granted to such mullahs by the Russian administration.

That good knowledge that “Tatars” had of the nomadic lifestyle and of the customs and language of the Kazakh people, and the experience they acquired in the settlement of claims of Kazakhs and the Russian authorities against one another, were also used by the administration in the introduction of the first administrative institutions in the steppe. Thus Ufa and Simbirsk governor-general Igel'strom sent the *akhun* Khusainov⁵⁵ and the translator Bekchurin into Kazakh encampments more than once during the creation of the Border Court [*Pogranichnyi sud*] and the border councils. He was counting on the authority of Khusainov, who had acquired “great respect” among Kazakhs on account of his spiritual office and enjoyed “excellent trust.” The translator Bekchurin, meanwhile, “as a most capable and reliable . . . Muslim,” could, “more than anyone,” resolve conflicts arising in the steppe.⁵⁶ Indeed, Khusainov and Bekchurin “subdued the tempers [of Kazakhs] by their conversations and admonitions,” and often induced them to take the decision desired by St. Petersburg or Orenburg.⁵⁷ Khusainov was also enlisted for the purposes of counteracting Central Asian mullahs in the steppe.⁵⁸

Imperial authorities sought to attract “Tatar” figures not only for their “admonitions,” but also for their very real participation in newly created institutions for the administration of the steppe. Thus primary leadership of the Khan's Council [*khanskii sovet*], opened on 6 June 1797, was given to Khusainov, as mufti of the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly. Later, the Council was joined by *akhun* Mukhametzhhan Kaziev, a native of Kazan province who had traveled throughout the encampments of the Kazakh clans and encouraged “order and submission” to the laws of the empire.⁵⁹

In 1823 three “Tatar” mullahs were incorporated into a “special” commission, established by Orenburg governor-general Essen, along with the khan of the Junior

Juz, sultans, and influential elders. Moreover, it was stated that the members of this commission should without fail include Abdrakhman Mukhametsharifov, a mullah from Seitov Posad who enjoyed “the particular trust and respect” of the Kazakh people and would thus be particularly well suited for bringing the Junior Juz into a “peaceful condition.” The goal of the commission was to examine complaints, from both Russians and Kazakhs, on matters of “various thefts” [*raznye pokhishcheniia*] that had occurred over the previous two years, and to secure the liberation of Russian prisoners, livestock that had been driven away, etc.⁶⁰

In the 1840s–1860s, “Tatars” – as both translators and experts – were always included in commissions created by both central and regional authorities for the establishment of administrative institutions in the steppe and the resolution of land disputes between Kazakhs and Cossacks.⁶¹ More than this, the Russian administration exploited the experience and knowledge of the translator S. Batyrshin by appointing him to the position of ruling sultan of the western portion of the Orenburg Kazakhs for four months from November 1865 to March 1866.⁶² This was, in essence, the first attempt to replace members of the Kazakh population with a representative of Russian authority at the middle level of administration.

The intermediary work of “Tatars” is also clearly evident in the first half of the nineteenth century, a period of desperate resistance of the Kazakh people to imperial efforts at extensive reform of the Kazakh Steppe. They served in the capacity of arbiters in relations between the Kazakh population and the regional authorities, and helped in the “explanation of the illegal acts” of insurgent Kazakhs during the liberation movement under Isatai Taimanov and Makhambet Utemisov (in the case of translators Iskander Batyrshin and Mukhamed-Sharif Aitov),⁶³ and under Eset Kotebarov (in the case of translator S. Batyrshin).⁶⁴

Such translators also managed to register the establishment of “illegal ties” between “certain Tatars” and the insurgent Kazakhs. Thus, they reported, a certain Tatar trader, Ustankudai Shukurov, was linked to the mutinous Kazakhs, for example Kutebar, Arslan, and others, who had engaged in “harmful and rapacious enterprises” [*vrednye khishchnicheskie predpriiatia*].⁶⁵ On the basis of these dispatches, on 3 July 1839 Orenburg military governor Perovskii instructed the head of the Orenburg customs administration “to prohibit in the sternest possible terms the visitation of the villages of rebellious Kirgiz [Kazakhs]” by Tatar bailiffs who were acquainted with “the mutinous clans and their leaders” and who, under the guise of trade in the steppe, were providing them “with gunpowder and other supplies,” giving them “information and directives of our government without permission,” and encouraging in them “a spirit of enmity and insubordination” towards the Russian authorities. For violating this instruction, they would be subjected to the empire’s general laws as “noxious spies and traitors.”⁶⁶

The role of “Tatars” in the formation of St. Petersburg’s Central Asian policy

The proximity of Kazakh nomadic encampments to the Caspian and Aral Seas and to the borders of the khanates of Khiva and Kokand, and also Orenburg’s

rule as a bulwark for the conduct of Russia's Central Asian policy, had the effect of widening the sphere of activity of "Tatar" translators. The unique configuration of the region and its tremendous distance from St. Petersburg endowed the governors of Orenburg with a mission different than the one pertaining to Russia's internal provinces. The government was in constant need of reliable information in order to develop a strategy with regard to Khiva and Kokand, and also in order to ascertain the intentions of the British in Central Asia.⁶⁷ Information was needed not just about this or that person, but also about the topography of a given locale, its geological relief, its flora, and its water resources. To the extent that even the geographical data about natural resources and climatic conditions were limited, it is not surprising that such information made its way to the Russian authorities through translators, who were attached to the official embassies and trade caravans that visited Orenburg from Khiva, Kokand, and Bukhara. Contact with their retinues allowed for the acquisition of "the needed information" about the character and purpose of the embassies, the identities of the most influential officials, and the size and combat-readiness of the armies of those neighboring states.⁶⁸

"Tatar" merchants collected information by questioning the caravan heads, merchants, and bailiffs who arrived in Orenburg for trade. In their reports, they informed the local administration about what they had heard from those Kazakhs and from residents of Tashkent who had come for trade. This included, for example, preliminary intelligence about diplomatic missions that were soon to arrive from adjacent khanates.⁶⁹ Moreover, Tatar merchants had a certain influence on their fellow Muslim colleagues. Thus Petr Demezov, a translator with the Orenburg Border Commission, and Ivan Vitkevich, an ensign in Orenburg Line Battalion no. 10, reported that "the views of Bukharans are under the significant influence of Tatars who are Russian subjects living in borderland regions and who trade with the Kirgiz [Kazakhs] and the states of Turkestan."⁷⁰

For their active cooperation in the empire's Central Asian policy, a series of "Tatar" translators were promoted in the ranks and rewarded with medals: on 23 March 1811, "for zealous execution" of his duties, Abdunasyr Subkhankulov was rewarded with a gold medal on a red ribbon and a one-time payment of 750 rubles.⁷¹ In September of 1840, Mukhamed-Sharif Aitov, a translator for the Orenburg Border Commission, received the rank of lieutenant for his assistance in the liberation of more than 500 Russian prisoners in Khiva.⁷² In 1862, S. Batyrshin attained the rank of court counsellor for his work in 1854–59 of accompanying Bukharan and Khivan embassies to St. Petersburg as a bailiff and a Russian embassy to Khiva and Bukhara as a dragoman.⁷³

The turning point in St. Petersburg's steppe policy: the rejection of "Tatars"

As early as the first decades of the nineteenth century, in response to the requests of some Kazakh leaders for permission to apply Sharia law to judicial practice in the steppe "for the resolution of internecine affairs," Russian officials declared that putting the principles of Muslim law into practice would complicate Kazakhs'

“adoption of the standards of the general state order.” However, even as late as the 1850s such tendencies could not take firm hold, on account of both foreign-policy considerations and a resulting inertia in the thinking of regional authorities. Nonetheless, a change in the position of the Kazakh Steppes by the mid-1860s – whereby those territories now appeared to be a sufficiently well integrated part of the empire – inclined the state’s highest leadership and its regional representatives to undertake a radical reconsideration of role of “Tatars” as participants in Russia’s imperial policy and conduits of imperial influence.

Indeed, the mid-nineteenth century should be seen as a fundamental turning point in the relations of imperial authorities to “Tatars,” who, as one document asserted, “cannot be considered useful accomplices in the matter of establishing Russian civilization [*rusaskaia grazhdanstvennost’*] in the steppe.”⁷⁴ This was connected to a series of factors having to do with country’s foreign policy. First of all, by the mid-nineteenth century Russia had expanded very close to the borders of the Central Asian khanates, where the population was largely Muslim. Moreover, the country also now bordered Muslim states, which called forth the apprehension of the Russian administration about the behavior of Russia’s own Muslims. Second, the tendency to reconsider the intermediary role of “Tatars” was strengthened as a result of the resettlement of a segment of the Crimean Tatar population from Russia to the Ottoman Empire. The government was concerned about the consolidation of the empire’s Turkic peoples under the aegis of Turkey, since in the opinion of regional authorities Tatars working in the steppe had a channel for the dissemination of their influence on co-religionists.⁷⁵ This sense of danger was only strengthened by events in another borderland region, the Polish insurrection of 1863–64. Russian authorities saw in the “Tatarization” of the Kazakhs an analogue to the process of Polonization in Russia’s western borderlands. Even within the framework of the Russian state, Polish cultural expansion gradually encompassed groups of the population that might otherwise have been the objects of Russification and eventually become part of the Russian nation.⁷⁶ The influence of Tatars was increasingly construed as a similar obstacle to Kazakhs’ Russification. Third, in the 1860s, Russian commercial expansion was directed toward the southeastern borderlands, where it encountered competition in the form of “Tatar” merchants who had already conquered the market of that territory.⁷⁷ Meanwhile, two legislative acts also played a distinct role in the government’s change of tactics: “The Statute on Bashkirs” (14 May 1863) and a provision “On the Transfer of the administration of Bashkirs from Military to Civilian Jurisdiction” (2 July 1865). Both of these concerned the Muslim Bashkirs living adjacent to Kazakhs, and both testified to changes in the region’s internal political situation. A final factor was the formulation of a set of new national priorities concerning the creation of a “unified and indivisible Russia” by way of a common language (Russian) and a common religion (Orthodoxy).

In this context, the question arose as to whether a Muslim could become a citizen of an Orthodox state. The answer to this question was contested and seemed to require the study of “the Muslims’ world.” As a result, in 1854 the Kazan Ecclesiastical Academy became a center for the scholarly study of Islam.⁷⁸ As the

orientalist Vasilii Bartol'd noted, the study of Islam occurred under the influence of Eurocentrism, which presupposed a fundamental distinction between East and West and the incompatibility of Islam with the conception of progress.⁷⁹ Knowledge about Muslims on the part of Russia's state and public was created through the work of missionaries, orientalists, and the regional administration, which were all in direct contact with Muslims or studied them on the basis of books by Western scholars, who ascribed to them fanaticism, religious intolerance, exclusivity, ignorance, stagnation. And Muslims' resistance to European – in this case, Russian – culture and influence was construed as “fanaticism,” while varying degrees of “religious fanaticism” were ascribed to Russian Muslims. In this scheme the most fanatical – and thus the most dangerous – were the Volga Tatars, who exerted cultural influence on other Muslims.

By the mid-nineteenth century, Russian authorities saw the activity of “Tatars” as intermediaries in the Volga-Ural region and the Kazakh Steppe as resulting in the disturbing creation of a unified space based on the “Tatar” language, Islam, and a commonality of culture. Official documents accordingly began to speak of “Tatar domination” [*tatarskoe zasil'e*] as essentially the main threat to Russia's national interests in the southeast, which in turn presupposed efforts to limit the spread of “Tatar” culture and to weaken the influence of Islam, hence the effort to contrast “fanatical Tatars” to Kazakhs, with their own mentality and a distinctly nomadic way of life. Indeed, Kazakhs were assessed as being among the least “fanatical” of Russia's Muslims, and they accordingly needed to be “saved” by the authorities. Officials of the Department of Spiritual Affairs of the Foreign Confessions underscored that Muslims of the Volga-Ural region, who were “more advanced and more accustomed to fulfilling religious obligations by long-established order,” would be able to attain complete spiritual domination over their nomadic neighbors. One could even hear dark predictions – that the Kazakh people, as a people that was “capable of labor” and had the basis “for a better future,” was nonetheless “still . . . very weak,” and would lose these qualities “because of the strong development of fanaticism and the strengthening of the power of the Mohammedan clergy.” Kazakhs' “development may be choked off in its very embryonic stage.”⁸⁰

According to these conceptions, the existence of Islamic culture within the framework of an Orthodox state did not correspond to Russia's interests, hindered the policy of rapprochement, and finally was simply dangerous. In the 1860s the Orenburg authorities regularly sent the interior ministry reports and proposals demanding the enhancement of the authorities' control over Muslim officials. Most indicative in this regard were an 1865 report by Orenburg governor-general Nikolai Kryzhanovskii, “On the transformation of the Administration of the Spiritual Affairs of Muslims,” and a follow-up presentation to the interior ministry in 1867. Kryzhanovskii proposed maintaining all correspondence in Russian; providing all mullahs with a state salary in order to “prohibit all requisition [*pobory*]” on their part and to put them “in a position of dependence on the government”; and forbidding all “Tatars” from teaching literacy to Kazakh children. The concern, in short, was to establish state control over them,

since “inclinations that paralyze the efforts of the government” were “predominant” among the Muslim clergy.⁸¹

In his report to the ministry of education, “On the elimination of the harmful influence of Tatars and Bashkirs on the Kirgiz [Kazakhs],” the military governor of the Uralsk oblast drew the government’s attention also to “the harmful influence of Tatar traders” and proposed a series of measures in response: (1) the abolition of the right of Tatars to exemptions from duties on the conveyance of goods into the steppe; and (2) the establishment of “special certificates” for Tatar traders, which would allow for surveillance of their commercial activity in steppe regions.⁸²

Measures designed “to weaken Mohammedan fanaticism” in the Volga-Ural region and neighboring territories of the steppe, the source of which government circles saw in the “Tatar clergy,” were becoming a reality. Evidence for this can be seen in the activity of the Steppe Commission of 1865–68, which, alongside issues of administration, taxation, and justice, examined the confessional situation.⁸³ The introduction of the “Temporary Statute on the Administration of the Steppe regions of the Orenburg and Western Siberian governor-generalships” on 21 October 1868 represented a fundamental revision in the government’s position on administration of Kazakhs’ religious affairs. Those affairs were now removed from the jurisdiction of the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly and were transferred to civilian administration, and through it to the interior ministry.⁸⁴ Moreover, only one mullah and one mosque were now permitted in each canton [*volost*]. That mullah had to be a Kazakh and was to be both confirmed and dismissed by the military governor.

Consistently limiting the influence of “Tatars,” St. Petersburg aspired to present itself as the champion of Kazakh interests as a way of solidifying Russian influence. The Tatar language was regarded as one of the most powerful instruments of “Tatar” influence, and therefore authorities developed propositions about the need for the “defense” of the Kazakh language and the promotion of its spread as a transitional stage on the road to the Russification and Christianization of the Kazakh population. At the same time, there was no full agreement among the representatives of various regional state structures about the role of “Tatar” language in Kazakh society. Lev Balliuzek, the military governor of the Turgai (Torghay) oblast (1869–77), openly expressed disagreement with the head of the Kazan educational district, Petr Shestakov, and the missionary Nikolai Il'minskii about the necessity of “strengthening Russian influence” by means of eradicating the Tatar language. Balliuzek believed that at the initial stage the Tatar language “is a more effective conduit for the information, knowledge, and outlooks [among Kazakhs] that are useful to the Russian cause” than was the Russian alphabet, which “is presently known to a paltry percent” of literate Kazakhs.⁸⁵ Il'minskii was also warned about the complications of transferring the Kazakh language to the Cyrillic alphabet by Ibrai Altynsarin in a letter of 31 August 1871: “One must keep in mind that a break of the Kirgiz [Kazakhs] from the Tatar reading and writing is impossible before the distant future, at the very least . . .”⁸⁶ At the same time, Il'minskii and the education minister, Dmitrii Tolstoi (1866–80), believed that the process of Kazakhs’ “Tatarization” needed to be stopped, and that Kazakhs could

be taught the Russian language “with the help of their native Kirgiz [Kazakh] language and textbooks in that language printed with Russian script, but by no means the Arabic.”⁸⁷

As we see, the authorities considered an accelerated policy of “rapprochement” to be a precondition for the weakening of the “harmful” influence of “Tatars,”⁸⁸ and placed its faith in the Russian language and the introduction of Russian classes in Muslim institutions of learning. In this matter, interior minister Dmitrii Tolstoi (1882–89) wrote that such a measure “does not concern the religious feelings and local way of life” among Kazakhs. The government’s fundamental goal was “to cut off the inroads of Muslim propaganda by purely administrative directive.”⁸⁹

The government’s plan of 1870, “On Measures for the education of non-Russians [*inorodtsy*] populating Russia,” laid the foundation for the creation of educational institutions of a new kind: “Russian-Kirgiz [Kazakh]” schools, which were designed “to supplant the multitude of small schools” maintained by Tatars.⁹⁰ On the basis of this plan, regional authorities worked out plans “for counteracting Tatar influence,” which included prohibiting Kazakhs from studying in “Tatar schools,” increasing the number of Russian-Kazakh schools, and the expulsion of “Tatar mullahs” from the steppe.⁹¹ As a result, the minister of education, after consultation with the interior ministry and the chief procurator of the Orthodox Holy Synod, published a directive of 23 October 1888 prohibiting the teaching of “Mohammedan doctrine” [*magometanskoe uchenie*] in Tatar in the educational institutions of the Orenburg educational district.⁹² The fundamental precondition “for occupying a spiritual post” in the steppe, meanwhile, became knowledge of the Russian language.⁹³

The government’s position also became harsh with regard to the construction of mosques and houses of prayer in the Kazakh Steppe. At the end of the 1870s the Kazakh population of the Turgai oblast had not more than fifteen mosques for fifty cantons, so that there were between five thousand and ten thousand souls for each mosque, even as a decree of 23 August 1763 allowed one mosque for each five hundred souls.⁹⁴ Even so, in 1883 interior minister Tolstoi published a directive noting that “given the goal of limiting further Islamization, the construction of new mosques for the Kirgiz [Kazakhs] is undesirable.”⁹⁵ In this case an equivalency was established between the term “Islamization” and the concept of “Tatarization,” which had been introduced by the government. Therefore, in the 1870s to 1890s none of the Kazakh petitions requesting the opening of new mosques or houses of prayer received satisfaction.

In a parallel fashion, the Russian authorities established control over the appointment of “Tatar” clerks to Kazakh clan leaders. In his directives to the military governor of Turgai oblast, education minister Tolstoi underscored that Tatar clerks “can be very dangerous in the steppe in a political sense.” Therefore, he concluded, in order to eliminate “the important administrative mistake” of the eighteenth century, it was necessary to replace “Tatar” clerks with Kazakh or Russian officials.⁹⁶ In 1876 the government accordingly issued a directive “On the replacement of Tatar translators in the steppe with native Kirgiz [Kazakhs].” In order to attract Kazakhs with a knowledge of Russian to the position of clerks at canton

boards, the government developed a system of incentives that included rewarding such officials with medals, certificates of merit, and gifts.⁹⁷ Simultaneously, a list of Kazakhs studying in Russian schools was drawn up. Thus eighty-one Kazakhs were studying in Russian-Kazakh schools in Turgai oblast in 1883.⁹⁸

At the same time, the government began contemplating the idea of replacing the Tatar language, written with Arabic script, as the bureaucratic language of the steppe with the Kazakh language using Russian letters.⁹⁹ Vasilii Radlov [Wilhelm Radloff], the inspector of Tatar, Bashkir, and Kazakhs schools for the Kazan educational district, supported this proposal since he thought that this would initiate a natural outflow of Tatar translators from the steppe.¹⁰⁰ A review of the bureaucratic organization of the canton boards of Turgai oblast, under the direction of the military governor there in 1882, revealed that at the lower levels of the administration of Kazakhs a replacement of “Tatar” clerks by Russian and Kazakh officials had already occurred. Thus among the clerks serving in thirty-seven cantons of Turgai oblast, there were two Kazakhs, three Tatars, one Bashkir, and thirty-one Russians.¹⁰¹ The reason for this change in the composition of the staff was the transfer of bureaucratic correspondence in the districts of Turgai oblast into the Cyrillic alphabet. At the first stage this affected the boundary districts of Aktiubinsk and Kustanai, where Russian language and literacy had received greater dissemination, while the remaining centers of population were affected in the next stage.¹⁰²

The logic of the government’s subsequent actions involved a prohibition on publishing directives in Tatar in all structures of imperial power, which would otherwise constitute indirect recognition “of the predominant significance of the Tatar language, as a dialect [*narechie*] supposedly common to all non-Russians of various ethnicities [*vse raznoplemennye inorodtsy*].”¹⁰³ Newly arising conditions compelled the government, in its subsequent Steppe Statute of 1891, to limit the duties of mullahs and to restrict their functions to serving only as “teachers of the faith,” and to regard their interference in the affairs of family and property as an “unauthorized appropriation of power” subject to criminal punishment.

And finally, in the 1890s, the issue arose as to whether there was even a legal basis for Tatars’ residence in the steppe. By the Temporary Statute of 1868, Tatars had enjoyed the right to be ascribed to towns and settlements in the Kazakh Steppe, but could not make use of the “privileges” that were granted to the Russian population there. By the “Steppe Statute” of 1891 even those limited rights were now withdrawn, and by article 136 Tatars were forbidden from settling in the steppe and having real property there.¹⁰⁴ Tatar petitions to regional and central state institutions about the limitation of their rights serves as clear evidence for their changing legal status. Among others, the Tatars of Seitov Posad emphasized in such petitions that almost two hundred years earlier the government had regarded them as subjects with full rights, “in both a civil and a religious sense,” but that now, even as they had made substantial contributions to the development of the Orenburg region, “[our] rights are being limited more and more.”¹⁰⁵ Petitions from Tatars living in Irgiz and Karabutak remarked that although trade in those settlements had developed thanks to their efforts, they did not have the right to maintain property and to settle there.¹⁰⁶ Thus we see that at the end of the nineteenth century

there was a rejection of “Tatars” as agents of an intermediary mission that the Russian government had previously ascribed to them.

Conclusion

As we have seen, in the eighteenth century the Russian state actively assisted the introduction of “Tatar” mullahs, clerks, translators, and merchants into the Kazakh Steppe. Endowing them with clearly articulated intermediary functions, the state made use of their help to strengthen its position. In essence, “Tatars” became an element of imperial administration in the steppe, serving as intermediaries between the authorities and the local population. But later on that course was abandoned. The reforms of the second half of the nineteenth century narrowed the functions of “Tatars,” initially by limiting the scope of their duties as intermediaries, and subsequently by seeking to displace altogether those Muslims who originated in the Volga region and the southern Urals from the territory inhabited by Kazakhs. The administration increasingly became a system in which Russian officials occupied the leading position.

What, then, were the consequences for Kazakhs of the mediation provided by “Tatars”? The foregoing material allows us to identify six broad observations by way of answering this question.

First of all, Tatar translators and interpreters, in light of their specific functions, kept service records and “travel registers” [*putevye zhurnaly*].¹⁰⁷ Their knowledge of the Kazakh language, culture, and way of life, and their extensive missions, often lasting for a year or more, facilitated a better and more thorough collection of a variety of information about the Kazakh Steppe and the activities of the Kazakh elite, and thereby assisted the accumulation of historical and ethnographic material about the Kazakh people. That material is valuable because it was produced by eyewitnesses of events in the Kazakh Steppe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Moreover, the personal relationships that these “Tatars” had with khans, sultans, *bïys*, and elders, and the fact that their own observations were combined with the Kazakh elite’s explanations of various aspects in Kazakh life, enhances the significance of this material. It was, moreover, partly on the basis of their reports that regional authorities worked out projects and plans for the development of trade, the improvement of administration, and changes in nomadic society.¹⁰⁸

Second, we might ask: How did representatives of the Kazakh elite and rank-and-file nomads perceive the activity of these “Tatars” – as those of “Russian officials,” “co-religionists,” or “enemies”? The surviving documents speak, above all, about the attitude of the elite, for whom such Tatars were in service and with whom they naturally had constant interactions. Here, there is a very wide range of attitudes about Tatar officials – from “good-for-nothing” and “traitor,”¹⁰⁹ to recognition as a “son,”¹¹⁰ “a religious leader and respected akhun,”¹¹¹ and “a guide in all our affairs.”¹¹²

The attitude of the Kazakh elite towards “Tatars” is also reflected in their many petitions for the reward of mullahs and clerks with ranks, official deeds, and gifts. These petitions reflect the Kazakh elite’s understanding of these rewards as

symbols of power of the Russian Empire, while also demonstrating their establishment of trusted relations with those “Tatars” and their gratitude for their services. Recognizing “Tatar” mullahs and clerks as conduits for the government’s policy, the Kazakh elite justified their requests for reward by noting that the “Tatars” had provided “instructions and advice”; had clarified the content of the Russian Empire’s “laws” to all Kazakh “nomadic clans”; had encouraged “good behavior and submission to the authorities placed over them”; had “indefatigably sought to admonish the people” for the purposes of establishing “peace and tranquility” among them; and “had fulfilled their service obligations vigilantly and with complete loyalty.”¹¹³

At the same time, in the consciousness of the rank-and-file nomads in the first half of the nineteenth century, the image of the “Tatar” translator was less the image of a co-religionist, and more that of a representative of Russian authority, to whom one could appeal and submit a petition. Kazakhs had a different attitude towards Tatar traders, whom they regarded as “cunning,” “swindlers,” “dangerous,” etc. A reflection of this can be found in Kazakh proverbs, which have remained in popular memory.

Third, Tatars of the Volga-Ural region, who had previously been incorporated into the administrative institutions of imperial administration, undoubtedly exerted influence on the gradual alteration of the system of values and models of behavior among the Kazakh elite. Working in administrative institutions, Tatars took on the image of a non-Russian official who was working in Russian service and who enjoyed influence and respect among his fellow people and the authorities. For the Kazakh elite it was important to retain influence in the changing circumstances, and thus the “Tatar” translator offered a model of a non-Russian [*inorodets*] who had made a career for himself and has used his position to improve his condition and the service opportunities of his children. It was for this reason that Nikolai Il'minskii wrote that “Tatars” exerted greater influence on members of the Kazakh clan aristocracy than on poor Kazakhs¹¹⁴ – and not just because the children of Kazakh khans and sultans studied reading and writing with Tatar mullahs or were enrolled at madrasas in Seitov Posad, Kazan, or Ufa. By the end of the eighteenth century a situation had emerged in which only someone who knew how to read and write “in Tatar” could become influential and indispensable. Moreover, they understood that “especially zealous execution of the demands of the authorities” in the steppe would always be rewarded by imperial authorities.¹¹⁵ It is notable that in the first half of the nineteenth century Kazakhs who had studied in Russian educational institutions in Orenburg and Omsk appeared alongside “Tatars” as officials in the state’s administration. For the most part they were all members of the Kazakh elite, who had earlier adapted to new circumstances and who, by the strength of tradition, their level of education, and their administrative skills, were able to preserve their influence over Kazakh society up until as late as 1917.

Fourth, Tatar traders became the fundamental communication link in the establishment of an internal market for the Kazakh Steppe and the development of long-distance trade between Russia and Central Asia. The distribution of Tatars in almost all the more or less economically significant regions of the steppe

played a definite role in the urbanization and cultural modernization of Kazakh lands. Toward the end of the nineteenth century Tatars constituted 1.34 percent of Kazakhstan's population, primarily in villages, towns, and cities – where they occupied a solid position in trade.¹¹⁶ The distinguishing feature of their settlement was its compact nature. Tatars districts [*slobody*] were created in all cities of pre-revolutionary Kazakhstan, and to this day, with the name “Tatarka,” they remain a part of the toponymy of the cities of Kazakhstan.¹¹⁷

Fifth, one may speak separately about acts of charity on the part of Tatar merchants in the Kazakh Steppe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Many mosques and new-method maktab and madrasas in the Kazakh Steppe were built on the basis of the contributions of Tatar merchants.¹¹⁸

Finally, the activities of “Tatar” mullahs, clerks, and translators were evaluated in various ways by their contemporaries. It is well known that Chokan Valikhanov viewed Tatar-Muslim influence negatively, seeing it as an obstacle to Kazakhs' communion with Russian culture. Of course, he was under the influence of certain academic and government circles – ones that came out as defenders of the Kazakh language from its “Tatarization.” This was something that clearly impressed him, even though Russian authorities did not share his fundamental commitments to that language, seeing it as a transitory phase on the road towards the Kazakhs' Russification.¹¹⁹ The preservation of the Kazakh language was one of the foundations for Kazakh identity and thus was an issue of import to Kazakh enlighteners. The Kazakh intelligentsia took an especially keen interest in this question at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. The importance of establishing a Kazakh literary language free of “Tatarisms” was also addressed on the pages of the first Kazakh-language newspaper, *Dala Walayatining Gazeti* [*Newspaper of the Steppe Region*] (1888–1902)¹²⁰ and in the discussions of Tatar and Kazakh shakirds of the new-method (Jadid) schools “Galiia” and “Khusainiia.”¹²¹ At the same time, when members of the Kazakh intellectual elite perceived a danger of Russification for the Kazakh people at the start of the twentieth century, then tendencies towards Turkic and Muslim unity against the Russification policies of the empire began to take shape. And Tatar teachers, merchants, and entrepreneurs played an organizing role in that movement. At the beginning of the twentieth century, an intense cultural and philosophical rapprochement of the national intelligentsias of these Turkic peoples in the Russian empire was now on hand.

(Translated from Russian by Paul Werth)

Notes

- 1 The famous orientalist Vasilii Grigor'ev (1816–81), who headed the Orenburg Border Commission for eleven years, established that in the first half of the eighteenth century the government did not know the customs, language, and religion of the Kazakhs or “what makes them tick” [*pruzhinu, privodiashchuiu ikh v deistvie*]. V. V. Grigor'ev, “Russkaia politika v otnoshenii k Srednei Azii: Istoricheskii ocherk,” in V. P. Bezobrazova, ed., *Sbornik gosudarstvennykh znanii*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1874), 233–234.
- 2 *Materialy po istorii politicheskogo stroia Kazakhstana* (Alma-Ata, 1960), 246.

- 3 This problem is addressed in the following works: Aleksandr Vasil'ev, *Materialy k kharakteristike vzaimnykh otnoshenii tatar i kirgiz s predvaritel'nykh kratkim ocherkom etikh otnoshenii* (Orenburg, 1898); Vil' Galiev, "Tatary-perevodchiki, puteshestvenniki i diplomaty," *Kazan utlary/Ogni Kazani*, no. 1 (1975): 147–151; idem, *Karavannye tropy (Iz istorii obshchestvennoi zhizni Kazakhstana XVII – XIX vv.)* (Almaty, 1994); Allen Frank, "Tatarskie mully sredi kazakhov i kirgizov v XVIII–XIX vv.," *Kul'tura, iskusstvo tatarskogo naroda* (Kazan, 1993), 125–131; Grigorii Kosach, *Gorod na styke dvukh vekov: Orenburgskoe tatarskoe men'shinstvo i gosudarstvo* (Moscow, 1998); Gul'mira Sultangalieva, "Tatarskaia diaspora v konfessional'nykh svyaziakh kazakhskoi stepi XVIII–XIX vv.," *Vestnik Evrazii* 4 (2000): 20–37; idem, "Tatarskie i bashkirskie sluzhashchie v kazakhskoi stepi v XVIII–XIX vv.," *Etnopanorama* 3 (2000): 48–54; idem, "Seitovskii posad v novoi istorii Kazakhstana," *Iz istorii tatar Orenburzh'ia (k 260-letiiu Tatarskoi Kargaly): Sbornik materialov nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii* (Orenburg, 2005), 56–62; Anatolii Remnev, "Rossiiskaia imperiia i islam v kazakhskoi stepi (60–80-e gody XIX v.)," in *Rasy i narody: Sovremennye etnicheskie i rasovye problemy* 32 (2006): 238–277; idem, "Tatary v kazakhskoi stepi: Soratniki i soperniki Rossiiskoi imperii," *Vestnik Evrazii*, no. 4 (2006): 5–32.
- 4 Aidar Nogmanov, "Evolutsiia zakonodatel'stva o musul'manakh Rossii (vtoraia polovina XVI–pervaia polovina XIX v.)," in Rafael' Khakimov, ed., *Islam v tatarskom mire: Istoriia i sovremennost'* (Kazan, 1997), 135.
- 5 RGIA (Russian State Historical Archive), f. 821. op. 8. dd. 689, 690.
- 6 See Fagima Khisamova, *Tatarskii iazyk v vostochnoi diplomatii Rossii* (Kazan, 1999), which investigates the stages in the development of the Tatar language in diplomatic and official correspondence from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries.
- 7 In principle, Russian authorities were resurrecting a previous historical experience of using Tatars as translators in the country's initial contacts with the countries of what Vasilii Bartol'd called Anterior Asia [*Peredniaia Aziia*] – essentially lands of the Caucasus region – in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. See V. V. Bartol'd, *Istoriia izucheniiia Vostoka v Evrope i Rossii* (Leningrad, 1925), 182.
- 8 *Kazakhsko-russkie otnosheniia v XVI–XVIII vekakh: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov* (Alma-Ata, 1961), 279 (document 108).
- 9 "Ukaz Kollegii inostrannykh del ob opredelenii k khanu Nuraly dlia pis'mennykh del tatarina A. Nurmukhamedova i o vydache zhalovaniia" (2 November 1749), in Ivan Kraft, ed., *Sbornik uzakonenii o kirgizakh stepnykh oblastei* (Orenburg, 1898), 28.
- 10 *Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii* [henceforward: PSZ], first series, vol. 20, no. 14540: 461. See also Hamamoto's chapter in this volume (Chapter 2).
- 11 In just the year 1744 in Kazan province 418 of 536 mosques were destroyed. See V. V. Bartol'd, "Istoriia izucheniiia Vostoka v Evrope i Rossii," in *Sochineniia*, vol. 9 (Moscow, 1977), 409. In 1745 Russian authorities allowed the construction of a mosque in Seitov Posad, outside Orenburg and undertook all possible measures to prevent Orthodox missionary activity among Kazakhs and even, in the words of Aleksandr Dobrosmyslov, "feared giving even a hint that the promotion of Christianity among them was possible," in order not to antagonize them. Petr Rychkov, *Istoriia Orenburgskaia* (Orenburg, 1896), 12; A. I. Dobrosmyslov, *Turgaiskaia oblast': Istoricheskii ocherk* (Orenburg, 1898), 220.
- 12 Dmitrii Arapov, ed., *Islam v Rossiiskoi imperii: Zakonodatel'nye akty, opisaniie, statistika* (Moscow, 2001), 45–51 (documents 6–12).
- 13 That publication was subsequently repeated in 1789, 1790, 1796, and 1798. In 1800 a decision was made to allow the publication of Islamic religious literature without limitation, something that was taken up by the Asiatic printing house of Kazan University that was created precisely for this purpose. Lutsian Klimovich, *Islam v tsarskoi Rossii* (Moscow, 1936).

- 14 “O razreshenii priema na voennuiu sluzhbu i nagrazhdenie ofiterskim zvaniem tatarskikh murz i chinovnykh liudei” (1 November 1783) and “O pozvolenii kniaz'iam i murzam tatarskim pol'zovat'sia vsemi preimushchestvami rossiiskogo dvorianstva” (22 February 1784), PSZ, first series, vol. 21, no. 15861; *ibid.*, vol. 22, no. 15936.
- 15 Nikolai Il'minskii, *Vospominaniia ob I. Altynsarine* (Kazan, 1891), 166.
- 16 Mikhail Viatkin, *Batyr Srym* (Almaty, 1994), 244.
- 17 Ramil' Khairutdinov, “Tatarskaia feodal'naia znat' i rossiiskoe dvorianstvo: Problemy integratsii na rubezhe XVIII–XIX vv.,” in *Islam v tatarskom mire*, 84.
- 18 Dobrosmyslov, *Turgaiskaia oblast'*, 173; *idem*, “Zaboty imperatritsy Ekateriny II o prosveshchenii kirgizov,” *Trudy Orenburgskoi uchenoi arkhivnoi komissii*, vyp. 32 (1915): 170–173.
- 19 Aidar Nogmanov, “Musul'mane Volgo-Ural'skogo regiona v Rossiiskom zakonodatel'stve XIX v.,” in Matsuzato Kimitaka, ed., *Novaia volna v izuchenii etnopoliticheskoi istorii Volgo-Ural'skogo regiona: Sbornik statei* (Sapporo, 2003), 176–199. When mullahs were sent to the Kazakh Steppe their tax and labor obligations were ascribed to their local communities, and therefore on resolutions concerning this matter the governors of Orenburg would include the question, “Will his taxes be meticulously paid in his absence?” It is curious that the regional authorities were likewise worried that the children of such mullahs, accompanying their fathers into the steppe, “will be outside of their homeland and will be unfamiliar with the obligations of their status” and thus might not discharge them in the future. Many mullahs in fact went into hiding in the steppe and often did not register with the Spiritual Assembly. Clear evidence for this is the fact that “Tatar” mullahs lived with Zhan-tore khan (1805–09) and khan of the Inner Horde Bukei Nuraliiev (1811–15) and fulfilled the corresponding religious obligations for 35 years without any written authorization. GAOro (State Archive of Orenburg Oblast), f. 6, op. 10, d. 2060; *ibid.*, d. 4655, l. 5; *ibid.*, d. 864, l. 30.
- 20 GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 105, l. 1ob.
- 21 GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 2096a, l. 208ob.
- 22 GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 2060, l. 304.
- 23 GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, l. 2968, l. 367.
- 24 Of particular interest for understanding the functions that Russian authorities imposed on “Tatar” mullahs and clerks is the activity of the mullah Nigmatulla Faizullin. He began his career as a mullah for the influential *batyr* Bukembai, who stood at the head of one of the largest tribal confederations of the Junior Juz, Zhetyru. The Orenburg administration, seeking support from this notable *batyr*, emphasized that the mullah Faizullin “was distinguished by zeal and executes the necessary commissions with active success, soberly and appropriately, and with prudence admonished them [the Kazakhs] to turn to the true path.” Later, as a “reliable” [*blagonadezhnyi*] person, he was assigned as a clerk to the khans of the Junior Juz, Zhan-tore (1805–09) and Shirgazy (1812–24). Mullah Faizullin was able to establish good relations with both representatives of the Orenburg administration and the Kazakh khans, who more than once petitioned for his receipt of princely title [*tarkhanskoe zvanie*]. On 3 June 1820, Faizullin became the first “Tatar” mullah on the steppe to be rewarded with such an honorary title. The Orenburg administration’s favorable attitude toward the mullah changed around 1822, when Faizullin began to boycott all demands of the local administration and, according to a supervisor [*pristav*] of khan Shirgazy of the Junior Juz, colonel Gorikhvostov, not only neglected documentation in the khan’s chancellery, but also influenced the khan negatively as well. Therefore, his presence in the steppe became, in the eyes of the authorities, “not only useless, but even harmful.” Authorities began to shadow Faizullin, since they believed that “important documents remain in his possession.” Incidentally, his son Zilametdin Nigmatullin became a clerk and mullah for sultan Tauke Aishuakov in 1816. GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 427, l. 2; *ibid.*, d. 2096, ll. 261–262.

- 25 GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 2060.
- 26 GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 2096, l. 262.
- 27 Likewise, in 1816 sultan Arungazy requested the appointment, “for the conduct of written affairs,” of the mullah and cornet Rakhmetulla Murtazin, as a person who knew “the Russian system quite well.” See *Materialy po istorii Kazakhskoi SSR, 1785–1828*, vol. 4 (Moscow, 1940), 298 (document 107).
- 28 GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 2060, ll. 2–3; *ibid.*, d. 609.
- 29 Border councils were created in three large tribal confederations of the Junior Juz (Alimuly, Baiuly, and Zhetyru), where bureaucratic affairs were conducted by the Tatar clerks Ibragim Iskhaoov, Bektimir Sabitaev, Ishmukhamet Ishaliev, Nigmatulla Faizullin, and Gabdultanar Tuigunov. GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 105, l. 1ob.
- 30 GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 2060, l. 9; *ibid.*, d. 858, l. 1; *ibid.*, d. 105.
- 31 Indeed, by the mid-nineteenth century Tatars constituted more than half of the population of the settlements of Khanskaia stavka, Novaia Kazanka, and Talovka. In the opinion of Aleksandr Alektorov, the school inspector for the Turgai oblast, these were “secret mullahs” [*neglasnye mully*] who had settled throughout the Inner Horde. RGIA, f. 1294, op. 84, d. 5, ll. 3–3ob.; *Ibid.*, f. 1291, op. 82, d. 6, l. 2; Aleksandr Alektorov, “Chem i kak my sposobstvovali ukrepleniui musul'manstva v kirgizakh,” *Orenburgskii listok*, no. 48 (1890).
- 32 Not that such clerks were always able to do this. O. Iartsev, a translator in the Foreign Ministry’s Asiatic Department, wrote about the scribe of sultan Arungazy that he “knows neither Arabic nor Turkish . . . and even has difficulty coherently writing an ordinary document.” *Materialy po istorii Kazakhskoi SSR 4: 377–380* (document 124).
- 33 GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 209, l. 3.
- 34 Inga Gvozdkikova, *Bashkortstan nakamune i v gody krest'ianskoi voiny pod predvoditel'stvom E. Pugacheva* (Ufa, 1999), 44.
- 35 Gregory L. Freeze, “The *Soslovie* (Estate) Paradigm and Russian Social History,” *American Historical Review* 91, no. 1 (1986): 11–36.
- 36 GAOro, f. 6, op. 6, d. 172, ll. 1–1ob.
- 37 I. Muravin wrote that mullah Al'mukhammet constantly came to him and provided information that he had acquired, among other things about the khan’s relations with Kalmyks, Bashkirs, Jungars, etc. See *Kazakhsko-russkie otnosheniia v XVI–XVIII vekakh*, 278–279 (document no. 108).
- 38 *Kazakhsko-russkie otnosheniia v XVI–XVIII vekakh*, 362–363 (document no. 142).
- 39 Ivan Kraft, *Sbornik o kirgizakh stepnykh oblastei* (Orenburg, 1898), 28.
- 40 *Kazakhsko-russkie otnosheniia v XVI–XVIII vekakh*, 689 (document 271). Also important were the reports of a scribe under sultan Aishuak of the Junior Juz, Seit Kasimov (a Tatar trader from Seitov Posad in Orenburg province) about the relations of the Kazakhs of the Junior and Middle Juz with China, Khiva, and the Karakalpaks. *Kazakhsko-russkie otnosheniia v XVI–XVIII vekakh*, 561–563 (document 220); *ibid.*, 616 (document 239).
- 41 “Ukaz Kollegii inostrannykh del o naznachenii pisariu pri sultane Ablae godovogo zhalovaniia” (14 January 1762), in Kraft, *Sbornik uzakononii*, 89.
- 42 In this regard certain interesting parallels emerge. The murder of khan Abulkhair did indeed occur a year later, and the scribe went over into the service of sultan Nuraly. *Kazakhsko-russkie otnosheniia v XVI–XVIII vekakh*, 362–363 (document 142).
- 43 *Kazakhsko-russkie otnosheniia v XVI–XVIII vekakh*, 330–332 (document 129); *Ibid.*, 348, 356, 358, 361 (documents 135, 139, 141, and 142).
- 44 Mulla Gubaidulla Fetkullin, serving under Khan Esim of the Junior Juz (1795–97), reported to Orenburg governor Sergei Viazmitinov in 1796 about the intention of the Kazakh clan Baibakty to relocate their herds to the frontier line in response to a harsh winter and the resulting ruin of many Kazakhs. The Orenburg administration related to this information with considerable suspicion, as Srym Datov, who had been the leader

of the Junior Juz's resistance to Russian encroachments in 1783–97, was himself from the Baibakty clan. *Materialy po istorii Kazakhskoi SSR* 4: 186–187 (document 56).

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Abulfetikh Abdulsaliyev, an *akhun* in the Junior Juz, reported to Orenburg governor Grigorii Volkonskii about the difficult economic condition of the Kazakh population, among whom “peace and clam” had ended due to internecine conflict, and who now, he believed, stood “on the verge of destruction,” for “their efforts to ruin one another, the abduction of children, insubordination to their clan leaders [*biys*] and elders is leading inexorably to their fall.” Presumably, the information provided by the *akhun* became the basis for Volkonskii's proposal to Alexander I to end the practice of *barymta*, a method of dispute resolution among nomads by which an offended party would drive away another nomad's livestock. *Materialy po istorii Kazakhskoi SSR* 4: 217–224 (document 66).

- 45 GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 2060, ll. 45–49.
- 46 TsGA RK (Central State Archive of the Republic of Kazakhstan), f. 4, op. 1, d. 5594, l. 569.
- 47 *Materialy po istorii Bashkirskoi ASSR*, chast' 1 (Moscow, 1936), 323–24 (document 147); *Kazakhsko-russkie otnosheniia v XVI–XVIII vekakh*, 268 (document 103).
- 48 *Materialy po istorii Bashkirskoi ASSR* 1: 360–61 (document 164); 365 (document 166).
- 49 Dobrosmyslov, *Turgaiskaia oblast'*, 217.
- 50 GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 1868, l. 1.
- 51 GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 2060, ll. 1–2.
- 52 Iskhak Isbulatov was a mullah of the Third Mishar Canton. GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 2060, l. 148.
- 53 For this the Mishar Asfendiir Abdukhaniev of the Second Mishar Canton earned the rank of lieutenant. TsGA RK, f. 4, op. 1, d. 212, l. 328.
- 54 GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 2096a, l. 208ob.; *ibid.*, d. 2060, l. 83; RGIA, f. 1291, op. 81, d. 71, l. 37.
- 55 Khusainov distributed “open sheets” [*otkrytye listy*] – that is, Igel'strom's address to Kazakhs of the Junior Juz. Despite the fact that Kazakhs “said all kinds of spiteful things and threatened him with death” [*zloslovili i strashchali umershchvleniem*], the *akhun* was able to fulfill his mission. On the basis of Igel'strom's request, Khusainov was granted a yearly salary of 150 rubles, which was raised to 300 rubles in 1786 on account of his “documented zealous service.” *Materialy po istorii Bashkirskoi ASSR*, vol. 5 (Moscow, 1960), 683.
- 56 *Materialy po istorii Kazakhskoi SSR* 4: 65–66 (document 9); TsGA RK, f. 4, op. 1, d. 1223.
- 57 *Materialy po istorii Kazakhskoi SSR* 4: 69–70 (document 11), 83 (document 19).
- 58 He sent a “letter of admonition” into the steppe, which expressed the basic idea that the subordination [*poddanstvo*] of Muslims to a ruler of another faith did not contradict Muslim law, and that manifestations of opposition to the tsarist government constituted a very great sin for a Muslim. Khusainov used selections from the Koran to justify this position. Viatkin, *Batyr Srym*, 247.
- 59 Kaziev's actions were highly valued by sultan Arungazy, who noted that “this *akhun*” had given “good admonitions in accordance with our religion” [*po zakonu nashemu dobrye uveshchevaniia*]. GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 2060, l. 113.
- 60 The commission was initiated by foreign minister Karl Nessel'rode. Khan Shirgazy became its chairman, and its members were sultan Temir Eraliev, Meletgali Turladin, the elder Isiangil'dii Ianmurzin, and the *akhuns* khoja Nadyr Khabdulvagapov, Absaliam Gabdulrakhimov, and Mukhametamin Baikev. The khan's supervisor was also required to participate in the commission's work. In 1823 colonel Aleksei Gorkhivostov occupied that position. TsGA RK, f. 4, op. 1, d. 262, l. 85–86; *Materialy po istorii Kazakhskoi SSR* 4: 447–448 (document 144).
- 61 Among the members of various commissions were Mukhamed-Sharif Aitov (the

- commission for review of the payment of taxes by the clans of Adai, Shomekei, and Tabyn on nomadic tents – 1845); Salikh Biglov (the commission on the administrative organization and division of Asiatic Russia and the Orenburg region – 1866); S. Batyrshin (the commission on the distribution of land along the left bank of the Ural River between Kazakhs and the Ural Cossacks – 1866). Beyond this, there were consistently translators working with the Cossack detachments that were building military fortifications (Ural'skoe, Orenburgskoe, and Fort Karabutak) in the steppe. TsGA RK, f. 25, op. 5, d. 245, ll. 1–62; *ibid.*, ll. 186–192; TsGA RK, f. 4, op. 1, d. 2786; *ibid.*, d. 2728.
- 62 TsGA RK, f. 25, op. 5, d. 245, l. 58ob.
- 63 Aitov had personal meetings in 1839 with Utemisov. TsGA RK, f. 4, op. 1, d. 2786, l. 3; *Ibid.*, d. 2006, ll. 8–10; *ibid.*, d. 2729, ll. 1–7.
- 64 TsGA RK, f. 25, op. 5, d. 245, l. 47.
- 65 GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 3748, l. 14.
- 66 GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 4978, ll. 7–7b.
- 67 Particularly notable was the activity of the Orenburg governor Vasilii Perovskii (1795–1857), who occupied that post twice (1831–41 and 1851–57) and who established a developed network for the collection of “intelligence.” This allowed him to inform the foreign and war ministries regularly about “the border affairs here,” about the intrigues of English agents in Central Asia, and so on. Important in this regard were of course the reports of Tatar officials, who gathered information on the internal situation in and the relations among the khanates of Bukhara, Kokand, and Khiva, on the penetration of the English, on their military strength and fortifications. *Materialy po istorii Kazakhskoi SSR* 4: 420–27 (documents 182, 183, 185).
- 68 GAOro, f. 167, op. 1, d. 2428, ll. 1–28ob.
- 69 *Kazakhsko-russkie otnosheniia v XVIII–XIX vekakh (1771–1867 gody): sbornik dokumentov i materialov* (Alma-Ata, 1964), 132 (document 53); TsGA RK, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4910, ll. 1–5; *ibid.*, d. 2467, l. 165.
- 70 *Zapiski o Bukharskom khanstve: Otchety P. I. Demezona i I. V. Vitkevicha* (Moscow, 1983), 21.
- 71 Subkhankulov was dispatched to Bukhara for the capture of Kh. Valitov, who was making false coin. He not only fulfilled that mission, but also gathered information on the number of Russians and Karakalpaks in the amirate of Bukhara, and on the intrigues of the English in Afghanistan. See Galiev, *Karavannye tropy*, 51.
- 72 GAOro contains a file “On the imprisonment of the cornet M. Sh. Aitov in Khiva in 1839–40”: f. 167, op. 1, d. 24, ll. 1–28.
- 73 TsGA RK, f. 25, op. 5, d. 245, l. 47. “Dragoman” – from the Arabic *tarjuman*, or “translator” – was a translator of eastern languages affiliated with diplomatic representations and consulates.
- 74 RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 634, l. 20.
- 75 GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 2086, l. 367. In this regard a series of directives by Orenburg governor-general Perovskii in 1853–55 is illustrative. One instructed the commander of the Bashkir-Mishar Military Host not to allow the release of Bashkirs and Mishars into the steppe as religious officials or for the teaching of “Tatar” reading and writing to the children there (1853). Another directed ruling sultans “that they not even dare enter into direct contact with the [Orenburg] Mohammedan Assembly bypassing the Border Commission” (1854). A third informed the chairman of the Provisional Council on the administration on the Inner Horde that in the territory under his jurisdiction there “are many Tatars without passports who are capable of causing disorders,” which necessitated the sending of agents [*syshchiki*] to the markets of the Horde together with a team of Cossacks “for assistance to those agents.” TsGIA RB (Central State Historical Archive of the Republic of Bashkortostan), f. 2, op. 1, d. 7956, l. 3; RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 624, l. 23; TsGA RK, f. 78, op. 2, d. 1097, ll. 10–10ob. Aleksandr Katenin continued the line of his predecessor and on 16 May 1860 published a

- directive allowing Tatars to travel to the Kazakh Steppe only for the purposes of trade. TsGIA RB, f. 2, op. 1, d. 10664, ll. 1–2.
- 76 Grigorii Kosach, “Kazakhskii ‘obrazovannyi’ klass v Rossiiskoi imperii,” in *Kazakhstan i Rossiia: obshchestva i gosudarstva*, vyp. 6 (Moscow, 2004), 30.
- 77 GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 2086, l. 367.
- 78 *Istoriia otechestvennogo vostokovedeniia s serediny XIX v. do 1917 g.* (Moscow, 1997), 35–40.
- 79 Bartol'd, *Istoriia izucheniia Vostoka*, 226.
- 80 RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 602, l. 34; GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 14005, l. 48.
- 81 GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 14005, ll. 3, 38–48.
- 82 RGIA, f. 1291, op. 82, d. 33.
- 83 The Steppe Commission prepared two secret memoranda: “On Mohammedanism in the Kirgiz Steppe and on the Administration of the Religious Affairs of the Kirgiz” and “On the Promotion of Christianity in the Kirgiz Steppe,” both of which included proposals on the confessional question. The materials of those memoranda were based on the work of Chokan Valikhanov, “O musul'manstve v stepi,” in Chokan Valikhanov, *Sobranie sochinenii v piati tomakh*, vol. 4 (Alma-Ata, 1985), 71–75.
- 84 Kazakhs later expressed disagreement with this arrangement. One manifestation was a Kazakh petition in 1905 to the chairman of a special commission of the interior ministry, Count A. Ignat'ev, considering the issue of establishing either an independent Muslim administration for Kazakhs or subordinating Kazakhs, again, to the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly. In the petition Kazakhs remarked that they, “as true Muslims, have earned the right to have their own special spiritual administration.” However, the government regarded their claims to being “true Muslims” as unfounded and thought that satisfying their petition would facilitate the further spread of “Tatar” culture among them. RGIA, f. 821, op. 10, d. 29, l. 29ob.
- 85 GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 8330, ll. 5–10.
- 86 N. I. Il'minskii, *Vospominaniia ob I. Al'tynsarine* (Kazan, 1896), 227.
- 87 GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 8330, ll. 17–23.
- 88 It was proposed that the question of methods “for the weakening of Mohammedan fanaticism” in the Volga-Ural region would be examined at a special committee of the interior ministry in 1876. And in 1910, a special conference was convened, known as the “Conference for the elaboration of measures for counteracting Tatar-Muslim influence in the Volga region.”
- 89 TsGAR K, f. 25, op. 1, d. 592, l. 18.
- 90 GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 8330, l. 23.
- 91 RGIA, f. 1291, op. 84, d. 5, l. 11ob. In a list of 1890, among the mullahs of the Turgai oblast who were not Kazakhs were: the Tatar Safautdin Shamsutdinov of the mosque in the Tatar quarter of Kustanai; the Tatar Gataulla Abdul-Vali of the main mosque in Kustanai; the Bashkir Akhmetgarif Kulbaev at the mosque of the town of Chelkar; and the Tatar Vali Srumbantaev of the mosque of Karabutak. TsGAR K, f. 25, op. 1, d. 1406, ll. 9–55.
- 92 GAOro, f. 10, op. 1, d. 73, l. 1.
- 93 In 1890 rules were issued according to which candidates for the position of mullah had to be literate in Russian. GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 14005, l. 32.
- 94 In 1870–1884, the Kazakhs Aitkul Alibaev and Suleiman Zhirnetorov built mosques in villages numbers three and four of Mandagara canton of Kustanai district without official permission. In 1895 those mosques were closed and the people maintaining them were accused of illegal construction and subjected to a fine of 20 rubles. RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 624, l. 23.
- 95 TsGAR K, f. 25, op. 1, d. 736, ll. 3–3ob.
- 96 TsGAR K, f. 25, op. 1, d. 2022, l. 20.
- 97 TsGAR K, f. 25, op. 1, d. 592, l. 17.
- 98 TsGAR K, f. 25, op. 1, d. 2022, l. 91.

- 99 TsGA RK, f. 25, op. 1, d. 592, l. 18.
- 100 NA RT (National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan), f. 92, op. 1, d. 12349, l. 7.
- 101 TsGA RK, f. 25, op. 1, d. 592, l. 18ob. District heads [*uezdnye nachal'niki*] were the ones most willing to make a proviso for accepting Tatars into the system of Kazakh administration. Thus the head of Irgiz district justified his acceptance of Tatars as clerks in Aranchi and Kzylzhar cantons with the observation that their replacement by Kazakhs would be difficult, since only the Irgiz school could provide literate cadres, and “the impending graduating class is insufficient to supply the district with clerks.” The head of Iletsk district requested that the Bashkir Baitiure Aznaev be left in his clerical position as an exception, since he “showed himself to be good and, aside from his primary duties, was a good draughtsman.” TsGA RK, f. 25, op. 1, d. 2022, ll. 70–70ob.
- 102 TsGA RK, f. 25, op. 1, d. 592, l. 18.
- 103 RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 603, l. 49.
- 104 Kraft, *Sbornik uzakonenii*, 432.
- 105 RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 632, l. 28.
- 106 TsGA RK, f. 25, op. 1, d. 1433.
- 107 In GAOro there is such a register for the translator Mendiir Bekchurin during his secret expedition to Bukhara. GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 494; Edyge Masanov, *Ocherk istorii etnograficheskogo izucheniia kazakhskogo naroda v SSSR* (Alma-Ata, 1966), 77–78. For such a register produced by mufti Khusainov of the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly in 1790, which includes rich factual material about the political situation in the Junior Juz, see Mukhametzhani Khusainov, “Zhurnal Orenburgskogo muftiia,” *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, no. 2 (1939): 117–220; Viatkin, *Batyr Srym*, 26–27.
- 108 The guardian of Kazakhs along the defensive line Mukhamed-Sharif Aitov gathered interesting material on the property and family relations of Kazakhs, which were regulated by the norms of customary law. Collegiate secretary of the Orenburg Frontier Commission Salikh Biglov presented detailed data about the *biy* courts and about forms of punishment by customary law, including also the names of the *biys* most famous for their intelligence and experience from the Shomekei, Tortkara, and Shekty clans, as well as the locations of their summer and winter encampments – information that enhances the significance of his work. *Materialy po kazakhskomu obychnomu pravu* (Almaty, 1998), 96–112; TsGA RK, f. 4, op. 1, d. 3466, ll. 16–16ob.
- 109 Khan Abulkhair of the Junior Juz used exactly these words to describe mullah Al'mukhammet when he learned that the latter had reported everything to the Orenburg administration. He then gave him a sentence of forty days and commanded him not to absent himself. On 23 February 1743 the khan called Al'mukhammet once again, forgave him and ordered him “not to go anywhere again,” not to write any letters, “and not provide any services to the Russian state.” *Kazakhsko-russkie otnosheniia v XVI–XVIII vekakh*, 280 (document 108).
- 110 Khan Aishuak of the Junior Juz wrote of the Abdunasyr Subkhankulov, a clerk serving him, that he trusted him completely, gave him “the right to bear a stamp,” and “regarded him as a son.” GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 249b.
- 111 Here the person in question was Abul-fetkhu Abdu-Selam uly, a Tatar from Seitov Posad and an *akhun* for the Junior Juz who participated in all events of Kazakh nomadic society in the last quarter of the eighteenth century and the first part of the nineteenth. This description of the *akhun*'s activities was given by the sultans, *biys*, and elders of the Junior Juz in 1803 during the taking of a “vow” on the termination of internecine struggle. *Materialy po istorii Kazakhskoi SSR* 4: 212 (document no 65).
- 112 This was the assessment of the Kazakh elite with regard to the translator Mendiir Bekchurin. Elders, *biys*, and Khan Aishuak of the Junior Juz emphasized Bekchurin's acute and sharp mind. *Materialy po istorii Kazakhskoi SSR* 4: 212 (document 65).
- 113 GAOro, f. 6, op. 10, d. 3264, ll. 4–7; *ibid.*, d. 2096a, l. 262; TsGA RK, f. 4, op. 1, d. 2126, l. 9.

- 114 Il'minskii, *Vospominaniia ob Altynsarine*, 167.
- 115 *Materialy po istorii Kazakhskoi SSR* 4: 219 (document 66).
- 116 Nailia Bekmakhanova, *Mnogonatsional'noe naselenie Kazakhstana i Kirgizii v epokhu kapitalizma (60-e gody XIX v.–1917 g.)* (Moscow, 1986), 146; Irina Erofeeva, “Formirovanie tatarskoi, nemetskoi, pol'skoi i drugikh diaspor,” in Nurbulat Masanov et al., *Istoriia Kazakhstana: narody i kul'tury* (Almaty, 2001), 236.
- 117 Today, Tatars constitute 1.7 percent of Kazakhstan's population, making them the sixth-largest group of the population.
- 118 Gul'mira Sultangalieva, *Istoriia Aktiubinskogo uezda, 1869–1917* (Aktobe, 2005), 106–109.
- 119 At the same time one should keep in mind that the anti-Tatar criticism of Chokan Vlikhanov was also directed against the policy of the Russian government, which patronized “Tatar” mullahs. Valikhanov, “O musul'manstve,” 71–75.
- 120 Uyama Tomohiko, “A Strategic Alliance between Kazakh Intellectuals and Russian Administrators: Imagined Communities in *Dala Walayatining Gazeti* (1888–1902),” in Hayashi Tadayuki, ed., *The Construction and Deconstruction of National Histories in Slavic Eurasia* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2003), 237–259.
- 121 Gul'mira Sultangalieva, *Zapadnyi Kazakhstan v sisteme etnokul'turnykh kontaktov, XVIII–nachalo XX v.* (Ufa, 2001), 164–178.

Not for Distribution

Part II

Taming space and people

Institutions and demography

Not for Distribution

Not for Distribution

4 Intra-bureaucratic debate on the institution of Russian governors-general in the mid-nineteenth century

MATSUZATO Kimitaka

This chapter is a follow-up to my essay “Governor-Generalships in the Russian Empire: From an Ethnic to a Spatial Approach” in the collection *Studies of New Imperial History and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Space*, published under the aegis of *Ab Imperio* in 2004.¹ That essay argued that the Russian Empire was not a mere extension of the Muscovite State but was a union of three core regions: the original Muscovite territory, the Volga-Urals (the former Kazan Khanate), and the Left-Bank Ukraine (Cossack territory). This territorial union took shape from the second half of the sixteenth to the first half of the seventeenth century. Administratively and judicially, this core territory had become nearly homogeneous through the *voevoda* system. It was not by chance that the Petrine government replaced this system with a gubernatorial system, precisely when Russia was expanding beyond its territorial core. Despite the further rapid expansion of the empire, its core did not expand. Symptomatically, more than two centuries after the Pereiaslav Treaty of 1654 (which completed the formation of the imperial core by incorporating the Left-Bank Ukraine), only New Russia (South Ukraine) was privileged to participate in the “core club,” which enjoyed the fruits of *zemstvo* and judicial reforms. At the same time, governor-generalships were specified as an institution for peripheral administration. Thus, the Great Reforms consolidated the bipolar structure of an empire with a core and peripheries.

Moreover, my previous essay criticized a late nineteenth-century writer’s classification of governors-general into those who governed “semi-primitive” tribes in the eastern part of the empire and those who governed nations politically more developed than Great Russians (Poles, Jews, and Baltic Germans) in its western area.² A brochure published in 1889 in Kiev proposed this classification not only to justify the extraordinary power of governors-general to govern the “semi-primitive” tribes, but also to refute the then-influential view that the culturally developed Western provinces did not need the institution of governors-general. My focus on the specific work done by governors-general led to another typology of them: as ethnopoliticians or managers. Governors-general operated as ethnopoliticians in regions with extremely disadvantageous (for Russians) ethnic balances (the Western provinces and the Caucasus), and as managers in newly acquired territories that needed prompt domestication and socioeconomic development (Siberia, Central Asia, and New Russia). I discerned two career patterns,

and accordingly frequent reshufflings, of governors-general between Central Asia and the Far East (S. M. Dukhovskoi, D. I. Subbotich, and N. I. Grodekov) and between the Caucasus, Ostzei, and the Western provinces (M. I. Pauluchchi and A. M. Dondukov-Korsakov). These patterns were accompanied by two types of personalities: ethnopolitical governors-general were masters of intrigue, cunning and skeptical, eloquent, respectable-looking at balls, popular among local noblewomen; managerial governors-general were entrepreneurs and even adventurers, research-minded, admiring collections of samples (from botany to anthropology). Perhaps a merit of my previous essay is that it revealed an unexpected similarity in government between New Russia and the Russian Far East (despite almost a century of time lag between their domestication), and between the Western provinces and the Caucasus.

Another purpose of my previous essay, as shown by its title, was to question the overemphasis on ethno-confessional factors in imperial management in recent historiography³ and to show the scope of the responsibilities of governors-general as being much wider and more multifaceted than has been recognized by historians.

Although the classification of governors-generals into the categories of ethnopolitician or manager has been accepted as a standard view by historians,⁴ the concrete application I proposed faced several criticisms. In particular, specialists of the eastern part of empire, such as Anatolii Remnev and Uyama Tomohiko, criticized my “oversimplification.” According to them, there were tangible differences between the governors-general of Siberia/the Far East and Central Asia (the Steppe and Turkestan). The concept of governors-general as managers would seem to apply only to those in Siberia and the Far East, whereas the Central Asian governors-general were deeply involved in ethnopolitics, even though the potential danger of politicization of local nationalities for the empire might have been less than in the Western provinces.⁵ Speaking of the peculiar Orientalism that fascinated the Russian military and administrators in Central Asia, Uyama notes their penchant for ethnic classification and particularism, characteristic of the modern spirit.⁶

With regard to Siberia and the Far East, Remnev argues that even policies that were apparently economic, such as motivating peasants to migrate to the Far East, had the strategic and ethnopolitical implications of “driving Russia eastwards” and “making the Far East Russian.”⁷ Moreover, governors-general of the Far East were not only managers, but also geographers. Receiving *carte blanche* from the imperial center, they organized research into the new lands and people, demarcated, evaluated, and colonized this “alien space,” and domesticated it in the symbolic sense by giving toponyms, building churches, and mythologizing local historical figures.⁸

Leonid Gorizontov criticized my definition of the imperial core, noting that “provinces of the Left-Bank Ukraine *officially* did not belong to the category of internal provinces even after the Great Reforms, let alone in the pre-Reform period” [*italics mine*].⁹ This criticism seems to derive from differences in research agenda. Gorizontov tries to reconstruct an imaginary geography of pre-revolutionary Russia based on *belles-lettres* and on notes by travelers and geographers,¹⁰ whereas I

describe the legal and administrative structure of the Russian Empire. It is almost tautological that in the second half of the nineteenth century, Russian law and official documents would refer to those provinces that had a standard (non-peripheral) administrative and judicial system as “internal provinces.” As for the Left-Bank Ukraine, to which Gorizontov refers, the minister of the interior, Sergei Lanskoi, proposed that Alexander II abolish the Malorussian governor-generalship, explaining that governors-general were useless in the provinces, which were “already correctly organized” and were without “multinational (*raznorodnye*) elements.”¹¹ Thus, the Malorussian governor-generalship was abolished, because Malorussia had become sufficiently “internal.”

Considering the criticism described above, this chapter tries to elucidate the institutional logic of governor-generalships. In this chapter, I describe the pseudo-federalist characteristics of governor-generalships and these officials’ relations with ministries, before returning to a comparison between the western and eastern parts of the empire.

Governor-generalship as a pseudo-federal institution

Anxious about the Swedish government’s reform policies in the seventeenth century, the Ostzei (Baltic) knighthoods readily responded to Peter I’s appeal to be integrated into the Russian Empire. This situation rendered inappropriate a repetition of the empire’s traditional way of expansion through the *voevoda* system. According to A. D. Gradovskii, a prominent pre-Revolutionary specialist in Russian state law history, the Petrine government was neither capable of dividing the territories of knighthoods into small units governed by *voevodas*, nor of inciting the Baltic lower classes to resist the nobility, as the Muscovite State did when it conquered, for example, Great Novgorod.¹² The government copied the existing institution under Swedish rule and introduced a gubernatorial system, which was a rudiment of the future governor-generalships.

During the nineteenth century, policy makers became increasingly concerned about the pseudo-federal, centrifugal connotations of the institution of governors-general. In 1840, having read a document submitted by the ober-procurator of the synod, Nicholas I crossed out the then-commonly used collective adjectives of provinces, such as “Belarusian” and “Lithuanian,” derived from the macro-regional jurisdictions of the governor-generals, and ordered that the provinces be known individually by their formal names, such as Vitebsk, Mogilev, Vilna, and Grodno.¹³

As late as 1896, V. V. Ivanovskii argued that the Muscovite State was capable of overcoming the separatism of the former Kazan Khanate, as well as the republican traditions of Novgorod and Pskov, by directly subordinating cities and small regions to its rule and thus preventing the emergence of “strong and independent provinces.” The Muscovite State “never introduced any important office with significant responsibilities at the local level, largely concentrating its entire management at the center, in departments (*prikazy*).”¹⁴

In 1903, K. Sokolov articulated this idea even more clearly. According to him, the introduction of governors-general in the newly acquired territories transformed

them into “absolutely alienated entities” and had the effect of emphasizing their differences from the “indigenous Russian lands.” The Muscovite State, aware of this danger, split the new territories into small administrative units. Sokolov wrote, “This is exactly the wisdom which should frankly be recommended to the present statesmen.” The institution of governor-generalships had the opposite effect: it renewed the integrity of macro-regions, glorified the historical power centers, and reproduced memories of the former independent polities. Governor-generalships were “appropriate for building a state based on federal principles, but they hardly correspond to the modern ideal of a unitary national state.”¹⁵

Aware of this pseudo-federal feature of governor-generalships, Siberian *oblastniki* (regionalists), such as N. M. Iadrintsev and G. N. Potanin, argued against the abolition of the Siberian governor-generalship in the 1870s.¹⁶ This was not specific to Russia. In a European context, the institution of governors-general was an important component of composite monarchies, another device for the pseudo-federalist integration of multiple law territories into a single polity.¹⁷ This is why the leaders of the Irish independence movement, guided by Daniel O’Connell (1775–1847), argued against the abolition of the position of their sworn enemy, the institution of lord lieutenant of Dublin, without which they thought Ireland would be completely transformed into an internal colony of England.¹⁸

Tsar’s viceroys: the linear and “insular” systems of administration

An important source of authority for the governors-general was their direct relationship with the emperor, who was the only person authorized to appoint and remove them.¹⁹ As was the case with ministers, governors-general served the emperor, rather than the nation or the depersonalized state. Even the most influential governors-general under Nicholas I, such as Dmitrii Bibikov and Nikolai Murav’ev-Amurskii, did not find places in Alexander II’s court. The emperors often annotated the text of reports submitted by governors-general, and the tsarist bureaucracy was obliged to take measures to implement these notes. The emperors often wrote words of thanks to the governors-general (the author of the report) in the margins of reports. The Russian Empire was a state run by comradeship between the emperor and the highest military cadres and officials. The privilege enjoyed by governors-general of reporting directly to the emperor became even more apparent after the governors lost it in 1856. Following this decision, ministers of the interior mediated between the governors and the emperor and only passed on to the emperor summaries of the governors’ reports.²⁰

The introduction of a ministerial system in 1802 ambivalently affected the institution of governors-general.²¹ On the one hand, ministers and governors-general inevitably competed with each other, since they represented different principles of government: linear (functional) versus “insular” (territorial), respectively.²² Both exploited their privilege of reporting directly to the emperor in order to criticize their opponents. On the other hand, the extreme deconcentration of power between ministries at the national level made it inevitable that an organ for inter-ministerial coordination would be established, at least at the

macro-regional level, and this was the role assigned to governors-general.²³ Protracted competition between ministries and governors-general pushed the latter out of internal provinces. In 1826, an inter-ministerial committee adopted the principle of no longer assigning governors-general to internal provinces. The 1837 Order to Governors vested governors with the responsibilities for political and administrative supervision (*nadzor*), responsibilities that had been the sole province of governors-general. This provision took into consideration the civilian governors of internal provinces, above which governors-general were no longer supposed to exist. However, this order did not specify responsibilities for the three categories of “provincial chiefs”: governors-general, governors supervised by governors-general, and governors of internal provinces above which governors-general were no longer to be assigned. Thus, the legal confusion that resulted in duplication of governors’ functions by governors-general remained unresolved. Even the 1853 Instruction to Governors-General left a large sphere of overlapping responsibilities between governors-general and governors.²⁴

An important landmark on this long path in the transformation of governors-general into a peripheral institution were two decrees issued by Alexander II on February 17, 1856. One abolished the governor-generalships of Malorussia and Belarus (Vitebsk), and the other removed Minsk province from the jurisdiction of the Vilna governor-general,²⁵ because all these territories were largely “Russian” (East Slavic) and the administrative institutions functioning there had become sufficiently “internal.” As mentioned above, in this year civilian governors were deprived of their right to report to the emperor directly, which made the status of governors-general even more extraordinary and thus periphery-oriented. However, under the uncertain political situation on the eve of the Emancipation of 1861, the opposite incentive, that is for the universal introduction of governors-general to govern not only the peripheries but also internal provinces, continued to exist. In 1858, State Secretary Vladimir P. Butkov proposed the universal introduction of governors-general, but ardent resistance by ministers, in particular the minister of the interior, S. S. Lanskoï, prevented it from realization.²⁶

In 1862, the transformation of the Russian Army from a system of corps to one of military districts prompted another question: that of whether governors-general should serve concurrently as military district commanders.²⁷ Almost a half-century earlier, the return of huge numbers of troops from Europe after the Napoleonic War resulted in the emergence of several almost sedentary corps in Siberia, the Caucasus and Orenburg, somewhat similar to the future military districts.²⁸ Military governors (later, governors-general) of these areas concurrently served as commanders of these corps. This situation prompted experiments and debates on territorial reforms of civilian government,²⁹ such as A. D. Balashov’s experiment from 1819.³⁰

In the early 1860s, military districts began to be introduced, starting from the Western provinces. Having already commanded the troops stationed in their provinces, the Kiev and Vilna governors-general were concurrently appointed as the commanders of the military districts identical to the jurisdictions of these governors-general.³¹ Regarding the further appointment of district commanders, on December 18, 1862, the minister of the interior, Petr A. Valuev, inquired of the

governors-general: Should governors-general serve concurrently as military district chiefs? Were they not too overburdened to serve concurrently as military district chiefs? If so, which responsibilities of governors-general should be removed from them? With regard to several regions, were governors-general necessary at all?³²

Criticizing the 1853 Instruction for failing to overcome the significant overlapping of responsibilities of governors-general and governors, Valuev proposed a draft of a new instruction. This draft aimed at relieving governors-general of managerial responsibilities and having them specialize in peripheral management and political matters. Speaking of the “political significance” of governors-general, however, Valuev seemed to bear in mind not creative macro-regional decision-making, but extraordinary measures to maintain political tranquility and public order.³³ In other words, his image of governors-general was close to that of the future temporary governors-general, which would become widespread after the attempted assassination of Alexander II in 1879. In particular, Valuev excluded the affairs of Orthodoxy, other “foreign” churches, Jews, schools, and the election of noble deputies from the responsibilities of governors-general,³⁴ which appalled ethnopolitical governors-general in the Western provinces.

Moreover, Valuev requested that as many provinces as possible be excluded from the jurisdiction of governors-general, since the security-officer-type governors-general that Valuev proposed could be introduced promptly, at a time of emergency. According to Valuev, governors-general were able to play a more or less beneficial role not because of their legal competence but by exploiting their personal connections in the court and higher echelons of government and by limiting their subordinate governors’ powers to the advantage of their own.³⁵ Valuev’s draft of the new instruction omitted several of the duties that had been prescribed for governors-general in the 1853 Instruction, such as responsibility for the morals and correct lifestyle of nobles and for the “pure confession” of youths, which he regarded as legally meaningless.

Almost all governors-general, with the exception of Moscow military governor-general (1860–64) P. A. Tochkov,³⁶ supported the idea of a single individual that combined the two positions of governor-general and military district commander. Since Valuev’s inquiries sent in December 1962 overtly represented the views and interests of the linear government (ministries), the governors-general, in response, harshly criticized the general ideas behind the inquiries.

The Baltic governor-general (1861–64) Baron Vil’gel’m Karlovich Liven and the Northwest (Vilna) governor-general (1855–63) Vladimir I. Nazimov emphasized the specific responsibilities requested of the governors-general in charge of the regions dominated by mighty non-Russian (Baltic German and Polish) elites and resisted Valuev’s attempt to curtail the powers of governors-general.³⁷ Liven noted that Valuev’s draft of the Instruction betrayed the government’s endeavor to replace centralization, which had inevitably been accompanied by arduous paperwork handled by the ministries, with a more lively, local administration (run by governors-general).³⁸ Nazimov criticized not only Valuev’s inquiries but also the entire skeptical discourse against the institution of governors-general, a discourse

that was repeatedly stated in the Decree of February 17, 1856, and by Lanskoi's argument in 1858. Nazimov remarked that governors-general had historically existed and, in some cases, continued to exist in European countries, such as France, Britain, Austria, and Prussia, because these countries needed decentralization. The institution of governors-general had often been introduced when it was necessary to raise the "moral values" of provinces.³⁹

Ridiculing Valuev's concern about the overburdening of governors-general by having them concurrently serve as military district commanders, Nazimov, as well as the St. Petersburg military governor (1861–66) Count Alexander Suvorov-Rymnikskii, questioned why, then, it was possible to find candidates for ministers, whose burdens were far greater than those of governors-general who were concurrently commanders.⁴⁰ Moscow military governor-general Tochkov argued that if the military administration needed decentralization, this need was much more urgent for the civilian administration.⁴¹

These governors-general not only justified the so-called "functional duplications" between governors-general and governors, they even unanimously applauded them. According to them, only with the help of the governors-general, who enjoyed the emperor's personal trust and prestige in the higher echelons of government, could governors find ways of overcoming difficulties in their provincial governments. Therefore, the retreat by governors-general from managerial matters would not promote the governors' power, but rather, would decrease it.⁴² Vilna governor-general Nazimov maintained that governors were no more than subordinates for ministers, but in contrast, the relations between governors and governors-general were those of "colleagues."⁴³

Nazimov, Suvorov-Rymnikskii and Liven argued that daily interventions by governors-general in civil and even private affairs, such as the receiving of petitions, were indispensable, particularly for the political management of the region. Moreover, if local (Polish) nobles had directly addressed petitions to ministers, the ministers, incapable of discerning their "sophism" and "tricks," would easily have been deceived.⁴⁴ Indeed, while exploring archival sources in the unit "governor-generalships of the Southwest region" in the Central State Historical Archive of the Ukraine in Kiev, I was surprised to learn of how much time and energy the governors-general spent on responding to petitions from widowed nobles and to petitions concerning orphaned nobles and to the inheritances of nobles, even immediately after the 1864 uprising, while mercilessly repressing the Polish nobility.

Opposition by governors-general caused P. A. Valuev's draft of a new instruction to be shelved and the institution of governors-general to be consolidated for creative and extraordinary leadership at the empire's peripheries. Yet Valuev's idea of security-officer-type governors-general seems to have been realized by The Security Law of 1881, in a different historical context.⁴⁵

Two ways to integrate the Russian Empire

At the western peripheries of the Russian Empire, the precedent states, the Baltic German knight-hoods, the Rzeczpospolita, and the Moldovan Princedom left

clearly demarcated law territories guided by the powerful non-Russian elite communities. Therefore, in these regions the institution of governors-general most typically functioned as a substitute for European composite monarchies, which integrated the law territories into the empire, avoiding at the same time significant administrative costs. In contrast, many regions in Asiatic Russia did not have precedent statehood before conquest by Russia, and even exceptional statehoods did not leave clearly demarcated law territories. Moreover, the Russian government tended to regard Asiatic Russia as a blank map, a place whose administrative territorial division could be conducted according to its own military and strategic considerations. It paid less attention to the ethnic and legal traditions of localities.

This does not mean that governors-general in Asiatic Russia did not contribute to the legal integration of the empire. It was precisely because Asiatic Russia lacked homogeneous law territories that the governors-general played important roles in transforming this heterogeneity into “state-dominated legal pluralism.”⁴⁶ Recent studies have refuted the static, passive image of the Russian Empire’s indirect rule of Muslim territories. Virginia Martin argues that *biys*, who were in charge of community-level justice on the Kazakh Steppe, had an unexpectedly good knowledge of imperial statute law and tactfully interpreted the supposed customary law so as to please Russian officials and military cadres.⁴⁷ Onuma Takahiro echoes this by describing a similar role played by *begs* in Eastern Turkistan under Qing rule. Before conquering Eastern Turkistan, Qing high officials presumed they would find a nomadic society there, similar to that in Mongolia, and they intended to integrate it through something similar to the Eight Banner system. When they found a sedentary society without the domestic dependents who were the organizational basis of the Eight Banner system, they revised the policy to integrate *begs* not as hereditary nobles, but as officials of rank.⁴⁸

Thus, one may find two ways in which the Russian Empire pursued territorial integration. At its western peripheries, the government introduced the governors-general, who were responsible for the law territories that Russia inherited from the precedent states. These territories were the stages on which they conducted ethnic Bonapartism (see below). In contrast, in Asiatic Russia the government devised from scratch and often changed the territorial jurisdictions of the governors-general. Proper demarcation between these jurisdictions often determined the success or failure of the empire’s eastern rule. To put it figuratively, at the western peripheries governors-general manipulated ethno-social categories, whereas in Asiatic Russia they managed the space.

Ethnic Bonapartism and wagering on the weak in the western peripheries

Ethnic Bonapartism is the strategy of ruling imperial peripheries by balancing two alien (non-ruling) ethnicities. This is a strategy often adopted in empires that want the ruling ethnicity to predominate demographically and culturally. An example was the Russian Empire, in which the East Slavs accounted for less than half of the population and whose literacy was markedly inferior to that of the Baltic

Germans, Poles, and Jews. Likewise, the Manchurians composed an absolute minority in the Qing Empire and therefore relied upon ethnic Bonapartism; for example, the Qing government is believed to have induced the Hans and Huis in its northwest provinces to come into conflict with each other.⁴⁹ According to the 1897 Census, Great Russians accounted for less than 3 percent of the population in the South Caucasus, but the Russian Empire was able to hold this region by manipulating rivalries between local ethnicities, such as Armenians and Georgians, and Georgians and Abkhazians. The same can be said for the Western provinces, where Great Russians accounted for about 3 percent of the population. The Kiev and Vilna governors-general manipulated the social tensions between Poles as people of an “aristocratic nation” and Ukrainians, Belarusians and Latvians as “peasant nationalities.”

In contrast, in empires where the ruling ethnicity has had demographic dominance, for example, the Han empires in Chinese history and the present People’s Republic of China, the government’s nationality policy tends to focus on relations between the ruling nationality (in this case, the Han) and each minority, while ignoring relations between the minorities. In other words, ethnic Bonapartism is based on a tripolar model (the ruling ethnicity and at least two ruled ethnicities), whereas the nationality policies of empires where the ruling ethnicity predominates tend to be modeled on a bipolar scheme (the ruling ethnicity and one or another minority).

In Russian history ethnic Bonapartism was a strategy adopted after the government abandoned what Andreas Kappeler describes as the classic imperial policy of ruling weak ethnicities through alliances with strong nationalities, such as the Baltic Germans, Poles, Georgians, and Tatars. Despite her reformative rhetoric, Catherine II expanded the empire by making it the last bastion of serfdom in Europe. Concerned about centralization and the emancipation policy pursued in Stockholm and Warsaw, the landed nobilities of the Ostzei region and the Eastern peripheries of the Rzeczpospolita defected to the Russian Empire.⁵⁰ The Russian Empire from Catherine II to Nicholas I was a classic empire, based on, as Kappeler has stated, “the priority of dynastic and estate-based principles at the expense of ethnic and linguistic ones.”⁵¹ This empire was based on eighteenth-century materialism, and its attitude toward confession, including Orthodoxy, was deeply utilitarian. As for Sergei S. Uvarov’s famous triad of “Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality,” Sergei Solov’ev’s comments seem instructive:

Showing himself as an outstanding *barin* (aristocrat and master), Uvarov did not have anything aristocratic. On the contrary, he was a servant who had learnt decent manners in the house of a decent *barin* (Alexander I) but who remained a servant in heart. He spared no effort, no flattery to please another *barin* (Nicholas I). He inspired him, Nicholas, with the idea that he was the creator of a kind of new education, based on new principles, and he invented these principles, namely the words Orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality: Orthodoxy, himself being an atheist and not believing in Christ even in the Protestant way; autocracy, himself being liberal; and nationality, himself

having never read through a book in Russian in his entire life, but writing constantly in French or German.⁵²

Yet by the 1840s this empire ceased to function normally. Slavophile writers were angry with the miserable social conditions of “Russian” (East Slavic) serfs in the Western provinces and Baltic peasants, while Poles, despite what the Slavophiles perceived as privileges, defied the empire. In the Baltic region, peasants converted en masse to Orthodoxy, expecting advancement in their social status (this was a kind of peasant movement). Shamil emancipated the entire Northeast Caucasus. Resistance by Kazakhs on the Steppe continued.

Among these crises, the Caucasian War rehearsed the future institution of governors-general by forging young military politicians and by making them work out the policy archetypes that would later be unfolded by generals-cum-ethnopoliticians and generals-cum-managers. M. S. Vorontsov, Viceroy of the Caucasus (1844–53), tried to use economic levers to integrate the North Caucasus into the empire;⁵³ at the same time he exploited conflicts between local tribes to pit them against each other. His office in Tiflis seemed like a school for future governors-general. One of the students was Alexander M. Dondukov-Korsakov, the future governor-general of Kiev and the Caucasus, who not only commanded military operations, but also served as Vorontsov’s secretary. Vorontsov dictated letters, and as Dondukov-Korsakov took them down he corrected Vorontsov’s Gallicisms while trying to leave their flavor.⁵⁴ (Typical of the Russian elite in the first half of the nineteenth century, Vorontsov was more fluent in French than in Russian.)

In the same period, the Kiev governor-general (1837–52), Dmitrii G. Bibikov, represented an archetype of governors-general/ethnopoliticians, in pursuing ethnic Bonapartism. He conducted the Inventory Reform and other anti-Polish and pro-peasant policies. Motivated by the “common Russian” project (regarding Great Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians as branches of common Russians),⁵⁵ Bibikov attempted to use Ukrainians as a “peasant nation”⁵⁶ to counterbalance the Poles as an “aristocratic nation.”

The policy-makers tried to compensate for the insufficient demographic status of “Russians” by promoting an allegedly homogeneous social group of peasants. The Emancipation of 1861 was presented as a renewal of primordial justice, and it aimed at making a multiethnic nation consisting of artificially created “middle peasants” into an imperial nation.⁵⁷ While the other components of the Great Reforms, such as the introduction of *zemstvos* and judicial reform, aimed to Westernize Russia, the Emancipation was an anti-modern policy, which reinforced peasant communes and legally segregated peasants by restricting their spatial and social mobility, as well as restricting the sales and purchases of peasant land plots. In the Right-Bank Ukraine, where peasants had historically been accustomed to household (*podvornaia*) land ownership, communes were created through endless operations to redefine redemption payments.⁵⁸ If it had not been for the Polish problem, the Emancipation would have been modeled after its Baltic precedent (personal emancipation without land). It has become conventional wisdom in

historiography that the Russian Emancipation had populist purposes; it attempted to use the imagined homogeneous peasantry as a substitute for the nation. For this purpose, the legislators artificially restricted the possibility of stratification of the peasants, even if this measure was detrimental to the capitalist development of agriculture.⁵⁹

The reply from Vilna governor-general Vladimir I. Nazimov dated January 31, 1863, to inquiries by Valuev, the minister of the interior, looked like a manifesto made by an ethnopolitical governor-general who was facing a second Polish uprising. Russia's Western provinces had been "Russian" as late as the end of the eighteenth century, but when Prussia Germanized the Poznan Grand Duchy, the harassed Poles immigrated there. The "Polish party" was trying to morally enslave the region, against which the governor-general should become the center of Russian life and strength. The governor-general should rally top experts to his side and promote the activities of "Russian circles" in provincial capitals. In contrast to the Kievan or New Russian governors-general, the Northwestern governors-general had been unable to contribute much to the Russian cause, because as a rule, they came initially to the Western provinces after serving in capitals or Great Russian provinces. They needed to study the region "from the ABCs." Learning that his predecessor has barely achieved anything useful but has only caused conflicts with the local Polish party, the new governor-general usually started from a position of appeasement. After three or four years, he would realize his errors, by which time his term would be approaching its end. Usually, governors-general were appointed suddenly, and they had no time to study the history and characteristics of the Western provinces. Nazimov thought it possible to abolish the Vilna governor-generalship only when a strong "Russian party" would emerge there.⁶⁰

In Nazimov's view, because of the insufficient authority enjoyed by the Vilna governors-general, national policies were often transplanted to the region mechanically, without necessary adjustments, which seriously harmed the region. He listed examples: (1) Orthodox priests' right to open and run parish schools was also granted to Catholic priests. (2) As was the case with internal provinces, peace arbitrators, having a tremendous influence on the fate of peasants, became independent, subordinate only to the Senate. This situation weakened the police's influence on the masses and strengthened the Polish nobility's connections with the "Russian" people, who were the only foothold of the Russian government in the Western provinces. (3) While the Prussian government spared no cost in purchasing land from the Polish nobility in the Poznan Grand Duchy and in encouraging Germans to settle there, the Russian Ministry of State Properties continued to lease unexploited state lands to Polish nobles, who would subsequently purchase them. Thus, the task of Russian colonization was endlessly postponed. (4) Jews were not allowed to rent these state lands. This not only contradicted the government policy of getting the Jews involved in agriculture and preventing their proletarianization, but it also incited them against the government, although Jews would potentially have become the government's ally against Poles. (5) Landowners were allowed to invite foreign agricultural laborers, so they used this right to invite their compatriots from the Poznan Grand Duchy or Galicia. The indigenous

local population could not compete with these Polish immigrants as cheap labor, because the indigenous locals had to pay levies to the state and to landowners and therefore needed a higher monetary income. Nazimov remarked that if the central government had requested and considered the local authorities' opinions, the listed problems would not have occurred.⁶¹

Criticizing Valuev's draft of a new Instruction for governors-general (see above) for being as vague as the 1853 Instruction, Nazimov proposed another draft of the Instruction, tailored to the governors-general of the Western provinces. According to the draft, governors-general were "the highest representatives of the Russian government and the Russian people, composing in the Western provinces the population who are native, original, natural [*naselenie korennoe, samobytnoe, prirodnoe*]." Therefore, the material and moral development of these people "as members of the common Russian family" was to be the goal toward which governors-general should strive as the guardians of the Russian people. At the same time, as the main keepers of law and order, they were to look after the wellbeing of other peoples, such as Latvians, Lithuanians, and Zhmudins [Lowland Lithuanians], and also "newcomer (*prishlye*) peoples, such as Jews, Poles, Tatars, and so forth."⁶² One finds here an archetype of Soviet ethnic hierarchy based on the alleged level of autochthonousness of each ethnic group, and Nazimov identified as newcomers those ethnicities that he regarded as unfriendly to the government.

Nazimov's draft obliged governors-general in the Western provinces to consolidate "Orthodoxy, which was the ancient property of the native population and the most powerful foothold against those who infringe the Russian people's originality." They should endeavor to prevent "Catholic propaganda" from spreading, because Catholicism in the Western provinces was pursuing "not so much the defense of the Western Church's interests, as political inducements." Governors-general were not to forget that Catholicism in Russia was "nothing but an instrument of a political party hostile to Russian nationality and the Russian government." Governors-general were to have a decisive voice in the cadre selections in the Western provinces. They were to do their best to establish elementary schools in the region and to educate peasant children, so that various groups of Russian nationals would merge into an indivisible entity.⁶³

Since the Polish problem served as a matrix for various types of ethnic Bonapartism in the empire, imagined exploiters of unprivileged nationalities and peasant masses began to be "exposed" in the eastern part of the empire, too, where there were no class tensions comparable to those in its western part. Indeed, these tactics worked in the Volga-Urals (the Il'minskii system as a countermeasure to Tatarization) and the Caucasus (manipulation between declining Georgian nobles and rising Armenian merchants⁶⁴), but it could not be adopted successfully beyond the Ural-Caspian line. In Turkestan the attempt by the Turkestan governors-general to pit nomad Kazakhs, depicted as half-Muslim primitives, against "Sarts" and Tatars, depicted as cunning exploiters, seemed strained. Likewise was the accusation that Lamaist priests were exploiting the Buriat masses. Asiatic Russia, to the east of the Ural-Caspian line, had not reached the stage of social development that might facilitate the populist manipulation of ethno-social categories.

Unable to realize the tripolar, Bonapartist scheme of nationality policies (aristocratic versus peasant nations, with the Russian authorities as the arbitrator between them), the Russian authorities to the east of the Ural–Caspian line had no alternative but to address each ethnic group individually. Perhaps this served as background for the Russian officialdom’s penchant for the particularism that Uyama discerned concerning Central Asia.

Managing the space in Asiatic Russia

My previous essays examined how important it was for the Russian Empire to correctly demarcate the territorial jurisdictions of governors-general in Asiatic Russia, based on case studies of the administrative territorial reforms in the Orenburg governor-generalship in the 1860s and the introduction of the Priamur governor-generalship (1884). I criticized the conventional view that attributes various administrative territorial reforms in the Orenburg governor-generalship (such as the abolition of the Bashkir Army and separation of the Ufa and Orenburg provinces) to the diminishing requirements for mobilizing the Bashkirs’ manpower to conduct military operations in Central Asia. I underscored that the jurisdiction of the Orenburg governor-generalship (the Ural–Caspian region) had become a test site for the applicability of the main idea of the Great Reforms to overcome the excessive particularization of socio-ethnic corporative groups during the reign of Nicholas I. The excessive particularization needed to be overcome, since it resulted in geographically mosaiced state administration and high administrative costs (for example, the extremely high cost of collecting taxes from the Bashkir Army, when it would have been much more efficient to transfer the Bashkirs to ordinary civilian administration).⁶⁵ In my essay on the introduction of the Priamur governor-generalship, I questioned the view of regarding the quarter century after Russia’s acquisition of the Priamur region until 1884 as “lost decades,” and I argued that the protracted intra-bureaucratic debate in the 1860s and 1870s on territorial reforms in the Priamur region and Asiatic Russia generated the concept of the Russian “Far East.” This new geographical concept combined newly obtained Priamur with the Transbaikal region of Old Siberia. This is why the new governor-generalship was able to be introduced promptly when military hostilities with the Qing Empire took place in 1883.⁶⁶

Further, let me provide a brief overview of debates among military leaders on how to build state-dominated legal pluralism in the newly acquired Caucasus and Turkestan. Just as the Polish problem in the Western provinces served as a matrix of ethno-Bonapartism for the entire empire, the Caucasian War and various experiments in governing native populations during this war provided a master discourse, with both models and counter-models, for the social transformation of various parts of Asiatic Russia, although the Caucasus did not belong to it. During the first half of the nineteenth century, the Russian military authorities in the Caucasus vacillated between passive reliance on the existing tribal/clientelist structure (the policy pursued by A. P. Ermolov in the 1820s and M. S. Vorontsov after 1844) and the hasty, perfunctory introduction of the Russian system of local

administration (typically, I. F. Paskevich's proposal in 1830, which was realized in 1840). In 1860, after Shamil's surrender, Viceroy A. I. Bariatinskii introduced "military-popular administration" (*voenno-narodnoe upravlenie*), a combination of Russian military rule at the regional and district levels and self-government by native notables at the community level. Moreover, Bariatinskii started to remove what the Russian officials perceived as Sharia (Islamic divine law) from judicial practices, promoting instead reliance upon what they regarded as *'āda* (local customary law).⁶⁷ This stereotyping of *'āda* as desirable and Sharia as dangerous would be extended to Central Asia and the Volga-Urals.

When the Committee of Ministers deliberated an ordinance⁶⁸ to introduce a "military-popular system" for nomads in newly acquired Semirechie and Syr-Darya on the eve of the creation of the Turkestan governor-generalship, the composer of a draft for this ordinance initially questioned what should be the grand strategy of the empire vis-à-vis Turkestan. Should the empire try to draw this new territory nearer to the imperial core, or should it be satisfied with indirect rule through native notables, similar to what had existed in the Caucasus (before 1860) and what existed in the Kazakh Steppe under the jurisdiction of the Orenburg governor-generalship? The composer proposed the first option and praised territorial administration (the *volost-aul* system) on the Siberian Steppe as a model for the coming reform in Turkestan, contrasting it with the traditionalist family/clan-based administration of the Orenburg Steppe.⁶⁹ Concerning the sedentary population in the Syr-Darya oblast, the draft proposed revitalizing the system that had functioned under the Kokand Khanate, based on *aqsaqals* (community elders) elected by household heads. Referring to positive experiences on the Siberian Steppe again, the composer predicted that the proper organization of elections and a definite term of service would limit the influence that *aqsaqals* had previously enjoyed.⁷⁰

Conclusions

Empire is an instrument for incorporating multiple law territories into a large polity. Legal assimilation not only poses the danger of provoking the resistance of the elite of the new territories, but it is also quite costly under the pre-modern, corporatist system of recruiting officials and judges. Various law territories needed to be integrated, while keeping their regional specifics largely intact. In Europe, composite monarchies played this role. There were about 500 polities in Europe circa 1500, but this number had decreased to about 25 circa 1900.⁷¹ This was possible in early modern and modern Europe, because even after the decline of the universal authorities of the Pope and the Holy Roman Empire, European dynasties consisted entirely of relatives, who composed a mega-empire. Northern Eurasia after the demise of the Rurik Dynasty lacked this condition, so the institution of governors-general substituted for the role of composite monarchies. This was exactly the case for the empire's western acquisitions, in which the jurisdictions of governors-general largely overlapped the territories of the precedent independent polities. In contrast, the empire gave itself *carte blanche* in demarcating

administrative boundaries in Asiatic Russia. First of all, most of these territories hardly had statehood traditions, and even in the exceptional territories, such as Turkestan, the Russian policy makers prioritized geopolitical considerations over the legal traditions of the former polities.

The intra-bureaucratic debate in the early 1860s reflected the ambivalence of the Russian government. On the one hand, the Decree of February 17, 1956, finally implemented the decision adopted in 1826 to specify governors-general as a peripheral institution. On the other hand, the uncertain political situation under the Great Reforms induced statesmen, such as V. P. Butkov and P. A. Valuev, to use governors-general as emergency state-security organs. The counterarguments provided by governors-general appeared more convincing than Valuev's abstract criticism of functional duplication, and perhaps this is why his proposal was not realized. The Polish uprising, which made the introduction of *zemstvos* and other "internal" institutions in the Western provinces impossible, and the acquisition of Central Asia and the Priamur region, which were in need of creative institution-building, left no room for choice. Governors-general evolved as extraordinary, charismatic leaders of the peripheries, following an outline that had been determined in 1826. On the other hand, the idea of the security-officer-type governors-general proposed by Butkov and Valuev was realized twenty years later with the introduction of temporary governors-general.

Facing the crises of the empire's integrity in the 1840s, the policy makers began to use the image of peasants as a substitute for the imperial nation. Governors-general had become social transformers with populist characteristics. Since the Polish problem served as a matrix for ethnopolitics in the Russian Empire, the policy makers tried to transplant ethnic Bonapartism to the east, but it could not go beyond the Ural-Caspian line as a viable policy. Lacking class/ethnic differentiation and reliable "oppressed nations," the policy makers needed to face each ethnic group individually and they consequently indulged in particularism.

The adoption of ethno-territorial federalism in the Soviet Union completely changed the pattern of ethnopolitics. In contrast to a union of autonomous republics with definite titular nations, the jurisdictions of Russian governor-generalships had been arenas in which various nationalities competed. However, in the statements by Vilna governor-general Nazimov, we unexpectedly see a key concept of Soviet ethno-territorial federalism: namely, autochthonous-ness. Much room remains for elucidating how various elements of nationality policies in imperial Russia were compiled into Soviet nationality policy.

Notes

- 1 Matsuzato Kimitaka, "General-gubernatorstva v Rossiiskoi imperii: Ot etnicheskogo k prostranstvennomu podkhodu," in I. Gerasimov et al., eds., *Novaia imperskaia istoriia postsovetskogo prostranstva* (Kazan: Tsentr issledovaniia natsionalizma i imperii, 2004), 427–458.
- 2 *General-gubernator ili gubernator* (Kiev, 1889).
- 3 See my criticism of the overestimation of ethno-confessional factors in recent studies of the Russian Empire in my introduction to the collection: Matsuzato Kimitaka, ed.,

- Imperiology: From Empirical Knowledge to Discussing the Russian Empire* (Sapporo, Slavic Research Center, 2007), 5–16.
- 4 See, for example, Darius Staliūnas, *Making Russians: Meaning and Practice of Russification in Lithuania and Belarus after 1863* (Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi, 2007), 13.
 - 5 A. V. Remnev, “Stepnoe general-gubernatorstvo v imperskoi geografii vlasti,” in *Aziatskaia Rossiia: Liudi i struktury imperii* (Omsk, Izd-vo OmGU, 2005), 164–166; Uyama Tomohiko, “A Particularist Empire: The Russian Policies of Christianization and Military Conscription in Central Asia,” in Uyama Tomohiko, ed., *Empire, Islam, and Politics in Central Eurasia* (Sapporo, Slavic Research Center, 2007), 23–24.
 - 6 Uyama, “A Particularist Empire,” 60–62.
 - 7 A. V. Remnev, *Rossiia Dal'nego Vostoka: Imperskaia geografii vlasti XIX – nachala XX vekov* (Omsk, Izdanie OmGU, 2004), 39–56. See also Remnev’s chapter in this volume (Chapter 5).
 - 8 A. Remunyofu (Remnev), “Ohōtsuku-Kamuchakka shū kara Kyokutō taishufu e: Roshia Teikoku no Kyokutō kūkan ni okeru gyōsei gēmu” [From the Okhotsk-Kamchatka region to the Far East viceroyship: Administrative games in the Far East space of the Russian Empire], *Kingendai Tōhoku Ajia Chiikishi Kenkyūkai news letter*, no. 19 (2007): 1–8.
 - 9 L. E. Gorizontov, “Retsenziia: V. S. Shandra, *Malorosiis'ke heneral-hubernatorstvo 1802–1856: Funktsii, struktura, arkhiv* (Kyiv, 2001),” in *Belorussiia i Ukraina: Istoriia i kul'turta. Ezhegodnik – 2003* (Moscow: Nauka, 2003), 376. Gorizontov addressed this criticism not to my 2004 essay (which had not been written), but to my review of the same book by Valentyna Shandra, in which I outlined the basic ideas that would be developed in my future essay. See my review published in parallel in *Ab Imperio* (2002, no. 2: 607–615) and *Ukrains'kyi humanitarnyi ohiad* (2002, vyp. 7: 69–82).
 - 10 Leonid Gorizontov, “The ‘Great Circle’ of Interior Russia: Representations of the Imperial Center in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries,” in Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen, and Anatolyi Remnev, eds., *Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 67–93.
 - 11 *Institut general-gubernatorstva i namestnichestva v Rossii*, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, Iuridicheskii tsentr press, 2003), 281; RGIA (Russian State Historical Archive), f. 1282, op. 2, d. 218, ll. 98–98ob.
 - 12 A. D. Gradovskii, “Istoricheskii ocherk uchrezhdenia general-gubernatorstv v Rossii,” in *Sobranie sochinenii A. D. Gradovskogo*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1899), 301–303.
 - 13 RGIA, f. 797, op. 10, d. 27485, l. 3.
 - 14 V. V. Ivanovskii, *Russkoe gosudarstvennoe pravo*, vol. 1, vyp. 3 (Kazan, 1896), 23.
 - 15 K. Sokolov, “Ocherk istorii i sovremennogo znachenii general-gubernatora,” *Vestnik prava* (Zhurnal Iuridicheskogo obshchestva pri Imperatorskom S.-Petersburgskom Universitete), 33, kn. 8 (1903): 72. Quoting from the Russian legal scholar A. D. Gradovskii, Remnev also remarks that the system of governors-general was a hindrance for the empire in shifting from a polyvalent to a monovalent structure. Anatolyi Remnev, “Siberia and the Russian Far East in the Imperial Geography of Power,” Burbank et al., *Russian Empire*, 433.
 - 16 Remnev, “Siberia and the Russian Far East,” 440.
 - 17 J. H. Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” *Past and Present* 137 (1992): 48–71.
 - 18 J. C. Beckett, *A Short History of Ireland*, 6th ed. (London, 1986), 123–124.
 - 19 This was not a formal request. Emperors actually selected governors-general as necessary, as was the case with the appointment of M. S. Vorontsov as viceroy of the Caucasus in 1844. Two years later, Nicholas I recollected: “After my visit to the Caucasus in 1837, I found it necessary to adopt other measures to manage that region. The situation was becoming worse and worse . . . Was I wrong to send Prince Mikhail

- Semenovich [Vorontsov] there? This is the only person I have for the Caucasus. God give him strength!" *Arkhiv Kniazia Vorontsova*, vol. 38 (Moscow, 1892), 384.
- 20 RGIA, f. 1284, op. 241, d. 16, l. 154–154ob. Reluctantly agreeing to Lanskoï's proposal, Alexander II jealously noted that "excerpts of important articles should be submitted to my attention." *Ibid.*, l. 122.
- 21 During the early decades of the nineteenth century, macro-regional administrative supervisors functioned under the title of "military governors"; for simplicity, this chapter does not distinguish them from the later governors-general.
- 22 Terms used by Count E. F. Kankrin, the minister of finance (1823–44). See Gradovskii, "Istoricheskii ocherk," 315.
- 23 John P. LeDonne, "Russian Governors General, 1775–1825: Territorial or Functional Administration?" *Cahiers du monde russe* 42, no. 1 (2001): 13–14.
- 24 I will not describe this process in detail here, because a number of scholars since the imperial period have studied this issue. For a brief summary, see my "General-gubernatorstva," 438–439.
- 25 *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii*, series 2, vol. 31 (1856) (St. Petersburg, 1857), st. 30189, 30190; RGIA, f. 1282, op. 2, d. 218, ll. 53–54.
- 26 Matsuzato, "General-gubernatorstva," 441–442.
- 27 The War Minister (1861–81), Dmitrii Miliutin, criticized the corps system for being costly, hyper-centralized, and impractical in the event of actual hostilities. Corps were excessively large tactical units and, in times of hostilities, it was necessary to form new units of troops by recruiting divisions from various corps. RGIA, f. 1282, op. 2, d. 218, l. 2.
- 28 RGIA, f. 1282, op. 2, d. 218, ll. 1. 3.
- 29 LeDonne, "Russian Governors General," 14.
- 30 A new governor-generalship was introduced to cover the short-lived internal provinces of Tula, Voronezh, Orel, Ryazan, and Tambov.
- 31 RGIA, f. 1282, op. 2, d. 218, ll. 90ob.–91ob.
- 32 *Institut general-gubernatorstva*, 277–281. This collection of sources published Valuev's inquiries and the replies of governors-general, but the publishers omitted some important paragraphs from the originals, which made us refer also to the original archives. Governors-general in Siberia and the Caucasus did not participate in this debate, apparently because their concurrent service as military district commanders was predetermined, since they had already served as corps commanders.
- 33 *Ibid.*, 244–245, 247, 253–254, 286, 292. Contradictorily but understandably, Valuev charged governors-general with supervision of the peasant emancipation and the local reform. *Ibid.*, 255–256, 260
- 34 *Ibid.*, 291.
- 35 RGIA, f. 1282, op. 2, d. 218, ll. 100–100ob.
- 36 *Institut general-gubernatorstva*, 326.
- 37 *Ibid.*, 331–332.
- 38 *Ibid.*, 333.
- 39 RGIA, f. 1286, op. 24, d. 580, l. 14; *Institut general-gubernatorstva*, 350–351.
- 40 *Institut general-gubernatorstva*, 296–297; RGIA, f. 1286, op. 24, d. 580, l. 4, 16ob.
- 41 RGIA, f. 1286, op. 24, d. 580, ll. 23–23ob.
- 42 *Institut general-gubernatorstva*, 300–303; RGIA, f. 931, op. 1, d. 280, ll. 9ob.–11ob., 18–19, 23ob.
- 43 RGIA, f. 1286, op. 24, d. 580, l. 18; *Institut general-gubernatorstva*, 361.
- 44 RGIA, f. 1286, op. 24, d. 580, ll. 18ob.–19; *Institut general-gubernatorstva*, 313–314. Liven noted: "Breaking or narrowing his lively relations with this element [Baltic Germans], the governor-general's political significance will significantly be diminished" (*ibid.*, 333).
- 45 Jonathan W. Daly, *Autocracy under Siege: Security Police and Opposition in Russia, 1866–1905* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1998), 26, 33–40.

- 46 Lauren Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400–1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 11.
- 47 Virginia Martin, *Law and Custom in the Steppe: The Kazakhs of the Middle Horde and Russian Colonialism in the Nineteenth Century* (Richmond: RoutledgeCurzon, 2001), 17–34.
- 48 Onuma Takahiro, “Beku seido no sōsetsu: Shinchō kōbunsho ni yoru Higashi Torukisutan shi kenkyū josetsu” [The creation of the institution of Begs: Introductory remarks on the history of East Turkistan, based on Qing archival sources], *Nairiku Ajia-shi kenkyū* 22 (2007): 39–59.
- 49 Yang Guiping and Ma Xiaoying, *Qingzhen changming: zhongguo yisilanjiao* [Islam shines forever: Islam in China] (Beijing: Zongjiaowenhuashe, 2007), 47–56.
- 50 Orest Subtelny, *Domination of Eastern Europe: Native Nobilities and Foreign Absolutism, 1500–1715* (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1986).
- 51 Andreas Kappeler, *The Russian Empire: A Multinational History* (London: Longman, 2001), 159.
- 52 S. M. Solov'ev, *Moi zapiski dlia detei moikh, a esli mozhno, i dlia drugikh* (Internet version from the original published in 1877, http://az.lib.ru/s/solowxew_sergej_mihajlowich/text_0410.shtml), 57–58.
- 53 It was obvious that the Russian Empire would be unable to conquer the North Caucasus by military measures alone. Recognizing the inherent entrepreneurial spirit of North Caucasians and relying upon his own experiences as the New Russian governor-general from 1823, the date when unprecedented economic growth of the region started, Vorontsov devised a program targeted at incorporating the North Caucasus into the economic zone of the Northern Black Sea Rim. Hanada Tomoyuki emphasizes the continuity of M. S. Vorontsov’s economic policies between his New Russia and Caucasus periods. See his “M. S. Vorontsofu kenkyū no shikaku to tenbō: Kafukasu zenken sōtoku (1845–54) no tōchi seisaku wo chūshin ni” [Perspectives in the study of M. S. Vorontsov: Focusing on his Caucasus viceroyship (1845–54)], *Hokudai Hōgaku Ronshū* 57, nos. 2–3 (2006).
- 54 A. M. Dondukov-Korsakov, *Kniaz' M. S. Vorontsov: Vospominaniia* (St. Petersburg, 1902), 3.
- 55 On this concept, see A. I. Miller, “Ukrainskii vopros” v politike vlastei i russkom obshchestvennom mnenii, vtoraia polovina XIX v. (St. Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2000).
- 56 The Vilna governor-general and, to a lesser extent, the Riga governor-general followed Bibikov by promoting the Belarusians and Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians as a counterbalance to the Poles and Baltic Germans. Remarkably, Latvians and Estonians already had ethnonyms with definite boundaries, while those who would be named in the next century as Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Lithuanians had no commonly recognized ethnonyms with clear boundaries. It seems instructive that those governed by the Baltic Germans developed as nations earlier than those ruled by Poles.
- 57 Mikhail Dolbilov was the first to present this view. See Mikhail Dolbilov, “The Emancipation Reform of 1861 in Russia and the Nationalism of the Imperial Bureaucracy,” in Hayashi Tadayuki, ed., *Construction and Deconstruction of National Histories in Slavic Eurasia* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2003), 205–235; M. Dolbilov and A. Miller, eds., *Zapadnye okrainy Rossiiskoi imperii* (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2006), ch. 5.
- 58 Redemption (*vykup*) was a system in which the state, using securities, purchased landowners’ land that had to be distributed among the emancipated peasants. Peasants were indebted to the state and the debts had to be repaid during the following decades. In the Right-Bank Ukraine, serfs were allocated smallholdings, and this was legally consolidated by the “Local Provision” concretizing the Manifesto of February 19, 1861. Yet for administrative simplification, the authorities conducted the redemption system on the basis of villages but not households. Matsuzato Kimitaka, “Iz komissarov

- antipolonizma v prosvetiteli derevni: mirovye posredniki na pravoberezhnoi Ukrainie (1861–1917 gg.),” *Ukrains'kyi humanitarnyi ohliad* 9 (2003): 80–85.
- 59 Steven L. Hoch, “Did Russia’s Emancipated Serfs Really Pay Too Much for Too Little Land? Statistical Anomalies and Long-Tailed Distributions,” *Slavic Review* 63, no. 2 (2004): 247–274; Dolbilov, “The Emancipation Reform”; Matsumura Takeshi, “To What Extent Could the Empire Be Constructed? Objective Limitation on Agrarian Dis-course in Nineteenth-Century Russia: The Baltic Provinces, the Russian Black Soil Region, and Right-Bank Ukraine,” in Matsuzato, *Imperiology*, 159–179.
- 60 *Institut general-gubernatorstva*, 352–357; RGIA, f. 1286, op. 24, d. 580, ll. 15–17.
- 61 *Institut general-gubernatorstva*, 358–359; RGIA, f. 1286, op. 24, d. 580, ll. 17–17ob.
- 62 *Institut general-gubernatorstva*, 365.
- 63 *Ibid.*, 365–367.
- 64 Matsuzato, “General-gubernatorstva,” 452.
- 65 Matsuzato Kimitaka, “Managing the Space: The Territorial Reforms in Great Orenburg in the Mid-Nineteenth Century,” paper presented at the 7th ICCCEES World Congress in Berlin, July 25–30, 2005; this essay was published in Japanese as “Chiiki kenkyū shigaku to Roshia teikoku eno kūkanteki apurōchi: 19 seiki no Dai Orenburugu ni okeru gyōsei kukaku kaikaku” [Area study methods in history and spatial approach to the Russian Empire: Administrative territorial reforms in the Greater Orenburg in the nine-teenth century], *Roshia-shi kenkyū*, no. 76 (2005): 38–49.
- 66 Matsuzato Kimitaka, “The Introduction of the Priamur Governor-Generalship in “1884 and the Reconfiguration of Asiatic Russia,” *Russian Review* (forthcoming).
- 67 RGIA, f. 1405, op. 80, d. 640, ll. 6ob.–12.
- 68 “Ob”iasnitel’naia zapiska k polozeniiu i shtatam voenno-narodonogo upravleniia Semirechenskoi i Syr-Dar’inskoi oblasteri” (RGIA, f. 733, op. 193, d. 323, ll. 7 and passim).
- 69 RGIA, f. 733, op. 193, d. 323, ll. 8–14.
- 70 RGIA, f. 733, op. 193, d. 323, ll. 13ob.–14.
- 71 Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” 49.

5 Colonization and “Russification” in the imperial geography of Asiatic Russia

From the nineteenth to the early
twentieth centuries

Anatolii REMNEV

The main concern of this chapter is not the socio-economic dimension of peasant migration (for which there exists an enormous literature), but rather the theoretical foundations of an empire that was developing the concept of a “united and indivisible” Russia and its justification in national terms. The agrarian movement of Russian peasants to new lands was implicated in an ideology of “internal imperialism” and, from the end of the nineteenth century, became part of a national discourse, then at a formative stage, that included a series of concepts in its elaboration of the so-called “Russian cause” [*russkoe delo*]: “peaceful conquest,” the “revival” of the borderlands, the “establishment of Russian civilization [*grazhdanstvennost'*],” and – most frequently – “Russification.”¹ In this chapter, I wish to examine how spontaneous peasant resettlement was incorporated into an official ideology of “popular autocracy” as a way of giving popular sanction to imperial policy. I also consider who precisely was most active in pursuing this goal.

The role of resettlement and colonization in the “Russification” of the Asian borderlands

Under the notions prevailing in post-emancipation Russia, the processes of the military and political consolidation of its borders, the Russification of administrative and legal systems, the consolidation of infrastructure, the overcoming of gaps in communication, and the establishment of “Russian citizenship” [*russkoe grazhdanstvo*] were all intended to reach their definitive completion in the “merging” [*sliianie*] of the borderlands with Russia’s core regions. Russian colonization was designed to secure the possibility of the Russian Empire’s “dual expansion” through the growth of the “imperial core” [*imperskoe iadro*] at the expense of adjacent borderlands.² The new ideological project and the political actions of the time envisaged the core of the Russian state gradually swallowing Siberia, the Far East, the steppe region, and even Turkestan. This was a complex and extended process that was designed to secure greater stability and national potential

for the empire. A central role in this process was to be played by Russian peasants, who were called upon to convert “alien” land into something “native” and “Russian.” This set of propositions allowed contemporaries, and after them historians, to interpret migration as a natural process of the Russians’ settlement of their own country, while acknowledging that the region of colonization itself “expanded together with the territory of the state.”³

In my view, the American historian Willard Sunderland has raised a very important question: Was resettlement a matter of agricultural development or of imperialism? Was this the story of colonial expansion or of internal development?⁴ Or was it both? In imperial discourse the terms “resettlement” [*pereselenie*] and “colonization” [*kolonizatsiia*] were often used interchangeably, although the former emphasized the agrarian priority of solving the social problems of the peasantry, while the latter highlighted the political interests of the state. There was a notion at the time that “resettlement is a private matter, while colonization is a matter of the state.”⁵ “We have a resettlement policy, but we still need a policy of colonization,” proposed Georgii Gins, one of the more visible figures in the matter of colonization.⁶ In this conceptualization, “resettlement” presupposed the natural demographic and socio-economic potential of a population that was striving to solve its own private problems. “Colonization,” on the other hand, was connected to a greater degree with imperial policy and artificial measures designed to regulate the flow of migrants. Yet for all of the salience of this distinction, Leonid Bolkhovitinov, a colonel of the General Staff and an expert on the Far East, was in some sense right to note that the military and political tasks of strengthening the eastern borders and the migration of peasants with inadequate land from European Russia in order to inhabit “peripheral wastelands” [*okrainye pustyri*] led to “the intertwining of colonization and resettlement.”⁷

A prominent stereotype of imperial policy was the notion that “expansion is durable only when the ploughman follows the warrior, and a line of Russian villages appears behind the line of fortifications.”⁸ Peasant colonization began to be consciously perceived as an indispensable supplement to military expansion. As publicist Fedor Umanets noted,

Right behind the country’s military pursuits should come its cultural and ethnographic work. The Russian plough and harrow should unquestionably follow behind Russian banners, and just as the mountains of the Caucasus and the sands of Central Asia have not stopped the Russian soldier, they should also not stop the Russian settler.⁹

Thus in contemplating the historical mission of Russia’s eastward movement, Umanets placed the sword and the plough side by side. Likewise, with regard to the Ussuri region, Gennadii Nevel'skoi concluded that after military action, “the axe, the spade, and the plough” should succeed the bayonet.¹⁰ It was precisely the peasant-farmer that was highly valued as the bearer of truly Russian traditions, in light of his attachment to the soil. From this perspective, he unquestionably appeared superior to the Cossack, let alone to the worker (the proletariat), who

became the principal “colonizer” in the Soviet policy of industrial reclamation of the Asian periphery.

The empire’s consolidation required a critical mass of Russian people, who could then become the demographic foundation for the state’s integrity. From approximately the middle of the seventeenth century, resettlement to the borderlands became a concern of the state, which sought to deploy it in the project of imperial consolidation of new territories. As the historian Matvei Liubavskii wrote of this era, “The powerful movement of people . . . compelled the authorities not only to abandon any thought of trying to stop that movement and of limiting itself merely to its regulation, but also to take the direction of that movement into its own hands.”¹¹ The main driving force behind colonization now became not “natural spontaneity” [*prirodnaia stikhiia*], but the state itself, which directed the flows of people, created a defensive infrastructure for Russian settlers, and stimulated and regulated the placement of Russian settlements by legal act.¹² Peasant colonization can be understood as a matter of both conflict and cooperation between the peasant communal system and the state. Despite bureaucratic prohibitions, the settler believed that in going beyond the Urals he was doing the Tsar’s bidding. Regardless of failures and calamities, peasants from central Russia entertained naïve myths, “to the effect that in Cheliabinsk trains carrying settlers are greeted with *kasha* by Empress Mariia Fedorovna and Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich.”¹³ Even if this kind of “elemental monarchism” created many troubles for the authorities, it also could not fail to inspire in them a certain political optimism.

The empire tried to make use of precisely this instinctive consciousness of the Russian peasant in order both to assimilate new territories economically and to fasten them reliably to the state’s core provinces. Indeed, the active participation of the people themselves in the construction of the empire was steadfastly emphasized. The first arrivals not only found lands beyond the Urals supposedly belonging to no one, but also secured for the empire the historical right to their possession. The incorporation of the Amur region was construed as the “return” of lands that had been acquired earlier by the popular masses. With regard to the “steppe,” one encounters the theme of perpetual struggle with “the forest” and the necessity of defending farmers from the “predation” of nomads. The matter was more complicated in the case of Turkestan, yet there, too, Russian peasants were called upon to “revive dead lands” [*ozhivit' mertvye zemli*] and to help “return” [*vozvratit'*] civilization to the Asiatic peoples.

The adaptive capacity of the Russian person, his cultural compatibility with other peoples, and his peaceful inclinations toward them – all of these things were extolled and highly valued. The Russian population could take the initiative and not wait for the state to expand its borders. In “fleeing” from the state in search of a better life or in order to escape religious persecution, that population simultaneously carried the state along in its wake.¹⁴ Unauthorized resettlement did not cease throughout the history of the empire, but more and more it was taken into account by the authorities, if not incorporated into their political script. Ignoring government prohibitions, settlers did not stop moving to the officially closed “internal” lands of Siberia, the steppe, and Turkestan in the nineteenth and even twentieth

centuries. Peasant settlement appeared in the Altai, in the Uriankhai region and Manchuria, even in northern Iran, long before those lands had been officially incorporated into the empire. Lands that had been upturned by the Russian plough could be considered as potentially belonging to Russia. All of this created the preconditions for an ideological convergence of unauthorized migration, governmental colonization, and even imperial expansion.

For an extended period of time, the state restrained peasant migration rather than encouraged it, making an exception only for resettlement guided by military and administrative imperatives.¹⁵ From 1861 to 1885 an annual average of twelve thousand people resettled across the Urals. In the next decade (1886–95) that number grew to almost forty thousand, in part because an elemental movement of peasants seeking salvation from the famine of 1891 had broken through the bureaucratic dams. In 1891–92 one sees a sharp jump in the resettlement movement (more than eighty thousand people a year), then a relatively small drop; with the opening of the Siberian railway the number of settlers rapidly increased. It experienced periods of rise and fall, but remained at a consistently high level. In the last two decades before the outbreak of the Great War, approximately four million people resettled in Asiatic Russia, some three million of them in the period 1907–14 alone. The principal mass of settlers – more than 90 percent of those

Table 5.1 The "Russian population" of Asiatic Russia in the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries*

Provinces and oblasts	"Russian population"		Overall population		"Russians" as % of population	
	1897	1911	1897	1911	1897	1911
Tobolsk	1,311,706	1,827,992	1,433,595	1,975,239	91.5	92.5
Tomsk	1,760,619	3,463,266	1,927,932	3,673,746	91.3	94.3
Yenisei	494,462	875,000	570,255	966,409	86.7	90.5
Irkutsk	376,291	588,148	515,070	750,000	73.0	78.4
Transbaikal	442,744	590,645	672,072	868,790	65.9	68.0
Yakutsk	30,007	18,035	269,191	277,187	11.2	6.5
Amur	103,523	242,304	120,306	286,263	86.0	84.6
Maritime Region	109,764	380,437	188,977	523,840	58.0	72.6
Kamchatka	3,881	4,200	34,658	36,012	11.2	11.7
Sakhalin	18,316	5,593	28,113	8,849	65.2	63.2
Uralsk	163,910	297,711	645,121	804,245	25.4	37.0
Turgai	35,028	235,480	453,416	712,615	7.7	33.0
Akmolinsk	225,641	835,441	682,608	1,443,721	33.0	57.9
Semipalatinsk	68,433	174,873	684,590	873,760	10.0	20.0
Semirechie	95,465	204,307	987,863	1,201,540	9.7	17.0
Transcaspian	33,273	41,671	382,487	472,500	8.7	8.8
Syr-Darya	44,834	103,500	1,478,398	1,816,550	3.0	5.7
Samarkand	14,006	22,929	860,021	960,202	1.6	2.4
Ferghana	9,842	34,200	1,572,214	2,041,900	0.6	1.7
TOTAL	5,341,745	9,945,732	7,746,718	10,327,033	69.0	96.3

* Source: *Aziatskaia Rossiia*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1914), 82, 85.

crossing the Urals – came from the regions of central Russia, Ukraine, Novorosiya, Belarus, and the Volga. Without going into the complexities of defining ethnicities or even establishing confessional distinctions, statisticians and – to an ever greater degree – local administrators often preferred to lump all of these people together into the general category of “Russian population” [*russkoe naselenie*].

By the start of the twentieth century Russians were already predominant in Siberia and the Far East, represented a significant portion of the population in the steppe region, and were noticeably increasing their numbers in Turkestan. Islets of “the Russian world” constituted a kind of Russian archipelago in an Asian sea, spreading out from cities and fortresses, Cossack stanitsas, and defensive lines, along postal and trade highways, merging gradually with a massive, metaphorical “Russian continent.”

Among those included in this process were even the persecuted Russian sectarians and “Old Believers” (Semeiskie), whose colonizing abilities were fully appreciated in the empire’s East. The local administration recognized Old Believers’ loyalty and respect for the law and even held them up as an example to adherents of the official church. “As concerns their material strength, the mass of sectarians has always stood out, and stands out now, for its industriousness, thrift, and sobriety, which, alas, does not constitute a general trait of the majority of the Orthodox,” acknowledged Siberian authorities at one point.¹⁶ At the start of the 1880s the military governor of the Transbaikal region, Luka Il’iashevich, suggested using the Old Believers there as conduits for establishing imperial policy among the Buriats, whom the sectarians could supposedly acclimatize to settled agriculture.¹⁷ Such toleration for adherents of a religious teaching that was persecuted in central Russia was expressed not only by local authorities, but also by certain hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church itself. Thus Archbishop of Kamchatka diocese Innokentii (Veniaminov) ascribed a substantial significance to Old Believers as the most capable colonizing element.¹⁸ Concerned about “the effects of Mongol-Buriats on a certain segment of the Russian population” in the Transbaikal region, the officer Mikhail Grulev also wrote about the Old Believers in a sympathetic vein:

That group of the Russian population is notable for the fact that it has emerged from the crucible of Mongol-Buriat influence fully intact, having preserved in complete inviolability the purity all of its ethnic particularities and religious beliefs, its traditional Russian patriarchal way of life, and its exclusive love for agricultural labor.¹⁹

And, similarly, Georgii Gins, an official of the resettlement administration, openly declared:

Every native Russian Old Believer and sectarian is immeasurably closer to the realization of the Russian state ideal [*russkaia gosudatstvennost'*] in the distant borderlands than the most well-disposed non-Russian person [*inorodets*], who remains alien by origin, customs, and mores because of his

cultural particularity, the orientation of his mind, and, finally, because of his religion.²⁰

And while the government – with its concern for the economic reclamation and demographic consolidation of new territories – and the Old Believers – with their aspiration for religious freedom and better conditions for their lives – marched along different paths, and indeed shunned one another, there was nonetheless much that drew them together in their attitude toward the East. The authorities could not fail to take stock of the Old Believers’ and Dukhobors’ high degree of resistance to assimilation in an alien environment and their ability to preserve their Russianness despite being a tremendous distance from centers of Russian culture. Some of the first free settlers in the Asian borderlands – though they often appeared there by compulsion – were other sectarians, who were drawn there by the promise of religious freedom. They, too, provided “strong, prosperous, thrifty and energetic new settlers.”²¹

Exile could also be construed as a means of settling particular Siberian territories, as it could represent a notable source for the formation of a local peasantry and working class. Here one must note that, in time, exiles to Siberia could be ascribed to the state peasantry, or, if they had mastered a handicraft, to the estate of townspeople [*meshchanstvo*]. In other words, they could acquire the same rights that native Siberians enjoyed, with the exception of the right to return to central Russia. Even penal servitude was construed not only as a way of organizing coerced labor, but also as the first step towards the settlement of remote and poorly accessible territories.²² Furthermore, although the government eventually recognized exile as being ineffective and abolished its basic forms in 1900, experiments involving the forced movement of people to inhospitable but economically or strategically important territories continued. A segment of the exiled population was able to adapt and become full-fledged residents of Siberia and the Far East. Thus governor-general Nikolai Murav'ev, when liberating exiles and those sentenced to hard labor, sent them to the Amur region with precisely the following words: “God be with you, children [*detushki*]. You are now free. Work the land and make it into a Russian region.”²³ Even those sentenced to hard labor on Sakhalin could declare,

Our unfortunate fate compels us to forget our homeland, our origins and to settle at the ends of the earth, among impenetrable forests. God has helped us. In a short time we have built homes, converted the valley into field and meadow, reared livestock, erected a temple, and you yourselves can now see that it all smells like Rus'.²⁴

Yet in the steppe region and in Turkestan the empire rejected the methods of what could be called “penal colonization,” since it feared not only the negative impact of criminal exiles on the local population, but also the compromising of the imperial image in the eyes of those whose subject status was still a matter of doubt. An exception was made for political exiles – there was, of course, no fear that their

propaganda might fall on fertile soil among the backward native population, but rather the presumption that, due to the inadequate numbers of qualified staff in the region, they would be presented with an opportunity to apply their intellectual abilities for the benefit of the empire.

How an “alien” land was becoming “Russian”

Over the course of the nineteenth century, albeit slowly, one sees the gradual collapse of the stereotypical image of Siberia as a “kingdom of cold and darkness,” and the peasant, accordingly, ceasing to “shun” the area. The popular conception of Siberia was changing as well. From an “unknown” land of “guilt,” a place of exile and penal labor, it was increasingly transformed into an attractive region rich in land.²⁵ During a trip in the Ussuri region in 1867–69, Nikolai Przheval'skii noted with satisfaction that peasants had brought with them to that “distant foreign land” their native habits, superstitions, omens, and that they were ceasing to yearn for their homeland. He reported them declaring,

What's back there? There's little land, a crowded state, but here, you can see what open space there is; live as you want, plough wherever you wish, there's also plenty of forest, fish, and all kinds of animals. What else does one need? If God allows us to get established and to get settled, there'll be enough of everything, and thus we'll make Russia here as well.²⁶

To the writer Ivan Goncharov, returning in 1854 to Russia from the Far East through Siberia after a naval expedition, even Yakutsk already seemed native: “Even though it was Yakuts who were inhabiting the city, all the same it was delightful when I drove into a bunch of one-story houses, blackened by time: all the same it was Rus', even if Siberian Rus'!” Subsequently, when approaching Irkutsk, he remarked with satisfaction: “Everything began to resemble Russia,” with just one distinction – that there were no gentry estates, as the absence of serfdom in Siberia “constitutes the most notable trait of its physiognomy.”²⁷ The French traveler Eugène-Melchior de Vogué provided a revealing example from his trip to Central Asia. On the steamship carrying peasant settlers from Baku to the other side of the Caspian Sea, he met a group of peasant men from Tambov province. When he asked them “whether it was not a pity to part with their homeland, they gestured to the east and responded, ‘Our homeland is moving together with us’.” This, de Vogué opined, was “a characteristic trait of the Russian people, peculiar to them alone; they feel themselves at home everywhere.”²⁸

Together with this went the mental reclamation of the new space and its appropriation as “Russian land.” The concept of “ours” [*nashe*], which, as Claudia Weiss notes, took deep root in Russian consciousness, represents a key element for understanding both the structure of the Russian Empire and the annexation of borderland regions to Russia, in particular Siberia.²⁹ At the same time, it is difficult to discern precisely what meaning, aside from socio-economic considerations, peasants ascribed to their eastward movement. Were they merely a “silent”

tool of imperial colonization? To what extent were they objects and subjects of a new nationalistic discourse of empire? Studying rare letters from peasant settlers, Willard Sunderland came to the provisional conclusion that they were far from consciously recognizing an imperial mission and therefore were, in effect, “un-imperial imperialists”: they were pragmatic, in a peasant kind of way, in their views about the local population of the areas that they settled, and they were concerned, in the main, with the quality and quantity of land that they acquired.³⁰ But having settled on new lands, they could not fail eventually to see them as their own and to provide their own interpretation about them and to develop their own means of symbolic possession. Historical evidence for such reflection is nonetheless limited, and most often we must make sense of descriptions and interpretations provided by others.

Indirectly, popular creativity in the act of converting “alien” land into “native” land can be established by considering folklore, as well as Russian symbolism and topographical semantics. The principal markers signifying “Russian land” were Orthodox churches, ploughed fields, and Russian villages with graveyards where crosses had been erected, as was the case with churches. “Russian grain” [*russkii khleb*], meanwhile, was not only a source of nourishment, but also had sacral significance. In part this can be explained by peasant conservatism with regard to the cultivation of other agricultural crops, even those more appropriate to the natural and climatic conditions of the new location. Russian toponyms were another marker of the “Russification” of colonized lands. The well-known ethnographer Sergei Maksimov, traveling around the Amur region in 1860 under a commission of the Naval Ministry, drew attention to the ability of Russian Cossacks and peasants to give their own names to geographical objects. He wrote that once some time had elapsed they would have “christened” everything there.³¹ In line with the administrative and human “consolidation” [*uplotnenie*] of the map of Asiatic Russia, new names that testify to the “Russification” of the territory began to appear. If at first, thanks in large measure to popular initiative, place names were most often connected to bodies of water (rivers and lakes) or to the names of their original founders, then in time there developed a toponymy with an Orthodox Russian character. An important role in this process was played by so-called transferred toponyms, whereby names associated with the places from which the settlers departed appear in Asiatic Russia on a massive scale.

Thereafter the situation changes, and with the strengthening of state control over peasant migration from the middle of the nineteenth century, the role of the state in naming population centers grows. In the middle of the century, the governor-general of Western Siberia, Gustav Gasford, instructed that new settlements should receive names associated with the names of members of the imperial family. A widely used practice was to ascribe to settlements names linked to Orthodox saints, moments in church history, historical events, and to dedicate them to state figures of local or empire-wide significance, to scholars, and even just to local officials. On the map one encounters names of openly imperial significance: the Golden Horn Bay, the Eastern Bosphorus Straits, the Gulf of Peter the Great, the cities Faithful [Vernyi], Rule in the East [Vladivostok], Annunciation

[Blagoveshchensk], and so on. Encompassed in this process were not only centers of population, but also natural and geographical objects. The matter here concerned not just the establishment of certain norms, but also the recognition that the replacement of old names by new ones would be useful to “the assimilation of the local population by the ruling people”; in this way “a certain spiritual kinship [would be established] between the native population and the assimilating people.”³² Still, considerable circumspection was deployed in the matter of renaming towns and villages, which is evident from the retention in Asiatic Russia of many traditional names that had already stood their ground.³³

It was a matter of principle that a connection be preserved between the settlers and their previous places of residence: that they wrote letters and even visited their previous homeland, which was made easier by the establishment of regular postal delivery and the development of transportation by river, sea, and rail. “And in this way it is as if invisible connecting threads extend from various places in European Russia to specific locations in Asia.” One official publication made a point of emphasizing that in leaving his homeland, a peasant nonetheless “maintains a general feeling of attachment to the native nest of his ancestors that has been left beyond the Urals – to central Russia, where there remains so much that is intimate and about which here, so far from everything, recollection becomes especially poignant and dear.”³⁴

The institution called upon to cement the variegated Russian society in the Asian borderlands was the Russian Orthodox Church. The peasant perceived “the Russian land” as “Christian space” inhabited by Orthodox people, as a territory defined by Christian markers. “Russians’ taking political possession of Siberia,” remarked the historian Petr Slotvsov at the beginning of the nineteenth century,

was something that also happened in a Christian key, through the construction of chapels, churches, monasteries, and cathedrals. The general rule of Russians at the time was this: wherever tribute is collected in the winter, there is a cross or subsequently a chapel as well.³⁵

In addition to Siberian-Russian heroes (Ermak, Khabarov, Dezhnev, Poiarkov), locally venerated saints, icons, popular sites of religious pilgrimage, and monasteries appeared in popular consciousness.³⁶ The opening of new Orthodox churches, the solemn consecration of icons, the erection of monuments to fallen heroes, the celebration of ecclesiastical and state holidays, the anniversary of the annexation of a given territory by Russia, the honoring of the principal agents of “the Russian cause” – all of this served to show the establishment “Russianness.” This was something emphasized by priests in their sermons, declared by local governors and governors-general, and propagandized by public activists. Local museums, public historical readings, and special publications for the broad masses were also called upon to serve this cause. In imperial and popular scenarios of “Russification,” the mechanisms for converting an “unknown” land into Russian Christian space included, aside from agriculture, its interpretation as land given by God and

consolidated by Orthodox and national symbolism – an entitlement secured by military exertions and spilled blood.

The “unity” of Russia and “agricultural” imperialism

Despite recognition of the pivotal role of colonization in Russian history, peasant migration was late to appear in the consciousness of imperial ideologists. And if the raising of the resettlement question as a matter of imperial policy was a late development – despite the historically high level of the population’s tendency towards migration – then the effort to link peasant colonization to the “Russification” of Asian borderlands and the country’s “national” development involved even greater intellectual innovation.

For Mikhail Katkov, a major ideologist of “Russification,” the unity of the Russian people and the creation of a “large Russian nation” as a coherent political entity represented a matter of principal importance.³⁷ This was, in effect, an overarching mission that began to be articulated in the 1860s as a plan for national development involving the creation of a “unified and indivisible” Russia, with a state nucleus at its center surrounded by borderlands. In the pages of the publications under his editorship – the newspaper *Moscow News* [*Moskovskie vedomosti*] and the journal *Russian Messenger* [*Russkii vestnik*] – Katkov called for Russia’s “internal unification,” which he regarded as a more important matter than the empire’s further expansion.³⁸ The idea of promoting the state’s national unity through the “merging” of the eastern borderlands with Russia’s “core” was, to a certain degree, a continuation of policy in the empire’s west and was to a large extent transferred from there. In his numerous publications on these issues, Katkov paid scant attention to Asiatic Russia and responded to affairs in the east only in the context of confrontation between Russia and Great Britain in Central Asia and the Far East. In these cases he was concerned with preventing foreign domination in those regions or was frightened by signs of “Siberian separatism,” behind which Polish intrigues seemed to be lurking.³⁹ For all this, the influence of his ideas on the direction of Russia’s Asian imperial policy is unmistakable.

The absence of distinct boundaries within the Russian Empire established the preconditions for the expansion of territory for Russian settlement. Imperial ideologues deliberately rejected the idea of applying the term “colony” to Russia’s Asian borderlands and in this way sought to emphasize their country’s difference from European colonial empires. In this view, Russia’s principal difference from the western world powers was its status as a single territorial monolith and the fact that free lands within the empire, which provided an alternative to emigration, could allow Russia to prevent the loss of a part of its population. Significantly, in these theoretical juxtapositions of Russia and the West, historians, geographers, orientalist and ethnographers notably did not limit themselves to describing processes of migration or government policy, but also remarked that “Siberia is gradually taking on the appearance of Russian land,” and that, “to the extent that the Russian population has begun to pour across the Urals, Siberia-as-colony is gradually but consistently retreating to the east before the Siberia that was part of

the Muscovite state” [*Sibir'-koloniia postepenno vse dal'she otstupaet na vostok pered Sibir'iu-chast'iu Moskovskogo gosudarstva*].⁴⁰

Peasant colonization became a consciously recognized element of a policy of “Russification” only from the second half of the nineteenth century.⁴¹ The botanist Gustav Radde recalled how Nikolai Murav'ev-Amurskii, the governor-general of Eastern Siberia, “burned with the desire to plant the seed of Russian culture in the boundless deserts.”⁴² It was asserted that the unity of the Russian state nucleus with the newly settled imperial borderlands was attained most effectively in those cases – to cite the governor of the city of Kyakhta, Nikolai Rebinder – when “Russian inhabitants of Siberia [*Sibiriaki*] have preserved the Russian type and Russian principles in all their purity. This serves as the best guarantee of the unity of Russians on both sides of the Urals.”⁴³ In a report to the tsar in 1867, the governor-general of Eastern Siberia, Mikhail Korsakov, specifically accentuated that the government’s principal concern in the Far East should involve the extensive promotion of Russian colonization, “since the seed of all further actions, all success in the future, and of the durability of Russian dominion is to be found only in this.”⁴⁴ In explaining the need for settlement of the Maritime region with Russian people, the military governor of the region, Ivan Furugel'm, declared that its defense could not be organized on the basis of military force alone. It was indispensable, he thought, to confront the Chinese and Koreans with a population, even if smaller in number, that was comparatively more civilized and could subordinate them to its influence “by the power of Europeanness [*siloi evropeizma*] and the establishment of mutual trade.” He continued:

With this in mind, it is necessary above all to make the Maritime region into Russian land by colonizing it with a Russian population, and in light of growing emigration from Korea, this program needs to be realized as rapidly as possible in order to prevent the formation of an independent Chinese-Korean province within Russia’s borders.⁴⁵

The empire sought not only to use the peasant for the agricultural reclamation of the Asian borderlands, but also to obtain popular sanction for new territorial expansion, which could be justified by the increase of arable land.⁴⁶ By 1856 Innokentii (Veniaminov), Archbishop of Kamchatka, the Kuriles and the Aleutians, was able to declare that the main goal of Russia’s annexation of the expansive and almost uninhabited Amur region was “to prepare a few places, ahead of time and without provoking hostilities with other powers, for the settlement of Russians when space for them within Russia becomes inadequate.”⁴⁷ The extensive character of Russian agricultural practices and the demographic explosion of the post-reform era meanwhile strengthened the motivation of the Russian peasant to migrate.⁴⁸ This was a peculiar kind of specifically “*agricultural*” imperialism, to use the felicitous definition of the well-known Russian thinker Nikolai Fedorov.⁴⁹ The greedy aspiration of Russian colonists for land and the “guile” with which they acquired it has left its mark on the folklore of the peoples of the Russian East. In this context, assertions that the land belonged to God and the

peasant commune provided a supplementary foundation for its occupation without having to take too much stock of the rights of local residents.⁵⁰ To an even greater degree than France (about which Ferdinand Braudel has written), Russia was in effect “doomed to pay the price for its own enormous territory, for its peasant-like insatiable appetite for the acquisition of ever more land.”⁵¹ For many years the mania for space was likened in popular consciousness to the political power of the empire.

Under these conditions the empire could position itself as a state that was concerned not only with Russians living presently, but with future generations as well. “It is necessary to remember,” wrote war minister Aleksei Kuropatkin, drawing on the calculations of Dmitrii Mendeleev, “that in the year 2000 the population of Russia will reach the level of 400 million. Even in the present we must prepare free lands in Siberia for at least a quarter of that number.”⁵² On 24 March 1908, Pavel Unterberger, the governor-general of the Amur region, and one who had long served in the Far East, presented a secret memorandum entitled “The Immediate Tasks in Our Consolidation of the Amur Region.” It identified the colonization of the region as the principal task of the government and proposed that its urgency was dictated by the need to provide for the future natural growth of the Russian population. “In this regard,” he emphasized,

for the Russian Empire, which lacks overseas colonies, colonization represents the only possibility to exploit the land resources in Siberia and the Far East for the benefit of our surplus population. It follows from this that the preservation of Siberia and the Amur region constitutes a vital issue for us, since otherwise the entire surplus population will depart for foreign lands, to the detriment of our own state.⁵³

The last Amur governor-general, Nikolai Gondatti, considered the following slogan to be the leitmotif of his activity: “The Far East must be Russian and only for Russians.”⁵⁴

Colonization models of “Russification” in the steppe region and Turkestan

In contrast to Siberia, the empire did not initially set broad social and cultural goals in the Kazakh steppe, such as peasant colonization or Christianization, but instead limited itself to military, fiscal, political, and administrative concerns. Resettlement of peasants could upset the delicate balance of interests and destroy the traditional nomadic economy, which threatened to reduce the already limited profitability of the region. But by 1865 the Steppe Commission had come to the conclusion that “the durable and strong binding of these lands to Russia forever and their gradual, organic merging with her can be the only goal of our administration in its Central Asian holdings.” It seemed now to imperial experts that, as the “pacification” of the steppe had been accomplished and the empire’s external boundaries had been pushed to the south, circumstances now allowed Russia to act

more decisively with regard to the Kazakhs. Exhibiting an ideological modernism, the Commission concluded,

For the spread of Russian *civilization* [*grazhdanstvennost'*] among the Kirgiz [Kazakhs], for their rapprochement with Russians, and for the development of the productive and industrial potential of the country, one cannot deny the utility and necessity of establishing a Russian population in the steppe – one that, in light of its belonging to a *higher race*, will have a beneficial influence on the people's way of life and will prepare them for *complete unification* with Russia. In this regard the Russian colonization of the Kirgiz steppes, which have become internal provinces of the empire as a result of our conquests in Central Asia, has tremendous significance for the entire state.⁵⁵

In the mid-1870s, the governor-general of Western Siberia, Nikolai Kaznakov, came to the conclusion that the only means for “Russifying” the steppe “is the mixing of the Kirgiz population with Russians by means of colonization.”⁵⁶ And yet, for the time being, only a subsidiary role was ascribed to peasant resettlement, and at this point Russian towns and villages were expected to play the role of models of “Russian life” with a settled, agricultural economy. Under these plans, the resettled peasant appeared in the role of an “instructor” in farming not only for Kazakhs, but also for Cossacks, whose capacity for the cultivation of the land was in some doubt.⁵⁷

Peasant movement to new lands was gaining steam. By 1882 the governor-general of Turkestan, Konstantin von Kaufman, could declare that the region of Semirechie was now “Russian,” and that “by various communications routes, both major and minor, it has already been unified through the presence of Russian settlements.” He added that,

now, finally, most prominent among those Russian settlements are not just minor towns, inhabited half by Tatars, and not just rare Cossack stanitsas, with their half-vagrant Siberian population, but growing peasant villages and communities, prospering in the open steppe spaces of that land of plenty.⁵⁸

Continuing the policy of supporting peasant settlement, the former head of Semirechie region, and from 1882 the governor-general of the steppe region, Gerasim Kolpakovskii, directly linked the task of “Russification” to concern for the Russian person, who would bring “Russian faith in Orthodoxy and limitless Russian devotion to the Orthodox Tsar into the former possessions of the hordes,” and would represent “the best guarantee for our decisive consolidation in this heterodox land.”⁵⁹ The introduction of “the Russian element” into the nomadic milieu would, it seemed, facilitate the definitive organization of the steppe as a Russian borderland. “Cohabitation and common work in the cleaning of irrigation ditches,” argued resettlement specialists, “will draw Kirgiz and Russians together and will facilitate the spread of our European civilization among the former.”⁶⁰ In its turn, placing limitations on the region's nomadic economy would allow a good

system of agriculture to be established in the steppe and liberate a portion of the territory for new settlers from European Russia. Peasant colonization thus became at once an end and a means.

However, only with the mass migration at the turn of the century did the Kazakh steppe become one of the main regions of colonization, and only then did it enter the field of vision of the theoreticians and practitioners of empire.⁶¹ Resettlement officials, who now were assuming leadership in the conceptualization of the empire’s socio-economic mission in the borderlands, continued to contemplate the issue within the inherited framework of Russia’s civilizing mission to Asia. This allowed them to reconcile their state service with their populist ideals, which they extended not only to Russian peasants, who still remained “backward,” but also to the primordially “wild” native inhabitants of the regions in question. Still especially dear in their minds was “the creative popular genius of divinely-inspired communal life,”⁶² combined with peasants’ adaptability to new conditions and their ability to construct neighborly relations with non-Russians [*inorodtsy*]. Moreover, the authorities and members of the intelligentsia with populist inclinations – in the case of officials concerned with peasant and resettlement affairs these were often one and the same – agreed that nomads were capable of development and that living alongside Russians would serve as a significant stimulus for their “culturalization.”

The situation was more complicated still in Turkestan, where the high density of the local sedentary population made it difficult to suppose that Russians would ever predominate or even constitute a significant number. In the regions of Ferghana, Samarkand, and the Transcaspian, the most fertile and irrigated lands were already densely settled, and there were also traditional forms of property in land – ones that the empire did not wish to recognize in the case of nomadic steppe zone. Possibilities for the leasing of land were also quite limited, while the climatic conditions and the peculiarities of local agriculture created supplementary difficulties.⁶³ Concerned in the first instance with issues of the population’s loyalty and the organization of the administration, imperial authorities had not contemplated the settlement of Turkestan with Russian peasants and did not even plan to establish Cossack bulwarks and defensive lines, which had already proven their effectiveness elsewhere. In the end, what prevailed was a view of this new borderland that had more in common with British and French colonial outlooks than it did with Russian ones. Also notable was the system of “military-popular administration” that had been established previously in the Caucasus region. The goals of “establishing civilization” [*vodvorenie grazhdanstvennosti*] and “merging” [*sliianie*] Turkestan with Russia – and indeed the use of Russian colonization to achieve these goals – were placed on the backburner, and they became a preoccupation only in the contemplation of a much longer timeframe. At the same time, there were distinct plans for converting Turkestan into a provider of raw materials – principally cotton – for Russian industry, which would require the establishment of only modestly sized “Russian centers” [*russkie ochagi*]. Thus, even the proponents of this vision viewed the idea of a Russian stronghold in Turkestan consisting of peasants with a certain skepticism.

Soon, however, the authorities' position was modified by spontaneous peasant movement, which, inspired by need and by rumors of an abundant land, defied great distances, natural obstacles, and bureaucratic impediments.⁶⁴ One resettlement activist, Vladimir Voshchinin, rapturously described such phenomena:

The brightest side of what we witnessed – indeed it was almost blinding – was the free Russian creativity that takes the form here of the peaceful assimilation of the borderlands. Often independently of the government's will, it involves the incorporation of the heretofore uninhabited expanses of Turkestan into the country's broader cultural and economic life.⁶⁵

In his eyes peasant settlements represented “centers of Russian life,” from which “Russian skills spread out,” resulting finally in the birth of “a new Turkestan.”⁶⁶ Prohibitions on resettlement to the region would be futile, he emphasized, since Russian history had clearly shown “that popular movement eastward constitutes an inherent, unchanging dimension of Russian life, and that it was this movement that created Asiatic Rus’.”⁶⁷

In this context Turkestan required a modification in the ideology and imperial practices of administration and the establishment of “Russian civilization” [*rusaskaia grazhdanstvennost'*]. The loyalty of the native population was still valued more highly than the economic exploitation of land resources – although the question of the “value” of the borderlands was becoming a topic for more active discussion, and reproaches about the unprofitability and inappropriate tax privileges of the borderlands also began to be heard.⁶⁸ One of the first Russian historians of Turkestan, Mikhail Terent'ev, asserted:

Our policy is a policy of self-sacrifice, one that expends more on the conquered than we receive from them. Our Great-Russian peasant pays almost three times more than a Pole does, and in return – in the form of schools, roads, bridges, and hospitals – receives almost ten times less. And with regard to our Asiatic subjects, who pay merely 1 ruble 10 kopecks for each soul and are obligated neither to serve in the military nor to quarter soldiers, there is no comparison to speak of. This policy has been pursued throughout our history and constitutes one of its splendid distinguishing features.⁶⁹

In time, the empire sought to be more pragmatic and economically efficient by enlisting the help of science. Irrigation would alter the “physiognomy” of the steppes and satisfy the needs of Russian peasants on their new lands. Imperial discourse included the idea of a “struggle with nature,” and its vision of enlightenment, involving the progressive development of “backward” peoples, was based on the newest accomplishments of the natural sciences and sociology. Behind socio-economic justifications were hidden political goals as well. Irrigation would not only provide land appropriate for agriculture, but also permit the creation of a “new” Turkestan. Only in these conditions would it be possible for “continuous, appreciable, and stable oases of Russian rural life and culture” to appear in densely

populated places.⁷⁰ Among other considerations was the fact that, under Muslim law, irrigated lands were considered to be the property of those who irrigated (or those who “brought them to life” [*ozhivil*]).⁷¹ As Voshchinin asserted, a canal “was the best monument here to European culture, a worthy emblem of the *new* Turkestan. And this is entirely a *Russian* installation,” since almost all the building materials were acquired from central Russia, and Russian peasants performed the labor.⁷² Such irrigated lands were to be settled by economically strong peasants, so that their settlements could become, in the words of Aleksandr Krivoshein, “a bulwark of Russian influence in the region.”⁷³

At the same time, it became obvious that colonization, despite precautionary measures, could become the basis for interethnic conflict, all the more given that Russian settlers could at times behave quite willfully and even aggressively, while the forceful taking of lands threatened to destroy the fragile mechanisms maintaining the loyalty of native inhabitants. This was especially palpable in those regions where the main mass of settlers had arrived (the Altai, the steppe regions, Turkestan, and Transbaikal), and where the resistance of local peoples could take dangerous forms. The administration of Turkestan was already calling for surrounding native villages – kishlaks and auls – by a ring of Russian settlements, and equipping and training Russian peasants in the use of arms.⁷⁴ By a law of 21 June 1914 it even became illegal to settle certain Russian sectarians on irrigated state lands precisely because their religious convictions prohibited military service. After the suppression of the Andijan revolt of 1898, the native inhabitants who had supported the mutinous ishan were punished by losing their lands, on which a symbolically named “Russian village” [*Russkoe selo*] was established. Likewise, after the Kirgiz uprising of 1916 authorities proposed confiscating land from the rebels and establishing Russian settlements alongside their villages. The military governor of Ferghana, Aleksandr Gippius, reported that this kind of threat – that is, the threat of not only losing land but also being converted into unskilled hired laborers for Russian settlers – “has a strong, one can say, bewitching effect.”⁷⁵

Peasants and geopolitics – turned inward

Aside from the concerns addressed above, the lands beyond the Urals were incorporated into a broader geopolitical discourse on the theme of “Europe–Russia–Asia.” A component element of this discourse was a new interpretation of the division of Russia into its European and Asian parts and the question of Russia’s responsibility not only for the military, economic, and scientific conquest of Asia and its civilization, but also the very expansion of Europe itself. The 1850s and 1860s brought with them both a spurt of public concern for the East and the creation of new political and geographical “images” of Asiatic Russia.⁷⁶ Russian society intensely sought answers to questions about the purpose and significance of the Asian lands that the country had acquired. In this context, the issue of peasant resettlement attained a high degree of currency in Russian political thought and was integrated into geopolitical preoccupations with the internal organization of the empire.

Indeed, discernable behind changes on Russia's administrative map is a purposeful process of the country's internal national configuration. Already in the early nineteenth century Nikolai Nadezhdin noted that new lands in Asia and North America were being annexed to the empire's "central nucleus" [*osnovnoe iadro*], where "the geography has a purely Russian physiognomy" and where one finds "the core Russian land" [*korennaiia Russkaia zemlia*]. At about the same time, Petr Slotvsov, a historian and well-known educator, construed Siberia as part of a Russia that had simply moved beyond the Urals. A member of the Russian mission to China, Filipp Vigel', wrote in 1805 that Siberia would be useful to Russia in the future as a tremendous land reserve for a rapidly growing Russian population, and that through the process of settlement Siberia would shrink while Russia itself would grow. In his famous work *Russia and Europe*, Nikolai Danilevskii asserted that the process of Russian colonization should be understood as the phase-by-phase "expansive settlement of the Russian race" [*rasselenie russkogo plemeni*]. Extended over time, this process had not created colonies of the western European sort, but rather expanded the entire continental mass of Russian state territory. In each geographical fragment of the Russian state, he proposed, one encounters neither "a separate piece of provincial particularity" [*otdel'naia provintsial'naia osob'*] nor a "possession" [*vladenie*] of the state, as such, but instead "Russia itself." For Vladimir Lamanskii this was a sufficient basis to declare the existence of a "Middle world" [*Sredinii mir*] between Europe and Asia. It corresponded largely to the borders of the Russian Empire and represented a particular historical-cultural entity, in which the Russian people, the Russian language, and the Russian state ideal predominated. Projecting the development of a new vision of space in the Russian state, he remarked, "In this sense one may already now speak of Asiatic Russia, while it is still impossible – and likely will remain so – to speak of an Asiatic England, France, Holland, Spain or Portugal."⁷⁷

Petr Semenov, the prominent Russian geographer, who was close to government and military circles and later earned the suffix "Tian-Shanskii" for his surname, directly posed the key question in conjunction with the three-hundredth anniversary of Siberia's annexation by Russia: Was the movement into Siberia a matter of chance, or was it "an inexorable consequence of the natural growth of the Russian people and the Russian state?" In responding to this question, Semenov sought to overcome the opposition, noted above, between willful resettlement by the people and colonization directed consciously by the state. Thus he tried to link the formation of the Russian nation and land with imperial expansion in a single process. In Semenov's conception, the ideas of a "historical calling" for the Russian people, the attainment of the country's "natural borders," and the appearance of a Russian national territory were all connected. This was, in essence, a new geopolitical construction of the internal space of the Russian Empire. Western Siberia "has become a Russian land [*russkaia strana*] to a greater extent than many of our eastern provinces," concluded the prominent geographer. In turn, the colonization of Eastern Siberia, where significant non-Russian territorial enclaves remained, would in the future depend on the development of transportation routes, while in

the steppe regions Russians had already occupied the larger portion of oases and foothills capable of supporting settled life and culture.⁷⁸

Semenov saw in all of this not only the growth of imperial territory, but the realization of a grand civilizing project, by which Russian colonization would displace the previously existing ethnographic boundary between Europe and Asia further and further to the east.⁷⁹ Later, with regard to Siberia, he would use not only the term “Asiatic Russia,” but also “European Asia.”⁸⁰ And his son and successor to his scholarly investigations, Veniamin Semenov-Tian-Shanskii, in his turn identified within the empire a particular “cultural and economic unit” that he called “Russian Eurasia,” the space between the Volga and the Yenisei, from the Arctic Ocean to the empire’s southern borders. In his view this territory could not be considered a borderland [*okraina*] but should instead be regarded as “a core Russian land equal [to others] in all respects” [*korennnaia i ravnopravaia vo vsem russkaia zemlia*].⁸¹ Dmitrii Mendeleev, who also thought in geopolitical terms, envisioned a similar scenario, according to which Russia “is appointed to smoothen over the thousand-year dissension between Asia and Europe, to reconcile and merge these two different worlds.” He considered the division into European and Asian Russia to be artificial in light of the unity of “the Russian people (Great Russians, Little Russians, and White Russians).”⁸²

Scholarly conceptions and predictions actively entered into imperial discourse and were deployed for the justification of military and political plans. One expert on Central Asia, colonel Aleksei Makshev of the General Staff, articulated the issue this way:

On the whole the movement of Russians to the East was a matter not of political or economic calculation, although it had enormous political and economic consequences, but was sooner a matter of instinctive popular creativity subordinate to a higher law of historical necessity.⁸³

The empire was sending Russian settlers to its eastern borderlands, and they would become conscious of their status as an advanced outpost of Russia, while the very flatness of the territory originally settled by Russians historically predetermined, in his view, the formation of a territorially large state. Mikhail Veniukov, another expert for the General Staff – who, like many others, combined his military service with scholarly activity in the Imperial Russian Geographical Society – likewise saw in peasant resettlement the foundation for the durable attachment of Asian borderlands to Russia. It was not enough, in his view, for Russia to attain its “natural borders” and to include territory and peoples into its imperial space; one needed furthermore to make them an inalienable part of the state, something that was impossible to attain without peasant colonization. This alone could secure “durable peace” [*prochnyi pokoi*] on the new lands.⁸⁴

Military science identified “population policy” – which envisaged active state interference in ethnic, demographic, and migratory developments in the context of resolving military and mobilizational tasks – as one of the most important aspects of imperial governance. Above all, this was connected with the dissemination of

the Russian Orthodox element in borderlands that either had a diverse population or, in the case of the Amur and the Maritime regions, that faced the threat of demographic and economic expansion on the part of Russia's neighbors. By this scheme, peoples began to be classified by their degree of reliability [*blagonadezhnost'*], and attempts were made to supplement the dynastic loyalty of ethnic elites with a broader feeling of national duty and all-Russian [*obshcherossiiskii*] patriotism. It was seen as necessary now to dilute the population of national borderlands with "the Russian element" and to deploy preventive measures in order to minimize the non-Russian threat originating both within the empire and outside of it.

War minister Aleksei Kuropatkin already placed the ethnic and confessional composition of the Asian military districts at the foundation of his assessment of their battle-worthiness:

At the present time the Siberian provinces of Tobolsk and Tomsk, in particular the latter, as well as parts of the Orenburg region and the North Caucasus, can be considered Russified to a significant degree. Thereafter the process of Russification is most notable in Yenisei province and the Semirechie region.⁸⁵

By the same criteria he divided territory to the east of the Volga into four regions: (1) the eight provinces of eastern and southeastern European Russia; (2) Tobolsk, Tomsk, and Yenisei provinces; (3) the rest of Siberia and the Russian Far East; and (4) the steppe region and Turkestan. If the first two regions could be recognized as "a Great Russian and Orthodox region," then in the third, which had also become Russian, the process had not been completed, and there was, accordingly, serious cause for apprehension in light of the growing in-migration of Koreans and Chinese. Even more dangerous, in his appraisal, was the situation in the fourth region. Kuropatkin therefore concluded that in the twentieth century "the Russian tribe" faced an immense task in effectuating the settlement of Siberia (especially its eastern parts) and maximizing the Russian population in the steppe and Central Asian areas.⁸⁶

In his political testament of 1895, Nikolai Bunge, the chairman of the Committee of Ministers and the vice-chairman of the Siberian Railway Committee, pointed to the example of the USA and Germany in regarding Russian colonization as a way of erasing ethnic and cultural differences:

The weakening of the racial particularities of the borderlands can be achieved only by recruiting the native Russian population [*korennoe russkoe naselenie*] to those lands, and yet even this method will be reliable only if the native population that has been recruited for that purpose does not adopt the languages and customs of the borderlands, but instead brings to those regions its own.⁸⁷

Therefore, he asserted, it was necessary to remove the administrative hindrances to peasant movement across the Urals, since those were likely to harm "the great task of closer union of our Asiatic possessions with European Russia." There was also another argument, one offered by Bunge: "As a counter to the possible

pressure of the yellow race it is necessary to install in Siberia the cultural power of the Russian people, which has staunchly protected the integrity of the state in all of its other borderlands.”⁸⁸ Those holding such views believed that Russian peasants in the Asiatic borderlands were stronger than those in the center of the country and identified themselves more readily with the Russian state, which protected them and which they, in turn, were called upon to defend. They were to become an impassable defensive borderline in the Far East against the “yellow peril,” and in Central Asia against the pretensions of “Muslim fanaticism.”

In conjunction with massive railway construction in Siberia, finance minister Sergei Witte predicted a change in geopolitical space within the empire itself, noting, as was his wont, the significance

of the great colonizing abilities of the Russian people, thanks to which it has moved across all of Siberia, from the Urals to the Pacific Ocean, subordinating all peoples, without arousing hostility among them, but instead gathering them together in one general family of Russia’s peoples.

It was precisely the Russian settler, in his view, that would change the civilizational boundaries of the empire: “For Russian people the border post that divides them, as a European race, from the peoples of Asia, has long ago moved beyond Lake Baikal, into the steppes of Mongolia. In time, its final place will be at the terminal point of Chinese Eastern Railway.”⁸⁹ Witte linked not only economic, but also political tasks to the colonization of Siberia. The Russia population of Siberia and the Far East, he contended, needed to become a bulwark in “the inevitable struggle against the yellow race.”⁹⁰ Witte’s continental conception was based on certainty about the capacity of peasant settlers to create a solid economic and demographic home front for Russian interests in Asia.

In the last years of the empire, peasant movement across the Urals received the official status of a most important affair of state. Deputies of the third State Duma recognized the resettlement issue as “a favorite child” [*izliublennoe detishche*] and emphasized that eastward resettlement had become a complex task of colonization. From the Duma’s rostrum the main goal was articulated: that “by settling our eastern borderlands, we are creating a bulwark of Russian statehood, and resettlement accordingly serves as a conduit for the transmission of Russian culture into a land inhabited entirely by non-Russians [*inorodtsy*].”⁹¹ As the head of the government, Petr Stolypin aspired to include in the country’s nationality policy the preservation of lands in the empire’s east from seizure by foreigners, and to subordinate to Russian authority the sparsely populated locations adjacent to China, “on whose rich black soil it would be possible to raise new generations of a healthy Russian people.” As one of his close associates, Sergei Kryzhanovskii, contended, the significance of Siberia and Central Asia as a cradle, in which one could create a new, powerful Russia and with its help support the withering Russian root, was something that Stolypin clearly recognized. If he had stayed in power, “the government’s attention would have been chained to this mission of prime importance.”⁹²

The main administrator of land management and agriculture, Aleksandr Krivoshein, whom publicists called “the Minister of Asiatic Russia,” purposefully strove to convert Siberia “from an appendage of historical Russia into an organic part of a Great Russia that is becoming Eurasian geographically but remaining Russian by culture.” In an interview with the French newspaper *Figaro* on 4 February 1911, he elaborated: “In resettling, the peasant, though guided by his own interests, is undoubtedly serving the general interests of the empire at the same time.” With regard to Siberia and the Far East this plan was most clearly articulated by Stolypin in a speech to the State Duma on 31 March 1908 concerning the construction of the Amur railway. He called upon the country to use the railways to pull together “the sovereign might of great Russia,” and asserted that the construction of railways in the Asian borderlands would involve a process whereby “Russian pioneers will build the railway, will settle along that railway, will push themselves into the region and, along with that, push Russia into it as well.”⁹³ Two months later, this time in the State Council, Stolypin added: “The Amur railway is without doubt a cultural undertaking, since it draws our valuable colonial possessions closer to the heart of the state.”⁹⁴ In unison with the declarations of the prime minister, State Council member Aleksei Neidgard declared that “the Russian ploughman and the Russian plough represent the only way to prevent the Sinification of our borderlands.” And this should become “a popular historical mission . . . of cultural conquest of the region.”⁹⁵ Specifically Russian settlers, as an official publication of the Main administration of land management and agriculture noted, must be the ones to bind the empire together spiritually, as they represent

the living and convinced conduits of our common faith in the integrity and indivisibility of our fatherland, from the banks of the Neva to the heights of the Pamir Mountains, to the impassable ranges of the Tian-Shan, to the frontier twists of Amur, and to the distant shores of the Pacific Ocean, where everything – in Asia and Europe alike – is our Russian land, one great and inalienable property of our people.⁹⁶

Conclusion

The presentations and interpretations on the theme of peasant colonization examined here allow us to enhance our understanding of how that theme was incorporated into the imperial theory and practice of “Russification,” at which levels its discussion occurred, and the particular place that it occupied in the geopolitical conception of a “unified and indivisible” Russia. Even after peasant resettlement in the Asian borderlands was perceived as a positive phenomenon in state chancelleries, as a way of strengthening territorial control and binding the empire together, the majority of debates concerned pragmatic steps, behind which larger objectives remained in the shadows – even though government ideology concerned not just the solution of socio-economic problems, but also motifs of the *Kulturträger*.⁹⁷ Drawn into the discussion of the political and cultural meanings of resettlement were the central and local administrations, resettlement officials

responsible for policy in the Asian borderlands, visible imperial dignitaries and military men, as well as scholars proposing various scenarios for exploiting the colonizing resources represented by the country’s people. The proposed ideological formulas were not contained in official documents and scholarly treatises, but gained a wide circulation and were propagandized by newspapers and journals, and thus became an important factor in the formation of public opinion and the elaboration of stereotypes in developing historical and geographical justifications for eastward peasant movement. The result was a descriptive language for the resettlement movement – one that was novel, at times contradictory, and politically burdened with imperial and national significations. Explicitly denying a colonial status for its Asian borderlands, and emphasizing their unbreakable ties with central Russia, imperial experts and even their opponents remained within the framework of a single discourse and preferred to speak about those Asian borderlands only as an object of colonization. Here we should note merely that in contrast to the place of Siberia and the Far East in geopolitical constructions of the time, the movement of Russians to Central Asia turned out to be more problematic and not infrequently confounded the theoretical articulations. It remained limited to general reasoning about civilizing missions and only indistinctly sketched the southern boundary of “the Russian world.”

It would seem that growth in the numbers of the Russian population in the Asian part of the empire would demonstrate the success of a course designed to secure the “merging” of those borderlands with the center of the country. Yet peasant resettlement created new problems for the authorities, by aggravating social, national, and confessional contradictions. To a large degree it was precisely peasant migration that gave birth to the “Kirgiz question” (among a series of referential government questions) and shifted Buriats and Yakuts into the ranks of “problematic peoples.” Nor did the empire find a balance between the desire to lessen the intensity of the agrarian crisis in the center of the country, to settle the Asian borderlands, and to preserve the loyalty of the local population there. On the one hand, settlers often did not reckon with the norms of traditional land usage, and their feeling of national and cultural superiority were strengthened by state support and propaganda focused on economic and cultural domination. On the other hand, Russian settlers themselves were often appraised as “backwards,” and their supposed “cultural impotence” generated doubts about their ability to realize a civilizing mission in actual fact. Cossacks also came under such suspicion, as they were accused not only of an absence of Kulturträger potential, but also with the loss of “Russianness” itself.⁹⁸ Contradictions in the empire along the “center-region” axis grew in strength, and in Siberia the situation was complicated by the formation of Siberian regional consciousness, whose social and political mobilization was being generated by a local intelligentsia defending the interests of the borderland. The purveyors of Siberian regionalism – the *oblastniki* – attempted to foist onto the empire a specifically colonial discourse, which threatened to destroy the ideological plan of “Russification.”

(Translated from Russian by Paul Werth)

Notes

- 1 On the complexities of interpreting the concept “Russification” [both *obrusenie* and *rusifikatsiia*], see Aleksei Miller, “Rusifikatsii: Klassifitsirovat’ i poniat’,” *Ab Imperio*, no. 2 (2002): 133–148.
- 2 Leonid Gorizontov, “‘Bol’shaia russkaia natsiia’ v imperskoi i regional’noi strategii samoderzhavii,” in *Prostranstvo vlasti: Istoricheskii opyt Rossii i vyzovy sovremennosti* (Moscow, 2001), 130.
- 3 Vasilii O. Kliuchevskii, *Sochineniia*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1956), 31.
- 4 Willard Sunderland, “The ‘Colonization Question’: Visions of Colonization in Late Imperial Russia,” *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, no. 48 (2000): 210–212.
- 5 D. A. Davidov, *Kolonizatsiia Man’chzhurii i Severo-Vostochnoi Mongolii* (Vladivostok, 1911), 24, cited in Leonid Rybakovskii, *Naselenie Dal’nego Vostoka za 150 let* (Moscow, 1990), 8.
- 6 Georgii Gins, *Pereselenie i kolonizatsiia* (n.p., n. d.), 28.
- 7 Leonid Bolkhovitinov, “Kolonizatory Dal’nego Vostoka,” in *Velikaia Rossiia: Sbornik statei po voennym i obshchestvennym voprosam*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1910), 222.
- 8 Gennadii Chirkin, “Ocherk kolonizatsii Sibiri vtoroi poloviny XIX i nachala XX v.,” in *Ocherk po istorii kolonizatsii Severa i Sibiri*, vyp. 2 (Petrograd, 1922), 85.
- 9 Fedor Umanets, *Kolonizatsiia svobodnykh zemel’ Rossii* (St. Petersburg, 1884), 33.
- 10 Gennadii Nevel’skoi, *Podvigi russkikh morskikh ofitserov na krainem vostoke Rossii, 1849–1855* (Moscow, 1947), 325–326.
- 11 Matvei Liubavskii, *Obzor istorii russkoi kolonizatsii* (Moscow, 1996), 474.
- 12 Irina Erofeeva, “Slavianskoe naselenie Vostochnogo Kazakhstana v XVIII–XX vv.: migratsionnoe dvizhenie, stadii sotsiokul’turnoi evoliutsii, problemy reemigratsii,” in *Etnicheskii natsionalizm i gosudarstvennoe stroitel’stvo* (Moscow, 2001), 333.
- 13 *Krizis samoderzhavii v Rossii. 1895–1917* (Leningrad, 1984), 47; Anatolii Kulomzin, “Perezhitoe,” RGIA (Russian State Historical Archive), f. 1642, op. 1, d. 200, d. 22.
- 14 Svetlana Lur’e describes this process figuratively as a “cat-and-mouse” game in *Istoricheskaia etnologiiia* (Moscow, 1997), 161–169.
- 15 For more details, see *Sibir’ v sostave Rossiiskoi imperii* (Moscow, 2007), chapter 2: “Kolonizatsiia Sibiri XVIII–nachala XX vv.: Imperio- i natsiostroitel’stvo na vostochnoi okraine Rossiiskoi imperii.”
- 16 “Vsepoddanneishii otchet nachal’nika Tomskoi gubernii za 1879 g.,” GAOO (State Archive of Omsk Oblast), f. 3, op. 10, d. 17047, ll. 170–171.
- 17 “Poezdka v Sibir’ i na ostrov Sakhalin v 1881–1882 gg.: Iz putevogo dnevnika M. N. Galkina-Vraskogo,” *Russkaia starina*, no. 1 (1901): 189.
- 18 Ivan Barsukov, *Innokentii, mitropolit moskovskii i kolomenskii: Po ego sochineniam, pis’mam i rasskazam sovremennikov* (Moscow, 1883), 394–395. Obviously this was not an exception in the policy of the Russian Empire. A similar case, having to do with the western borderlands, is provided by Leonid Gorizontov in “Raskol’nichii klin: Pol’skii vopros i staroobriadtsy v imperskoi strategii,” *Slavianskii al’manakh, 1997* (Moscow, 1998): 148.
- 19 Mikhail Grulev, “Iz proshlogo Zabaikal’ia (k istorii nashei missionerskoi deiatel’nosti na okrainakh),” *Russkaia starina*, no. 4 (1904): 222–223.
- 20 Georgii Gins, “Pravo sektantov na pereselenie i zemel’noe ustroistvo v Turkestane,” *Zhurnal Ministersstva iustitsii*, no. 2 (1913): 168. Official attitudes to Russian sectarians and Old Believers could change depending on the degree main-line Orthodox settlement in borderland regions, and Orthodox clerical circles and certain local administrators who shared their views were most inclined to emphasize the danger of such proximity of Orthodox and sectarian elements. Indeed, there were even certain legal limitations of such cohabitation. For all that, the “Russianness” and high colonizing potential of sectarians and Old Believers was greatly valued – something on which Prime Minister P. A. Stolypin commented publicly more than once.

- 21 Bolkhovitinov, “Kolonizatory Dal'nego Vostoka,” 220.
- 22 Zapiska GTU MVD, “Ob upravlenii ostrovom Sakhalinom” (25 November 1883), RGVA (Russian State Military History Archive), f. 400, op. 1, d. 825, l. 54.
- 23 Petr Kropotkin, *Zapiski revoliutsionera* (Moscow, 1990), 173.
- 24 Ivan Mirolubov (Iuvachev), *Vosem' let na Sakhaline* (St. Petersburg, 1901), 214.
- 25 Natalia Rodigina, *Drugaiia Rossiia: obraz Sibiri v russkoi zhurnal'noi presse vtoroi poloviny XIX – nachala XX veka* (Novosibirsk, 2006).
- 26 Nikolai Przheval'skii, *Puteshestvie v Ussuriiskom krae, 1867–1869* (Moscow, 1947), 70.
- 27 Ivan Goncharov, *Fregat “Pallada”: Ocherki puteshestvia* (Moscow, 1950), 624, 650.
- 28 Cited in Zakish Sadvokasova, *Dukhovnaia ekspansiia tsarizma v Kazakhstane v oblasti obrazovaniia i religii, vtoraiia polovina XIX – nachalo XX vekov* (Almaty, 2005), 75–76.
- 29 Claudia Weiss, “‘Nash,’ Appropriating Siberia for the Russian Empire,” *Sibirica* 5, no. 1 (2006): 141–155.
- 30 Willard Sunderland, “Peasant Pioneering: Russian Settlers Describe Colonization and the Eastern Frontier, 1880s–1910,” *Journal of Social History* 34, no. 4 (2001): 895–922.
- 31 Sergei Maksimov, “Na Vostoke. Ch. 1,” in *Sobranie sochinenii S. V. Maksimova*, vol. 11 (St. Petersburg, n.d.), 211.
- 32 N. M., “Ob uporiadochenii mestnoi geograficheskoi nomenklatury,” *Turkestanskii vedomosti*, February 4, 1899.
- 33 An example is the preservation of the name Kustanai (Nikolaevsk from 1893 to 1895) or the unrealized attempt to rename Sakhalin “Romanovskaia oblast.”
- 34 *Aziatskaia Rossiia*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1914), 190, 198.
- 35 Petr Slovtsov, *Istoricheskoe osvoinenie Sibiri*, kniga 1 (Moscow, 1836) 36.
- 36 See Sergei Maksimov, “Sibirskaiia sviatynia,” in *Sobranie sochinenii S. V. Maksimova*, vol. 16 (St. Petersburg, 1910), 115–275.
- 37 On the concept of a “big Russian nation” see Gorizontov, “Bol'shaia russkaia natsiia”; Aleksei Miller, “*Ukrainskii vopros*” v politike vlastei i russkom obshchestvennom mnenii (vtoraiia polovina XIX v.) (St. Petersburg, 2000), 31–41; Anatolii Remnev, “‘Bol'shaia russkaia natsiia’ i regional'naia identichnost': Istoricheskii opyt Sibiri,” in *Rossiiskaia Zapadnaia Sibir' – Tsentral'naia Aziia: novaia regional'naia identichnost', ekonomika i bezopasnost'* (Barnaul, 2003).
- 38 Mikhail Katkov, *Sobranie peredovykh statei “Moskovskikh vedomostei,” 1866 god* (Moscow, 1897), 58.
- 39 See also Anatolii Remnev, “Mikhail Nikiforovich Katkov v poiskakh ‘sibirskogo separatizma,’” in *Lichnost' v istorii Sibiri XVIII–XX vekov: Sbornik biograficheskikh ocherkov* (Novosibirsk, 2007), 64–80.
- 40 Georgii Vernadskii, “Protiv solntsa: Rasprostranenie russkogo gosudarstva k vostoku,” *Russkaia mysl'*, no. 1 (1914): 64.
- 41 It is notable that in the discussion of the colonization of eastern borderlands that occurred in the politico-economic committee of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society in 1861, questions about socio-economic problems were raised, even ones with various interpretations of colonial policy, but the theme of “Russification” was absent. Vladimir Bezobrazov, “Politiko-ekonomicheskii komitet pri Imperatorskom Russkom geograficheskom obshchestve,” *Vek*, nos. 15, 22 (1861).
- 42 Gustav Radde, “Avtobiografia,” in *Graf N. N. Murav'ev-Amurskii v vospominaniakh sovremennikov* (Novosibirsk, 1998), 171.
- 43 Nikolai Rebinder to Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich (1855), RGAVMF (Russian State Archive of the Navy), f. 410, op. 2, d. 1016, ll. 11–12; f. 224, op. 1, d. 236, ll. 161–162.
- 44 Aleksandr Anisimov, “Problema sokhraneniia za Rossiei Dal'nego Vostoka i obespecheniia ego bezopasnosti s tochki zreniia administratsii Vostochnoi Sibiri (50-e – 60-e gg.

- XIX v.),” in *Dal'nii Vostok Rossii v kontekste mirovoi istorii: Ot proshlogo k budushchemu* (Vladivostok, 1997), 116.
- 45 *Zapiska kontr-admirala I. V. Furugel'ma o Primorskoj oblasti* (no date), RGAVMF, f. 410, op. 2, d. 4246, ll. 85–86.
- 46 Igor' Iakovenko, *Rossiiskoe gosudarstvo: natsional'nye interesy, granitsy, perspektivy* (Novosibirsk, 1999), 103.
- 47 Barsukov, *Innokentii, mitropolit moskovskii i kolomenskii*, 382.
- 48 See Mikhail Churkin, *Pereseleniia krest'ian chernozemnogo tsentra Evropeiskoi Rossii v Zapadnuu Sibir' vo vtoroi polovine XIX – nachale XX vv.: Determiniruiushchie faktory migratsionnoi mobil'nosti i adaptatsii* (Omsk, 2006).
- 49 Nikolai Fedorov, *Sochineniia* (Moscow, 1982), 110, 286, 335, 378.
- 50 See Vadim Trepavlov, “*Belyi tsar*”: *Obraz monarkha i predstavleniia o poddanstve u narodov Rossii XV–XVIII vv.* (Moscow, 2007), 123–124.
- 51 Fernand Braudel, *Chto takoe Frantsiia?* kniga 1, *Prostranstvo i istoriia* (Moscow, 1994), 272.
- 52 Aleksei Kuropatkin, *Itogi voiny: Otchet generala-ad''iutanta Kuropatkina*, vol. 4 (Warsaw, 1906), 44.
- 53 *Zapiska Pavla F. Unterbergera “Blizhaishie zadachi v dele zakrepleniia za nami Priamurskogo kraia”* (24 March 1908, Khabarovsk), RGIA library, printed memoranda, no. 257, p. 1.
- 54 Governor of Tobolsk province Nikolai Gondatti to Nikolai Pleve (1 March 1908), RGIA library, printed memoranda, no. 2487, p. 1.
- 55 “Po proektu polozheniia Kirgizskoi Stepnoi komissii ob upravlenii kirgizskimi stepiami” (1868), RGVIA, f. 400, op. 1, d. 120, l. 60 [emphasis added].
- 56 RGVIA, f. 400, op. 1, d. 498, l. 39. “The Kazakhs along the defensive line [*prilineinye kirgizii*],” wrote Pavel Nebol'sin, a researcher of Siberia, about his impressions of a trip to the Kazakh steppe under Orenburg's jurisdiction in 1850, “on account of their close acquaintance with Cossack settlements, increasingly adopt the principles of our social life day by day, and, being subjected to the influence of Russian civilization, gradually become Russian [*postепенно ruseiut*]. It is a wonderful result – one very much sensed by the Kazakhs themselves.” Pavel Nebol'sin, *Rasskazy proezzhego* (St. Petersburg, 1854), 294.
- 57 “Vsepoddaneishii otchet voennogo gubernatora Akmolinskoi oblasti za 1879 g.,” GAOO, f. 3, op. 10, d. 17047, l. 2; P. A. Khvorostanskii, “Kirgizskii vopros v sviazi s kolonizatsiei stepi,” *Voprosy kolonizatsii* 1 (1907): 82.
- 58 *Proekt vsepoddanneishego otcheta Gen.-Ad''iutanta K. P. fon-Kaufmana I po grazhdanskomu upravleniiu i ustroistvu v oblastiakh Turkestanskogo general-gubernatorstva* (St. Petersburg, 1885), 186.
- 59 *Vsepoddanneishii otchet Stepnogo general-gubernatora G. A. Kolpakovskogo za 1887 i 1888 gg.* (n. p., n. d.).
- 60 Orest Shkapskii, “Nekotorye dannye dlia osveshcheniia kirgizskogo voprosa,” *Russkaia mysl'*, no. 7 (1897): 43.
- 61 On the radical changes in the ethno-demographic geography of the steppe regions in 1896–1916, see chapter 4 of George Demko, *The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan, 1896–1916* (Bloomington, 1969), “The effects of Russian in-migration.”
- 62 Aleksandr Kaufman, *Pereselenie: Mechty i deistvitel'nosti* (Moscow, 1906), 26.
- 63 On Russian colonization of the Semirechie region and Turkestan, see Petr Galuzo, *Agrarnye otnosheniia na iuge Kazakhstana v 1867–1914 gg.* (Alma-Ata, 1965); A. I. Ginzburg, *Russkoe naselenie v Turkestane (konets XIX – nachalo XX v.)* (Moscow, 1991); Ol'ga Brusina, *Slaviane v Srednei Azii: Etnicheskie i sotsial'nye protsessy. Konets XIX – nachalo XX veka* (Moscow, 2001).
- 64 With a striking knowledge of events, peasants submitted the first petitions requesting resettlement to the Syr-Darya in 1868, when those lands had only just been annexed by the empire.

- 65 Vladimir Voshchinin, *Ocherki novogo Turkestana: Svet i teni russkoi kolonizatsii* (St. Petersburg, 1914), 76.
- 66 Obviously, the conception of a “new Turkestan” was regarded as being fortuitous for justifying the colonizing policy in the region. A renowned researcher and high-ranking official, the director of the Division of Land Improvement of the Main Administration for Land Management and Agriculture, Prince Vladislav Masal'skii, addresses this issue in *Rossii: Polnoe geograficheskoe opisanie nashego otechestva*, vol. 19, Turkestanskii krai (St. Petersburg, 1913): vii–viii.
- 67 “Zapiska Glavnoupravliaiushchego zelmeustroistvom i zemledeliem, 1913,” *Voprosy kolonizatsii*, no. 14 (1914): 152.
- 68 Ekaterina Pravilova, *Finansy imperii: Den'gi i vlast' v politike Rossii na natsional'nykh okrainakh Rossii, 1801–1917* (Moscow, 2006), especially chapter twelve, on tax reform in Turkestan and the ability of the Central Asian borderlands to pay for their own upkeep.
- 69 Mikhail Terent'ev, “Turkestan i turkestantsy,” *Vestnik Evropy*, no. 10 (1875): 529.
- 70 “Zapiska Glavnoupravliaiushchego zemleustroistvom i zemledeliem po poezdke v Muganskuiu step' v 1913 godu,” *Voprosy kolonizatsii*, no. 14 (1914): 152.
- 71 Shkapskii, “Nekotorye dannye dlia osveshcheniia,” 47.
- 72 Voshchinin, *Ocherki novogo Turkestana*, 28. On imperial policy with regard to irrigation in Central Asia, see Muriel Joffe, “Autocracy, Capitalism and Empire: The Politics of Irrigation,” *Russian Review* 54, no. 3 (1995): 365–388; Ekaterina Pravilova, “Reka imperii: Amudar'ia v geopoliticheskikh i irrigatsionnykh proektakh vtoroi poloviny XIX veka,” in *Aziatskaia Rossii: Liudi i struktury imperii* (Omsk, 2005).
- 73 From the report of Aleksandr Krivoshein to the State Duma, “Ob otvode russkim perezselentsam uchastkov oroshaemoi kazennoi zemli v Golodnoi stepi i o sostoianii rabot po orosheniiu tam novykh zemel' (10 maia 1913),” in *Golodnaia step' 1867–1917: Istoriia kraia v dokumentakh* (Moscow, 1981), 145.
- 74 On this issue see Petr Galuzo, *Vooruzhenie russkikh perezselentsev v Srednei Azii: Istoricheskii ocherk* (Tashkent, 1926); idem, *Agrarnye otnosheniia na iuge Kazakhstana*, 214, 222.
- 75 *Vosstanie 1916 goda v Srednei Azii i Kazakhstane: Sbornik dokumentov* (Moscow, 1960), 741.
- 76 См.: Milan Hauner, *What is Asia to Us?* (Boston, 1990); Mark Bassin, “Inventing Siberia: Visions of the Russian East in the Early Nineteenth Century,” *The American Historical Review* 96, no. 3 (1991): 763–794; Mark Bassin, “Russia between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of Geographical Space,” *Slavic Review* 50, no. 1 (1991): 1–17.
- 77 Vladimir Lamanskii, “Tri mira Aziisko-Evropeiskogo materika,” *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta*, series 12, *Politicheskie nauki*, no. 1 (2001): 102.
- 78 Petr Semenov, *Rech' po povodu 300-letii Sibiri, chitannaia v zasedanii IRGO 8 dekabria 1881 goda* (St. Petersburg, 1882), 19–20.
- 79 Petr Semenov, “Znachenie Rossii v kolonizatsionnom dvizhenii evropeiskikh narodov,” *Izvestiia IRGO* 28, vyp. 4 (1892): 354.
- 80 *Gosudarstvennyi sovet: Stenograficheskie otchety*, sessiia III (St. Petersburg, 1908), zasedanie 30 May 1908, col. 1398.
- 81 Veniamin Semenov-Tian-Shanskii, “O mogushchestvennom territorial'nom vladenii primenitel'no k Rossii,” in *Arabeski istorii*, vyp. 7, *Rozhdenie natsii* (Moscow, 1996), 603–604, 608–609.
- 82 Dmitrii Mendeleev, “O karte Rossii,” in Dmitrii Mendeleev, *K poznaniiu Rossii* (Moscow, 2002), 181–182.
- 83 Aleksei Maksheev, *Istoricheskii obzor Turkestana i nastupatel'nogo dvizheniia na nego russkikh* (St. Petersburg, 1890), 46.
- 84 Mikhail Veniukov, *Rossii i Vostok: Sobranie geograficheskikh i politicheskikh statei* (St. Petersburg, 1877), 114–115.

- 85 RGVIA, f. 400, op. 1, d. 596, l. 5.
- 86 Aleksei Kuroparkin, *Russko-kitaiskii vopros* (St. Petersburg, 1913), 55–75. In 1915, Kuroparkin wrote to Nicholas II with substantial historical and political justifications for his geopolitical predictions concerning the Russian Empire's new borders in the case of that country's victory in the Great War. On this see Anatolii Remnev, "Kak obustroit' Rossiia: Geopoliticheskie prognozy byvshego ministra Kuropatkina," *Rodina*, no. 9 (2004): 32–34.
- 87 Nikolai Bunge, "Zagrobnye zametki," *Reka vremeni (Kniga istorii i kul'tury)*, kniga 1 (Moscow, 1995), 211.
- 88 Aleksei Kulomzin, "Perezhitoe," RGIA, f. 1642, op. 1, d. 199, l. 44.
- 89 RGIA, f. 1622, op. 1, d. 711, l. 41.
- 90 "Vsepoddanneishii doklad ministra finansov S. Iu. Vitte," RGIA, f. 560, op. 22, d. 267, ll. 8–9.
- 91 *Gosudarstvennaia дума, Chetvertyi sozyv: Stenograficheskie otchety*, session I, part 3 (St. Petersburg, 1913), col. 1672.
- 92 Sergei Kryzhanovskii, "Zametki russkogo konservatora," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 4 (1997): 113.
- 93 *Gosudarstvennaia дума, Tretii sozyv: Stenograficheskie otchety*, 1908, session I, part 2 (St. Petersburg, 1908), col. 1413.
- 94 *Gosudarstvennyi sovet: Stenograficheskie otchety*, 1908, session III (St. Petersburg, 1908), col. 1529, sitting of 31 May 1908.
- 95 *Ibid.*, col. 1440, sitting of 30 May 1908.
- 96 *Aziatskaia Rossiia* 1: 199.
- 97 Alfred J. Rieber, "Colonizing Eurasia," in Nicholas Breyfogle, Abby Schrader, and Willard Sunderland, eds., *Peopling the Russian Periphery: Borderland Colonization in Eurasian History* (Abingdon, 2007), 269, 272.
- 98 For more details, see Anatolii Remnev and Natalia Suvorova, "'Russkoe delo' na aziatskikh okrainakh: 'russkost' pod ugrozoi ili 'somnitel'nye kul'turtregery,'" *Ab Imperio*, no. 2 (2008): 157–222.

6 Empire and demography in Turkestan

Numbers and the politics of counting

Sergei ABASHIN

This chapter is about the “conceptual conquest and mastery” of Central Asia at the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth century. Studying nationalism and self-awareness in the region, one can understand the importance of the way in which the ethnographic map of Central Asia was created in the eyes of imperial administrators in this period, and, in particular, the importance of the statistical description of Central Asian society as one of the procedures or technologies of imperial knowledge-power. To count is not simply to assign a number, but also to name, to provide a social, ethnic, gendered, and age-group label, that is, to form an image of the counted, to place him or her into some sort of definite niche in an imagined space and time. To count is to classify, to reveal important attributes, to establish differences and similarities, to draw borders, to construct hierarchy and subordination. To count is to establish relations with the counted, to include them in the field of social interactions with the authorities.

Benedict Anderson has noted the role of statistics, especially censuses, in colonial policies. He wrote, in particular, about censuses as technologies for the creation of “national grammars” or images of those nationalisms, which will then replace the empires.¹ In this chapter I will briefly dwell on the history of the counting of Central Asia’s inhabitants and a little more on the historical process of creating “national grammars” in Russian Turkestan. At the study’s base will be the example of Ferghana oblast.

The “statistical” conquest of Turkestan

From the outset, Russian power in Turkestan took steps to count, that is, to see and to put under control that which it had conquered. The development of statistics proceeded alongside the economic and administrative mastery of the region.

The first task that the authorities encountered was the establishment of a system of taxation, which required the recording of the population’s size, the quantity and quality of cultivated lands, harvests, cattle, etc. In the initial years, the Russian administration was forced to preserve the former system of taxes and to rely on the *daftars* – the records of the Kokand and Bukharan tax collectors. However, in parallel, work was begun on a land-tax register, for which special commissions were created; these commissions year after year, *kishlak* (Central Asian village)

after *kishlak*, gradually created a thorough description of the land and population. The gathered information was concentrated in the oblast statistical committees, which processed and transmitted it to the Turkestan statistical committee, created in 1868, one year after the creation of the general-governorship. From the Turkestan committee the information was then passed to the Center, to various ministries in the form of official reports of the general-governor or other kinds of documents. The “independent” audits of F. Girs (1882–83) and K. Palen (1908–09) employed the very same data of the local statistical committees.

The sphere of interests of the oblast statistical committees gradually widened and the sectors for the gathering of information became more diverse – there were some types of economic and demographic indicators, recordings of crimes, diseases, religious institutions, etc. In the 1870s the Turkestan Statistical Committee published “Statistical Materials of Turkestan Krai [Region],” which was produced with the participation of secretary of the statistical committee N. A. Maev. From the 1880s regular installments of Statistical Yearbooks in each oblast were published, which were quickly transformed into detailed socio-economic and ethnographic descriptions of the corresponding territories and their inhabitants. In different oblasts the yearbooks had different names: in Ferghana – *Obzor Ferganskoi oblasti* [Survey of Ferghana oblast], in Samarkand – *Spravochnaia knizhka Samarkandskoi oblasti* [Information book of Samarkand oblast], etc.

The published periodicals reveal the changes that began to take place in the method of counting the population. Local administrators then already based their calculations not only on conversations with local officials, but gradually, year after year, quarter after quarter, *kishlak* after *kishlak*, with the help of their own trained specialists, they verified information supplied by local authorities and introduced corresponding corrections into the statistics.² The empire’s gaze gradually moved out from Tashkent and other large cities to the suburbs, then to nearby *kishlaks*, and then to the more and most distant villages. The growth of the empire’s power-knowledge is visible in how the officially recognized population size of Ferghana oblast, formed as part of Turkestan krai in 1876 from the conquered Kokand khanate, changed.

Concerning the population of Ferghana, great confusion existed for quite some time (see Table 6.1).

Academician A. Middendorf, who visited Ferghana in 1878 and to whom was presented all official information, calling his discussions “fruitless play with unknown quantities,” wrote that “the population size was originally determined to be about 800,000, but now with greater probability can be considered higher, namely 960,000 souls.”³ Nevertheless, he then wrote that the most moderate “of the available figures” was 720,000 persons.⁴ According to the anthology of the military statistician L. Kostenko, *Turkestanskii krai*, published in 1880, in Ferghana oblast there were about 700,000 persons;⁵ the author wrote that “the population figure in Ferghana oblast has significantly decreased.”⁶ In the posthumous report of the first Turkestan general-governor, K. P. Von Kaufman, dated 1881, it was stated that the population of Ferghana oblast included 690,000 persons.⁷ Another government official, F. Girs, who in 1882–83 supervised the inspection of

Table 6.1 Numerical composition of Ferghana oblast's population, 1876–85

	Total	Natives [tuzemtsy]	Urban population	Settled people and nomads in rural areas
Data, 1876–79	755,095			sett. 527,000 nomad. 128,095
1877–78 (Middendorf)	From 720,000 to 960,000			
1880 (Kostenko)	729,690		133,278	sett. 472,422 nomad. 123,990
1880–81 (Kaufman)	690,000		124,850	sett. 414,990 nomad. 149,980
1882–83 (Girs)	674,485	671,460		sett. 548,655 nomad. 122,805
Data, 1884	738,660			sett. 651,075 nomad. 87,585
1885 (TsSK MVD)	716,133		165,210	550,923

Note

The table is composed from the following sources: Middendorf; Kostenko, *Turkestanskii krai*, 378; Kaufman; Girs, p. 55; *Sbornik svedenii po Rossii za 1884–1885 gg.* (St. Petersburg: TsSK MVD, 1887), 15; TsGA RUZ, f. 19, op. 1, d. 28098, ll. 1–27; TsGA RUZ, f. 19, op. 1, d. 1178, ll. 2–53.

Turkestan krai, cited a figure of 670,000.⁸ Finally, in the *Collection of Information about Russia for 1884–1885*, a publication of the Central Statistical Committee (TsSK) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), data about the population of Ferghana oblast for 1885, with an exactness that included the single individual, was given as 716,133, but with the comment that all such figures could not be considered “sufficiently firm.”⁹

The dynamic of change of Ferghana’s population figure after 1886 is visible from the data of the Oblast Statistics Committee (see Table 6.2).

In the very first *Survey of Ferghana Oblast* for 1887, the authors provided a figure of 750,789 persons (natives) and made the proviso, “one can only say that this number indicates the minimum, but in no way the maximum size of the population.”¹⁰ The *Survey* for 1888 indicated a figure of 773,394 and commented, “One can safely say that the actual number may be less.”¹¹ V. I. Kushelevskii reproduced the figures in *Materials for the Medical Geography and Sanitary Description of Ferghana Oblast*.¹² He wrote that the figures “must be viewed only as approximate, because to a considerable extent they do not express the true population size”; the calculation of the population was based on reports of volost administrators; and he noted, “according to popular belief, to count the people means to condemn the country to some sort of disaster.” In addition, they feared the counting, because they thought that this would be followed by the introduction of military service; thus, “it takes great labor to find a way to obtain exact figures [. . .] It is supposed that the population in the oblast is a million, or perhaps more.”¹³

In the *Survey of Ferghana Oblast* for 1890, there was a detailed explanation of the method of counting the population accepted in the region: “the population is

Table 6.2 Numerical composition of Ferghana oblast's population, 1886–96

	<i>Total</i>	<i>Natives [tuzemtsy]</i>	<i>Urban population</i>	<i>Settled people and nomads in rural areas</i>
1886*	No more than	736,932		
1887		754,469	750,789	
1888		775,600	773,394	
1889		785,600	782,712	166,513
1890		801,269	798,280	
1891		801,598	798,624	
1892		822,007		
1893		951,682	946,113?	
1894		991,719	987,386	
1895		1,045,655	1,039,115	
1896		1,184,700		

Notes

* Calculated from the data of *Obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1887*, in which is indicated the change in the native population size from the previous year.

The table is composed from the following sources: *Obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1887 god*, 15; *Obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1888*, 12; *Obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1889 god*, 38; *Obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1890 god*, 42; *Obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1891 god*, 25; *Obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1892 god*, 29; *Obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1893 god*, 6; *Obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1894 god*, appendix 2; *Vedomost' o naselenii Ferganskoi oblasti po sosloviiam i veroispovedaniiam za 1894 god*; *Obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1895 god*, 8; *Obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1896 god*, 2.

counted by questioning volost administrators and other lower organs of local native administration.”¹⁴ Further, it was affirmed that “the size of the native population indicated here [798,280] is much less than the actual number of inhabitants.”¹⁵ The authors of the *Survey* noted that for the clarification of the population number an attempt was made at “the determination, exactly as possible, of the number of households and yurts for all uyezds, especially for each volost . . .,” but it seemed unsuccessful, since the native administration greatly underestimated the data revealed in test verifications, “and the indicated number of households, for individual volosts, was 30 to 56 percent below the actual number.”¹⁶ The authors noted that if the revealed mistake was applied to all available data, then the population of Ferghana oblast would be no less than 1.5 million persons.¹⁷

The *Survey of Ferghana Oblast* for 1893 once more confirmed the conditionality of the presented figures:

In general, statistical information about the movement of the population in the oblast can be regarded as only approximate, because previously the natives related extremely suspiciously to the gathering of this sort of information and had a tendency to underestimate the actual population number. With time this mistrust began to weaken, and the administration began to take more insistent measures in gathering this information. As a result, recently the yearly population growth began gradually to include earlier concealed numbers, by which is explained the excessively large percentage growth of the population in 1893.¹⁸

Table 6.3 Numerical composition of Ferghana oblast’s population in 1897

	Total (without troops)	Natives	Urban population	Settled people and nomads in rural areas
1897 local statistics (at the year’s end)	1,571,157	1,563,711	266,438	
1897 census	1,572,214		284,358	

Note

The table is composed from the following: *Obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1897 god*, 1–2, 70; *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis’ naseleniia 1897 g.*, 89: 2–3.

In fact, the population in 1893 was almost 130,000 more than in 1892, a growth of almost 17 percent (previously, yearly growth never exceeded 2–3 percent), which, of course, could not have occurred through natural increase.

According to the 1897 census data, the population of Ferghana oblast had grown from the previous year by almost 400,000 persons, nearly 28 percent more than 1896, and reached the figure that statisticians had predicted already in 1890: 1,571,157 persons, including 1,563,711 natives (see Table 6.3).¹⁹

Thus, approximately one third of Ferghana’s population over the almost twenty years of Russia’s occupation of the region had not been included in the statistics. Certainly, I am not asserting that the entire revealed difference should be ascribed to statisticians’ errors. There were other processes: natural growth increased; part of the population that had left Ferghana during the bitter military conflicts in 1875–76 returned; migration from other regions – from Bukhara and Xinjiang (China) – began to increase. However, all these processes occurred gradually, possibly, with leaps, but not with such leaps as are fixed in the statistics at the start of the 1890s. The main causes of the radical change in the figures, as the statisticians of the time themselves wrote, were the “insistent measures” of the authorities in the gathering of information and the “weakening of mistrust” of the population toward the Russian authorities. In these two parallel processes we see the whole contradictory nature of imperial authority in Turkestan: on the one side, the strengthening of the colonizer’s control, including through the improvement of data collecting technology; on the other side, the agreement of the very colonized with this control, their accommodation to it, and even the finding of benefit from it.

The “national grammar” of Turkestan

One special sphere of the statisticians’ activities was the compilation of lists of peoples or tribes living in Turkestan and the determination of their numbers. On this subject, I will focus in more detail on the example of the Ferghana oblast. Let us compare the information of two already mentioned authors, who wrote approximately at the same time: Kostenko’s *Turkestanskii krai*²⁰ and Kaufman’s *Vsepoddanneishii otchet*.²¹ They both cited official data, but their information differs essentially (see Table 6.4).

Table 6.4 Ethnographic composition of Ferghana oblast's population in the 1880s

	<i>Kostenko</i> 1880	<i>Kaufman*</i> 1881	<i>Obzor**</i> 1888	<i>Iavorskii***</i> 1889
Sarts	344,023	[470,000]	594,460	475,000
Uzbeks	19,852	—	—	5,000
Kirgiz	126,006	150,000	112,170	110,000
Kipchaks	70,107	70,000	5,931	—
Karakalpaks	7,060	—	—	—
Dungans	343	—	11,435	—
Tajiks	11,580	30,000	44,788	61,000
Indians	370	—	123	—
Mongol-Manchurians	182	—	353	—
Yuz	—	—	319	—
Arabs	—	—	1,466	—
Afghans	—	—	19	2,000
Tsygans	—	—	1,211	—

Notes

The table is composed from the following sources: *Kostenko, Turkestanskii kraï*, 1: 326; *Proekt vse-poddanneishego otcheta Gen.-Ad"utanta K. P. Fon Kaufmana*, 22, 26; *Obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1888 god*, 13; *Iavorskii, Opyt meditsinskoi geografii i statistiki Turkestana*, 1: 320, table 2.

* Kaufman combines Kirgiz and Karakirgiz; the number of 470,000 Sarts is estimated, since Kaufman provides an overall population number for Ferghana and the size of individual groups.

** The *Obzor* combines Uzbeks and Sarts; in the column "Tajiks" is indicated the overall number of Tajiks and "Karategin" (61 persons); the *Obzor* called the Indians "Hindus," the Mongol-Manchurians – "Kalmyks," the Arabs – "Khojas (of Arab origin)."

*** In the column "Kirgiz" is entered the number of Karakirgiz, about which *Iavorskii* wrote; *Iavorskii* combined the Tajiks with the Iranians, and the Afghans with the Semites.

Kaufman and Kostenko introduced approximately the same figures about Kipchaks. Kostenko referred to the Kirgiz, but Kaufman referred to the Kirgiz-Kaisaks and Karakirgiz, the combined number of which he put at 25 percent more than Kostenko. In Kaufman's report the number of Tajiks was two times more than that of Kostenko. Furthermore, Kostenko included the Dungans, Karakalpaks, Mongol-Manchurians and Indians, about which Kaufman wrote nothing. However, in his report Kaufman wrote that the local population was "mixed up and often indistinguishable on ethnographic grounds."²²

From the data published by Kaufman and Kostenko, it is understandable that they used different sources and calculations, though they both had to rely on the information of the local administration. The very detailed character of Kostenko's figures suggests that we have here not so much an evaluation of numbers as the initial results of statistical reports made, apparently, in the 1870s. It is true that Kostenko himself called his data "only approximate." Kaufman's information can be dated approximately from the same years; he also certainly used the reports and evaluations of officials and statisticians.

The inconsistency in the official figures suggests that in Turkestan there was no single center determining the categories and counting the population. Uezd, oblast, and regional officials were able to interpret the received information at their own discretion and to present it to those at the top, bypassing their immediate superiors.

It is also obvious that the Russian authorities still lacked the forces and possibilities to gather the data independently, and so still had to rely on information presented by the local authorities established in Khanate times. The question of how to gather information about the “tribes” also remained open. In my archival research I did not discover any primary, that is, uezd and oblast, documents from earlier than 1890 in which the “national” (tribal) identity of Ferghana’s population was recorded. The known archival statistical tables, dated from the 1870s and 1880s, do not contain columns about “tribes” or “nationalities,” but only divide the population into “settled” inhabitants and “nomads.” It is possible that the calculations of the size of “tribes” at that time were the highly approximate estimates of officials.

At the end of the 1880s yet another series of figures appeared in the work of I. L. Iavorskii, *An Attempt at a Medical Geography and Statistical Analysis of Turkestan*,²³ and in the official publication of the Statistical Committee of Ferghana oblast, *Survey of Ferghana Oblast for 1888* (see Table 6.4).²⁴ Iavorskii provided rounded figures, while the *Survey* provided detailed numbers, but they completely distinguished their ethnographic terminology from each other, and from the data of Kostenko and Kaufman. Iavorskii examined the Sarts and Uzbeks separately, while the *Survey* examined them together, but, all the same, the latter’s overall number was 25 percent more than Iavorskii’s. In his *Attempt*, Iavorskii united in one category the Tajiks and Iranians, while in the *Survey* they were labeled separately as Tajiks and Karateginians (Iranians were not listed), the overall number of which was almost 25 percent less than in Iavorskii. In the *Survey* the Afghans were counted separately, but in Iavorskii, they were united with the Semites in one category, and thus here too the numbers do not correspond (the strange union was based on that the Afghans themselves believed they originated from one of the “Tribes of Israel”). Besides the groups Iavorskii mentioned, the *Survey* named the Kipchaks (the number of which was an order of magnitude less than in Kostenko and Kaufman), Tsygans (Gypsies), Yuz, Kalmyks and Hindus [*indusy*] (which recall Kostenko’s “Mongol-Manchurians” and “Indians,” though their numbers disagree by two times), Khojas (or Arabs?), Dungans (who, according to the *Survey* were 40 times greater than the number in Kostenko, which means most likely that the Kashgaris were included with the Dungans; see below). Neither source mentioned the Karakalpaks, who were present in Kostenko’s list. Only the number of Kirgiz (as they were called in the *Survey*) or Karakirgiz (as they were called in the *Attempt*) approximately corresponded (and corresponded with Kostenko’s data).

The most detailed lists of “native” peoples of the Muslim faith were provided in the *Survey* (twelve names) and in Kostenko (nine names), less detailed in Iavorskii (five names) and in Kaufman (four names). It is not by chance, apparently, that the former two provided complete figures, while the latter – rounded numbers. I think Iavorskii and Kaufman had more detailed information at their disposal, but saw in their task the union (at their discretion) of those groups (they thought) close by language and origin into larger categories. In this regard, Iavorskii noted that the figures “indicating a correlation between various ethnicities populating the country under observation have only a degree of approximate validity . . .”²⁵ In his work, Iavorskii partly revealed some of the details of his method for gathering

ethnographic data: “The native was ascribed to this or that race, related to one or another ethnicity [*narodnost*’], according to his statement about belonging to one or another of them . . .”²⁶ This means, in a literal reading, that each person (or each head of household) was surveyed about his “ethnicity.” However, as already mentioned, we are not aware of any information about the carrying out of such a survey in the 1880s in Ferghana oblast. Moreover, it is known that only in 1889 or 1890 was anything like a census (if not of an individual’s then of a household’s belonging to this or that people) for the first time carried out (in Margelan uezd).²⁷ Apparently, the data of Iavorskii and the *Survey*, as well as that of Kaufman and Kostenko, were the result of an unsystematic survey of local native officials and the use of random information received by Russian uezd administrators.

The 1897 census

As already noted, power-knowledge in Turkestan did not possess any single legitimizing and sanctioning source, and within this power existed a multitude of different autonomous centers, each of which possessed its own vision and had its own priorities in the interpretation of statistical data. We see this diversity of centers of imperial authority and varying “visions” of the region graphically displayed in the history of the undertaking of the First All-Russian Census of 1897, which provided the most thoroughly worked out and complete statistical picture of Turkestan.

As is known, Turkestan krai was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War, which continually defended its right to determine internal policy in the region. Another influential imperial institution – the Ministry of Internal Affairs – pretended to a similar role. At times, there were quite heated discussions between these two ministries as to which one Turkestan should be subordinate to and which measures were necessary for control of the region.

The organization of the census was entrusted to the TsSK MVD, which decided to insert in the census questionnaire a question not about a person’s “nationality” or “ethnicity,” but about “native language (mother tongue)” (the twelfth question on the questionnaire). The question did not indicate concretely which language should be considered “native,” and the answer was accepted as a sign of “ethnographic belonging.” Although local statisticians were employed in the actual collection of the data, the interpretation and composing of definitive lists of peoples were entrusted to special experts from the Center. As a result, the data obtained was classified differently from the classifications to which Turkestan academics and statisticians adhered (see Table 6.5).

The final reports, eventually published in 1904, listed for Ferghana oblast, alongside the Sarts, also Uzbeks, Karakirgiz, Karakalpaks, Kipchaks, Kashgaris, Tajiks, and some “Turko-Tatars [*tiurko-tatary*],” that is, in total, eight groups.²⁸ Moreover, the population sizes of these groups in the census were different from the figures in routine statistics. As already stated, the census revealed that the overall population of Ferghana was approximately 1.5 times greater than at the end of the 1880s. Only the number of Sarts had grown at a similar pace. However, the number of Tajiks had grown two times compared to Iavorskii’s data and almost

Table 6.5 Ethnographic composition of Ferghana oblast's population in 1897

	1987 Census	Palen*	Turchaninov**
Sarts	788,989	828,080	1,072,964
Uzbeks	153,780	153,780	20,479
Turko-Tatars	261,234	—	815
Karakirgiz	201,579	423,639	259,721
Kipchaks	7,584	—	45,353
Karakalpaks	11,056	25,971	18,584
Kashgaris	14,915	—	41,312
Tajiks	114,081	114,081	96,856
Mongols	—	—	45

Note

The table is composed from the following sources: *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia 1897 g.*, 89: 2–3; *Materialy k kharakteristike narodnogo khoziaistva v Turkestane*, chast' 1, otdelenie 1: 64–65; Turchaninov, “Naselenie Aziatskoi Rossii: Statisticheskii ocherk,” 82–85.

* Palen also combines the Kirgiz with the Karakirgiz, calling them all the latter.

** Turchaninov writes about “other Turkics,” who I tentatively included in the row “Turko-Tatars,” though, of course, the author had in view a completely different group from the 1897 census; instead of the term “Karakirgiz” Turchaninov uses the term “Kirgiz”; and in the row “Tajiks” Turchaninov combines Tajiks, Persians and Hindus.

three times compared to the data of the *Survey* for 1888 (and almost an order of magnitude compared to Kostenko's and Kaufman's figures). The number of Karakirgiz had grown two times, and of Uzbeks 30 times compared to Iavorskii's data. The number of Kipchaks, on the contrary, had decreased by an order of magnitude compared with Kostenko's and Kaufman's data, and roughly corresponded to the figure in the 1888 *Survey*. In the ethnographic list the Karakalpaks re-appeared, their number comparable to that suggested by Kostenko, and also the Kashgaris, comparable to the number of Dungans from the *Survey*.

The most mysterious group in the 1897 census's ethnographic list was the “Turko-Tatars,” whose population size was second largest after the Sarts. Here is how the ethnographer S. Patkanov, who was involved in working out these materials, explained the group's appearance:

More significant obstacles for the correct assignment of the inhabitants by nationality were encountered in a large part of Turkestan, where in whole uyezds the language of the local Turkic tribes (Sarts, Uzbeks, Karakirgiz, Taranchis, etc.), because of the semi-literacy and the carelessness of local census-takers, was replaced by a more general, but poorly defined term “Turkic [*tiurkskii*],” or simply with the abbreviations “tur., tiur., tat., ta” or the letters “t., k., s.” And such abbreviations, especially from an illegible letter, would lead to the most diverse interpretations: for example, “tiur. and tur.” could mean “Turkic” and “Turkmen” languages; “tat, ta, and t” – “Tatar,” “Tajik,” and “Taranchi,” while the letter “k.” could refer to a whole series of dialects of the region: “Kirgiz, Kirgiz-Kaisak, Kurama, Kipchak, Kashgari, Karakalpak” and others (“c.” means “Sart” language).²⁹

As a result, “from such portions of the native population of Central Asia, belonging mostly to the Turkic tribe (and partly to the Tajiks), it was necessary, in compiling summary tables, to form one combined group for the “Turkic language without determination of dialects.”³⁰ Obviously, all those whose “tribal” membership was questionable were included in this category. Apparently, many peoples and groups, who could not clearly define their “native language” or national/ethnic identity, also fell into this category. In this regard, Patkanov wrote, “native language, which not all interviewees understood similarly, is far from always providing the correct understanding of the nationality of one or another population group.”³¹

It is interesting to compare the 1897 census data with the data for the same year from the materials of local statisticians, which were published in the work of N. Turchaninov, *The Population of Asiatic Russia: A Statistical Outline* (see Table 6.5).³²

The number of Sarts and Kirgiz together with Karakirgiz (it should be noted that the local statisticians separated the Kirgiz from the Karakirgiz, which will be explained in more detail below) in the local list was 20 percent more than in the census; the number of Karakalpaks, 60 percent more; Kashgaris, more than 2.5 times; and the Kipchaks, about eight times more. The number of Uzbeks, by the same information, was less by almost an order of magnitude; the number of Tajiks (together with Iranians and Hindus) less by 20 percent. In the local list there were no “Turko-Tatars,” but in place of them were present Turkics [*tiurki*], which Turchaninov called “others,” and their number was less by 400 times. There were also Mongols in this list. Clearly, the principles of classification in the census and routine statistics differed: while the terminology in the census strictly followed the indicator of “language,” the local statisticians attempted to differentiate indicators, and considered, besides language, other characteristics of the population. The difference between the local and “central” statistics can be explained not only by chance and the different competence of the experts, but was also determined by the (in truth not always explicit) political motives of the various institutions. The MVD was considerably more conservative and cautious in declaring particular groups as nationalities. The Ministry of War appealed much more boldly to the national theme and even attempted to use it in its own political appraisals.³³

The 1897 census facilitated the appearance of its own kind of “double-entry book-keeping” of Ferghana’s population. Some authors, who wrote about the ethnographic composition of the population of Ferghana, preferred to rely on the materials of routine statistics and the means of classification developed by local officials and academics (like the already mentioned Turchaninov). Other authors (especially those officials and statisticians who never served in Turkestan krai) employed the results of the 1897 census, relying, it seems, on the higher administrative status and legitimacy of the census’s accepted method of classification.

In addition, a distinctive genre of correcting the 1897 census data emerged. Thus, in 1911, in the appendix to the *Report*, the head of the latest inspection of Turkestan krai, K. K. Palen, wrote about the shortcomings of the census concerning “language”: “In general, one must note that in Turkestan native language cannot always serve as an indicator for clarifying the ethnographic composition of the population.”³⁴ Palen considered the designation of the group of

“Turko-Tatar languages” debatable and proposed to divide it (after “consultations with specialists”) into groups that would not provoke doubt. The author included the “Turko-Tatars” of the cities of Namangan, Chust and Osh in the group of “Sarts,” and all the others in the group of “Karakirgiz,” and as a result he received new data for Ferghana oblast concerning 1897 (see Table 6.5).

Hence, as a result of the completion of the first census, a single view of the ethnographic map of Ferghana oblast did not emerge. There continued to exist several versions, which were distinguished from each other by principles determining the categories and the terminology, as well as the actual numbers. Most interesting, all these versions coexisted simultaneously and each possessed its own legitimacy, which could be based on the institutional, administrative, or scientific authority of those who gathered, employed, or commented on the figures.

Local statistics

Besides the discrepancies between the Ministries of War and of Internal Affairs that we encounter when comparing the statistics presented by these ministries, we see also that even at the most basic level of the gathering of statistics there was no real clarity or clear criteria. At the uezd and oblast levels there existed a multitude of different procedures of calculation, which had a local character and were instruments of local politics and local agreements between various interest groups. Around the numbers (of voters, residents, lands, harvests, taxes) could develop debates, conflicts, and clashes.

In particular, various oblast statistical committees developed their own criteria for identifying and counting the “nationalities” and in no way attempted to reconcile their views with the views and principles of their own colleagues from neighboring oblasts in Turkestan krai or with the higher organs of power.

It is interesting to trace the dynamic of classifying the population of Ferghana oblast in the statistical data. From the end of the nineteenth century up to 1917 the Statistical Committee of Ferghana oblast regularly published the current data about the ethnographic composition of the region’s population. They were published yearly: for 1898–1900 in *Survey of Ferghana Oblast*, for 1901–03 in *Yearbook of Ferghana Oblast*, and for 1904–14 in *Statistical Survey of Ferghana Oblast*. In 1909 the *List of Population Points of Ferghana Oblast* appeared, the authors of which – members of the Oblast Statistical Committee – attempted to clarify the quantity and composition of the population (the figures were in sum roughly 1 percent below current data).³⁵

In the *Survey* for 1899 the Oblast Statistical Committee noted that in the 1890s it completed investigative work on the ethnographic composition of the population of Ferghana oblast. However, only data about Margelan uezd was published, from which percentages were extrapolated for all of Ferghana oblast.³⁶ The compilers of the *Survey* wrote, “in the counting, of course, were considered not ethnographic indicators, but to which tribe the inhabitants ascribed themselves.”³⁷

Beginning in 1904, information about the population’s composition was published in special appendices to the *Statistical Survey of Ferghana Oblast* (see Table 6.6).

Table 6.6 Ethnographic composition of Ferghana oblast's population, 1904–14

	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909
Sarts	1,085,639	1,184,287	1,275,656	1,220,562	1,295,348	1,278,946
Uzbeks	158,926	108,942	28,457	27,393	25,745	24,949
Turkics	18,644	20,811	14,934	20,671	22,607	21,670
Kirgiz	294,859	250,799	266,549	208,553	264,054	316,360
Karakirgiz	22,982	75,411	55,374	173,758	121,233	77,042
Kipchaks	57,140	57,877	63,511	69,252	59,853	60,123
Karakalpaks	19,323	25,558	26,215	3,120?*	21,789	22,638
Kashgaris	47,388	48,651	50,238	56,857	49,517	53,981
Dungans	605	569	688	690	585	117
Tajiks	107,050	102,191	105,742	108,065	94,912	111,245
Persians	246	394	906	885	898	1,137
Tsygans	1,814	1,639	1,436	1,000	1,849	1,496
Yuz	3,969	478	499	308	414	3,800
Arabs	387	260	291	—	—	1,669
Hindus	212	222	—	—	—	—
Iranians	—	—	—	—	1,217	—
Afghans	—	—	—	—	177	49
Kalmyks	—	—	—	—	—	330
	1910	1911	1911**	1912	1913	1914
Sarts	1,293,356	1,310,267	1,392,167	?	1,348,134	1,371,139
Uzbeks	28,125	51,395	25,223	?	—	—
Turkics	22,749	22,890	860	?	23,938	24,117
Kirgiz	295,506	322,783	319,881	?	261,556	345,581
Karakirgiz	117,418	81,669	—	?	143,896	66,157
Kipchaks	64,856	64,333	60,785	?	71,931	68,193
Karakalpaks	18,234	19,571	22,888	?	18,250	22,531
Kashgaris	55,008	55,761	54,576	?	52,094	57,106
Dungans	227	234	—	?	353	198
Tajiks	114,481	126,466	117,778	?	131,006	155,473
Persians	1,792	2,178	—	?	3,337	3,370
Tsygans	1,695	1,841	—	?	1,761	2,109
Yuz	4,010	4,014	—	?	4,178	4,554
Arabs	1,888	1,981	—	?	799	1,218
Hindus	—	193	—	?	—	200
Iranians	1	—	—	?	36?	—
Afghans	169	164	—	?	189	296
Kalmyks	350	—	347	?	—	549

Note

The table is composed from the following sources: *Statisticheskii obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1904 god* (Novyi Margelan, 1905), appendix 2: Narodonaselenie v 1904 godu; *Statisticheskii obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1905 god* (Skobelev, 1908), appendix 5: Svedeniia ob estestvennom priroste naseleniia Ferganskoi oblasti za 1905 god i o delenii ego v etnograficheskom otnoshenii; *Statisticheskii obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1906 god* (Skobelev, 1908), appendix 4: Etnograficheskoe delenie naseleniia Ferganskoi oblasti v 1906 godu; *Statisticheskii obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1907 god* (Skobelev, 1909), appendix 5: Vedomost' o naselenii Ferganskoi oblasti po natsional'nostiam v 1907 g.; *Statisticheskii obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1908 god* (Skobelev, 1909), appendix 5: Vedomost' o naselenii Ferganskoi oblasti po natsional'nostiam za 1908 g.; *Statisticheskii obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1909 god* (Skobelev, 1911), appendix 3: Vedomost' o naselenii Ferganskoi oblasti po natsional'nostiam za 1909 g.; *Statisticheskii obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1910 god* (Skobelev, 1912), appendix 3: Vedomost' o naselenii Ferganskoi oblasti po natsional'nostiam za 1910 g.; *Statisticheskii obzor Ferganskoi*

oblasti za 1911 god (Skobelev, 1914), appendix 3: Vedomost' o naselenii Ferganskoi oblasti po natsional'nostiam za 1911 god; *Statisticheskii obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1913 god* (Skobelev, 1915), appendix 3: Vedomost' o naselenii Ferganskoi oblasti po natsional'nostiam za 1913 g.; *Statisticheskii obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1914 god* (Skobelev, 1917), appendix 3: Vedomost' o naselenii Ferganskoi oblasti po natsional'nostiam za 1914 g.

* Unfortunately, the condition of the text did not allow me to decipher this figure accurately.

** Turchaninov's data (Turchaninov, "Naselenie Aziatskoi Rossii: Statisticheskii ocherk," 82–84); in the "Tajiks" column Turchaninov included figures for Tajiks, Persians, and Hindus, while he called the "Kalmyks" Mongols.

Characteristically, in the collections for 1904–06 these appendices were called the "Ethnographic divisions," and in subsequent collections – the "National divisions." This change of terminology speaks to the turnabout in interpreting the problem, following, evidently, the political events in the Russian empire in 1905: the notion that published data expressed not simply the views of academics and officials, but were an expression of the real national picture was strengthened.

The lists of Ferghana's peoples had a sufficiently detailed and stable character: in 1904–05 they included 15 names (Sarts, Uzbeks, Turkics [*tiurki*], Kirgiz, Kaka-kirgiz, Kipchaks, Karakalpaks, Kashgaris, Dungans, Tajiks, Persians, Tsygans, Yuz, Arabs, and Hindus); in 1906 the Hindus disappeared; in 1907, the Hindus and Arabs; in 1908, the Iranians and "Afghans [*avgantsy*]" appeared; in 1909, the Iranians again disappeared, while the Arabs and Kalmyks appeared; in 1910, the Iranians again appeared; in 1911, the Iranians and Kalmyks disappeared, but the Hindus reappeared; in 1913, the Iranians again appeared, but the Uzbeks and Hindus disappeared; in 1914, the Iranians again disappeared, but the Hindus and Kalmyks reappeared. The greatest number of categories – 17 – was in 1910, and overall for those years 18 categories were named.

Why did categories like Hindus, Iranians, Kalmyks, and Arabs appear on and then disappear from the lists? There seem to be two possibilities: first, these groups could be foreigners, and in order to evade this status they "were hidden" or "hid" themselves under other categories; second, these small groups became so blended with the surrounding population that they did not always "remember" their "true" nationality.

The ethnographic lists for 1904–14 continued the traditions of local classification begun in Turkestan in the 1880s. They referred to Dungans, Indians, Yuz, Arabs, "Afghans," and Tsygans, that is, those groups that were absent from the 1897 census. They preserved the confusion between Kirgiz and Karakirgiz, which the 1897 census did not allow, using only the name "Karakirgiz." In addition, new categories appeared: Kashgaris, Turkics, Persians, and Iranians.

Recording the quantity of this or that category, the authors of the statistical classification pointed out its proportional "weight." Two-thirds of the population were Sarts; after them, the largest group were the Kirgiz, then the Karakirgiz, then the Tajiks and Uzbeks. All the remaining groups included less than 100,000 persons. In 1913–14 the Uzbeks were removed from the lists; apparently, they were added to the Sarts.

In quantitative terms, the majority of the groups also underwent interesting metamorphoses. For example, the number of Sarts from 1904 to 1905 increased by almost 100,000 persons (9 percent), in 1906, in relation to 1905 by almost 80,000 (8 percent), but in 1907 fell by 55,000 compared to the preceding year (4 percent). In 1908, the number of Sarts again increased – by 75,000 persons, and in the next year it grew by 20,000 and then 20–40,000 per year.

The number of Uzbeks in 1905, compared to 1904, decreased by 50,000 persons (30 percent); in 1906 by another 80,000 persons (almost 80 percent). Up to 1909 the number of Uzbeks decreased a little, but then again began to grow: in 1910, by 3000 (around 17 percent); in 1911 by 13,000 (around 50 percent). In 1913 and 1914, the Uzbeks, as already noted, completely disappeared from the census.

The number of Tajiks in general grew steadily: it fell only slightly in 1905 and 1908, but in 1914 it increased by 24,000 persons (almost 20 percent). This growth is explained, of course, not by the sudden arrival of about 20,000 Tajiks in 1914 to Ferghana; rather a part of another group (apparently, the Sarts) began to call themselves Tajiks or some official suddenly revealed that those who he considered to be Sarts, also had the name “Tajik.” On the other side, the decrease of the Tajiks before this (with the general growth of the population) was connected, most probably, with their “Sartization.”

The group of “Turkics” remained roughly at one level – around 20,000 – though in 1904–07 its number varied by 2,000–3,000. By 1914 the number of Turkics had grown to 24,000 persons. The number of Kipchaks remained stable – around 60–70,000 persons – only varying a little. This number fell very sharply in 1908 – by 10,000 (almost 17 percent). Roughly the same thing happened to the Karakalpaks: their number varied between 20,000 and 30,000, but in 1908 fell by 10,000 persons (30 percent). The same thing occurred with the Kashgaris, the number of which remained between 50,000 and 60,000, but in 1908 decreased by 7,000 persons (11 percent). Again, this does not mean that in 1908 a significant portion of Kipchaks, Karakalpaks, and Kashgaris actually died or left Ferghana. Also, it is difficult also to believe that in 1908 such a significant portion of these groups suddenly decided to change their native name. Such numerical metamorphoses were connected (and about this one can speak quite confidently) with the method of counting, the opinions of specific administrators and statisticians, who decided, depending on a multitude of factors, to consider or not to consider inhabitants of this or that settlement “Kashgaris” or “Sarts,” to discern (or not) in the mass of “Sarts” solitary representatives of the “Kipchaks.”

We should discuss the “Kirgiz” separately. In the oblast statistics two groups figure consistently – the Kirgiz and the Karakirgiz, each given its own population size. In 1904 the former was an order of magnitude larger than the latter (295,000 and 23,000 persons, respectively). From 1904 to 1907 the number of Kirgiz gradually decreased by almost 90,000 persons (28 percent), but in the next two years it again grew to the level of 1904; then, by 1913 it again decreased by 55,000 (almost 17 percent), but then in the following year grew by 80,000. In 1905, the number of Karakirgiz tripled, and then decreased by 20,000 persons (almost 25 percent); in 1907, it again tripled; by 1909 it had decreased by 60 percent, but by 1913 it had

again grown by two times, and then in the next year fell by almost three times. The increase of Kirgiz in principal corresponded with the decrease of the Karakirgiz, which provides a basis to propose that members of these groups flowed back and forth from one to the other. However, this is not an indisputable correspondence; Kirgiz and Karakirgiz could in some years become Sarts, Uzbeks, Kipchaks, or something else. Nevertheless, it remains a mystery why the statisticians divided one group in two and how they divided people between them.

There was also great confusion with the smaller groups. The number of Dungans in 1904–08 remained at the level of 600–700 persons, and then fell and varied between 200 and 300 persons. The number of Persians from 1904 to 1906 tripled, and then there was an abrupt take-off in 1910 (by 65 percent) and in 1913 (by 50 percent compared to 1911). In 1908, separately from the Persians, a group called “Iranians” appeared, numbering 1,200; then this group again disappeared and then reappeared in 1913 in an insignificant number. What distinguished the Persians from the Iranians is not intelligible. In 1908, a group of “Avgan” (Afghans) appeared, numbering less than 200 persons, and from then on it featured in all of the data collected and gradually grew in number. The group of “Kalmyks” appeared in 1909 and numbered 300 persons; the next year it was preserved, but in 1911 disappeared; and in 1914, it reappeared, now numbering 550 persons. The number of Arabs in 1906 reached 300 persons, which was 100 less than in 1904; in 1907–08 they completely disappeared, but in 1909 reappeared, already numbering 1,700 persons (almost six times more than in 1906); by 1911 this group had grown to 2,000 persons, but in 1913 it decreased to 800 and in 1914 again reached 1,200. Finally, I will mention the Tsygans: their number from 1904 to 1907 fell by 80 percent; in 1908 it grew, but in the next year again fell, and then gradually increased.

In the censuses there also figures the group of “Yuz.”³⁸ In 1904, their number was 4,000 persons, but in 1905, 500 in total; in 1909 their number had grown, and very sharply, to 3,800 persons, and by 1914 it had reached 4,500.

We should note that 1908–09 was a sort of peak in the changes in the list of nationalities and their numbers. This can be explained, in particular, by the fact that precisely in those years an attempt was made to clarify the settlement size and composition of the population, the result of which became the already mentioned *List of Population Points of Ferghana Oblast*. It is true that the *List* only indicated the “predominant part” of the population of *kishlaks*, under which “predominant” could be a group which composed 30–40 percent of the inhabitants. Accordingly, in contrast to the yearly *Statistical Survey*, in the *List* an exhaustive list of Ferghana’s nationalities was absent, and summary data about the number of each was not provided. Nevertheless, the *List* sheds light on some peculiarities of the methods of counting nationalities by the Ferghana Statistical Committee.

The *List* graphically demonstrates the uncertainty in fixing the nationality of separate groups in Ferghana’s population, which in the *Statistical Surveys* is barely noticeable. Amongst the “predominant” groups mentioned were Sarts, Tajiks, Kirgiz, Kipchaks, Karakalpaks, Kurama, Uzbeks, Turkics, Kashgaris, Tsygans, Yuz, Kalmyks, and Arabs. However, separately from the Kirgiz were mentioned also

“nomadic Kirgiz,” “Kirgiz-Naiguts,” “Kazaks” (whose name is taken in parentheses), and even simply “nomads.”³⁹ The “Turks [*turki*]” were named separately from the “Turkics,” which begs the question of whether they are the same group or two different groups. Finally, in some (very few) villages the statisticians could not distinguish “Uzbeks” from “Sarts” and so gave a double-name in two forms: “Sarts (Uzbeks)” or “Sarts-Uzbeks.”⁴⁰ Of course, these are all isolated cases, because at the stage of working through the received data, the statisticians, unconditionally, carried out a unification of the names. But, apparently, the absence of summary tables, which set a more stringent method of classification, became the cause of the accidental appearance in the *List* of raw, preparatory material, from which the statisticians began their work.

Detailed analysis of the statistical lists and series, which were compiled and published yearly by the Ferghana Oblast Statistical Committee, lead to the conclusion that the criteria used in the calculations were continually being adjusted. It is not completely clear from the tables themselves why there was no standard and consistent method of determining the composition of Ferghana’s population and the size of various groups. It is possible that the tastes and notions of the local statisticians, who had the opportunity to determine the categories and figures at their sole discretion, played their own role. In such cases, any change in their thinking, or the replacement of one statistician with another, was reflected in the tables of the *Statistical Survey*. It is possible that some of the figures were a result of agreement with the uezd and oblast administrators, who needed, for example, to track the flows of foreign migrants from neighboring regions. Again, a change of these administrators or a change of interest in internal politics could be expressed in the details when counting small groups. Perhaps, native officials also played a certain role, lobbying for their interests, various local identities and names, or on the contrary, hid them, presenting to the Russian officials more simplified information. Most probably, all these factors operated together. In any case, we sense a very complex, but not always now understandable struggle for statistical information, and alliances which clubbed together at the local level and which were an aspect of what could be called “colonial politics.”

To cheat statistics?

In B. Anderson’s discussions about censuses, statistics, and the empire’s creation of a “national grammar” amongst the colonized population, an important aspect is absent – the attitude and participation of the colonized themselves in the process. More precisely, the colonized are present, but they act only in the role of passive receivers of the knowledge and “vision” that is formulated by the forces of the colonizers. It is curious how the natives take part in the creation of imperial statistics, either through mechanisms of inclusion in the procedure of gathering information and advocating through this creation their own interests, or through the mechanisms of resistance, first of all by evading the “colonizer’s gaze.”⁴¹

From the example of the counting of the number of inhabitants in Ferghana oblast and the almost two decades where these were far too low, we understand

that the conscious and sometimes not completely conscious concealment of large social spaces from control had a mass character.

Scribes who conducted the census of the population of the former Bukharan khanate in the 1920s describe a similar situation. Though it proceeded in a somewhat different context, the difficulties and peculiarities were roughly the same. The method of the survey was as follows:

all information . . . was gathered by means of questioning of *aqsaqals* (elders) and *amins* (chiefs) and representatives of each individual population point, for which they were called to appointed centers. . . . In the absence of any sort of clerical procedure in the villages, the administration, even with a sincere desire to provide a correct answer, would have had difficulty exactly determining this or that figure.⁴²

In the report about the gathering of such information it was noted that, “the first survey of the *aqsaqals* gave very improbable results (for example, there were four times fewer households listed than in the tax lists composed not long before).”⁴³ And it related the following story:

In the report of one district [*raion*] leader was described the following picture of the survey, typical for Bukhara: “We assembled at the bazaar on market day. We gathered at a tea house. Here all the old people, *aqsaqals* and ‘honourable members of *kishlaks*’ were grouped together.” The survey proceeded in the presence of a large crowd of people. . . . The *aqsaqals* found it difficult to answer the list of basic questions. Their usual answer: “god knows, we did not count them, no one counted them.” And only after the persuading of the chair of the District [*tuman*] Executive Committee, asking them to speak “approximately [*takhminan*]”, did they give responses. One can understand what happened with this “*takhminan*.” Each indication, each figure, in particular, about sowing and livestock, had to be stretched . . .⁴⁴

The authors of this collection added, “there were also amongst the population cases of conscious deception. Hence, in some villages the *aqsaqals* indicated on average two and even one and a half persons per household. Only after lengthy questioning, persuasion, and sometimes even door-to-door investigation using the list, did we manage to establish more exactly the population size.”⁴⁵

Investigators who encountered this problem in Turkestan some decades earlier wrote, in particular, that local natives not uncommonly concealed the number of their daughters and wives.⁴⁶ As one of the most knowledgeable specialists, P. E. Kuznetsov, wrote,

all natives relate in general suspiciously to the collection by Russians of various kinds of statistical information, especially information about the population’s size: they usually think that, having counted the inhabitants, the Russians intend to conscript them into military service (terrible for them),

banish them to Siberia, or resettle them from Turkestan to other parts of the empire. Hence, the natives, in presenting information about population size, claim that in most cases it is at least two times less than it should be.⁴⁷

In fact, Kuznetsov noted that the native authorities asked him which would be better for them – to present overstated or understated information to the authorities.⁴⁸

Apart from fear of repression, the motivation to evade being counted could also be completely rational. Concealing plots of land or cattle allowed them to avoid taxes. Concealed members of a family could be moved imperceptibly across open borders.

Native officials had a special interest in hiding or distorting information. As already noted, in the procedure for gathering and initial processing of statistical information the lowest-level authorities were included – elders of the village communities (*aqsaqals*) and volost administrators (*mingbashis*) – who, remember, were appointed to their positions through a complex procedure of elections and confirmations. Together with the judges (*qazis*), who were also elected by the population's representatives and confirmed by Russian authorities, the native officials were obliged to carry out the initial counting of the population – births, marriages, deaths, migrations – and then to present this information to the imperial administrators.

For these officials, the manipulation of the counting opened up great possibilities. Because they collected taxes from the population that they counted, the funds from unrecorded households could pass into their hands. It was easier for native officials to keep under their control those who were invisible to the empire. The possession of this information was also an electoral resource for these officials: raising or lowering the recorded population size could change election totals in order to obtain the necessary result.⁴⁹

The population hidden from imperial control, thus, fell under the control of intermediaries, who stood between the population and the colonizers; as a result, we see that during various uprisings and rebellions the first victims were precisely the *aqsaqals* and *mingbashis*, that is, those also colonized.

This situation pushed many people to choose another strategy – to become “visible” to the empire’s “gaze” and to use this fact for achieving various goals within the official, imperial space, including resisting the power of these authorized intermediaries.

One could observe this strategy in the discussion local natives initiated to discredit the term “Sarts,” which had become the main label for the majority of Turkestan’s population in official, imperial statistics. I will name two figures who in various years initiated this discussion – S. Lapin from Perovsok, and a Samarkand native, Mahmud-khoja Behbudi. The discussion about the “Sarts” has been described in detail in a whole series of publications, hence, I will not repeat it here.⁵⁰ Native intellectuals spoke out with public criticism that the Russian authorities in their counting and classifications employed the name “Sarts,” which, in their opinion, was not an indigenous name. Acting in the legal sphere, arguing and publishing their point of view in the press, Lapin and Behbudi obtained recognition

from the Russian authorities that their opinion had a right to exist. Moreover, this opinion received official status: it is known that the Statistical Committee of Samarkand oblast some time at the beginning of the 1890s in principle refused to recognise “Sarts” as a separate category of the local population, replacing it with Uzbeks. This found expression both in the data of then current statistics⁵¹ and in the materials of the 1897 census (see Table 6.5). The well-known Turkestan figure, mayor of Tashkent and editor of *Turkestanskii vedomosti*, N. G. Mallitskii, indicated directly that Lapin was the initiator of this kind of statistical innovation in Samarkand.⁵²

Conclusion

Thus, through an examination of statistics we have exposed the imperial space as very heterogeneous, diverse, and ambiguous.

First, the concentration of a “vision” and the capacity to control the population were distributed very unevenly across Turkestan’s territory, and this concentration changed over time. There were zones, which were under the close attention of the authorities, which were minutely and painstakingly described, and which, accordingly, became the main points for the implementation of the colonizers’ and, in general, the reformers’ efforts. In the same imperial space there also existed zones concealed from the authorities’ gaze, unnoticed by it, in which the colonial authorities barely interfered, about which they had a very vague understanding and which they left alone, not possessing the forces to subordinate them conceptually to their power.

Second, there did not exist any kind of single “vision” of the empire; it was split into a plurality of various “visions” – from the center and the localities, from various departments, from science and institutions of administration. Each view had its own focus, its own angle, its own optics. In the Russian Empire there was no single source that established the legitimacy or correctness of a statistical view of the imperial space. Paradoxically, this meant that no one image of the empire existed, but rather there were many such images, which sometimes competed with each other, and sometimes did not even overlap but were located on different planes.

Third, the colonized, or their separate groups, made their own contribution to the creation of the statistical picture; they collaborated with the colonizers in the gathering of information and in its interpretation. Hence, the process of producing information was not one-sided and dictatorial; in it were represented to one or another degree the most varied groups and forces of the colonizers and the colonized, located in the imperial space. In this sphere, clashes of diverse interests, dialogue, resistance, and compromise all had a place.

(Translated from Russian by Mark Baker)

Notes

- 1 B. Anderson, *Voobrazaemye soobshchestva: Razmyshleniia ob istokakh i rasprostraneni natsionalizma* (Moscow, 2001), 181–183, 186–187.

- 2 See F. Azadaev, *Tashkent vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka* (Tashkent, 1959); V. Kiselev, "Demograficheskaia statistika v kolonial'nom Turkestane vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka," *O'zbekiston tarixi*, no. 1 (2002): 11–19.
- 3 A. F. Middendorf, *Ocherki Ferganskoi doliny* (St. Petersburg, 1882), 328.
- 4 *Ibid.*, 328.
- 5 L. F. Kostenko, *Turkestanskii krai: Opyt voenno-statisticheskogo obozreniia Turkestanskogo voennogo okruga*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1880), 378, 382.
- 6 *Ibid.*, iii.
- 7 *Proekt vsepoddanneishego otcheta Gen.-Ad'iutanta K. P. fon Kaufmana po grazhdanskomu upravleniiu i ustroistvu v oblastiakh Turkestanskogo general-gubernatorstva, 7 noiabria 1867 – 25 marta 1881 g.* (St. Petersburg, 1885), 13.
- 8 *Otchet revizuiushchego, po Vysochaisheму poveleniiu, Turkestanskii krai, tainogo sovetnika Girs*a (St. Petersburg, 1884), 55.
- 9 *Sbornik svedenii po Rossii za 1884–1885 gg.* (St. Petersburg: TsSK MVD, 1887), 15.
- 10 *Obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1887 god* (Novyi Margelan, 1889), 15.
- 11 *Obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1888 god* (Novyi Margelan, n.d.), 13.
- 12 V. I. Kushelevskii, *Materialy dlia meditsinskoi geografii i sanitarnogo opisaniia Ferganskoi oblasti*, vol. 2 (Novyi Margelan, 1891), 119.
- 13 *Ibid.*, 120–121.
- 14 *Obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1890 god* (Novyi Margelan, 1891), 41.
- 15 *Ibid.*, 44.
- 16 *Ibid.*, 44. About the motives of native administrators to lower the numbers, see below the section "To cheat statistics?"
- 17 *Ibid.*, 44–45.
- 18 *Obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1893 god* (Novyi Margelan, 1895), 6.
- 19 *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia 1897 g.*, vol. 89, *Ferganskaia oblast'* (St. Petersburg: TsSK, 1904), 2–3.
- 20 Kostenko, *Turkestanskii krai*, 326.
- 21 *Proekt vsepoddanneishego otcheta Gen.-Ad'iutanta K. P. fon Kaufmana*, 22, 26.
- 22 *Ibid.*, 46.
- 23 I. L. Iavorskii, *Opyt meditsinskoi geografii i statistiki Turkestana*, chast' 1 (St. Petersburg, 1889), 320, table 2.
- 24 *Obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1888 god*, 13.
- 25 Iavorskii, *Opyt meditsinskoi geografii*, 332.
- 26 *Ibid.*, 333.
- 27 TsGA RUz (Central State Archive of the Republic of Uzbekistan), f. 23, op. 1, d. 532 (1890 g.).
- 28 *Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia 1897 g.*, 89: 2–3.
- 29 *Obshchii svod po imperii rezul'tatov razrabotki dannykh Pervoi vseobshchei perepisi naseleniia, proizvedennoi 28 ianvaria 1897 goda*, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1905), i–ii.
- 30 *Ibid.*, ii.
- 31 *Ibid.*, i.
- 32 N. V. Turchaninov, "Naselenie Aziatskoi Rossii: Statisticheskii ocherk," *Aziatskaia Rossiia*, vol. 1, *Liudi i poriadki za Uralom* (St. Petersburg, 1914), 82–85.
- 33 About the role of military statisticians in the creation of national terminology, see Peter Holquist, "To Count, to Extract, and to Exterminate: Population Statistics and Population Politics in Late Imperial and Soviet Russia," in Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin, eds., *A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 111–144.
- 34 *Materialy k kharakteristike narodnogo khoziaistva v Turkestane*, chast' 1, otdelenie 1, *Prilozhenie k otchetu po revizii Turkestanskogo kraia, proizvedennoi po Vysochaisheму poveleniiu Senatorom Gofmeisterom Grafom K. K. Palenom* (St. Petersburg, 1911), 62.
- 35 *Spisok naseleennykh mest Ferganskoi oblasti* (Skobelev, 1909), i.

- 36 *Obzor Ferganskoi oblasti za 1899 god* (Novyi Margelan, 1901), 73.
- 37 *Ibid.*, 74.
- 38 The Yuz (literally “hundred”) is one of the large Uzbek tribes; its members to the present day preserve their self-identity and distinguish themselves from other Uzbeks.
- 39 *Spisok naselennykh mest Ferganskoi oblasti*, 116, 124.
- 40 *Ibid.*, 18, 130, 132.
- 41 See P. Vert [Paul Werth], “Ot ‘soprotivleniia’ k ‘podryvnoi deiatel’nosti’: vlast’ imperii, protivostoianie mestnogo naseleniia i ikh vzaimozavisimost’,” in *Rossiiskaia imperiia v zarubezhnoi istoriografii* (Moscow: Novoe izdatel’stvo, 2005), 48–82.
- 42 *Materialy po raionirovaniu Srednei Azii*, kniga 1, *Territoriia i naselenie Bukhary i Khorezma*, chast’ 1, *Bukhara* (Tashkent, 1926), 11.
- 43 *Ibid.*, 9.
- 44 *Ibid.*, 11.
- 45 *Ibid.*, 12.
- 46 N. S. Lykoshin, “Chapullukskaia volost’ Khodzhtenskogo uezda Samarkanskoi oblasti: Opyt issledovaniia ekonomicheskikh i bytovykh uslovii zhizni ee naseleniia,” *Spravochnaia knizhka Samarkandskoi oblasti*, vol. 8 (Samarkand, 1906): 23–24.
- 47 P. E. Kuznetsov, “O tadjikakh Tashkentskogo uezda (kratkii otchet),” *Izvestiia Turkestanskogo otdela IRGO* 2, vyp. 2 (Tashkent, 1900), 33.
- 48 *Ibid.*, 34.
- 49 M. A. Terent’ev, “Statisticheskie ocherki Sredneaziatskoi Rossii,” *Zapiski Imperatorskogo Russkogo Geograficheskogo Obshchestva po otdeleniiu statistiki* 4 (St. Petersburg, 1874): 64, 80.
- 50 See Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 199–209; S. N. Abashin, *Natsionalizmy v Srednei Azii: v poiskakh identichnosti* (St. Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2007), 95–176.
- 51 N. A. Aristov, “Zametki ob etnicheskom sostave tiurkskikh plemen i narodnostei i svedeniia ob ikh chislennosti,” *Zhivaia starina: Izdanie Otdeleniia etnografii IRGO*, vyp. 3–4, god 6-i (St. Petersburg, 1896): 426.
- 52 N. G. Mallitskii, “O vzaimootnoshenii nazvanii ‘sart’ i ‘uzbek’,” *TsGA RUz*, f. 2231, op. 1, d. 46, l. 32–33.

Not for Distribution

Part III

Russian power projected beyond its borders

Not for Distribution

Not for Distribution

7 Russo-Chinese trade through Central Asia

Regulations and reality

NODA Jin

This chapter examines trade relations between the empires of Qing China and Russia in Central Asia, mainly from the perspective of the Russian Empire. As background, the “eastern” trade between the two empires is examined. Russo-Chinese trade through Kyakhta (Mongolia) officially began in 1728, under the Treaty of Kyakhta. The Qing court, however, later imposed embargoes on trade through Kyakhta (1762–68, 1778–80, 1785–92),¹ and trade did not resume until 1792. After the fall of the Junghar (Oyirat) regime, Russia was able to focus on places other than Kyakhta as trade routes. Thereafter, the Russians sought to open a route directly to western China, despite the prohibitions imposed by the Treaty of Kyakhta. Research² on this “western” Russo-Chinese trade appears to have dealt with each trade route separately. In this chapter, the intention is to synthesize the trade routes as a whole, revealing the realities behind the official regulations of the two empires, especially in the first half of the nineteenth century. While there remains obscurity arising from the “unofficial” characteristics of the trade in this region,³ this kind of research can clarify part of the relations between the Russian Empire and Muslim networks in Central Asia from the viewpoint of trade. Moreover, this chapter reveals traders’ contacts with imperial officials, which often resulted in Russo-Qing and Russo-Central Asian diplomatic problems.

The area in Central Asia between West Siberia and Xinjiang

Four routes

First, I will address trade routes between Russia and Qing through Central Asia. The routes can be classified into the following.

1 Via Altai (by way of the lands of dvoedantsy, the Altaic dual-subject Kalmyks⁴)

The so-called Altaic *dvoedantsy*, whose name originated from their simultaneous subjection to both the Russians and the Junghars, mediated trade between the two empires,⁵ particularly after the Qing conquest of the Junghars (1755). According



Figure 7.1 Siberia, Central Asia and Xinjiang (first half of the nineteenth century, with present state borders)

to regulations imposed in 1822, they had the right to trade freely with Russians and they sold Chinese cotton and silk fabrics to incoming Russian merchants. Such trade was also considered highly profitable for the Russians.⁶

2 From Bukhtarma to northwest China

Bukhtarma (the eastern end of the Russian Irtysh fortified line) was a base from which Russian merchants tried to engage in direct trade with Qing subjects. Even though the Qing court did not approve of the activities of the Russians in this region, Russians traded not only with western Mongolia – for instance, with the citadel of Khobdo – but also with northern Xinjiang, that is, Chuguchak (Tarbagatai) and Kulja (Ili).

3 Via the Kazakh Steppe

The Kazakhs, who were allowed to trade in northern Xinjiang from 1758 and came to the Irtysh line for trading, directly connected Xinjiang and West Siberia. On the Qing side, the sultans of the Kazakhs, descendants of Chingiz Khan, had

the right to dispatch caravans to Chuguchak and Kulja, based on their “tribute” to the Qing Empire. When the caravans crossed the guard post (*karun*,⁷ or picket) line, the *karun* garrisons checked their identity.⁸ This was why they required a letter from the sultans.⁹

Owing to the fact that the Kazakhs were permitted to cross the Qing border, they became intermediaries for the Russian merchants, most of whom were Muslims. According to a report to the Siberian governor-general, Selifontov, “since only the Kazakhs are allowed to cross the border, trade is going on by way of the Kazakh sultans.”¹⁰ This shows that the Russians were evidently aware of the intermediary role played by the Kazakh sultans. We also find the case of a Kazakh sultan becoming the guarantor for Russian merchants captured at a guard post. An agent of an Ust-Kamenogorsk merchant reported in 1830 that at a *karun* near Chuguchak, the Qing garrisons took some of his belongings. His master merchant, Popov, turned to a Kazakh sultan so that the sultan would give his own seals to guarantee that the agent had truly traded on the sultan’s pastures, that is, they had connections with the sultan.¹¹

4 Via the Kokand Khanate

Kokandi merchants (or those from Tashkent), sometimes including Bukharans, played the role of connecting southern Xinjiang (Kashgar, Yarkand and other towns) and, partly, northern Xinjiang with the towns of West Siberia. However, they often suffered pillage at the hand of the Kazakhs.

Therefore, it is certain that the abovementioned multi-ethnic traders moved between the empires. Their activities will be detailed in the third section. Though the route through Altai was politically significant to Russia’s rule over the so-called Altai people, the amount of trade was apparently not great among the four routes. For this reason, this chapter focuses on the other three routes.

Control, or tolerance? Regulations of both empires concerning trade

Negotiations between the empires at the center and at the frontier

As is widely known, the Treaty of Kyakhta was concluded as the basis for relations between the Qing and Russian empires. Notably, it did not address Central Asian affairs, including trade there.¹² This fact was well recognized by Russian officials, one of whom was Liubimov from the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry. He cited the following from the proceedings of a committee (1843) on trade through Kyakhta:

[Although there are trade relations with Chuguchak and Kulja through Semipalatinsk,] those relations are not governed by any treaty and [are carried out] secretly, not under Chinese [=Qing] jurisdiction.¹³

Thus, in dealing with problems related to trade, both empires were required to take the Treaty of Kyakhta into consideration.

Russia's focus on the Bukhtarma fortress as a base for trade other than that through Kyakhta began to be observed as early as the latter half of the eighteenth century.¹⁴ This caused the Russian government to negotiate with the Qing court through Orthodox Christian missionaries dispatched to Peking.¹⁵ In 1830, for instance, instructions issued by the Russian Foreign Ministry show that the Russian government required that the mission explore the possibility of trade with the Qing around Bukhtarma.¹⁶ In principle, Russia intended to establish trade with western Mongolia and with Chuguchak in northern Xinjiang through Altai or Bukhtarma. Nevertheless, it was not until 1851 that this intention was realized by a new commercial treaty.

As well as negotiating in the center, the two empires negotiated with each other at the frontier.¹⁷ The earliest example was in 1805, when a Qing official entered Russian territory from the Chingistai guard post (*karaul* in Russian).¹⁸ Thereafter, there was evidence of frequent exchanges between the two parties around 1830. In 1827, Brant, the chief of Bukhtarma customs, reported that a Qing interpreter, Dzhogai, had come from the Chingistai guard post into Russian territory. Brant attempted to persuade Dzhogai that trade via the Bukhtarma area would be more profitable than that via Kyakhta.¹⁹ Brant also remarked that "the conversation with Dzhogai made it definite that the Chinese themselves place high hopes on expanding the trade in this region (*krai*)."²⁰ However, Dzhogai's opinion was that if they allowed Russians to trade, the Russians might build houses on Qing territory and claim ownership of land within that territory.²⁰ The following year, Dzhogai returned to Khobdo with a gift for the general (*amban*) of Khobdo in the name of the chief of the Omsk province (*oblast'*), De-sent-Loran,²¹ so that the Russian authorities could make a contract with the general stationed in Khobdo concerning trade.²²

In 1827, also from Qing territory, a merchant named Dalantai came to Bukhtarma. He was issued a pass (*billet*) by Bukhtarma customs, and he moved to Ust-Kamenogorsk to trade in Chinese tea.²³ Thereafter, Dalantai even asked the Russian authorities to allow him to visit the Russian subjects, the Kalmyks, in order to trade with them.²⁴

There were negotiations concerning Kazakh pillage as well as trade. In 1833, the Russian court (*prikaz*) at Ayaghuz sent a letter to the Qing guard post at Borohudir. The letter, written in Mongolian, stated that a Russian caravan traveling from Kulja back to Petropavlovsk was robbed of 6,000 rubles by a Kazakh sultan who was supposed to be a subject of the Qing Dynasty. The letter requested that the guard post "prohibit illegal actions by the cunning Kazakhs, who had pastures within Chinese [Qing] territory."²⁵ This suggests that the caravans moving between the two empires were often the target of Kazakh robbery, with problems sometimes causing friction in Russo-Qing negotiations.

It is notable that in 1828, a Russian official from Bukhtarma was dispatched to the Qing guard post at Narym. He negotiated with a Qing official on whether they should conclude a treaty concerning trade.²⁶ In another case that year, the

chief of the Siberian customs district ordered that an officer be dispatched to the guard posts at Bat (Qonimailaqu) and Chingistai. He was received warmly by a high-ranking Mongolian official of the Qing (*Noyan*) and his aide (*Tusalayçi*).²⁷ However, the negotiations only confirmed the principles that trade with Russia was prohibited, except through Kyakhta, and that the local officers did not have the authority to mediate in such diplomatic problems. The Qing officials added that goods from “Europe,” that is, Russia, had little appeal. In the following year, the general stationed in Khobdo came to Bukhtarma and remarked that Russian trade with the Qing through Bukhtarma contravened the Treaty of Kyakhta and that although the Russians often came to Chuguchak and Khobdo to trade with the Chinese, they were allowed to enter the territory only by “changing into the Kazakh attire and shaving their head.”²⁸

While the Qing central government undoubtedly insisted on the “Kyakhta principle,” the frontier officials, principally following the Treaty of Kyakhta, occasionally went as far as to propose that merchants of the two empires trade at fairs held in inner parts of Russia, for example, at the Irbit fair.²⁹ This indicates a difference between the views of the Qing court and those of the local officials, although sources on the Qing side do not mention such discord. In contrast, through the Siberian Committee,³⁰ the central organs of the Russian empire rather strictly controlled the local administrative officials, such as the West Siberian governors and Omsk provincial chiefs.

Russia's “open” policy

In general, the Russian attitude toward trade in this region was favorable; thus, Russia permitted dispatches of Russian caravans abroad. The opening of a route to India was a hope that had remained since the time of Peter I. Caravans entering Russia were also welcome as a source of information concerning Xinjiang and, beyond that, Kashmir. The Russian authorities gave merchants a passport that certified their purpose and destination. For example, a passport from 1825 (in Russian and Turkic) mentioned that Semipalatinsk merchants would be going to Kokand (*Qoqan yurti*) and it required that the Kazakh sultans or *bis* allow merchants to operate freely.³¹ One can also find passports of foreign merchants entering from Tashkent, Bukhara and other Central Asian cities.³²

There was frequent pillage by the Kazakhs, however. Russian measures against this pillage were as follows: criminals were searched for (in the case that the Russian authorities regarded them as their own subjects),³³ caravans were escorted by Cossack troops³⁴ and Kazakhs were barred from interfering with caravans. As for the last, according to a document addressed from a Kazakh sultan of the Middle Juz to the West Siberian governor-general, Kaptsevich, the local authority required that sultans “insure the safety of the merchants who went to Kashgar or Kokand from Russia through the land (*yürt*) of the Kazakhs.” To this, the Kazakhs responded that they would not commit any crimes (*zorliq*).³⁵ Thus, the effect of these measures surely depended on relations between the Russian authority and influential Kazakhs, in particular the sultans.

The amount of damage by pillage indicates the extent of trade. For instance, in 1830, Adamov, the agent of a Troitsk merchant called Abubakirov, was robbed by Kazakhs on his return from Chunguchak. The agent's merchandise consisted of a large piece of satin (*kanfa*, valued at 140 rubles per piece), a small piece of *kanfa* (30 rubles), Nanjing cotton (*kitaika*, 20 rubles), an ingot of silver (*yambu*, 350 rubles), *fu* brick tea³⁶ (20 rubles) and green tea (750 rubles per box). The value of these totaled 4,510 rubles.³⁷ In another example, in 1826, a Tatar trader was robbed of 7,500 rubles worth of goods while passing through Kazakh pastures from Kashgar,³⁸ and such theft on this route was common.

Despite these difficulties, foreign merchants, mainly Muslims, visited the West Siberian frontiers, and this brought conflict between the local Russian authorities and the foreign Tashkent or Bukharan merchants.³⁹ Nevertheless, these merchants were allowed to engage in trade in the border area and at the three large fairs in Irbit, Nizhegorod and Korennaya (the goods traded by the foreign merchants were exempt from duty there). First, a dispensation was made, in a decree issued by the Asiatic Committee (*polozhenie*) on 28 July 1825. The decree gave traders entering West Siberia the same rights as those of "Asian" merchants engaging in trade with Persians under the Treaty of Gulistan.⁴⁰ Second, and rather importantly, this was confirmed by the State Council's opinion (*mnenie*) (12 February 1834) and ratified by the Emperor.⁴¹

Needless to say, merchants – both domestic and foreign – were forced to pay customs duties. To obtain this duty, the Russian government levied a "Kyakhta tariff" on goods from Qing and an "Asiatic tariff" on those from other regions. In 1833, a report from the Semipalatinsk customs to the Department of External Trade stated that trading merchants often declared, without any certification, that they carried goods from Kulja or Chuguchak, that is, from Qing, even though they did not seem to be Chinese products.⁴² This meant that the merchants carefully chose the origin of the goods in order to reduce the payment of customs duty, since there were differences between the Kyakhta and Asiatic tariffs.

The Siberian customs district established in Petropavlovsk administered trade on the Irtysh fortified line as a whole. It is noteworthy that Russia undoubtedly intended to realize direct trade with Xinjiang, as was evident by the opinion of the chief of the Siberian customs district (in 1832).⁴³ The chief of the customs district also stated in 1834 that the Kokpekti area, located to the south of Lake Zaisan, was very significant for its convenient location for trade with towns under Qing jurisdiction.⁴⁴

Evading the Qing's restrictions

As we noted earlier, the Qing Empire had the principle of prohibiting foreign trade in northwest China, except for the trade by Kazakhs and "Andijans" (Kokandi merchants). As a Qing policy concerning peripheral trade, the institution of *hu-shi* (literally: "mutual trade") was applied to foreign commerce in Xinjiang. For the Kazakhs, the following was clearly described as a precedent in the Collected

Statues of the Qing: “the Kazakhs traded [*hu-shi*] their livestock at Kulja and Chuguchak.”⁴⁵

Despite the prohibition, it was often the case that “Russians” (Russian subjects, including Russian Muslims) carried out trade disguised in Muslim dress as Andijans or Kazakhs.⁴⁶ Such “outward decencies” (*naruzhnoe prilichie*)⁴⁷ enabled Russian merchants, who had felt that trade in this region was unprofitable for Russians owing to the intermediary role of the Kazakh caravans, to enter Qing territory.⁴⁸ We know of a Bukharan merchant, Mirniyazov, who crossed the Qing border from Semipalatinsk into Chuguchak in 1836.⁴⁹ There was also a case in which Andijans mixed with Kazakhs and carried contraband trade.⁵⁰ These cases imply that, as long as the Qing government admitted foreign Muslims (*huizi*) into its territory in accordance with the institution of *hu-shi*, the frontier officials did not dare to strictly watch who was actually allowed to trade. The Russians, however, could dispatch their caravans to Xinjiang, making use of the Qing Empire’s superficial restriction of trade. Even in 1845, the general stationed in Chuguchak thought that Russians wishing to trade in the town “should wear Asian attire.”⁵¹ The beginning of trade by Russians in Xinjiang resulted in the exclusion of the Kazakhs from the trading scene and also in direct Russian trade with the towns of Xinjiang. Therefore, it is possible to state that the frontier of the Qing Dynasty was not entirely closed to trade.

It is certain that the Qing court also tried to control the trade by embargo, especially that on rhubarb⁵² (from Qing) and opium (into Qing). Remarkably, there were negotiations between both governments regarding the embargo on opium.⁵³ In addition, according to Qing archival documents, the Qing government attempted to restrain the import of Russian products and to prohibit the Xinjiang Muslims from going out for trade.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, the existence of contraband opium traded by Russian merchants⁵⁵ or Kokandis⁵⁶ reveals the incompleteness of Qing’s policy toward trade. In reality there was room for foreign merchants to trade rather freely within the territory of the Qing Empire.

In addition, the Qing authorities issued passports to foreign Muslim merchants entering Qing territory⁵⁷ and levied customs duties. With regard to the tariff, we can refer to the table in Millward, which shows that customs duties varied from one trader to another.⁵⁸ Here, I present only the information found in remarks made by Russian merchants. According to them, in Chuguchak, the tariff on goods imported by “Andijans” was 10 percent,⁵⁹ whereas it was much lower in the southern Xinjiang towns. This might have been because of the difference between the administrations in northern and southern Xinjiang: northern Xinjiang was a stronghold of the military governor, and southern Xinjiang was a land for Muslims with whom Kokandi merchants could trade.

A particularly significant role was played by the Qing guard posts (*karun*).⁶⁰ Garrisons at guard posts were responsible for identifying caravans,⁶¹ confirming merchandise and seizing contraband merchandise. Therefore, Qing policy was closely connected with border defense. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, it seemed that strict investigations were not always made.

Who were the traders?

This section addresses the trade activities of the merchants under the abovementioned “imperial” regulations.

The Kazakhs

First of all, the Kazakhs connected the Russian Irtysh line and Xinjiang. They had begun trading with the Russians at the Irtysh line earlier, exchanging their livestock for Russian products.⁶² Semipalatinsk was a particularly significant trade center.⁶³ It is remarkable that the Kazakh caravans were mainly under the jurisdiction of the Kazakh sultans.⁶⁴

In the east, after the Kazakhs entered into official relations with the Qing court in 1757, the possibility of trade between Qing and the Kazakhs was considered by the Qing court. For example, a Qing palace memorial from local generals to the Qing Emperor reported that such trade would be profitable for both Qing and the Kazakhs.⁶⁵ As a result, trade began in the next year. The main purpose was to exchange livestock for cotton or silk fabrics (thus, transactions were done without any customs duties). The amount of trade that was carried out can be found in Qing archival documents, especially in the *yuezhe-dang* (Monthly Memorial Packets).⁶⁶ One record mentions that 80–100 horses, 200–300 cows and 27,000–30,000 sheep were traded every year.⁶⁷ After the outset of trade with the Qing, the Kazakhs began to bring fabrics or silver ingots obtained at the Xinjiang border area into Russia. Table 7.1, based on the records of Russian customs, shows the imports from the east to towns on the Russian frontier (the Irtysh line).

It is certain that the statistics do not mean that the entire amount of each article was carried only by Kazakhs, as the archival documents lack details. Nevertheless, we know that Chinese goods were brought through the Kazakh Steppe into West Siberia.⁶⁸

Trade by the Kazakhs, which had been based on their tribute to the Qing Empire, was gradually restricted by the Russian West Siberian authorities, who intended to

Table 7.1 Imports from the east to towns on the Irtysh line in 1827 (unit: rubles)

<i>From</i>	<i>To</i>	<i>Chinese calico (biaz')</i>	<i>Cotton fabrics (daba)</i>	<i>Yambu silver</i>	<i>Amount</i>
Chuguchak, Kazakh Steppe	Semipalatinsk	5,829 (rubles)	90,694	62,367	866,146*
Kazakh Steppe, Yarkand, Chuguchak	Bukhtarma		1,622	60,394	88,192†
Tashkent, Turkestan, Kazakh Steppe	Petropavlovsk	1,675	14,857	470	1,899,441‡

Notes

* TsGA RK, f. 806, op. 1, d. 15, ll. 44–47ob.

† TsGA RK, f. 806, op. 1, d. 15, ll. 56–57.

‡ TsGA RK, f. 806, op. 1, d. 15, ll. 3–7ob.

establish their own administrative units (*okrug*) through the Kazakh Steppe. This was done not only for political reasons but also for an economic one: the establishment of direct trade relations with northwest China. Finally, in 1842, the Russian government established regulations limiting the movements of Kazakh caravans that traveled beyond the *okrug* borders.⁶⁹ As a result, although some trading by Kazakhs who were subjects of the Qing continued, the Kazakhs' role of binding the two empires together began to wane.

The Central Asian (especially Kokandi) merchants

Between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, "Bukharan" merchants connected Central Asia with Siberia.⁷⁰ In the early nineteenth century, Bukharans went as far as Kyakhta to trade rhubarb.⁷¹ From the eighteenth century, the number of merchants from Tashkent, in addition to the Bukharans, began to rise. During the reign of the Junghars, Tashkent merchants were allowed to trade freely with Eastern Turkistan (later, Xinjiang).⁷² After the Qing conquest of the Junghars, Kokand became a tributary state of Qing, and Kokandi merchants – the "Andijans" in Chinese sources – had the right to trade with Xinjiang, as mentioned earlier. Evidently, the Kokandis were able to trade in Chinese products more easily than the Bukharans because of the geographical position of the Kokand Khanate.

Afterward, the capture of Tashkent by the Kokand Khanate secured the route to Russia, that is, to Orenburg⁷³ and Siberia, whereas in the past, the route traversed Bukharan territory. As cited by many researchers, an English official, Wathen, vividly described the role of the Kokandi merchants and the articles they brought:

From Kashgar the U'sbek merchants bring them [bricks of tea] to Kokan, whence they are exported on camels to Bokhara. The returns are said to be made in shawls, European articles, raw silk, horses, &c. . . . The trade with Russia is carried on by means of caravans: the Kokan merchants meet those of Bokhara at Tashkend, and forming one body, they proceed via Turkistan through the Steppes occupied by the Cossacs, part to Omsk, and part to Orenburg. The productions of China, raw silk, camlets, and cotton yarn, are taken to Russia, and the returns are made in furs, gun barrels, and locks, cutlery, Russian leather, and other Russian manufactures.⁷⁴

From Kokand to Kashgar, Nebol'sin notes, these merchants brought Russian steel, pans, woolen cloth (*sukno*), fur, calico (*sitets, vyboika*), Nanjing cotton and colored velvet; and from Kashgar to Kokand they brought tea, pottery, silk and *yambu* silver.⁷⁵ They often became the heads of caravans (*karavan bashi*)⁷⁶ and moved between Kokand, southern Xinjiang (Kashgar, Yarkand), northern Xinjiang (Kulja, Chuguchak) and the Russian frontier (the Irtysh line).

With regard to the trade by Kokandi merchants, we should take note of the *aqsaqal* (seniors) system of the Kokand Khanate. While the *aqsaqal*⁷⁷ appointed for Kashgar in 1832 (after the rebellions by Jahangir and Yusuf Khojas) was very famous,⁷⁸ the other *aqsaqals* of the towns on the Russian Irtysh line did not receive

much recognition; furthermore, they were not linked with the *aqsaqals* within Qing territory. Appointment to the post of *aqsaqal* was principally under the influence of the Kokand khans. This was confirmed in a remark by Qurbanghali, a later *imam* in Chuguchak, who wrote:

There was a conference (*maṣlahat*) to appoint *aqsaqals* for the [Kokandi] subjects living in Russia. At first, in Semipalatinsk, . . . [the *aqsaqal* was] given the edict (*yarliq*) by the khan, and he was approved by the Russian side, too.⁷⁹

According to Ziaaev, there was also an *aqsaqal* appointed according to the khan's *yarliq* in Petropavlovsk.⁸⁰ Thus, the *aqsaqal* system seemed to extend to both West Siberia and Xinjiang, and the formation of communities of Kokandi merchants is regarded as the background of the system. In this connection, Umar Khan of the Kokand Khanate tried to appoint an official to the position of *qadibeg* of Kashgar in 1813, even before the appointment of an *aqsaqal* in West Siberia.⁸¹ Concerning the intensification of commercial relations with Siberia, the Kokand Khanate entered into diplomatic relations with Russia (around 1812).⁸² First, Russia invited Kokand – not directly, but by way of a Kazakh sultan – to establish trade relations with Russia.⁸³ In turn, the Khan of Kokand sent an envoy to Russia through Petropavlovsk, so that he could require Russia to protect the Kokandi merchants living in Siberia and so that an agreement could be concluded regarding compensation for damage from pillage (*quṭṭā' al-tarīq*).⁸⁴

In this way, Kokandi merchants – including Bukharan and other Central Asian Muslims – were able to develop their commercial activities on a wider scale. It is known that a Semipalatinsk *aqsaqal* from Tashkent even built a mosque at his own expense.⁸⁵ The information of archival documents collected by N. Konshin may illustrate the activities of Kokandi merchants in detail.⁸⁶ For example, Negmatov, a merchant from Tashkent under Kokand rule who was living in Semipalatinsk, went to Kulja for trade in 1822.⁸⁷ An example of a Bukharan merchant is Asanzhan Amirov, who was born in Bukhara and moved to Troitsk by caravan in 1820. He prepared his own caravan and went from Semipalatinsk to Kulja, and through Aksu to Yarkand. There, after exchanging Russian goods for silver, he bought Kashgari calico (*biaz'*).⁸⁸

“Russian” merchants

Until the first half of the nineteenth century, Russian merchants needed to pay a commission for the intermediary activities of the Kazakh sultans,⁸⁹ so their business was not that profitable. However, by disguising themselves as Muslims, they came to enter Qing territory and to engage in direct trade. In 1811, trade carried out between Bukhatarma and northern Xinjiang was valued at 156,941 rubles.⁹⁰

It is notable that under the Russian trade system, an agent (*prikazchik*) went to Xinjiang on behalf of the head merchants registered in the guild.⁹¹ The Russian caravan trade with Central Asia through Orenburg is discussed in Hamamoto's

chapter (Chapter 2), which addresses the role of Tatars as agents of both Russian and Central Asian merchants. On the West Siberian frontier as well, such agents mainly consisted of Russian Muslim subjects, like Siberian Bukharans, Siberian Tatars and Volga Tatars.⁹² Thus, non-Russians engaged in a significant amount of trade activities. The so-called Siberian “Bukharans” (*bukhartsy*) and Siberian Tatars, who lived in Tara, Tobolsk, Tiumen and other towns in West Siberia, were particularly active, according to records assembled by G. Potanin.⁹³

An example of a particularly active Volga Tatar (*kazanskii tatarin*) is Faizulla Seifullin.⁹⁴ He became the agent of the Semipalatinsk merchant Samsonov in 1814 and traveled to Kokand as the head of a caravan. Later, he became the commission merchant (*komissioner*) of the first guild merchants of Semipalatinsk. In Kashgar, he traded five times more profitably than he did in Kokand. In 1825, he visited Kulja and exchanged goods and sheep for Chinese cotton fabrics (*daba*).⁹⁵ At the orders of the Russian authorities, he was dispatched to pastures of the Kyrgyz and Kashgar, where he acted as something like a Russian secret agent. He was acquainted with the Kazakh sultans. Although local negotiations around 1830 between Russia and Qing were not successful, as mentioned earlier, the Russian Empire made more active attempts to engage directly in trade involving this region. This will be examined in the next section.

Changes in trade relations

Disputes on the Kazakh Steppe

It is obvious that from 1822, when Russia promulgated regulations among the Middle Juz Kazakhs, Russian influence was gradually imposed on their society, and this influence extended to trade. Additionally, the Kazakhs' relations with the Qing Empire became distant by degrees. Therefore, the number of sultans who could mediate between the two empires diminished. On the other hand, the Kazakh Steppe itself was convulsed with revolts, especially that led by Kenesary Kasymov (1837–47).

Prevalence of “Russians” and the Treaty of 1851

From the 1820s to the early 1830s, Xinjiang suffered rebellions at the hands of the Jahangir and Yusuf brothers, who were well-known Makhdumzada khojas. The Qing court, considering that the Kokandi merchants were the greater cause of the confusion, decided to embargo trade by them and to displace the Kokandis who were staying within the territory. The results of this policy are evident from a Russian document: “[in 1827, after the war], Asian [traders] much more than ever looked to the Russian border.”⁹⁶ On the difficulties of Kokandis displaced from Qing, it was reported in the Qing palace memorial: “No fewer than several thousand ‘Andijans’ lost their property to manage and their homes to go back to . . .”⁹⁷ The Qing government even tried to restrain Russia from cooperating with the Kokand Khanate in general.⁹⁸

Table 7.2 Tea imports from China via the Orenburg and Irtys' fortified lines* (unit: pud)

	1836	1837	1838	1839	1840	1841	1842	1843 [†]	1844	1845	1846	1847	1848	1849	1850
<i>bathua</i> tea [‡]	9	19	10	152	1221	1362	473	750	1213	1637	2438	2109	740	3907	9159
brick tea	1411	1008	1136	1727	1556	1714	3255	4020	2974	4760	6513	4457	4667	7194	6010

Notes

* Korsak, *Istoriko-statisticheskoe obozrenie*, 440. In the case of 1842, tea imported from West China to Siberia totaled 449 pud (*bathua*: 21,209 rubles) and 3,151 pud (brick: 38,879 rubles); see *ibid.*, 438.

[†] Hereafter, the numbers only indicate tea cleared through Semipalatinsk customs.

[‡] It is said that the distributed *bathua* (*bathovyy*) tea was usually black tea; see Korsak, *Istoriko-statisticheskoe obozrenie*, 432.

After a peace was reached between the Qing and the Kokand Khanate in 1832, Kokandi traders were allowed to re-enter southern Xinjiang; however, they faced difficulties in conducting business in northern Xinjiang. A report by a Bukharan merchant revealed that unlike Kokandi traders, “the Russian merchants were welcomed gladly.”⁹⁹ Therefore, there was room for “Russian” merchants to participate in the trade more intensively.

China rapidly increased in the 1840s.¹⁰⁰ This table also shows that brick tea was imported in large quantities into Russia through Central Asia, which was different from the tendency of the trade in tea via the East Asian borders.¹⁰¹ Archival documents additionally mention that in 1843, *daba* (cotton fabrics), white *biaz'* (calico), *yambu* silver (84,868 rubles),¹⁰² *baihua* tea (36,175 rubles) and brick tea (48,718 rubles) were imported from Qing to Semipalatinsk, with the imports totaling 228,848 rubles and the exports to Qing totaling 204,184 rubles.¹⁰³ Undoubtedly, trade through Kyakhta was much larger in scale than that through Central Asia. However, what this chapter insistently emphasizes is that the abovementioned trading routes necessitated that the merchants and goods moved between the empires in this region, which required that the empires dealt with trade disputes and sometimes negotiated them.

At that time, the demand for Russian goods in Xinjiang was high, as was shown by Liubimov.¹⁰⁴ This clearly indicates the existence of direct trade. The Troitsk merchant Abdulvali, who entered northern Xinjiang after Liubimov (but before 1851), even declared at the guard post that he was a subject of Russia, which was a nation that was friendly with China.¹⁰⁵ Judging from this example, entrances by merchants who were Russian subjects were already common at the Qing frontier in Xinjiang.

Finally, based on suggestions by the Russian side, a new commercial treaty (the Treaty of Kulja) concerning trade in Chuguchak and Kulja – both places far from Kyakhta – was concluded in 1851; however, the Qing court denied the Russian wish to include trading in Kashgar.¹⁰⁶ Needless to say, this wish was closely related to the shadow cast by Great Britain, which had been approaching Central Asia via India. The treaty increased Russian initiative in the field of trade. In contrast, the role of the Kokandi merchants began to decline. Thereafter, the more obvious that Russia's southeastern border with Xinjiang became, the more the Russian Empire intervened in the affairs of Xinjiang. Examples of this were the Russian diplomatic relations with the Yaqub-beg government in Kashgaria and the “Ili crisis,” which were closely connected with Russian trading ambitions.¹⁰⁷

It is certain that “Russian traders” in this region were Muslim merchants who were Russian subjects. However, archival documents show evidence of hostility toward Muslim merchants by Russian Orthodox Christians. In 1825, the chief of the Siberian customs district reported:

Most harmful to the trade by Russian Christian [Orthodox] merchants were the fleeing Tatars . . . It is by staying in Chuguchak to trade with Chinese that they caused disturbances there with their turbulent nature [*buinyi kharakter*] . . . At times, they betrayed Christians to the general of [Qing] China.¹⁰⁸

This suggests that Russian authority had a negative image among Muslim subjects. These kinds of interethnic relations require further research. Nevertheless, despite conflicts, the Russian Empire was forced to make use of Muslim merchants for trade in Central Asia.

Conclusion

What is discussed above shows that, apparently, the Russian Empire attempted to engage in trade with Qing through its western border from the mid-eighteenth century, and it was the Treaty of 1851 that officially launched direct trade between Russia and Xinjiang. Sino-Russian trade through Central Asia up until 1851 went through three stages, which were, needless to say, deeply connected with politics in the region:

1. The time of the Kazakh caravans (approx. 1760s–1830s): however, Kazakh trade activities were gradually restricted by the Russian Empire. Even so, frequent pillage by the Kazakhs greatly influenced international trade affairs in Central Asia and often resulted in diplomatic negotiations among Russia, Qing and Kokand (in particular, between the first two).
2. The predominance of Central Asian, especially Kokandi, merchants (1810s–1840s): the network of their communities both in Xinjiang and on the Irtysh line enabled them to trade continuously between the empires.¹⁰⁹ Nonetheless, they began to lose their significance, particularly in northern Xinjiang after the rebellions in Kashgaria in the 1820s.
3. The medium of “Russian” Muslims, that is, Volga Tatars, Siberian Tatars and Siberian Bukharans (1810s–1840s, and also after the Treaty of 1851): their trade activities led not only to the development of Muslim networks in the region, but also to the realization of Russian hegemony, that is, the subsequent entry of Slavic-Russian merchants into Xinjiang.¹¹⁰ Notably, Tatars prevailing in the Kazakh Steppe and northern Xinjiang later came to play the role of a window onto the new cultures in this region and continued connecting the two areas.

The phases show that, in reality, the role played by Muslim merchants behind the trade regulations of the Empire – especially by the Russian Muslims who increased their presence as Russia advanced to Qing’s northwest – cannot be ignored.

Consequently, since the network of Kokandi-Bukharan merchants as well as that of Russian Muslims was significantly dominant, the trading system could be recognized as a triangle of Siberia, Xinjiang and the Kokand Khanate. In this triangle, the Russian Empire had to deal with diplomatic relations with Qing and the Central Asian khanates, including the Kazakhs, and it tried to control the merchants by establishing customs points. From a local perspective, the triangle system mainly involved the northern (Siberian) and southern (Central Asian, particularly Kokandi and then Bukharan) Muslim networks and the nomadic Kazakhs that moved within these networks, who connected the two empires in another

way. In other words, adding to the participation by the Kazakhs in Sino-Russian trade (by means of agency and, paradoxically, even of pillage), these networks of Muslim merchants certainly “bridged” the two empires through Central Asia.

Notes

- 1 For problems regarding trade through Kyakhta and for the Russo-Qing relations that were influential in that trade, see Yanagisawa Akira, “Some Remarks on the ‘Addendum to the Treaty of Kiakhta’ in 1768,” *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, no. 63 (2005): 65–87.
- 2 Concerning Russo-Qing trade through Kyakhta in general, see Yoshida Kin’ichi, *Kindai Ro-Shin kankei shi* [A history of Sino-Russian relations in the modern period] (Tokyo: Kondō shuppansha, 1974); M. I. Sladkovskii, *Istoriia torgovo-ekonomicheskikh otnoshenii narodov Rossii s Kitaem, do 1917 g.* (Moscow, 1974). For research on trade in Central Asia, see Saguchi Tōru, *18–19 seiki Higashi Torukisutan shakaishi kenkyū* [Study of the social history of Eastern Turkestan in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1963); V. S. Kuznetsov, *Ekonomicheskaiia politika Tsinskogo pravitel'stva v Sin'tsziiane v pervoi polovine XIX veka* (Moscow, 1973); J. Fletcher, “The Heyday of the Ch’ing Order in Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet,” in J. K. Fairbank, ed., *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 10, part 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 351–408; idem, “Sino-Russian Relations, 1800–62,” in *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 10, part 1: 318–350; B. P. Gurevich, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral'noi Azii v XVIII – pervoi polovine XIX v.*, 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1983). For the situation in the latter half of the nineteenth century, see S. B. Kozhirova, *Russko-kitaiskaia torgovlia v Tsentral'noi Azii (vtoraia polovina XIX – nachalo XX vv.)* (Astana, 2000); N. A. Aldabek, *Rossii i Kitai: Torgovo-ekonomicheskie sviazi v tsentral'no-aziatskom regione XVII–XIX vv.* (Almaty, 2001); Zh. K. Kasymbaev, *Kazakhstan-Kitai: Karavannaia torgovlia v XIX – nachale XX vv.* (Almaty, 1996); Li Sheng 厲聲, *Xinjiang dui Su (E) maoyi shi: 1600–1990* 新疆對蘇(俄)貿易史 [A history of trade between Xinjiang and the USSR (Russia): 1600–1990] (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 1993); Mi Zhenb 米鎮波, *Qingdai xibei bianjing diqu ZhongE maoyi: Cong Daoguang chao dao Xuandong chao* 清代西北邊境地區中俄貿易: 從道光朝到宣統朝 [Sino-Russian trade on the northwest frontiers in the Qing era] (Tianjin: Tianjin shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 2005); Cai Jiayun 蔡家芸, *Qingdai Xinjiang shehui jingji shigang* 清代新疆社會經濟史綱 [A socioeconomic history of Xinjiang during the Qing Dynasty] (Peking: Renmin chubanshe, 2006).
- 3 In contrast, we can refer to much research on the statistics of Sino-Russian trade through Kyakhta, e.g., Morinaga Takako, “Irukūtsuku shōnin to Kyafuta bōeki: 1792–1830 nen,” [Irkutsk merchants and Kyakhta trade, 1792–1830], in Hara Teruyuki, ed., *Roshia no naka no Ajia / Ajia no naka no Roshia* [Asia in Russia/Russia in Asia], vol. 1 (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 21st Century COE Program, Occasional Papers 3, 2004), 1–36. According to Yoshida’s calculation, Kyakhta trade (1801–50) averaged 5 million–8.1 million rubles annually. Yoshida, *Kindai Ro-Shin kankei shi*, 192.
- 4 They are often called “Kalmyk” in Russian literature, although they differed ethnically from the Junghars and the Volga-Kalmyks.
- 5 This trade was free from any customs duty, which means that the trade was beyond Russian control. See TsGAR K (Central State Archive of the Republic of Kazakhstan), f. 806, op. 1, d. 157, l. 4.
- 6 O. V. Boronin, *Dvoedannichestvo v Sibiri XVII–60-e gg. XIX vv.* (Barnaul, 2002), 188.
- 7 *Karun* originates from a Manchu word. See L. J. Newby, *The Empire and the Khanate: A Political History of Qing Relations with Khoqand c. 1760–1860* (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 14.

- 8 Noda Jin, “Roshin no hazama no Kazafu hānkoku: Surutan to Shinchō no kankei wo chūshin ni” [The Kazakh Khanate between the Russian and Qing empires: On the relations of Kazakh sultans with the Qing Dynasty], *Tōyō Gakuhō* 87, no. 2 (2005): 29–59.
- 9 *Chouban yiwu shimo: Xianfeng chao* 籌辦夷務始末:咸豐朝 [A complete account of the management of foreign affairs], vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979), 3.
- 10 M. B. Davydova et al., eds., *Russko-kitaiskie otnosheniia v XIX veke: materialy i dokumenty*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1995), 204.
- 11 TsGA RK, f. 806, op. 1, d. 13, ll. 198–198ob.
- 12 Noda Jin, “18 seiki Chūo Ajia ni okeru Roshin kankei: Jūgaru seiken hōkai kara Kazafu, Altai shozoku no kizoku mondai e” [Russo-Qing relations concerning Central Asia in the eighteenth century: The Junghar conquest and the question of the subjection of the Kazakhs and the Altai groups], *Shigaku Zasshi* 116, no. 9 (2007): 1–37.
- 13 N. Veselovskii, *Poezdka N. I. Liubimova v Chuguchak i Kul'dzhu v 1845 g. pod vidom kuptsa Khorosheva* (St. Petersburg, 1909) (republished in *Turkestanskii sbornik*, vol. 544), 174.
- 14 “[Arkhivnye materialy o russko-dzhungarskikh i kitaiskikh otnosheniakh (Rukopisnye dokumenty)],” in Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, *Sobranie sochinenii v piati tomakh*, vol. 4 (Alma-Ata, 1985), 215.
- 15 Ministerstvo inostrannykh del SSSR, ed., *Vneshniaia politika Rossii XIX-go i nachala XX-go veka: dokumenty Rossiiskogo Ministerstva inostrannykh del*, vol. 11 (Moscow, 1979), 329.
- 16 Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii, ed. *Vneshniaia politika Rossii XIX-go i nachala XX-go veka: dokumenty Rossiiskogo Ministerstva inostrannykh del*, vol. 16 (Moscow, 1995), 462–463.
- 17 While the late Prof. Kasymbaev has suggested the existence of diplomatic negotiations at the Russo-Qing frontier, those negotiations can be confirmed more positively by archival documents. See Kasymbaev, *Kazakhstan-Kitai*, 56.
- 18 Davydova et al., *Russko-kitaiskie otnosheniia*, 208.
- 19 TsGA RK, f. 806, op. 1, d. 13, ll. 24–26ob. (Report by Brant). This case is related to that cited by Kozhirova, *Russko-kitaiskaia torgovlia*, 28.
- 20 TsGA RK, f. 806, op. 1, d. 13, l. 130 (Report by the interpreter Robanov to the chief of Bukhtarma Fortress).
- 21 TsGA RK, f. 806, op. 1, d. 13, l. 61 (Report by Brant).
- 22 TsGA RK, f. 806, op. 1, d. 13, l. 65 (Secret order issued by the Russian Department of External Trade to the chief of Bukhtarma customs).
- 23 TsGA RK, f. 341, op. 2, d. 26, l. 9 (Notification issued by the chief of the Siberian customs district to the chief of the Bukhtarma customs, Krok). See also Kozhirova, *Russko-kitaiskaia torgovlia*, 28.
- 24 TsGA RK, f. 806, op. 1, d. 13, l. 109 (Report issued by Bukhtarma Fortress to the chief of the Siberian customs district).
- 25 TsGA RK, f. 806, op. 1, d. 61, ll. 8–12.
- 26 TsGA RK, f. 806, op. 1, d. 13, l. 88 (Report by the Bukhtarma customs to the chief of the Siberian customs district).
- 27 TsGA RK, f. 806, op. 1, d. 13, ll. 110–112ob. (Report by the Bukhtarma fortress to the chief of the Siberian customs district).
- 28 TsGA RK, f. 341, op. 2, d. 26, ll. 10ob.–11 (Report by the chief of the Bukhtarma customs to the chief of the Siberian customs district).
- 29 TsGA RK, f. 806, op. 1, d. 13, l. 36 (correspondence from the Department of External Trade to the chief of the Siberian customs district in 1827).
- 30 E. V. Bezikonnaia, *Administrativno-pravovaia politika Rossiiskoi imperii v oblasti Zapadnoi Sibiri v 20–60-kh gg. XIX vv.* (Omsk, 2005), 67.
- 31 TsGA RK, f. 338, op. 1, d. 585, l. 12. The passport was issued according to imperial edict.

- 32 N. G. Apollova, *Khoziaistvennoe osvoenie Priirtysh'ia v kontse XVI – pervoi polovine XIX v.* (Moscow, 1976), 345.
- 33 The petition from the merchants preceded the search. See TsGA RK, f. 478, op. 2, d. 75, l. 158 (petition by a foreign Tashkent merchant to the administration of Omsk province).
- 34 This can be compared with escorts for caravans from Orenburg to Bukhara. For an example, from 1824, see Ministerstvo inostrannykh del SSSR, *Vneshniaia politika Rossii*, vol. 13 (Moscow, 1982), 411–412.
- 35 Ministerstvo inostrannykh del SSSR, *Vneshniaia politika Rossii*, vol. 14 (Moscow, 1985), 289–290.
- 36 In 1831, a Semipalatinsk merchant imported such *fu* tea as a new kind of tea. See TsGA RK, f. 806, op. 1, d. 49, l. 1.
- 37 TsGAR RK TsGARK, f. 478, op. 2, d. 75, l. 31 (Report by an agent of the merchant from Troitsk).
- 38 TsGA RK, f. 478, op. 2, d. 75, l. 46 (Information obtained from merchants).
- 39 Sometimes, the Russian authorities argued over what rights foreign merchants should have. For a case from 1825, see TsGA RK, f. 806, op. 1, d. 7, ll. 12–12ob. (Report by the Semipalatinsk customs to Semipalatinsk town hall). See also G. A. Mikhaleva, *Uzbekistan v XVIII – pervoi polovine XIX veka: Remeslo, torgovlia i poshliny* (Tashkent, 1991), 53–54. In addition, there were complaints by Slavic-Russian merchants against the privilege granted to Bukharans. See GAOMO (State Archive of Omsk oblast, Russia), f. 3, op. 1, d. 424, ll. 181, 182 (Opinions of merchants from Tiumen and Tara in 1827).
- 40 Trade affairs on the West Siberian frontier were much closer to those in the Caucasus. See Chapter 8 by Crews in this volume.
- 41 TsGA RK, f. 806, op. 1, d. 7, ll. 193–194ob. In 1833, the Department of External Trade (Ministry of Finance) considered that unified regulations were necessary for the reception of caravans entering from abroad. See TsGA RK, f. 478, op. 2, d. 109, l. 30 (Report by the Semipalatinsk customs to the Department of External Trade). See also V. P. Shpaltakov, “Sredneaziatskie torgovye liudi v Sibiri v XVIII–XIX vv.,” in O. N. Vil'kov ed., *Torgovlia gorodov Sibiri kontsa XV – nachala XX v.* (Novosibirsk, 1987), 215–224.
- 42 TsGA RK, f. 478, op. 2, d. 109, l. 28 (Report by the Semipalatinsk customs to the Department of External Trade).
- 43 TsGAR RK, f. 806, op. 1, d. 48, ll. 93–93ob. (Report by the chief of the Siberian customs district to the Minister of Finance).
- 44 TsGA RK, f. 338, op. 1, d. 701, l. 126 (Order by the minister of the army to the Siberian Separate Corps).
- 45 *Qinding Daqing huidian* 欽定大清會典 [Collected statutes of the Qing] (Jiaqing ed.), cited in Ma Dazheng 馬大正 and Lu Yiran 呂一燃, eds. *Qingdai Lifanyuan ziliao jilu* 清代理藩院資料輯錄 (Beijing: Quanguo tushuguan wenxian suowei fuzhi zhongxin, 1988), 82. Still, whether the Kazakhs engaged in trade with the Qing as tribute is under discussion. For an example of the emphasis on the distinction between tribute and trade, see J. A. Millward, *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759–1864* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 49. In another case, Di Cosmo carefully discussed this issue; see N. Di Cosmo, “Kirghiz Nomads on the Qing Frontier: Tribute, Trade, or Gift-Exchange?” in N. Di Cosmo and Don J. Wyatt, eds., *Political Frontiers, Ethnic Boundaries and Human Geographies in Chinese History* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 351–372. In fact, Kazakh missions had presented horses as tribute to Qing provincial officials and even to the Emperor, and these missions were directly connected with their trade activities; see Noda Jin and Onuma Takahiro, *A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty* (Tokyo: Department of Islamic Area Studies, University of Tokyo, 2010). Including the Kazakh cases, the Qing's trade policy in Xinjiang was complicated by border control, frontier administration and commercial relations.

- Thus, the trade relations between the Kazakhs and Qing may have contained elements of tribute as well.
- 46 TsGA RK, f. 341, op. 2, d. 26, ll. 10ob.–11 (Report by Bukhtarma customs to the chief of the Siberian customs district).
 - 47 TsGA RK, f. 806, op. 1, d. 48, ll. 93–93ob.
 - 48 Davydova et al., *Russko-kitaiskie otnosheniia*, 204.
 - 49 GAOmO, f. 3, op. 12, d. 17976, l. 55 (Report by Mirniyazov to the Semipalatinsk district court).
 - 50 For the 1828 case, see Cao Zhenyong 曹振鏞 et al., eds., *Qinding pingding Huijiang jiaogin nifei fanglüe* 欽定平定回疆剿擒逆匪方略 [An imperially commissioned history of the pacification of the Muslim frontier and the capture of the rebels' descendants], vol. 68 (Daoguang 10 [1830]; repr., Taipei, 1972), 5–6.
 - 51 Veselovskii, *Poezdka N. I. Liubimova*, 179.
 - 52 For the trade in rhubarb from China to Central Asia, see E. K. Meiendorf, *Puteshestvie iz Orenburga v Bukharu* (Moscow, 1975), 129.
 - 53 For instance, the Russian Senate sent correspondence to a tribunal of Qing in 1842, pledging that Russia would prohibit the export of opium to Qing. The redaction of *Lishi yanjiu* 《歷史研究》編集部, ed., trans. Wang Zhixiang 王之相 and Liu Zerong 劉澤榮, *Gugong ewen shiliao* 故宮俄文史料 [Documents in Russian preserved in the National Palace Museum] (Beijing, 2005 [orig. pub. 1964]), 360.
 - 54 Meng Xianzhang 孟憲章, ed., *Zhong-Su maoyishi ziliao* 中蘇貿易史資料 [Materials on the history of Sino-Soviet trade] (Beijing: Zhongguo duiwai jingji maoyi chubanshe, 1991), 193–195.
 - 55 TsGA RK, f. 374, op. 1, d. 39, l. 1 (Report by the Ayaghuz court [*prikaz*] to the border administration of the Siberian Kirgiz in 1842).
 - 56 Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan 中國第一歷史檔案館, ed., *Yapian zhanzheng dang'an shiliao* 鴉片戰爭檔案史料 [Archival documents on the Opium War], vol. 1 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1987), 780–781.
 - 57 Saguchi Toru, “The Eastern Trade of the Khoqand Khanate,” *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, no. 24 (1965): 70.
 - 58 Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, 100.
 - 59 P. I. Nebol'sin, ed., “Rasskaz troitskogo 2-i gil'dii kuptsa, Abdul-Vali Abdul-Vagapova Abu-Bakirova, o puteshestvii ego s tovarami iz Troitska v Chuguchak, i o prochem,” *Geograficheskie izvestiia*, vyp. 2 (1850): 19–21; “[Putevoi zhurnal poezdki na Vostok N. I. Liubimova, 1845 goda],” in Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, *Sobranie sochinenii v piati tomakh* 4: 290.
 - 60 Baoyinchaoketu 寶音朝克圖, *Qingdai beibu bianjiang kalun yanjiu* 清代北部邊疆卡倫研究 [Research on the guard posts of Qing's northern frontiers] (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2005), 151–153.
 - 61 For example, at one post, “the Qing guards counted people and horses indicated on the *yarlyk* which was given to the chief of the caravan”; see A. Korsak, *Istoriko-statisticheskoe obozrenie torgovykh snoshenii Rossii s Kitaem* (Kazan, 1857), 422. We know of a letter from 1830 in which Sart sultan assured the safe passage of the caravan to Kulja; see N. Konshin, “Materialy dlia istorii Stepnogo kraia III: O zagranichnykh obstoiatel'stvakh (prodolzhenie),” *Pamiatnaia knizhka Semipalatinskoi oblasti na 1902*, vyp. 6 (1902): 28.
 - 62 Apollova, *Khoziaistvennoe osvoenie Priirtysh'ia*, 322.
 - 63 The role of towns along the Irtysh River, including Semipalatinsk, is much emphasized in Kasymbaev, *Kazakhstan-Kitai*.
 - 64 I. G. Andreev, *Opisanie Srednei ordy kirgiz-kaisakov* (Almaty, 1998 [orig. pub. 1785]), 40.
 - 65 The First Historical Archives of China, *Junjichu* [Grand Council] group, *Manwen lufu zouzhe* 滿文錄副奏摺 [Copied Palace Memorials, in Manchu], microfilm no. 47–1391.

- 66 The work using these documents indicates the details of Kazakh trade; see Lin Yongkuang 林永匡 and Wang Xi 王熹, *Qingdai xibei minzu maoyi shi* 清代西北民族貿易史 [A history of trade among the peoples of the northwest during the Qing Dynasty] (Beijing: Zhongyang minzu xueyuan chubanshe, 1991). We acquired the following as a recent publication: B. Ezhnghan, ed., *Qazaq khandighi men Tsın patshalighining sauda qatınastarı turalı Qıtai muraghat quzhattarı*, vol. 1 (Almaty, 2009). For more details on the Kazakhs' trade relations with the empires, see Noda Jin, "Chūō Ajia ni okeru Roshin bōeki to Kazafu sōgen" [Russo-Qing trade in Central Asia and the Kazakh Steppe], *Tōyōshi kenkyū* 68, no. 2 (2009): 1–31.
- 67 Xingzhao 興肇 enlarged, *Ta'erbahatai shiyi* 塔爾巴哈台事宜 [Affairs of Chuguchak] (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1969 [originally revised in 1805]), 185–186.
- 68 Although Ibragimov mentioned it without citing any evidence, cases can be found in the archival records; see S. K. Ibragimov, "Iz istorii vneshnetorgovykh svyazei kazakhov v XVIII v.," *Uchenye zapiski Instituta vostokovedeniia*, vol. 19 (1953): 39–54. For example, an 1835 case; see TsGA RK f. 478, op. 2, d. 109, l. 3 (Instruction by the Department of External Trade to Semipalatinsk customs).
- 69 Kasymbaev, *Kazakhstan-Kitai*, 65.
- 70 A. Burton, *The Bukharans: A Dynastic, Diplomatic, and Commercial History, 1550–1702* (New York: Curzon, 1997); Kh. Z. Ziiaev, *Ekonomicheskie svyazi Srednei Azii s Sibir'iu v XVI–XIX vv.* (Tashkent, 1983), 147.
- 71 Ziiaev, *Ekonomicheskie svyazi*, 83.
- 72 Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii, *Vneshniaia politika Rossii* 16: 462.
- 73 Trade between Central Asia and Russia through Orenburg was well examined by Mikhaleva; see G. A. Mikhaleva, *Torgovye i posol'skie svyazi Rossii so sredneaziatskimi khanstvami cherez Orenburg: vtoraiia polovina XVIII – pervaiia polovina XIX v.* (Tashkent, 1982). Nevertheless, trade through Siberia, which is the main focus of this paper, should be addressed separately from that through Orenburg, since the former trade was highly influenced by relations with Qing China.
- 74 W. H. Wathen, "Memoir on the U'sbek State of Kokan, properly called Khokend, (the Ancient Ferghana,) in Central Asia," *Journal of the Asiatic Society* 3, no. 2 (1834): 376–377.
- 75 P. Nebol'sin, "Ocherki torgovli Rossii so Srednei Aziei," *Zapiski imperatorskogo Russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva*, kniga 10 (1855): 172.
- 76 V. Z. Galiev, *Karavanye tropy* (Almaty, 1994).
- 77 The *aqsāqal* at that time was called "*shang-tou* 商頭 [the chief of commerce]" or "*hudaïda* 胡岱達" in the palace memorials in Chinese. For an example of the former, see Ma Dazheng 馬大正 and Wu Fengpei 吳豐培, eds., *Qingdai Xinjiang xijian zoudū huibian: Daoguang chao juan* 清代新疆稀見奏牘匯編道光朝卷 [A collection of rare documents presented to the throne relating to Xinjiang in the Qing Dynasty, Daoguang period] (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 1996), 108. For the latter, see *Junjichu-dang* 軍機處檔 [Documents of the Grand Council], in the Palace Museum of Taipei, no. 070910. Also see Newby, *The Empire and the Khanate*, 65–66. The letter from the Kokandi envoy to the Qing general of Ili (Kulja) mentioned the "āqsāqal" of the Kokandis, while the Chinese translation used "胡岱達." *Junjichu-dang*, no. 081402 (in Turkic); *ibid.*, no. 081401 (Chinese translation). The origin of this term is disputed. For the latest analyses on it, see Hamada Masami, "Pekin dai'ichi rekishi tō'ankan shozō Kōkando kankei monjo kyūshū [Nine Chaghatay Documents kept in the First Historical Archives in Beijing on Kokand]," *Seinan Ajia kenkyū*, 68 (2008): 82–111. Nevertheless, I suppose that the term is more likely to be derived from the Persian word "*khudā-dād*," since a Chinese document notes that "*shang-tou* is called *hudaïda* in the language of the Muslims [*hui-yu* 回語];" *Junjichu-dang*, no. 406002873 (the palace memorial of *Deling* 德齡, on the 20th day of the 12th month of the 2nd year of Xianfeng [1853]).

- 78 Pan Zhiping 潘志平, *Haohan guo yu Xiyu zhengzhi* 浩罕國與西域政治 [Central Asian Kokand Khanate and politics in the Western Regions] (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 2006).
- 79 Qurbān ‘Alī Khālidī, *Tavārīkh-i khamsa-yi Sharqī* (Kazan, 1910), 367.
- 80 Ziaev, *Ekonomicheskie sviazi*, 118.
- 81 Saguchi, “The Eastern Trade,” 96.
- 82 Ministerstvo inostrannykh del SSSR, *Vneshniaia politika Rossii*, vol. 6 (Moscow, 1962), 726.
- 83 *Ibid.*, 16–17.
- 84 The Kokandi Umar Khan dispatched an envoy to *Qiziljar* [=Petropavlovsk]. See Mir Abdoul Kerim Boukhary, *Histoire de l’Asie Centrale (Afghanistan, Boukhara, Khiva, Khoqand)*, ed. and trans. Charles Schefer, vol. 1 (Paris, 1876; repr., Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1970), 102 [Persian text].
- 85 Allen J. Frank and M. A. Usmanov, eds., *Materials for the Islamic history of Semipalatinsk: Two manuscripts by Ahmad-Walī al-Qazānī and Qurbān ‘alī Khālidī* (Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 2001), 91.
- 86 N. Konshin, “Materialy dlia istorii Stepnogo kraia III: O zagranichnykh obstoiatel'stvakh,” *Pamiatnaia knizhka Semipalatinskoi oblasti na 1900*, vyp. 4 (1900): 77–117.
- 87 *Ibid.*, 79; TsGA RK, f. 338, op. 1, d. 405, ll. 4–4ob. (Negmatov’s report). He reported that he even went to Peking, accompanying a tribute mission from the Kazakh sultans.
- 88 TsGA RK, f. 338, op. 1, d. 405, l. 20.
- 89 M. P. Viatkin, “Putevye zapiski lekaria Zibbershteina,” *Istoricheskii arkhiv* 1 (1936): 254. For example, in 1811, the Russian translator Putimtsev got a letter from a Kazakh sultan to enter Qing territory. See “Dnevnyie zapiski perevodchika Putimtseva v proезде ego ot Bukhtarminskoi kreposti do kitaiskogo goroda Kul’dzhi i obratno v 1811 g.,” *Sibirskii vestnik* 7–8 (1819): 16. The intermediary role of the Kazakh sultans was also analyzed by Kozhirova, *Russko-kitaiskaia torgovlia*, 25. This chapter has attempted to explain the role of the Kazakh sultans in another way, by linking it with Qing policy.
- 90 Ministerstvo inostrannykh del SSSR, *Vneshniaia politika Rossii* 6: 188.
- 91 Nebol’sin, “Ocherki torgovli Rossii,” 18–20. In West Siberia the second and third guild merchants, as well as the first, were allowed to trade with Asians. See Shpaltakov, “Sredneaziatskie torgovye liudi,” 218.
- 92 V. Shkunov, “Tatarskie kuptsy v rossiisko-vostochnoi torgovle (vtoraia polovina XVIII – pervaiia polovina XIX vv.),” *Gasyrlar avazy*, nos. 3–4 (1997): 64–69.
- 93 G. N. Potanin, “O karavannoi torgovle s Dzhungarskoi Bukhariie v XVIII stoletii,” in his *Izbrannye sochineniia v trekh tomakh*, vol. 3 (Pavlodar, 2005), 37–53. See also Kh. Ziaev, *Uzbeki v Sibiri XVII–XIX vv.* (Tashkent, 1969); V. V. Radlov, *Iz Sibiri: stranitsy dnevnika* (Moscow, 1989), 118–121.
- 94 F. Zobnin, “Semipalatinskie avantyristy,” *Zapiski Semipalatinskogo podotdela Zapadno-Sibirskogo otdela IRGO*, vyp. 2 (Semipalatinsk, 1905): 1–11. For a more thorough examination of the Tatars on the Kazakh Steppe, see Allen Frank, “Islamic Transformation on the Kazakh Steppe, 1742–1917: Toward an Islamic History of Kazakhstan under Russian Rule,” in Hayashi Tadayuki, ed., *The Construction and Deconstruction of National Histories in Slavic Eurasia* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2003), 261–290.
- 95 TsGA RK, f. 338, op. 1, d. 405, l. 24.
- 96 TsGA RK, f. 806, op. 1, d. 13, l. 55 (Secret order from the Department of External Trade to Bukhtarma customs).
- 97 *Qingdai waijiao shiliao: Daoguangchao* 清代外交史料: 道光朝 [Materials on foreign relations of the Qing Dynasty: The reign of Daoguang], vol. 4 (Beijing, 1933), l. 16.

- 98 *Lifanyuan* 理藩院 (The Tribunal on Foreign Affairs) sent a letter to the Russian Senate in 1831. The redaction of *Lishi yanjiu*, ed., *Gugong ewen shiliao*, 345–346; Gurevich, *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, 246.
- 99 *Kazakhsko-russkie otnosheniia v XVIII–XIX vekakh (1771–1867 gody): sbornik dokumentov i materialov* (Alma-Ata, 1964), 261.
- 100 Owing to the opening of the proper import of Canton tea in 1861, Russia’s systematic imports through European borders began in 1862. In that year, imports of tea through European borders already amounted to 243 thousand *pud*, while those through Asian borders amounted to 472 thousands *pud*. See A. Subbotin, *Chai i chainaia torgovlia v Rossii i drugikh gosudarstvakh: proizvodstvo, potreblenie i raspredelenie chaia* (S. Petersburg, 1892), 605–606.
- 101 *Ibid.*, 609.
- 102 These data are consistent with those shown in Korsak’s work. Korsak, *Istoriko-statisticheskoe obozrenie*, 439.
- 103 TsGA RK, f. 478, op. 2, d. 162, ll. 1–8.
- 104 Aldabek, *Rossiiia i Kitai*, 87. It was also reported that a Tashkent merchant tried to bring “goods favored by the Chinese.” See TsGA RK, f. 806, op. 1, d. 134, ll. 36–37ob.
- 105 Nebol’sin, “Rasskaz troitskogo 2-i gil’dii kuptsa,” 12.
- 106 *Chouban yiwu shimo*, 146.
- 107 For Russian offensives in Northern Xinjiang, see Noda Jin, “Reconsidering the Ili Crisis: The Ili Region under Russian Rule (1871–1881),” in Watanabe Mitsuko and Kubota Jumpei, eds., *Reconceptualizing Cultural and Environmental Change in Central Asia: An Historical Perspective on the Future* (Kyoto: Research Institute for Humanity and Nature, 2010), 163–197.
- 108 TsGA RK, f. 806, op. 1, d. 7, ll. 38–38ob.
- 109 Even though trade by Central Asian Muslim merchants had become smaller by the beginning of the eighteenth century, as shown in A. Burton’s research or Frank’s observations, the trade in Central Asia again flourished between the mid-eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries on a wider scale than before the eighteenth century. See Andre Gunder Frank, *Reorient: global economy in the Asian age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 117–126.
- 110 A document shows that Russian officials intended to open Russian factories within Xinjiang in 1843; see TsGA RK, f. 806, op. 1, d. 136, l. 9 (Opinion of the chief of Semipalatinsk customs). This intention was realized by the Treaty of 1851.

8 Muslim networks, imperial power, and the local politics of Qajar Iran

Robert D. CREWS

Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the space extending from the northern shores of the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf coast lay at the center of a dizzying array of competing political projects. From Tehran, Istanbul, and Kabul, centralizing regimes aspired to bring more and more territory under their direct control. Until the early twentieth century, however, tribal authorities and local magnates still held sway along the margins of this zone. The role of Russia, Britain, and other European powers steadily expanded, especially in the realms of finance, trade, and infrastructure.¹ But European demands for concessions and monopolies related to railroads, telegraphs, and tobacco spurred popular discontent and fueled nationalist and constitutionalist movements that swept throughout Iranian society, including the diaspora in the Ottoman Empire and the Caucasus. In 1907, amid revolution in Iran, an Anglo-Russian Convention initiated a new era. It divided the country into three zones of influence (with the north claimed by Russia, the south by Britain, and a neutral zone in between). In 1909 Russian troops seized the northern province of Azerbaijan, ushering in more than a decade of Russian, British, and Ottoman occupation regimes.

This period gave rise to a nationalist narrative that projected the assault on Iranian sovereignty – and the suffering of the nation – back to the imposition of a series of legal and commercial concessions that followed Qajar defeat in the Russo-Persian war of 1826–28. In 1914, Mohammed Mossadegh's *Iran and the Regime of Capitulations* galvanized elite opposition to the privileges and immunities that the Treaty of Turkmanchai of 1828 had granted to Russian subjects and that later applied to other foreigners (including the British in 1841 and the Americans in 1856) and that served as symbols of national humiliation.² By most accounts, the shadow of the tsarist empire then darkened northern Iran, distorting the country's development and creating popular resentment against both the Qajars and the Romanovs.³ Viewed through the lens of legal jurisdictions alone, the border delineating Russian from Qajar territory would seem to count for little: the Russian state projected an expansive umbrella of extraterritorial protection over its subjects that stretched from the Caspian to the Persian Gulf.

These perspectives are essential for understanding the conditions of occupation and resistance that have subsequently framed nationalist politics and historiography in Iran. They are far less illuminating, however, when one turns to the actual

workings of the capitulations regime and to the evolution of the merchant and other networks that operated throughout this space and that sustained their own trans-border geographies. A shift in focus from the formal provisions of the Treaty of Turkmanchai to their complex transmutations on the Iranian plateau reveals a different picture.

The relations prescribed by diplomatic treaties differed dramatically from those prevailing on the ground. Russia's projection of power from the Caucasus and, later, from Central Asia remained fragmentary, uncertain, and everywhere dependent upon local actors. The case of this frontier, which extended by the late nineteenth century from Echmiadzin in the southern Caucasus to the Tezhen River on the edges of the Qara Qum Desert, is particularly instructive about what Ann Laura Stoler has called "the opacities of imperial rule."⁴ Despite painstaking attention to mapping state boundaries and regulating access to the Caspian Sea, numerous treaties failed to clearly establish the extent of control of each state. Economic and ecological dependencies as well as marital and kinship bonds – and the property tied up in such relationships – continued to enmesh the lives of populations on both sides of the border.⁵ Nor did these agreements succeed in creating unambiguous criteria for determining who was a Qajar and who was a tsarist subject, whether in the borderlands or, in the case of diaspora merchant communities, in the interior. Mobile populations of traders, pilgrims, students, laborers, pastoralists, smugglers, and even revolutionaries formed complex cross-border networks that both undermined and, on occasion, amplified imperial power.⁶

By the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the tsarist regime was far more powerful than the Qajar state. Russia had seized a swathe of Qajar territory as a result of the wars of 1804–13 and 1826–28, but a number of considerations led St. Petersburg to adopt a cautious course of action in Iran. Tsarist officials remained wary of conflict with Great Britain and, sensitive to their tenuous hold on the empire's southern borderlands, of the shah's interest in Shi'ite Muslims there, as well as in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁷ Moreover, the murder by a Tehrani mob of the writer Aleksandr Griboedov, whom Nicholas I (r. 1825–55) had sent to collect the indemnities imposed on the shah at the end of the second Russo-Persian war, confirmed Russian stereotypes about the "fanatical" resistance to be found encountered in Iran.⁸

The nature of the Qajar political system was another critical factor in shaping St. Petersburg's approach. Qajar Iran was a land of autonomous regions and tribal homelands. For most of the nineteenth century, tsarist officials were never dealing with a centralized or even unitary government. Urban, regional, and tribal elites exercised significant power everywhere, often in conflict with the shah's appointed representatives in the same area. Everywhere notables maintained fragile relations with the center involving constant negotiation and contestation.⁹ Exiles and favorites jockeyed for local predominance, seeking to keep the shah's court at bay – or to guarantee a more advantageous position in Tehran. And just as the Qajars carefully balanced the interests of the Russians and the British, utilizing their rivalry to preserve royal control, local notables sought out foreign patronage and protection. By the middle of the century, British and Russian diplomats were

deeply involved in disputes with the shah and his court over the right to “protect” figures whose subjecthood was in question. At the same time, the Europeans had become embroiled in controversies over appointments to provincial offices, contributing to frequent turnover in personnel and persistent infighting. On other occasions, however, the great powers worked individually or in concert to shore up monarchical authority in Iran. So while St. Petersburg never turned Iran into a colony or outright dependency, it pursued an opaque mode of imperial hegemony through its ties to Qajar notables, including the shah and, not least, through merchant networks. These varied circuits of power linked state building in Iran and Russia, entangling their pasts in ways that national and even conventional imperial histories have been ill-equipped to decipher. These composite forms of rule were articulated less by clearly marked “metropolises” and “colonies” than by a variety of actors, Russian and Qajar, wielding distinctive, if unequal, forms of power across porous state boundaries.

Capitulations and the law of Islam

On paper, the Treaty of Turkmanchai secured spectacular advantages for Russians, who gained protections for their persons and property that no Qajar subjects enjoyed. Russian merchants could trade anywhere in Iran and buy or rent homes and warehouses. Overcoming the opposition of Fath ‘Ali Shah (r. 1797–1834), who had resisted early tsarist demands for the appointment of a consul in the Caspian town of Rasht, the Russians won the right to name consular and commercial agents to promote trade.¹⁰ Commercial clauses attached to the treaty established a 5 percent tariff rate for Russian traders.

Most important, the treaty established special immunities for Russian subjects in the Qajar legal system. Like other Europeans, tsarist authorities contended that Qajar justice was arbitrary, and that non-Muslims would be placed at a disadvantage. Criminal and civil matters between Russian subjects were to be beyond the reach of Iranian law and were to be subject to the judicial authority of the Russian consul. Disputes between Russian and Qajars subjects were to be heard before a Qajar governor, though in the presence of a consular official. In extraordinary cases involving charges of murder against Russians, proof had to be brought against the accused in a Qajar court, but, if convicted, the tsarist subject was to be transferred to Russian officials for punishment. At the same time, the treaty created a provision requiring the consent of a tsarist consular official for Qajar officials to enter Russian-owned premises. One of the most controversial clauses of the treaty extended many of these privileges to Qajar subjects attached to foreign diplomatic missions.¹¹

In the wake of Turkmanchai, tsarist power radiated from a hub of consulates. Under Peter the Great (r. 1696–1725), Russia had secured the right to appoint consuls to supervise the trade of Russian merchants in Iran, but the Russians abandoned these outposts amid political strife after the collapse of Safavid rule in 1722.¹² Under Nicholas I, St. Petersburg revived and expanded this network in the major trading centers of Tabriz (1829), Rasht (1835), and Astarabad (1846).

Nasir al-Din Shah (r. 1848–96) expressed unease about these developments, condemning the consul at Rasht as “a sort of king, grasping at, and exercising, more authority than the Persian government.”¹³ In the second half of the nineteenth century the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs nonetheless succeeded in opening consulates in Isfahan, Bushire, Mashhad, and Seistan, and other European powers followed suit. The tsarist ministry instructed its consuls to monitor trade and the fulfillment of treaties with the Iranians and Ottomans, since commerce linked all three states. Acknowledging that consuls often had to “adapt to local customs,” they were to “collect with exactitude accurate information about all customs which are observed in trading matters in Persia.”¹⁴ Subordinated to St. Petersburg and the Russian Imperial Mission in Tehran, consuls were expected, in turn, to organize Russian subjects into hierarchical communities under their supervision. Merchant communities were directed to elect two elders to “monitor decorum among Russian subjects,” report misconduct to the closest Russian officials, and defuse disputes and push parties toward mediation.¹⁵

Russian consular officials enjoyed broad judicial and police authority. They could resolve disputes among Russian subjects involving sums less than 100 rubles according to “firm and stable customs.”¹⁶ Wherever these could not be determined, judgments were to rely on “the laws of Wakhtang,” the early eighteenth-century legislative compilation of the Georgian king Wakhtang VI, which, the ministry explained, was still “in use in Georgia” and which would be familiar to “the majority of Russian subjects in Persia” who “are native inhabitants of Our Transcaucasian Territories.” In matters where these proved insufficient, “Russian laws” were to apply.¹⁷ In disputes with Iranians and other foreigners, the ministry expressed preference for “the conclusion of cases by a court of arbitration, to which the litigants should be strongly urged.” At the same time, however, Russian subjects in locales under the jurisdiction of a consulate or the mission were prohibited from taking disputes with one another to Iranian authorities. Finally, consuls could apply “corrective measures” to Russians who violated the rules of decorum and expel from Iran subjects who were “not engaged in any trade or honest means of making a living” and who thereby “violate[d] the public order with their bad conduct and thereby denigrated the national dignity.”¹⁸

Drawing on international agreements dating to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, tsarist diplomats had envisioned the legal power of the consulate as a means to protect the “rights and interests” of subjects trading in the “despotic East,” while also extending police control over Russians abroad. Legal scholars had hoped to separate this expansive consular jurisdiction, representing the law of “civilized states,” from the territorially based authority of ostensibly arbitrary and unjust regimes.¹⁹ In the cosmopolitan markets and bazaars of Iranian trading centers, however, the question of legal jurisdictions was far more fluid and muddled.

While the Russian consular network expanded, the shah’s government, too, improvised a new institution, the office of the Agent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1834, Tehran began to appoint these agents, *kārguzārs*, in northern Iran to interact with the growing numbers of foreigners. As Vanessa Martin and Morteza Nouraei have shown, the *kārguzārs* were to monitor the movement and

activities of foreigners on Iranian soil. Yet their chief duty was to arbitrate disputes between Qajar and foreign subjects in keeping with the Treaty of Turkmanchai.²⁰ In mediating between these two sides – and even in the presence of a consular representative – the *kārguzār* still operated within the Qajar legal world as part of the secular (*'urf*) jurisdiction. Although Turkmanchai had called for the use of documents registered by consular and Qajar notaries rather than sworn testimony, the court of the *kārguzār* remained an informal affair.²¹

A growing body of archival evidence suggests that in Qajar Iran, as in the Ottoman empire, the capitulations regime did not, in practice, secure foreigners a distinct and privileged legal jurisdiction. In both instances, disputes between European and local merchants were largely adjudicated in local jurisdictions where customary usages predominated.²² Reflecting the wider Iranian system, mediation and compromise were the *kārguzār*'s main priorities, which, in turn, echoed a number of the Russian foreign ministry's instructions to its consuls.²³ Foreigners might benefit from the presence of a diplomatic official, but disputes appear to have been resolved by some form of negotiation involving indigenous mediators, typically in accord with Islamic legal principles.²⁴ Traders from the Caucasus, Iran, Central Asia and elsewhere had long been part of a commercial world ordered by Islamic law, family relations, and other customary legal norms. Far from being averse to the jurisdiction of the Sharia court, many of them had relied on Islamic legal contracts to sanctify agreements with partners near and far. These practices continued to underlie commercial networks and transcend state borders even after the Treaty of Turkmanchai.

For their part, Russian and British diplomatic officials seem to have adapted to this way of doing business within the Iranian system. They sought to influence appointments to the office of *kārguzār* (and other important posts) and offered payments to him, likely reinforcing the legal system's propensity to favor powerful actors.²⁵ The British and Russians sometimes clashed with the *kārguzār*, but in other instances he sided with the foreigners against Iranians. On more than one occasion a *kārguzār* had to seek sanctuary in the British Residency.²⁶ At the same time, Russian authorities may have turned a blind eye to tsarist subjects turning to Qajar courts, a practice that they could scarcely stamp out in any event. Describing the state of trade in Iran at mid-century, one European traveler observed that tsarist officials permitted their Muslim subjects to manage their own legal affairs. In cases that fell under Sharia law, Otto Blau observed, Russian Muslims were able to adjudicate disputes with other Muslims, whether Russian or Qajar subjects, in local courts like other Iranians.²⁷ In short, the Treaty of Turkmanchai did not establish a separate realm of law as much as draw foreigners and Iranians into the institution of the *kārguzār* and the world of Iranian officialdom and law.

Merchants beyond the empire?

In the 1830s and 1840s, contacts between Russian and Qajar subjects intensified as the volume of trade between the two states increased. Trading in silk, rice, wheat, sugar, textiles, and various manufactured commodities, tsarist merchants

flocked to markets in northern Iran and, in particular, to Tabriz, the country's largest town and the most important commercial center linking Iran and Europe. By mid-century, the traveler Il'ia Berezin estimated that between 300 and 500 tsarist subjects could be found in Tabriz, making them by far the largest population of foreigners in Iran.²⁸ In reality, the number of tsarist subjects there was often higher because, as consular officials complained, traders from the Transcaucasian districts of Karabagh, Shirvan, Sheki, Nukha and elsewhere migrated seasonally and often ignored tsarist laws obliging them to carry passports or register with the consulate. Russian Muslims, Armenians, and even Georgians blended inconspicuously into the bazaars of the region. This adaptability, in turn, facilitated the smuggling of goods from Tabriz to Russia – a trade that the consul general valued in 1848 at some 1.7 million rubles.²⁹ By the late 1850s, according to a Prussian traveler, between 2,000 and 2,200 merchants from the Russian empire were scattered throughout the country.³⁰

Russian traders nonetheless faced daunting challenges in the Iranian marketplace. "The Persian trade," the historian Marvin Entner has observed, "was for failures, fools, fly-by-nighters, gamblers, or Caucasians and Persians."³¹ Political instability, tribal raids, social banditry, outbreaks of cholera and plague, poor transportation infrastructure, and dramatic economic downturns were just a few of the dangers that confronted merchants of all nationalities. Local Qajar administrators sometimes levied additional duties or sought to monopolize trade by issuing decrees that Russian merchants had to work through an officially appointed broker.³² Most transactions between tsarist and Iranian merchants depended on credit, and, as early as 1830, a Russian official in Tabriz complained that local traders – and *sayyids* (descendants of the Prophet) in particular – habitually defaulted on their debts to merchants from the Russian empire.³³ As Iran became more closely integrated into a global economy, traders become vulnerable to sudden shifts in credit markets and in manufacturing trends half a world away. Berezin observed that 1836 was a watershed year for Tabrizi merchants who had imported vast amounts of European goods from Istanbul on credit but who then could not sell them.³⁴ Similarly, in 1843, when the prices of manufactured goods fell suddenly in England, a wave of inexpensive imported goods bankrupted many traders in Tabriz.³⁵

In this uncertain climate, the number of contested bankruptcies and other disagreements between creditors and their clients increased. Under Fath 'Ali Shah, the governor of Azerbaijan and heir-apparent, Abbas Mirza, had apparently granted tsarist subjects preference in collecting property from bankrupted merchants. In 1843 the government of Muhammad Shah (r. 1834–48) made a similar provision for British subjects.³⁶ Yet the continued unreliability of these financial agreements between Europeans and Qajar subjects only heightened the importance of the Russian or British consul. While the tsarist state was still in the throes of attempting to absorb its southern borderlands and establish effective administration in the Caucasus, its officials in Iran deployed the might of the empire on behalf of its predominantly Caucasian merchants. In 1838, for example, tsarist merchants presented the consul-general in Tabriz with 142 overdue promissory notes worth

nearly 700 thousand ruble notes. He managed to recover half of this amount.³⁷ The consuls thus spent much of their time and political influence acting as debt collectors, cajoling Qajar authorities and merchants to repay Russian subjects in disputes that commonly dragged on for years and years.

Tsarist officials soon discovered, however, that their superior geopolitical position did not necessarily translate into the power to enforce contracts or collect debts at the local level. Moreover, Russian commercial networks fanned out into the provinces – and into neighboring countries – beyond the range of the consular system. In 1836, a Russian report on trade in Mazandaran complained about the absence of a consular official there to mediate disputes between Russian and Iranian merchants. Iranians gained the upper hand, its author lamented, because the imperial mission in Tehran was so far away. Lacking the protection of tsarist authorities, Russian merchants had to make concessions to their local partners.³⁸ As a result, in many cases the mission in Teheran discouraged merchants from turning to the diplomats or even to the central government for assistance. In 1839 it advised the Armenian G. E. Erivandov to try instead to ingratiate himself with regional authorities, offering “courtesies and gifts” to the local governor and “other esteemed citizens.”³⁹

Thus while Russian consular officials simultaneously condemned and encouraged “corruption,” the make-up and functioning of the trading networks themselves presented other obstacles. Tsarist authorities constantly faulted Russian subjects for lacking the initiative and persistence to study the Iranian market and adapt to its tastes; and they seem to have reserved their sharpest critiques for Greeks, Armenians, and ethnic Russians.⁴⁰ In Tabriz, the consulate appointed one Armenian and one Muslim elder to represent and manage Russian merchants operating there, but this mechanism did not establish state control.⁴¹ And, while consular officials typically supported the claims of Russian merchants in disputes with Iranians, tsarist authorities on both sides of the Russo-Iranian border struggled to discipline traders who openly defrauded their Iranian counterparts. One such investigation involved officials from Astarabad and Baku in the search for a Russian Muslim merchant who had absconded with a number of bills of credit and who threatened to undermine “trust in the Russian trading figure.”⁴² The presence of a substantial Iranian trading community on Russian territory in Astrakhan – and the prospect of demands for reciprocity – also muted some Russian claims against Iranian subjects. Like the Russians, the Iranian consuls in Tiflis and Astrakhan demanded fair treatment for their merchants.⁴³ On a number of occasions, tsarist consular pressure strengthened Iranian officials’ resolve to enforce contracts, thereby enhancing Qajar authority – and likely contributing to the violent exercise of power in Qajar society. A consular report of 1845 noted that “only Russia’s strong political influence on Persia” motivated the local government to press Iranian merchants to honor debts held by Russians, and “then,” it added “often with the application of the most severe Oriental punishments.”⁴⁴

Tsarist officials welcomed the opportunity to represent the interests of Russian subjects as a means to advance Russian trade and to leverage their grievances to claim a greater stake in Qajar politics. I. O. Simonich, the Russian representative

at the shah's court from 1832 to 1838, aggressively defended the interests of merchants from the Russian empire (as well as of Greeks and other nationals under Russian protection), irritating Qajar as well as European merchants and statesmen who thought the practice afforded their rivals an unfair advantage. Yet, as with so much else involving the Russians in Iran, the actions of figures such as Simonich frequently yielded more ambiguous outcomes. In December 1835, for example, Simonich dispatched an angry letter to the Qajar foreign minister. Written in Persian and accompanied by the appropriate niceties, it nonetheless pressed its case, complaining that a tsarist subject, Minas Khan Gorji, an Armenian, had loaned 6,000 toman to Aqa Khan Mahalati. The latter, Simonich charged, "made excuses and ignored" the deadline for repayment.⁴⁵ Simonich had aided Minas Khan in seeking mediation with Mahalati's associates. Although wealthy merchants such as Minas Khan, a well-connected figure (identified in other documents as "*konyāz*" or "prince"), enjoyed special access to Russian diplomatic circles, such recourse may not have been their first choice. Resort to tsarist authorities probably risked upsetting long-standing relationships and alienating trading partners. This may have proved an unnecessary risk, especially since its effectiveness was uncertain.

In this case, negotiations with Mahalati's people led to an agreement to guarantee the debt, as long as the Armenian reduced it by more than half, to 2,500 toman. When the borrowers still did not pay after a specified period of time, Minas Khan turned again to the Russian Mission. Simonich then intervened with the foreign minister, requesting that he exert pressure on the debtors and warning that "another excuse will not be acceptable."⁴⁶ In spite of such threats, the weakness of the chief Russian representative in Tehran became evident when the minister – or merchants (or perhaps both in concert) – ignored his insistent entreaty: the debt was not recovered, and the pugnacious Simonich was compelled to repeat his request two months later. Six months passed, but his pressure had still not met its mark, and he had to try again.⁴⁷ Similar cases recorded in both the Iranian and Russian archives from the 1830s and 1840s suggest that merchants appear to have selectively guarded the autonomy of their networks. Russian documents tended to cast such disputes as struggles between "Russian" and "Persian" parties, but it is not at all clear that the parties involved drew these distinctions. Various kinds of informal mediation among business partners – who were sometimes also bound together by marriage and kinship – continued to prevail, and when officials such as Simonich were brought into the picture, their primary role seems to have been to facilitate further negotiation.

Iranian archival records indicate that Qajar officials often agreed to offer their assistance to tsarist merchants as part of a broader strategy of maintaining cordial relations with the European powers. They did so even in the case of collections against religious notables and other influential figures.⁴⁸ In 1856, for example, Nasir al-Din Shah responded to such a complaint by directing his government to intervene on behalf of a Russian creditor, writing in the margin of the request, "This is correct (*Ṣaḥīḥast*)."⁴⁹ These transactions were complex and difficult to reconstruct, however. Networks of trade and credit cut across nearly all Qajar social groups and spanned vast distances. By the third quarter of the nineteenth

century, the vast operations of the Qajar merchant Haj Muhammad Hassan Amin al Zarb stretched, Shireen Mahdavi has shown, from “important cities and ports of Iran such as Tabriz, Isfahan, Mashhad, Kirman and Yazd and the ports of the Caspian Sea (Barfurush and Mashdi Sar)” to “Baku and Astrakhan, Moscow, Istanbul, Trebizond, Marseilles, and Manchester, with correspondents in other places.”⁵⁰ In Tabriz, Muslim and Christian merchants from the Caucasus maintained smaller enterprises, but their varied networks crossed confessional lines and stretched into neighboring villages and the camps of Shahsevan pastoralists and to partners as far away as Isfahan and Shiraz. A consular report from October 1859 recorded numerous unpaid promissory notes extended by some two dozen Russian subjects to 125 Qajar subjects of diverse backgrounds – including one from the Armenian Nikogos Karapetov to Mirza ‘Ali Asghar, the shaikh al-islam of Azerbaijan, a figure known for his wealth and philanthropy.⁵¹ Russian creditors’ inability to collect from individuals such as Mirza ‘Ali Asghar testify to the continued resilience of relatively autonomous elite social networks even in the face of the expansion of tsarist and Qajar power.

Similar conditions prevailed in the realm of criminal affairs. The fate of the head of the Russian trading colony (*tujjār bāshī*) in Rasht provides another illustration of the limited capacity of authorities in Tehran or St. Petersburg to penetrate local communities. In 1836 the local governor and a senior cleric (*mujtahid*), together with a retinue of young followers, entered the home of this tsarist merchant, “Aqa Mikail,” and supposedly found him drunk. They then dispatched him to the mosque and gave him 40 lashes for drinking wine.⁵² The official Russian protest condemned this punishment as a violation of the Treaty of Turkmanchai, declaring it “without justice and cause” and demanding that the governor be arrested and brought to Tehran.⁵³

Imperial patronage and the recasting of networks

Tsarist subjects such as Aqa Mikail, like their Qajar counterparts, remained vulnerable to the rough justice of local strongmen, but as the Russian and British consular networks expanded, affiliation with the protection of an imperial power became an increasingly valuable resource in Qajar commercial and political life. For Armenians, Jews, Afghans, Iranian elites and perhaps especially for emigrés who had left the Russian empire years before, securing a foreign passport or establishing close ties with European consular personnel might open up a variety of opportunities. Indeed, by the early 1830s tsarist officials noted difficulties in distinguishing between subjects of the shah and the tsar. Deserters, runaway serfs, petty traders, artisans, pilgrims, and pastoralists were among the mobile populations that regularly crossed the recently drawn borders and evaded the scrutiny of both states. At the same time, Iranian subjects had begun to seek Russian passports to gain access to a more favorable tariff on trade with the Ottomans. A tsarist passport might bring other commercial advantages as well. The most successful figure to adopt Russian subjecthood and become a merchant of the first guild of Astrakhan, Mir Abu Talib, went on to dominate the fishing industry around Astarabad.⁵⁴

Both governments regularly questioned the loyalties of these migratory populations, suspecting that they served the interests of a foreign state – or, in the case of smugglers and counterfeiters, simply their own. Many Armenians took advantage of this opportunity to become tsarist subjects, but numerous Muslims did so as well. Whereas tsarist officials grumbled that the porous border made Iran a refuge for deserters from the Russian army, Qajar authorities complained that the same conditions allowed Iran's restive tribes to escape their control. In 1833 negotiations aimed at regulating the border more closely faltered when the tsarist side blocked Iranian efforts to repatriate prominent Muslim families who had taken up residence on the Russian side. In 1844, however, both states agreed that a person seeking to cross the border required a government-issued passport. This agreement also barred either state from interfering in cases when subjects sought permission from their governments to emigrate to the other country.⁵⁵ During the Crimean War, the Russian consul in Tabriz drew attention to a number of figures who had fled Karabagh, Lenkoran, and other locales in the Caucasus to Iran following the Russian annexation but who still retained substantial family ties and property there. One of these notables, Mir Ali Negi Khan, a native of Lenkoran, had recently cultivated British support and now, the tsarist official warned, sought to use his extensive relations to incite “disorders” there. Another, a “renegade from among the Armenians,” who had traded a position in Russian service for one in the Iranian government, had recently become friendly with the British Mission and, the Russian consul suspected, had offered to reconnect with his family in Karabagh to undermine the Russians.⁵⁶ International ties might cut both ways, leaving each state vulnerable to cross-border espionage and subversion.

Armenians were the focus of much anxiety in St. Petersburg and Tehran, but Muslim merchants, too, remained a particularly challenging group because in this setting criteria such as language and confession did not clearly distinguish them from their neighbors. Many of them became adept at claiming Iranian, British, or Russian nationality when a shift of identity – and legal status – might bring advantage in a commercial dispute or criminal case. Their networks brought the Russian and British empires commercial benefits and received the support of imperial officialdom. Yet their autonomy and opacity remained sources of anxiety in government circles. By the 1850s, and particularly after 1852, when the Qajar government abolished the right to seek *bast*, or refuge, in religious sanctuaries, articulating one's status as a subject of a European state in Iran or seeking protection in foreign missions had become a forceful strategy in a wide range of contests.⁵⁷

The challenges posed by the expansion of European power and patronage can be seen in a dispute in the town of Shiraz. In August 1858, a merchant identifying himself as a subject of the tsar, Meshedi Khasan Ali Oqli, sent a complaint to the Russian envoy in which he described a business deal that had soured.⁵⁸ Not only had a local trader refused to repay a loan recorded in a promissory note, but the resulting dispute had led to the intervention of local elites. Despite an agreement reached in an Islamic law court, the conflict escalated. Ultimately, Shirazi authorities arrested and supposedly tortured the man claiming to be a Russian subject. For the next two years the Russian merchants of Shiraz wrote to the tsarist authorities

in Tehran complaining of extortion and abuse at the hands of locals. These merchants were Muslims and tsarist subjects, and the Sharia had apparently served as the legal framework for the adjudication of the dispute. Still, the Russian Mission protested vociferously to the Qajar government. Noting that similar cases of “torture” of Russian subjects by a royal prince in the northern province of Mazandaran had gone unpunished, the Mission called this incident a “violation of the treaty” and demanded satisfaction.

Yet the Iranian government did not capitulate. Qajar authorities conducted their own investigation and concluded that all of the accusations were false. In a letter to the Russian ambassador, the interior minister Mirza Said Khan suggested that the Russians had misread the treaty and drew his attention to an article that established that “the crime must be proved.” More important, he even called into question the identity of the accusers, implying that they were very likely, in fact, not even Russian subjects but were Iranians seeking special treatment. The Russian ambassador responded, in turn, that this dispute was but one of “nearly one thousand unsatisfied claims” by Russian authorities against their Iranian counterparts as of the beginning of 1858, and that such disputes harmed their “good neighborly relations.” Finally, in April 1860, tsarist officials declared the matter closed – and the treaty dispute redressed – when the Iranian government reported that it had sentenced the primary suspect, a Shirazi notable, to a jail term of 20 days.⁵⁹

In criminal cases involving the murder of Russians, Mirza Said Khan was even more intransigent. Tsarist subjects and authorities charged that the Qajar government did nothing to safeguard their security. Russian officials conducted their own investigations and frequently turned over the names of the victims and suspects to the Qajar police. In 1860, the Russian ambassador protested the robbery and murder of Meshedi Magomed and named a suspect, but the interior minister refused to act on what he dismissed as unfounded allegations. Over a dozen such murders remained uninvestigated, despite Russian pressure to arrest figures, including renegade tsarist subjects, whom the Russians named in official communiqués.⁶⁰ Iranian officials thus managed to defy the claims of the tsarist state, and Russian subjects faced most of the same sources of insecurity as their Iranian partners and rivals.⁶¹ In the decades that followed, however, a number of Iranians still continued to seek out some affiliation with Russian law as a potential safeguard against the endemic instability of life under the Qajars.

The issue of disputed subjecthood persisted into the twentieth century. The fact that the majority of the merchants and other tsarist subjects who were to fall under the “European” jurisdiction hailed from Transcaucasia, including districts that had only recently been brought under Russian control, further muddied these distinctions. Russian authorities were inconsistent in extending the protections of a tsarist passport. Tsarist policy-makers hotly debated the practice, and consular officials may have acted independently, especially on behalf of particular Armenians or even Jews, but the archives record many more cases, at least by the late nineteenth century, when Russian authorities took seriously the terms of the 1844 convention that called for Tehran to sign off on the applications of Iranians seeking tsarist nationality.⁶²

Conclusion

The capitulations regime inaugurated by the Treaty of Turkmanchai ignited the Iranian nationalist imagination in the late nineteenth century. Before the Russian occupations of the early twentieth century, however, it proved to be a weak instrument of imperial power. Tsarist authorities hoped that Russian merchant networks would flourish under the various immunities and privileges afforded by the agreement and amplify Russian imperial influence throughout the Middle East and Asia. But the commercial world that linked Europe, Iran, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and India retained its own conventions, and the drawing of new state boundaries did not soon sever these long-standing linkages or wholly reorient customary practices.

The Qajar state contributed to the persistence of elements of this older world by drawing foreigners and their consular representatives into the realm of Qajar customary practice and negotiation through the office of the *kārguzār*. Islamic law remained a familiar repertoire and framework for commerce. The Russian or European consul emerged as an asset in commercial disputes with Qajar partners, but this opportunity had to be weighed against the risk of alienating trusted partners and, in many cases, kinfolk and neighbors. From the 1850s, when the Qajar state attempted to expand its authority by curtailing access to traditional sanctuaries, the inhabitants of Iran and neighboring states saw further incentives in seeking imperial protection and legal status as a Russian or British subject. The extension of state power from St. Petersburg and Tehran gradually resulted in the splintering of some networks, which increasingly relied on the rights attached to Qajar or tsarist nationality. Yet authorities on both sides of the border struggled to identify the legal identities of persons who claimed subjecthood – and the rights that came with it – in different contexts. For participants in these adaptive networks, the emergent era of the passport and border control still left room for maneuver in the shadow of the great powers.

Acknowledgment

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Notes

- 1 See Firuz Kazemzadeh, *Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864–1914: A Study in Imperialism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).
- 2 See Roy Parviz Mottahedeh, “Iran’s Foreign Devils,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 38 (Spring 1980): 19–34, here, 22.

- 3 See, for example, Cosroe Chaqueri, *The Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran, 1920–1921: Birth of the Trauma* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995).
- 4 Ann Laura Stoler, “Imperial Formations and the Opacities of Rule,” in Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, and Ken W. Moore, eds., *Lessons of Empire: Imperial Histories and American Power* (New York: The New Press, 2006), 48–60.
- 5 Russia managed to impose new political boundaries in Transcaucasia, but Iranian notable families continued to claim lands lost to Russia. See, for example, Fāṭimah Qāzīhā, *Asnād-i ravābiṭ-i Īrān va Rūsiyah dar dawrān-i Fath ‘Alī Shāh va Muḥammad Shāh Qājār: 1240–1263 Qamarī, 1824–1847 Mīlādī* (Tehran: Markaz-i Asnād va Tārīkh-i Dīplumāsī, 1380 [2001]), 72.
- 6 See Touraj Atabaki, “Disgruntled Guests: Iranian Subalterns on the Margins of the Tsarist Empire,” *International Review of Social History* 48, no. 3 (2003): 401–426. For examples of inhabitants of a trans-border underworld of arms smuggling and other illicit practices, see Šamad Sardārīniya, *Mashāhīr-i Āzarbāyjān* (Tabriz: Intishārāt-i Zawqī, 1370 [1991]), 118; ‘Abd al-Ḥusayn Navāyī, *Dawlat ‘hā-yi Īrān: az āghāz-i mashrūṭiyat tā ūltīmātūm* (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Babak, 2535 [1977]), 84. In the second half of the nineteenth century many Iranian pilgrims embarked on the hajj via the Caucasus. See Shireen Mahdavi, *For God, Mammon, and Country: A Nineteenth-Century Persian Merchant Haj Muhammad Hassan Amin al Zarb (1834–1898)* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999); and Hafez Farmayan and Elton L. Daniel, eds. and trans., *A Shi ‘ite Pilgrimage to Mecca 1885–1886: The Safarnameh of Mirza Mohammad Hosayn Farahani* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990). See also Eileen M. Kane, “Pilgrims, Holy Places, and the Multi-Confessional Empire: Russian Policy toward the Ottoman Empire under Tsar Nicholas I, 1825–1855,” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2005). Muslims from the Russian empire also visited Mashhad and other shrine centers in Iran or passed through the country on the way to visit Mecca and the shrine cities of Iraq.
- 7 On Nasir al-Din’s aspirations to serve as protector of Shi’ites outside of Iran, see Abbas Amanat, *Pivot of the Universe: Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar and the Iranian Monarchy, 1831–1896* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 225–237.
- 8 See Elena Andreeva, *Russia and Iran in the Great Game: Travelogues and Orientalism* (London: Routledge, 2007).
- 9 See, for example, Shaul Bakhash, *Iran: Monarchy, Bureaucracy and Reform under the Qajars, 1858–1896* (London: Ithaca Press, 1978); Vanessa Martin, *The Qajar Pact: Bargaining, Protest and the State in Nineteenth-Century Persia* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005); and Arash Khazeni, *Tribes and Empire on the Margins of Nineteenth-Century Iran* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009).
- 10 On Qajar resistance to European requests for consulates, see A. K. S. Lambton, *Qajar Persia: Eleven Studies* (London: Tauris, 1987), 120–126.
- 11 J. C. Hurewitz, trans. and ed., *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics*, vol. 1 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 231–237.
- 12 St. Petersburg had appointed a consul to Isfāhan and a vice-consul to Shemakha in 1720 and to Rasht in 1735. See G. Mamedova, *Russkie konsuly ob Azerbaidzhane (20–60-e gody – XVIII veka)* (Baku: Elm, 1989).
- 13 Amanat, *Pivot of the Universe*, 230.
- 14 *Pravila v rukovodstvo Rossiiskoi Missii i Konsul’stvam v Persii, otnositel’no torgovli i zashchity prebyvaiushchikh tam Rossiiskikh poddannykh* (n. p., n. d. [1829]), 1.
- 15 *Ibid.*, 7–8.
- 16 In other cases between Russians, general consuls or senior translators formed a court of first instance, together with local Russian elders, and the first secretary headed a court of second instance.
- 17 Cases involving more than 500 rubles could be appealed to the second instance, while, those above 2,000 could be appealed to the Senate, as was customary in Georgia and at the Russian mission in Constantinople. The cases were to be recorded in Russian for litigants who knew Russian, but in other languages for those who did not. *Ibid.*, 9–11.

- On the code of Wakhtang VI, see Davis Marshall Lang, *The Last Years of the Georgian Monarchy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), 32–48.
- 18 *Ibid.*, 13.
 - 19 See F. Martens, *O konsulakh i konsul'skoi iurisdiktsii na Vostoke* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Ministerstva Putei Soobshcheniia, 1873).
 - 20 Vanessa Martin and Morteza Nouraei, “The Role of the Karguzar in the Foreign Relations of State and Society of Iran from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to 1921, Part I: Diplomatic Relations,” *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 15, no. 3 (2005): 261–277, here, 263–265.
 - 21 This appears to have been true even in the 1870s and 1880s when its activities became more regularized. *Ibid.*
 - 22 On the Ottoman system, see Maurits H. Van Den Boogert, *The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System: Qadis, Consuls and Beraths in the 18th Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2005).
 - 23 Martin and Nouraei, “The Role of the Karguzar,” 266–270. See, too, Nouraei and Martin, “The Role of the Karguzar in the Foreign Relations of State and Society of Iran from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to 1921, Part III: The Karguzar and Disputes over Foreign Trade,” *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 16, no. 2 (2006): 151–163.
 - 24 Vanessa Martin and Morteza Nouraei, “The Role of the Karguzar in the Foreign Relations of State and Society of Iran from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to 1921, Part I: Diplomatic Relations,” *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 15, no. 3 (2005): 261–277.
 - 25 For examples of tsarist authorities’ attempts to control the appointment of Qajar officials see Fātimah Qāzīhā, *Asnād-i ravābiṭ-i Īrān va Rūsiyah az dawrah-’i Nāsir al-Dīn Shāh tā suqūṭ-i Qājāriyah: 1267–1344 Qamarī, 1851–1925 Milādi* (Tehran: Markaz-i Asnād va Tārīkh-i Dīplumāsī, 1380 [2001]), 167–168. See, also, O. I. Zhigalina, *Kurdskie khanstva Khorasana pri poslednikh Kadzharakh: konets XIX – nachalo XX veka* (Moscow: “Vostochnaia literatura” RAN, 2002), 82, 132; and Mohammad Ali Kazembeyki, *Society, Politics, and Economics in Mazandaran, Iran, 1848–1914* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 56–67.
 - 26 Martin and Nouraei, “The Role of the Karguzar [Part 1],” 270–271.
 - 27 Otto Blau, *Commerzielle Zustände Persiens* (Berlin: Hofbuchdruckerei, 1858), 29–30.
 - 28 I. Berezin, *Puteshestvie po severnoi Persii* (Kazan: Tipografiia gubernskogo pravleniia i universitetskaia, 1852), 86. In 1860, there were still only 111 British subjects (including 86 “Indians and others enjoying British protection”). Charles Issawi, ed., *The Economic History of Iran, 1800–1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 23. Partial lists of Russian subjects trading in Rasht in 1835 and Tabriz in 1837 may be found in N. G. Kukanova, ed., *Russko-iranskaia torgovlia 30–50-e gody XIX veka: Sbornik dokumentov* (Moscow: Glavnaia redaktsiia Vostochnoi literatury, 1984), 77, 88, 96–97.
 - 29 Kukanova, *Russko-iranskaia torgovlia*, 43, 119, 165.
 - 30 Blau, *Commerzielle Zustände Persiens*, 36.
 - 31 Marvin L. Entner, *Russo-Persian Commercial Relations, 1828–1914* (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1965), 5.
 - 32 Kukanova, *Russko-iranskaia torgovlia*, 35–41.
 - 33 *Ibid.*, 33, 40–41.
 - 34 Issawi, *The Economic History of Iran*, 105.
 - 35 Lambton, *Qajar Persia*, 134–135. See, also, W. M. Floor, “Bankruptcy in Qajar Iran,” *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 127 (1977): 61–76.
 - 36 Nouraei and Martin, “The Role of the Karguzar [III],” 152.
 - 37 N. G. Kukanova, *Ocherki po istorii russko-iranskikh torgovykh otnoshenii v XVII – pervoi polovine XIX veka* (Saransk: Mordovskoe knizhnoe izd-vo, 1977), 189–190.
 - 38 Kukanova, *Russko-iranskaia torgovlia*, 87.
 - 39 *Ibid.*, 99.

- 40 See, for example, the critical comments in reports of 1844 and 1847 in *ibid.*, 117, 145.
- 41 *Akty sobrannye Kavkazskoiu Arkheograficheskoiu Kommissieiu: arkhiv Kantseliarii Glavnonachal'stvuiushchago grazhdanskoiu chast'iu na Kavkaze*, vol. 12 (Tiflis: Tipografiia Kantseliarii Glavnonachal'stvuiushchago grazhdanskoiu chast'iu na Kavkaze, 1904), 602.
- 42 CSHAA (Central State Historical Archive of Azerbaijan), f. 45, op. 2, d. 153.
- 43 For example, Kukanova, *Russko-iranskaia torgovlia*, 113–114.
- 44 *Ibid.*, 123.
- 45 Qāzīhā, *Asnād-i ravābiṭ-i Īrān va Rūsīyah dar dawrān-i Fath 'Alī Shāh va Muḥammad Shāh Qājār*, 64.
- 46 *Ibid.*
- 47 *Ibid.*, 68–69, 90–91.
- 48 See, for instance, Qāzīhā, *Asnād-i ravābiṭ-i Īrān va Rūsīyah az dawrah-'i Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh tā suqūt-i Qājārīyah*, 44.
- 49 *Ibid.*, 45.
- 50 Mahdavi, *For God, Mammon, and Country*, 54.
- 51 AVPRI (Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire), f. Miṣṣiia v Persii, op. 528a, d. 520, ll. 45–56ob. On Mirza 'Ali Asghar, see Christoph Werner, *An Iranian Town in Transition: A Social and Economic History of the Elites of Tabriz, 1747–1848* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2000), 218–219.
- 52 Qāzīhā, *Asnād-i ravābiṭ-i Īrān va Rūsīyah dar dawrān-i Fath 'Alī Shāh va Muḥammad Shāh Qājār*, 94–98.
- 53 *Ibid.*, 98.
- 54 Kukanova, *Russko-iranskaia torgovlia*, 43–44, 51–57.
- 55 C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries*, vol. 10 (Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, 1892), xxxi–xxxii.
- 56 *Akty sobrannye Kavkazskoiu*, 11: 548–549.
- 57 See Amanat, *Pivot of the Universe*, 237–247; and A. K. S. Lambton, “The Case of Hajji 'Abd al-Karim: A Study on the Role of the Merchant in Mid-Nineteenth Century Persia,” in C. E. Bosworth, ed., *Iran and Islam: In Memory of the Late Vladimir Minorsky* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1971), 331–360.
- 58 *Sakartvelos sakhelmtsipo saistorio arkivi* (Central State Historical Archive of the Republic of Georgia), f. 11, op. 1, d. 3254, l. 27.
- 59 *Ibid.*, ll. 33–63ob.
- 60 *Ibid.*, ll. 69–71ob.
- 61 See, too, Nouraei and Martin, “The Role of the Karguzar [Part III],” 162.
- 62 On debates surrounding this issue, see AVPRI, f. 194, op. 528/1, d. 979. See, also, the unsuccessful petition of an Iranian subject who lacked documentation from the shah's government approving of his petition in CSHAA, f. 44, op. 1, d. 537. On these issues in the context of Russian-Ottoman relations, see James Meyer, “Immigration, Return, and the Politics of Citizenship: Russian Muslims in the Ottoman Empire: 1860–1914,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 38, no. 1 (2007): 15–32.

9 Sunni–Shi‘i relations in the Russian protectorate of Bukhara, as perceived by the local ‘ulama

KIMURA Satoru

Works devoted to Bukharan society by the Soviet ethnographer O. A. Sukhareva (1903–83)¹ elucidate the history and culture of Shi‘i Muslims in Bukhara in detail. These works, which are based on several written sources and many accounts from local inhabitants, demonstrate that the Bukharan Shi‘is had come from Iran at different times and for various reasons and that most if not all of them had continued to observe Shi‘ism.² Although her study as a whole sheds light on many aspects of life among Bukharan Shi‘is, it seems that much still remains to be considered. One of the most basic topics to be argued is the historical relationship that developed for decades between the Sunni majority and the Shi‘i minority.³ According to Sukhareva, the latter enjoyed religious freedom to observe Shi‘ism “without hindrance” in Central Asia, particularly under the rule of the Bukharan amirs:

In accordance with a tradition peculiar to the theocratic states (one of which was Bukhara, whose ruler bore the title of amir ul-muminin), each inhabitant of a country was guaranteed the right to observe the regulations of his own religion, and was even obliged to observe such regulations. In this respect, also, the Shi‘is who inhabited Bukhara suffered no interference. They freely practiced their worship, and they had their own chapels headed by Shi‘i clergy, or sheykhs.⁴

If we take a close look at several eyewitness accounts by foreign visitors to Bukhara in the early to mid-nineteenth century, however, quite a different picture emerges, which cannot but cast doubt on such religious tolerance in Bukhara during that period.

Given that Sukhareva tends to depend for information on the verbal accounts offered by her contemporaries, it is possible that she might have overlooked the significant fact that a substantial change occurred in the religious situation in Bukhara as a Russian protectorate, which we can prove with evidence taken from little-used sources, including manuscripts and archival documents. Such being the case, what influence did the Russian Empire have on the relationship between the two sects after the amirate of Bukhara became one of its *de facto* dependents in 1868?

This chapter aims to consider Sunni–Shi‘i relations in Bukhara when it was a Russian protectorate. In order to do this, a survey of the historical background is

essential in order to gain a clear view of several neglected facts and to explain the changes brought by Russian rule. So, first, the Shi'is' situation in Bukharan society before Russian rule will be outlined. Also, close attention will be paid to the question of *taqiyya*, that is, the precautionary dissimulation of one's beliefs under duress or in the face of threats. The issue of *taqiyya* cannot be discussed properly without an explication of the character of Bukhara as a religious city during the Manghit dynasty (1756–1920), the ruling family of the amirate during that period. Then, an examination will be made of how relations between the sects developed when Bukhara was a Russian protectorate, paying particular attention to the Shi'i side and with a focus on the Bukharan 'ulama's perceptions.

Bukharan Shi'is before Russian rule

The Shi'i population in Bukhara basically consisted of an ethnic group called *īrāniyān* (sing. *īrānī*), that is, Iranians. They were also called *marviyān* (sing. *marvī*; also *mavrī* in colloquial usage), since many of them originally came from the city of Marv in Khurasan. It is also known that after the Sunni–Shi'i conflict in Bukhara in 1910, they started to call themselves *fārs-hā* (sing. *fārs*), that is, Persians, instead of *īrāniyān*.⁵

The history of the establishment of the Shi'i community in Bukhara is somewhat unclear. However, one of the most remarkable events in that process must have been the conquest of Marv by the Bukharan amir Shahmurad-biy (r. 1785–1800), in the early years of his reign, as a result of which reportedly 18,000 or 30,000 families of Marvis were forced to migrate to Bukhara.⁶ Although both of the above numbers, as Sukhareva relates,⁷ seem overestimated, it can still be said that an immense number of Marvi immigrants moved to Bukhara around the mid to late 1780s, and “the colony” that they then settled in was remarked upon “about forty years” or so later by Alexander Burnes (1805–41), a British Army officer.⁸ Another case of forcible removal of the Marvi people occurred during the reign of the amir Haydar (r. 1800–26), by whose order apparently 4,000 families were resettled in the vicinity of Samarkand. A brief account is given by N. V. Khanykov (1819–78), a Russian orientalist and a member of the Imperial Embassy to the amirate in 1841–42.⁹ This account probably refers to the same incident that was recorded by Baron Meyendorff, a member of the Imperial Embassy in 1820–21.¹⁰

According to Mir 'Abd al-Karim Bukhari's account, having been satisfied with their new ruler's favor and concern for them in Bukhara, the Marvis converted to Sunnism (*ahl-i sunnat va jamā'at shudand*).¹¹ In other words, as Muhammad Ya'qub Bukhari put it, “because of his [i.e., Shahmurad's] efforts, all [of the Marvi immigrants] became *musulmān*.”¹² (The term *musulmān* here can be interpreted as connotative of “orthodox Sunni” Muslim in contrast to the “heretical Shi'i.”) Moreover, in the eyes of another historian, Khumuli, this conversion appeared to be a reconciliation (*āshṭī*) of the two sects, arranged by the amir Shahmurad.¹³

In this connection, the following story related by Khumuli may be worthy of special note. Under the threat of invasion by the Bukharan army, the governor of Marv decided to convert to Sunnism, trying to persuade his people to do the

same by saying, “if we choose to be Sunni, that is the true path, but if we strain to remain Shi‘i, [there is no way other than practicing] *taqiyya*.” Some time later, the Bukharan amir sent messengers to the Marvis with a sealed *fatvá* [legal opinion] issued by the Bukharan ‘ulama, including the statement that “there is no choice for an apostate but to accept conversion or to suffer the sword (*li-’anna al-murtadda lā tuqbalu min-hu illā al-tavbatu av al-sayfu*).” So informed, all the Marvis were obliged to follow their governor, and they expressed to the Bukharan messengers their disgust of the Shi‘i tenets as well as affirming their accord with Sunni belief.¹⁴ This episode already suggests the possible practice of *taqiyya* by the Marvi immigrants as well as their virtually forced conversion to Sunnism.

Just as one might expect, the Marvis covertly retained their former beliefs despite their conversion to Sunnism. Zayn al-‘Abidin Shirvani, a Shi‘i traveler who visited Bukhara in the early 1810s, sketched out the Bukharan population at that time: “The greater majority [of the Bukharans] belong to the Hanafi school. About ten thousand families of Shi‘is are entirely concealing their beliefs (*dar kamāl-i taqiyya and*), and there are one thousand houses of Jews.”¹⁵

Thus, the practice of *taqiyya* among the Shi‘is in the amirate could never have been ignored by their fellow sectarians from Iran, such as Shirvani, who found the Sunni Bukharans oppressing the Shi‘is (*shī‘a-gudāz-and*), and the Qajarid ambassador ‘Abbasquli-khan Kurd,¹⁶ who was dispatched by the shah to the amir Nasr Allah (r. 1827–60) in 1844 to negotiate the abolition of slave trade and the emancipation of Persian slaves and of Joseph Wolff, a British priest who was being held in captivity.

The situation in which the Shi‘is were obliged to disguise themselves as Sunnis also attracted the attention of other foreign visitors, namely N. V. Khanykov and Hungarian orientalist Arminius Vámbéry (1832–1913), who traveled to Bukhara in 1863. Having keen insight into the situation, Khanykov related that “all of them of course became Sunnis; nevertheless, in their heart they remain Shi‘is.”¹⁷ Vámbéry testified that “as Shiites they can only practise their religion in secret.”¹⁸ Otherwise, as in the case witnessed by Mohan Lal, who accompanied Alexander Burnes to Bukhara in 1832, those who “follow the principles of Ali, and do not believe in the three friends of Mohammad [i.e., the first three caliphs], are treated with indignity by the Sunnis, who molest, and even sell them, at their own pleasure.”¹⁹ All this suggests that during the years preceding Russian rule, the Shi‘is who had settled permanently in the amirate had no other choice but to convert to Sunnism, regardless of whether they were doing it sincerely or on pretense. However, most of the converts do not seem to have really discarded their Shi‘i beliefs, holding them under *taqiyya*.

In other words, it was inevitable that they would practice dissimulation, because they were under the threat of being enslaved by the Sunnis on the pretext that all Shi‘is were *kāfir* [infidels]. In those days, the slave trade was widespread in Central Asia, including in Bukhara. It involved the enslavement of Shi‘i Persians—also referred to by the Sunnis as *qizilbāsh* in a somewhat derogatory manner—who, for the most part, were first captured by the Sunni Turkmen horsemen in or near their homeland in Khurasan to be brought as “prisoners of war” to the slave markets of Khiva, Bukhara, and other cities in Central Asia and then sold

to the Sunnis. These Persian slaves formed the greater part of the slave population, especially in the khanate of Khiva and the amirate of Bukhara. One may assume that the practice of enslaving Shi'i Persians in Central Asia began in the early sixteenth century, during the rise of the Shi'i Safavid state in Iran, though what process it underwent over the course of time remains unclear.²⁰ For earlier times, it would be sufficient to point out the following.

At the time when Nadir Shah (r. 1736–47) captured Khiva, in 1740, there were estimated to be 12,000 Persian prisoners who had previously been brought to the khanate from Khurasan,²¹ while another account puts their population at 30,000 (some of whom were those who had already been liberated from slavery).²² The shah ordered that they all be gathered and sent back to Khurasan, where they were resettled in the newly constructed settlement of “Khīvaq-ābād,” near Abivard. According to ‘Abd al-Karim Kashmiri, the author of an unofficial history of Nadir Shah, who gives yet another number (7,000 Persian prisoners in Khwarazm), apparently there were a large number of prisoners from Khurasan within the Bukharan territory at the time; despite the shah’s order that they be returned to Iran, most of them settled, remaining there “willingly.”²³ That the term “prisoners (*usarā*)” on this occasion refers to slaves should be noted.

It would be safe to say that by the nineteenth century, the slave trade sustained by the enslavement of Shi'is had already become institutionalized and was widely practiced in Central Asian Sunni regions. In discussing the issue of Persian slaves, however, it is important to distinguish between the non-enslaved Marvis and the enslaved Persians. A good example of this may be a seemingly misleading account given by Meyendorff, in which he estimated the Persian slave population in the amirate at 40,000, including 25,000 Marvi immigrants,²⁴ despite the latter never having been enslaved.²⁵ Yet different sources give different estimates, and it is difficult to determine the number accurately. For example, the 200,000 proposed by Joseph Wolff is simply unreliable.²⁶ In any case, it is worth noting that usually in accounts left by Russian and Western travelers, the Marvis appear to have been distinguishable from the Persians (or Persian slaves).²⁷

In Bukhara, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, a number of high-level officials and commanders as well as most of the amir’s court servants were of Persian slave origin, some of whom had bought themselves out of enslavement. Their presence was noted by several foreign visitors. For instance, Burnes writes as follows:

Almost every individual who visits the king is attended by his slave; and though this class of people are for the most part Persians or their descendants, they have a peculiar appearance. It is said, indeed, that three of the people of Bokhara are of slave extraction; for of the captives brought from Persia into Toorkistan few are permitted to return, and, by all accounts, there are many who have no inclination to do so.²⁸

Although this account may be a bit exaggerated in terms of population numbers, other visitors had similar impressions. The following passage by Vámbéry shows

how the Persian slaves adapted to their new circumstances and advanced their position in the amirate:

The Persians in Bokhara are partly slaves, partly such as have paid their own ransom and then settled in the Khanat. Here, in spite of all religious oppression—for as Shiites they can only practise their religion in secret [as already cited]—they readily apply themselves to trade and handicraft, because living is here cheaper and the gain easier than in their own country. The Persian, so far superior in capacity to the inhabitants of Central Asia, is wont to elevate himself from the position of slave to the highest offices in the state. There are hardly any governors in the province who do not employ in some office or other Persians, who were previously his slaves, and who have remained faithful to him.²⁹

As is shown here, there was some kind of patronage system for Persians. In connection, it should be noted that each Bukharan amir—‘Umar b. Haydar (r. 1827), Nasr Allah b. Haydar, Muzaffar b. Nasr Allah (r. 1860–85), and ‘Abd al-Ahad b. Muzaffar (r. 1885–1910)—had a mother of Persian slave origin.³⁰

Table 9.1 Manghit Rulers (1756–1920)

Muḥammad Raḥīm Khān (1756–59)
Dāniyāl-biy Atālīq (1759–85)
Amīr Shāhmurād-biy (1785–1800)
Amīr Ḥaydar-khān (1800–26)
Amīr Ḥusayn-khān (1826–27)
Amīr ‘Umar-khān (1827)
Amīr Naṣr Allāh-khān (1827–60)
Amīr Muzaffar-khān (1860–85)
Amīr ‘Abd al-Aḥad-khān (1885–1910)
Amīr ‘Ālim-khān (1910–20)

Ahmad Makhdum Danish (1827–97), a historian and a great scholar under the late Manghits, relates that the amir Nasr Allah “settled numerous Tajiks and incomers (*mardum-i musāfir*) in the seat of dignities and offices; he had learned also this [unworthy] way from his father.”³¹ Historically, the term Tajiks was sometimes used to refer to people of humble birth and non-tribal genealogy, particularly in contrast to the ruling class of Uzbeks, and Tajiks and Persians together composed the Bukharan administrative system’s class of *shāgird-pīsha*,³² to which almost all court servants belonged. In Danish’s view, the amirs’ customary practice of giving important posts to those of humble or slave extraction had begun at least by the reign of Haydar and, as a consequence, after the year 1250 [1834–35], “deterioration started to appear in the affairs of religion and state.” For Danish, the blame lay primarily with their inability to adequately manage state affairs, though it seems to have been acknowledged that this might have been connected to their “humble” extraction. He did not hesitate, on the other hand, to praise Shahrūkh-khān Irāni, a Persian prince in exile, for his military leadership. Shahrūkh-khān was a cousin of

the Qajarid shah Nasir al-Din (r. 1848–96), but not long after the latter's accession, he fled to Bukhara where he was appointed commander-in-chief of the amir's regular troops.³³ Danish's perception of the Shi'is will be discussed further below.

It was around the aforementioned year 1250 [1834–35] that the amir Nasr Allah started trying to restore central power and strengthen his control over affairs of state at the expense of his senior high officials and Uzbek tribal chieftains. In the winter of 1837–38, by his order, 'Abd al-Samad-khan Tabrizi, a Persian officer in exile, created a well-equipped, well-trained army in his capital. It consisted of 800 soldiers (*sarbāz*) and 250 gunners (*tūpchī*), most of whom were Persian slaves bought by the amir, as well as 20 Russian slaves.³⁴ The amir used this army not just for internal unification but also for conquest. He appointed Persian officers—first 'Abd al-Samad-khan, and some years later Shahrūkh-khan—as lavishly paid commanders-in-chief. Each soldier was also paid comparatively well, according to rank.³⁵ At the same time, he purged his influential officials, such as the grand vizier Muhammad Hakim-biy Qoshbegi (d. 1840), and replaced them with his slave courtiers or others close to him. According to Khanykov's firsthand impressions, "the amir and the Bukharan officials thoughtlessly entrust themselves to the Persians."³⁶

His successor, Amir Muzaffar, in turn, replaced the former amir's senior officials with his own slave courtiers³⁷ and appointed one of them, Muhammad Shah-biy, as the grand vizier (*vazīr-i a'zam*).³⁸ From Muhammad Shah-biy Qoshbegi up to Astanaqul-biy Qoshbegi, who was deposed in 1910, the post of grand vizier was successively held by four Persians, all of whom were of slave extraction.

Thus, before the Russians invaded, some of the Persians in their own way acquired comparatively stable positions in the amirate. Even though most of them remained slaves, some exercised a great deal of influence in politics. However, they still apparently had no right to acknowledge their Shi'i beliefs publicly.³⁹

***Bukhārā-yi Sharīf* and the Shi'is**

As far as currently available information suggests, the first time that Bukhara was given the epithet *sharīf*⁴⁰ in writing seems to be during the monetary reforms introduced by Shahmurad in the first year of his reign (1199 [1785]), when the name of *Bukhārā-yi sharīf* ("Holy Bukhara") started to be inscribed on silver coins (and apparently a year later on gold ones as well).⁴¹ It is possible to assume that the attribution of the word *sharīf*, among other words, to his capital in such an official manner might have been tied to this Manghit ruler's political ideology of propagating an image of the religious centrality of Bukhara as a stronghold of Islam. (This deserves further discussion in a separate study.)

Shahmurad played a great role in the revival of Bukhara, whose influence had waned in the aftermath of political and social disorder in the first half of the eighteenth century. He actively introduced a series of measures to restore religious life in Bukhara. This was probably promoted not a little by the new stream of mystical thought of Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya, which had flowed from Northwest India into Transoxiana and whose key characteristics lay, first, in obedience to the

sunna [the traditions of Muhammad] and the *sharī‘a* [Islamic law] and, second, in a polemical hostility toward Twelver Shi‘ism.⁴²

Becoming a *murīd* [disciple] of a Mujaddidi *shaykh* [Sufī master], Shahmurad not only displayed his devoutness as a Sufī, but also followed Mujaddidi principles in carrying out his policies as a ruler. He took steps to restore religious institutions such as mosques, *maktabs*, *madrasas*, and *khānaqāhs* [monasteries], and to reissue *vaqf* [endowment] documents so that the *vaqf* system for maintaining these institutions could operate, and he strictly prohibited any *bid‘at* [(heretical) innovations]. Under the supervision of the office of *ra‘īs* (or *muhtasib*) [superintendent of religious order and practices], every Muslim subject was encouraged to conduct religious practices and duties in accordance with the *sharī‘a*.⁴³ As a result of these reformative measures, Bukhara enjoyed a revival as a religious city under his rule. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, Bukhara had about eighty *madrasas*, and those studying there were said to have exceeded 10,000 in number. They came from far-flung regions, including the Volga basin, Eastern Turkistan, and Northwest India.⁴⁴

Shahmurad organized annual military campaigns against Khurasan, under the name of *ghazā* (or *jihād*) [holy war], though in reality they were more like predatory invasions organized to meet financial needs. It is obvious, however, that in principle he regarded Khurasan as *Dār al-ḥarb* [the Land of War] and the Shi‘is as *kāfir*.⁴⁵ Shahmurad’s unsympathetic attitude towards Shi‘ism is also sharply reflected in his enforcement of the strict prohibition against the ritual of *ta‘ziya* [mourning over the death of Husayn b. ‘Ali (626–80) on ‘āshūrā, or the tenth of the month of Muharram] being practiced in and around the city of Bukhara. A description in verse, given by Miri, a son of Shahmurad, suggests that this prohibition took place before the large-scale immigrations of Marvis to Bukhara and that there might have been, perhaps, not a few Sunni participants in that ritual.⁴⁶

As supreme ruler, he styled himself as *amīr*, refraining from bearing the title of *khān*. For one thing he was no descendant of Chingiz Khan; for another, he apparently had the intention of infusing the title of *amīr* with some religious significance. His son and successor, Haydar, whose mother was of both *sayyid* and Chingizid extraction, was already proclaiming himself *amīr al-mu‘minīn* [Commander of the Faithful] on his coins from 1222 [1807–08].⁴⁷ This time-honored title of caliphs was inherited by his successors. In this respect, it is very interesting that the Persian inscription on the seals of Shahmurad—“*Amārat* [or *Imārat* in classical Arabic] *khilāfat-i khudā-yi ta‘ālā ast bar sabīl-i ‘adl buvad; az ‘adl khālī buvad khilāfat-i Iblīs ‘alay-hi al-la‘nat ast*”⁴⁸ (“The amirate is the deputyship of the Most High God when based on justice; when not based on justice, it is the deputyship of Satan—[God’s] curse be upon him!”)—was also seen on those of his successors, up until the last amir, ‘Alim-khan (r. 1910–20).⁴⁹ Although he never publicly proclaimed himself *amīr al-mu‘minīn*, probably on account of his genealogy, there is little doubt that Amir Shahmurad laid the foundation for the religiously legitimized prestige of the Manghit rulers.

Furthermore, he and his successors tried to reinforce the legitimacy of their dynasty based on the authority of the Ottoman caliphs in Istanbul, to whom they

sometimes dispatched an envoy to express their obedience and to ask for favorable treatment, although this came to an end when they became subjects of the Russian Empire in 1868. In diplomatic relations, an Ottoman sovereign would be addressed by the Bukharan amirs as “the Caliph and Lord of People of Islam,” “His Majesty the Caliph of the Earth,” and so on.⁵⁰ In a letter to the caliph, Shahmurad also proposed that the Shi‘is in Iran be attacked cooperatively from both sides by the Sunni Ottoman and Bukharan forces; Shahmurad condemned them for continuously interfering with Central Asian Muslims on pilgrimage to Mecca.⁵¹ This seems to be a good example of the Bukharan amirs’ political dogma of orthodox Sunnism as well as of their ideological view that sharply differentiated between the Sunni Islamic world and the land of the Shi‘is. Thus did they spatially conceptualize the Sunni Islamic world.

In contrast, the Shi‘i political power, that is, the Qajarid dynasty, was well aware of this framework of interregional politics. For instance, according to the historical work of Rizaquli-khan Hidayat, the reason the Bukharan amir’s envoy went to Istanbul by way of Iran (ca. 1814) was “to purchase several volumes of works and jurisprudential literature of the leading Hanafī scholars and ask for [the Shaykh al-Islam of Istanbul’s] legal opinion concerning the contract for sale of the Shi‘i captives.”⁵² It was likely that relations between the Manghits and the Qajarids became strained over the issue of the slave trade. The dispatch of ‘Abbasquli-khan to Bukhara in 1844 can be regarded as relating to this. As a result of his persevering negotiations with the amir, 1,000 or so Persian slaves were emancipated and brought back to Iran.⁵³ Later, in 1860, the Qajarid government sent a vast force to conquer Marv and punish the Turkmens for their continuous capturing and selling of its subjects. Certainly this practice of the Turkmens, who would accept or disregard the authority of the Bukharan amirs depending on circumstances, was based on the *faivās* issued by the Bukharan ‘ulama.⁵⁴ But this expedition—“directed, in fact, against Bokhara”—resulted in a devastating defeat of the Qajarid army, and in one fell swoop, 18,000 Persian soldiers were taken and held to ransom.⁵⁵

Thus, the Sunni-centric ideology of the Manghits and the political setting above were probably crucial factors in the position of the Shi‘is in the amirate of Bukhara. The Shi‘is seem to have been generally considered unacceptable as subjects of the amir. It is, to be sure, obvious at a glance that there was no office that would be connected with Shi‘ism in the administrative structure of the amirate.⁵⁶ In a rare case, several rich Persian merchants stayed at “the caravanserai of Qoshbegi” in Bukhara around the mid-1830s, yet they had to constantly present expensive gifts to Hakim Qoshbegi to enjoy his protection. The others preferred to station their agents in Bukhara, in the interest of keeping themselves safe.⁵⁷ As long as the Shi‘is were counted as infidels, they were obliged to convert to Sunnism. According to Burnes, the Bukharans “believe that they are conferring a benefit on a Persian when they purchase him, and see that he renounces his heretical opinions.”⁵⁸ This suggests that once sold into slavery, Persians were theoretically no longer regarded as a Shi‘i. In Holy Bukhara, apparently, there remained no Shi‘i Muslims among the amir’s subjects, at least nominally.

As mentioned above, the amir Nasr Allah assigned some Persians to important posts. Yet this did not mean he was tolerant towards Shi‘ism itself. The case may be distinctly illustrated by the following account given by Ahmad Danish:

Under the reign of the amir who was blessed and supported by God, namely Sultan Amir Nasr Allah, the people of *shī‘a* were so vile and accursed that they, with fear, trembling and *taqiyya*, led a life like that of the Jews and feared the Muslims just as the Jews dreaded the latter, because the blessed amir himself inflicted punishment on a large number of people [for their unlawful conduct]. [The amir] publicly executed a great *mujtahid*⁵⁹ [Shi‘i religious scholar] among them [i.e., the Shi‘is] after an enquiry into his sectarian creed, because this man, who posed as a preacher, admonished the people in the daytime, but at night encouraged them to reveal their sectarian creed and to conduct shameful practices such as would be shunned in the light. [Then the amir] resolved that he would impose *jizya* [capitation to be paid by non-Muslims] on these [Shi‘i] people. It was [after the arrival from Iran of] Shahrūkh-biy Inaq, who was a Persian prince, that the amir exempted them from their liability to pay *jizya* instead of ordering them to serve the artillery [commanded by Shahrūkh-biy].⁶⁰

This account clearly shows that any detection of Shi‘i observance would have been followed by stern punishment. In light of this, practicing *taqiyya* was essential for Shi‘is to keep themselves secure and to keep up a front before their fellow Sunnis, for *taqiyya* itself as an indiscernible action by nature would appear neither harmful nor antagonistic to the Sunnis. Consequently, the practice of *taqiyya* was of great importance in such circumstances, in which Sunnis formed an overwhelming majority of the population and Shi‘ism was strictly prohibited. The Manghit amirs, from Shahmurad up to Nasr Allah in particular, under the strong influence of the Sunni orthodox ideology in combination with the religious character of Bukhara, never gave the Shi‘is any right to observe or practice their beliefs in public. Without religious freedom, each Bukharan Shi‘i was compelled to dissemble about his or her faith under *taqiyya*, pretending to be a Sunni.

Sunni-Shi‘i relations during Bukhara’s time as a Russian protectorate

On the eve of the fall of Samarkand (May 1868), a letter affixed with 17 individuals’ seals, was dispatched to the commander of the approaching Russian army, K. P. von Kaufman. The letter begins: “We are Iranian people, captives from Iran. Now, we will be subjects of the White Emperor [*āq pādshāh*]. We will obey and submit to you.”⁶¹ Judging from the seals, most of the senders were officials of the amirate of Bukhara, although here they styled themselves as completely otherwise. By declaring their voluntary obedience to the Russian emperor, they were asking for a written guarantee of security (*yak khatt-i amān*). Muhammad Yusuf

Toqsaba Irani, who was seemingly their leader, also cooperated with the notables of Samarkand in inviting the Russians to come and take control of the city.⁶² Eventually, representing the local populace, one of the amir's *mufīīs* of Samarkand, Mulla Kamal al-Din, with five or six other people, including *īrānī*, went to meet Kaufman and express their intention to submit to him. Thus Samarkand fell into the hands of the Russian army.⁶³

The case introduced above may give some indication of how the Shi'i Muslims in the amirate perceived Russian imperial power and how they expressed their identity to the Russian authorities. The above letter concludes: "we are incomers (*musāfir*); we are perplexed and at a loss." This shows it was important for them to exaggerate their external origin when asking the Russians for protection. In reality, most of the Bukharan Shi'is remained under the amir's direct rule.

After its defeat in the war, the amirate of Bukhara became a Russian protectorate. Despite losing much of its independence and its ability to act, particularly in terms of diplomacy under the Commercial Convention of 1868 and the Friendship Treaty of 1873 concluded between the two governments, the amirate retained its legal sovereignty. Therefore, the question of Sunni-Shi'i relations continued to live on in Bukharan domestic affairs.

However, the fact that Article 17 of the Friendship Treaty of 1873 obliged the amir, Muzaffar, to decree that slavery and the slave trade henceforth be abolished within the borders of Bukhara⁶⁴ seems to have had great significance on the position of the Shi'is, although this was followed by neither immediate nor comprehensive prohibition of slavery. Although Article 17 forbade the sale of slaves, it stipulated nothing about the emancipation of those slaves already in their masters' possession. In order to define their legal status, in 1874, the amir issued a decree according to which all slaves should remain under their present masters' control for ten years, unless they could ransom themselves.⁶⁵ That is, for the complete abolition of slavery the amir granted a ten-year extension, which also had the tacit approval of the Russian authorities. "Slavery was, after all, an internal affair of no vital practical interest to Russia."⁶⁶ This remark by S. Becker is, in a sense, to the point. With Russia's minimum engagement, the resolution of this problem made very slow progress even after the expiry of the term. But following the accession of the amir 'Abd al-Ahad (November 1885) and, perhaps more importantly, the establishment of the Imperial Russian Political Agency at New Bukhara (January 1886), the situation started to change substantially.

At the beginning of his reign, 'Abd al-Ahad issued a decree to the effect that in all provinces and districts, every slave should be emancipated without payment and the list of those emancipated slaves should be submitted to the central government by the officials in charge. The archival evidence suggests that this decree was enforced strictly, although far from completely.⁶⁷

It may be quite difficult to know exactly what psychological effect slavery had on the Shi'i Persians and the other Sunni Bukharans, yet this question is worth some consideration. What is especially interesting is the following account given by Lieutenant Colonel V. V. Krestovskii, a member of a Russian diplomatic mission to the amirate in 1882–83:

Here, it is especially remarkable that while adopting the culture, fashion and regulations of social life from Persia, the Uzbeks and, following them, of course, the Bukharan Sarts have some sense of superiority towards the Persians and despise the latter so much that any courtier or administrative official, if he is Persian, only for this reason would invariably try to conceal his extraction and pass for Uzbek. It seems to me that this is affected not only by the Sunni’s religious antipathy towards the Shi‘i, but also by the situation in which most of the slaves here are those Persians who were captured by the Turkmens and sold in the Bukharan bazaars, and in which thus the Uzbeks became accustomed to looking down on the Persians as a master looks down on his servants. For them, the word “Persian” and “slave” are synonyms; as for “Uzbek,” in etymology the word means “one who is his own master; a free and independent person.”⁶⁸

The mission was shown a great deal of hospitality in Qarshi by Astanaqul-biy, its governor and the future grand vizier (adm. 1905–10), and in Bukhara by his grandfather and the grand vizier (adm. 1872–89) Mulla Muhammadi-biy Qoshbegi and Muhammad Sharif-biy Inaq, the former’s son and Astanaqul’s father.⁶⁹ This distinguished family was nevertheless of Persian slave extraction, because Mulla Muhammadi-biy was a *zar-kharīd* [purchased slave] of the amir Muzaffar. As for the Persian officials’ tendency to conceal their ethnic origins, Mulla Muhammadi-biy was no exception either. He attempted to pass for Uzbek.⁷⁰ Even at this point in time, public mention of one’s Persian extraction appears to have been avoided. This suggests a deep-rooted stereotypical sense of superiority and an inferiority complex between the Sunnis and the Shi‘i Persians in Bukhara.

The ‘ulama, who had more or less experienced the amir’s entire independent rule, by and large perceived the Shi‘is’ political position and religious behavior under the Russian protectorate unfavorably. This was partly because a Sunni-centric order was something of an axiom for them, whether it was political or religious. It should be noted that the two famous figures of the Bukharan ‘ulama in that period, ‘Abd al-‘Azim Sami (ca. 1838–1907) and Ahmad Danish, each wrote a polemic on sectarian problems between Sunnis and Shi‘is. They both had a fairly critical attitude towards Shi‘ism.

According to Sami, “their business gathered momentum especially from the beginning of the year 1290 [1873/74], by virtue of the protection provided by some individuals of this sect, each of whom was a holder of governmental office or of a commandership”; as a consequence, fearlessly undertaking to make their sect and faith public, the Shi‘is “in some locations named pernicious assembly buildings as *ta‘ziya-khāna* [houses of mourning]” and even “overtly promulgated the corrupt behavior of *rafz* [abandoning faith] and the disagreeable custom of *sabb* [cursing the first three caliphs].”⁷¹ It seems that Sami was already aware that some of the Bukharan Shi‘is had started to actively perform their sectarian practices soon after Russian indirect rule came to the amirate.

While Sami took up his pen, “not for opposing [the Shi‘is], but for guarding faith and correcting constancy in religion,” he also professed that “the final cause

(*'illat-i ghā'ī*) for writing this treatise lies in attaining true faith in God as well as driving out and repulsing the satanic apostates (*ravāfīz-i shayā'īn-ṣifat*).⁷² This is why the work was entitled "*Mir'āt al-yaqīn fī radd al-ravāfīz al-shayā'īn*" [The mirror of faith for repulsing the satanic apostates].⁷³ What seems to have been another motive for his writing is a polemical challenge offered by some Shi'is who, "raising several futile subjects of discussion out of their complete fanaticism, are holding a controversy and oppositions against the People of the *Sunna* and the Community." According to Sami's assertion, however, "having a face-to-face debate with them is not a wise affair,"⁷⁴ and this led him to attempt to refute his opponents in writing. He finished his work in 1885,⁷⁵ but some time later (probably by 1897)⁷⁶ he set about adding to it a sequel that continues up to the opening sentences of a chapter entitled "On the Qualities of the Prime Minister, the Holder of the Office of Vizierate of the Capital," and there it breaks off abruptly.⁷⁷

Sami's accounts frankly tell us that, at some time before 1885, there appeared to be something of a religious uprising including a more or less anti-Sunni sentiment among the Bukharan Shi'is under the patronage of Shi'i high officials. At this stage, however, Shi'i practices and rituals may have been performed rather modestly, with respect to the views of the Sunnis. Danish, who finished his work "*Mi'yār al-tadayyun*" [The standard of religiosity] in 1894, regarded the *taqiyya* as still having been in practice during the time of the amir Muzaffar:

After the time when the seat of deputyship and the sofa of power gained ornament and embellishment by the sitting of the late amir Sultan Amir Muzaffar, and when he dismissed those who had been exalted by his celebrated father and replaced them with his own slaves (*ghulamān*) and servants, the office of justice vizierate and that of finance minister fell to the hands of Shi'is. During the time of the late amir, the Shi'is observed their beliefs in *taqiyya* and in secret. However, under the reign of his most laudable son [ʿAbd al-Ahad], through communication with Russia and his indulging in servility [to the latter], the Shi'is gained so much trust that they took pride in revealing Shi'ism at an elevated place. Now the Sunnis fear the Shi'is.⁷⁸

Danish recognized the Russian presence as a decisive factor in the emergence of the open observance of Shi'ism in Bukhara. It was probably not until the reign of the amir ʿAbd al-Ahad that Shi'is in general started to discontinue the practice of *taqiyya*, as Danish relates.

On the other hand, the murder in 1888 of Muhammad Sharif-biy, the son of the grand vizier Muhammadi-biy, was significant not only to the subsequent development of the political situation, but also to the Shi'is circumstances in Bukhara. Since he was one of the most reliable figures of the amir's government for the Russians, this affair invited serious intervention from the Russian authorities, who, suspecting even the amir of being involved in the murder, embarked on an investigation into the case. While the amir himself was proven innocent, the circumstances caused the amir to appoint Astanaqul-biy as grand treasurer (*dīvānbīgī-yi kalān* or *zakāтчī-yi kalān*) on behalf of his late father, giving him some extended

powers.⁷⁹ In Sami’s views, this “became a cause for the advancement and stabilization of the rule” of the Shi‘is.⁸⁰ To the Russians, Astanaqul-biy was a no less reputable figure than his father. Krestovskii also testifies that he made an extremely favorable impression on the members of the diplomatic mission.⁸¹ “This young and competent chancellor,” according to Cossack Captain P. P. Shubinskii, “is a newly born type of Bukharans of the modern school formed under the influence of the relations with Russian civilization.”⁸²

Astanaqul took charge of commercial affairs as well as diplomatic negotiations with the Russian Political Agency. In fact, he was not altogether acquiescent to their demands, but it did not hinder him from emerging as a good partner of the Russians. By this time, he had already played an important role in the construction of the railroad across the amirate, which reached Samarkand in May 1888, via Kagan (New Bukhara) near the capital. Later, in his petition to the amir ‘Alimkhan after his dismissal from the post of grand vizier, he states with confidence that, “conducting various kinds of good business with the Russians, this ignorant servant gained benediction for His Majesty and pleased everyone; I let the railroad pass through; and none of the Russians were vexed at all.”⁸³ He also administered the construction of the Russian settlements in the amirate.⁸⁴ It is remarkable that he was decorated by the Bukharan and the Russian governments with several magnificent orders for such achievements in his official career.⁸⁵

After the death of Muhammadi-biy in 1889, another Shi‘i Persian, Mulla Jan Mirza Sabzavari (adm. 1889–1905), was appointed grand vizier. He too was a *zarkharīd* of the amir Muzaffar. According to Muhammad Ma‘sum Shirazi, who traveled to Bukhara by rail in 1898, Jan Mirza was a firm follower of the Ja‘fari school of jurisprudence.⁸⁶ This foreign Shi‘i traveler revealed another interesting fact: during the time that Bukhara was a Russian protectorate, some of the Bukharan Shi‘is made a fortune despite their servitude and showed a great deal of hospitality to fellow Shi‘is coming from Iran; moreover, they also sent gifts to the people around the mausoleums of the Imams in Iraq and Mashhad. For this, Jan Mirza, among others, acquired a reputation for generosity, although he stopped helping his fellow countrymen in public after being slandered by his political enemies.⁸⁷

Indeed, during Bukhara’s time as a Russian protectorate, Shi‘is enjoyed more freedom and opportunity than ever before, in terms of mobility and travel. Especially after the Central Asian railroad penetrated through Bukharan territory, traffic and exchanges between Central Asia and Iran became more and more active, which made it possible for the Bukharan Shi‘is to have greater contact not only with the religious centers of Shi‘ism, such as Mashhad, Karbala, and Najaf, but also with Mecca and Medina.

Among the Bukharan Shi‘is who made the pilgrimage to Karbala during the earlier period, we can find, for example, “Hakīm Beg” (Hakim Bek) and his companions. According to H. W. Bellew, a British medical officer who met them on the road to Karbala around the middle of 1872, Hakim Bek

spoke in most favourable terms of the Russian rule in Turkestan, and said their government was just and popular; the Russian officials he described as

kind and liberal, yet stern when necessary, and declared the people preferred them to their own rulers [i.e., the Bukharan amirs].⁸⁸

Another good example of such a pilgrim is Mulla Mirza Jahangir, alias Majnun (d. 1895/96), to whom his fellow Shi'is from Bukhara, Qari Rahmat Allah Vazih (1817/18–93) and 'Abd al-'Azim Shar'i (d. 1893), each assigned a separate section in their *tazkira* [anthology of poets].⁸⁹ Each *tazkira* consisted principally of biographies and poems of the author's contemporaries. What is worthy of special mention here is the following account given by Vazih in his *tazkira*, "*Tuhfat al-ahbāb fī tazkirat al-aṣḥāb*" [A gift for the lovers of literature in the form of an anthology of literary masters]:

"Majnūn"—This is the pen name of "Mullā Jahāngīr Bukhārī." Though his [fathers'] origin lies in the city of Marv, this Mulla Jahangir was born in Bukhara. He was a man who used books of verse practically, thereby enhancing his literacy skills, who evidently had a talent for agreeable conversation and the arts of blandishment, and who had a ready wit. Having learned some of the literary sciences (*ba'zī az 'ulūm-i adabiyya*) and having been ordained by God to demonstrate evidence of this learning, he went to Sanctified Mashhad and besides to Karbala. Then he returned to enter the country of Iran, where he printed a work of his own writings on *manāqib* [virtues] and *marāṣī* [dirges], which he wrote out of respect and encouragement for *ta'ziya-i 'āshūrā* [mourning over Husayn's death on the tenth of the month of Muharram]. Bringing a number of copies to Bukhara, he distributed them among all well-wishers and lovers of reading. Afterwards, he set up a site for the practice of *ta'ziya* in the Town of Jahangir (*Jahāngīr-ābād*) named after him, where he even built new buildings on unrivalled foundations.⁹⁰

Mulla Jahangir, or Majnun, was a Bukharan Marvi. Vazih's *tazkira* was completed in 1288 [1871/72] (or only slightly later, at most), before which Majnun would have visited and studied in Mashhad and Karbala, and, more noticeably, he would have even published his own work devoted to *ta'ziya* somewhere in Iran.⁹¹ It is very intriguing that Majnun was already engaged in promoting the practice of *ta'ziya* in Bukhara at that time. This may have had something to do with what Sami became sensitively aware of and critically related in the first part of the *Mir'āt al-yaqīn*. Besides, according to Shar'i's account, Majnun traveled to Mecca and Medina as well as to sacred Shi'i sites with the assistance of his fellow sectarians, and after returning to Bukhara he enjoyed the highest esteem and treatment among them; their adherence to him exceeded that to even the most eminent Shi'i scholars, such as Khwaja Nasir al-Din Tusi (d. 1274) and Mir Baqir Damad (d. 1631).⁹² However, Shar'i trenchantly refers to Majnun's gross ignorance of almost all the sciences other than the literary ones, that is, those of poetry, history, hagiography, and the like.⁹³ Majnun's case thus symbolically suggests that in Bukhara a rising of Shi'ism started in some populist manner and from its early stage the Bukharan Shi'is sought linkage with sacred Shi'i sites in Iran and Iraq through pilgrim-

age thereto. Additionally, it can be assumed that the Bukharan Marvis who lived quite collectively in some quarters of Bukhara played a major role in this movement.

Vazih and Shar‘i, like Majnun, were also *hājjiīs* (or *hājīs* in more colloquial usage): those who had completed the pilgrimage to Mecca (*hajj*). As is vividly described in his *hajjnāma*, or “journal of pilgrimage,” Vazih already enjoyed modern transportation, such as railway locomotives, horse-drawn rail carriages, and steamships, to and from Mecca (the journey took from May 1886 to April 1887). On his return trip, he visited the so-called ‘*atabāt-i ‘āliyāt* [Sublime Thresholds], which were the Shi‘i shrine cities of Karbala, Najaf, Kazimayn, and Samarra, where he stayed for 45 days, visiting and paying homage to the shrines of the Imams.⁹⁴

With easier access to the ‘Atabat as well as increasing significance of Shi‘ism among its followers in Bukhara, a demand naturally grew for more knowledge on its orthodox rites and practices in religious and social life as well. It was probably important for individual Shi‘is to know what were the norms to be followed and what was considered right and wrong in terms of Shi‘i doctrine. In this respect, those who they could count on to advise them were *mujtahids*: Shi‘i jurists capable of formulating through independent reasoning interpretations (*ijtihād*) in legal and theological matters based on the Ja‘fari school of jurisprudence. In contrast to the generally accepted notion in Sunni jurisprudence that “the gates of *ijtihād* were closed,” the Shi‘is regarded *ijtihād* as what was to be practiced. Therefore, it is not surprising that the aforementioned Mulla Jan Mirza Qoshbegi “used to insist upon [practicing] *ijtihād* (*da‘vā-i ijtihād mikard*).”⁹⁵

As far as it is known, nine pieces of *fatvā* (or *hukm* in Shi‘i terminology) are available and can be useful in supporting the fact that some Bukharan Shi‘is actually visited *mujtahids* somewhere in Shi‘i regions in order to ask for *fatvās*.⁹⁶ Two pieces have the seal of “Muḥammad Taqī 1302 [1884/85],” while the rest carry that of “‘Alī al-Ja‘fari al-Ḥusaynī 1308 [1890/91]” as well as the signature “al-Mīr Sayyid ‘Alī al-Yazdī al-Ḥā’irī.” In the case of the latter, one may assume that the *nisba* [attributive name] of this *mujtahid*, “al-Yazdī al-Ḥā’irī,” indicates that he was originally from Yazd and was residing in Ha’ir (or Karbala), where the tomb of Husayn was believed to be. If this was true, then he could be counted as one of the *mujtahids* of Karbala in that period.

In any case, given the *nasta‘līq* style of Persian handwriting used in drawing up these documents, the imprints of the seals of the two *mujtahids*, and the forms of documents in general, there is little doubt that they can be identified as *fatvās* issued in Iraq or Iran, and not in Bukhara. All matters addressed there involve issues of commercial transactions and other economic activities. Although neither proper names (other than “Zayd” and “Amr”) nor places are mentioned in the main texts of these *fatvā* documents, we do see phrases such as “in our country” and “however, most of these purchasers are Sunnis, Jews, and Christians.”⁹⁷ This may be enough to suggest that the recipients of these documents were those Bukharan Shi‘i tradesmen who sought to legally have dealings with their counterparts of different faith on Shi‘i jurisprudential grounds, for they would have been

facing a new type of multi-religious commercial environment that had emerged in the amirate of Bukhara during its time as a Russian protectorate.

Needless to say, no *madrassa* for Shi‘i Islamic learning existed in Bukhara. Therefore, any Bukharan Shi‘is who set their sights on specialized sectarian learning had to go abroad to the main region of Shi‘ism to access and enjoy its intellectual resources. However, local *mujtahids* also appeared in Bukhara some time during the late nineteenth century. As their existence became more tangible, the Sunni ‘ulama became more irritated. Apparently, it was this that prompted Sami to pick up his pen again. In the preface to the sequel to “*Mir ‘āt al-yaqīn*,” he bitterly criticizes such *mujtahids*, calling them,

some of the ignorant idiots who, flying a flag of scholarship (‘*ulamā’ī*) and an ensign of mujtahidate (*mujtahidī*), and opening a ledger for teaching and utilizing deceit and duplicity, are now, among this erring sect, showing their followers the road to hell and a way deprived of the mercy and forgiveness of God.⁹⁸

Furthermore, Sami tries to picture the mechanism of the administration of *ta‘ziya-khānas* as being located in several places in the city of Bukhara.

In accordance with the manner of their sect, assigning a *mujtahid* and an impostor to every *ta‘ziya-khāna* and appointing someone *mutavallī* [administrator] of *ta‘ziya-khāna* in order to levy *khums* [one fifth of all gain, to be paid as an income tax] and collect votive offerings, [the Shi‘is] have been fearlessly engaged in exposing vicious customs and publicizing fraudulent slogans [i.e., Shi‘i creedal statements that would be irreconcilable with Sunni tenets].⁹⁹

Thus, the foundations for Shi‘i religious practices were being erected steadily, based on their financial strength, under the supervision of the *mujtahids*. Complaining bitterly that “now almost all state affairs belong to and are entrusted to this sect destined for an evil end,” Sami does not fail to insinuate that this is an unprecedented movement in Bukhara that has developed under the active patronage of Shi‘i dignitaries.¹⁰⁰ It is not clear who these *mujtahids* were. However, there is good reason to assume that among them were those who had enjoyed an opportunity to study in the main centers of Shi‘i learning.¹⁰¹

The fact that Danish wrote “*Mi‘yār al-tadayyun*” at the urging of Mir Badr al-Din (d. 1908), the grand *qāzī* of Bukhara,¹⁰² suggests that the Sunni–Shi‘i relationship at that time was somewhat tense and had already started to assume a political character. In the preface, Danish explains the substance of the work.

This is a treatise that discusses restoring the concord between hateful Shi‘is and sublime Sunnis (*shī‘a-‘i shanī‘a va sunnī-yi saniyya*) and explains the discord and opposition between both sects so that they are encouraged to assist one another.¹⁰³

In this work, Danish draws a comparison between Sunnism, Shi‘ism, Judaism, and Christianity to “specify and ascertain the religion of truth,” as well as to “exhibit the way of the true God,”¹⁰⁴ introducing a number of episodes concerning religious figures of each faith and their sayings and actions. He also says that if one “understands the excellence and defects of one’s faith, then one endeavors to avoid and shun an evil sect and a bad religion.”¹⁰⁵ The work as a whole is written from a philosophical point of view.

However, his views on Shi‘ism do not appear to be free from preconceptions. It is obvious that he unfavorably regarded the Shi‘is involvement in politics. Danish evolves his theory as follows:

In whatever country Shi‘ism became prevalent, there appeared rebellion, calamity, baseness, and hypocrisy; it [i.e., Shi‘ism] was a cause for the decline of the kingdom. Whenever the supremacy of the Shi‘is occurred in a region, it was inevitably followed by the predominance of infidels. The Shi‘is’ ascendancy is, so to speak, nothing less than a warning and a signifier of the supremacy of infidels.¹⁰⁶

It goes without saying that this theory should be applied to the Russian conquest as well. He adds that “Russia’s conquest of Transoxiana was realized by means of the exaltation of the Shi‘is” in the amirate of Bukhara. The work “*Mi‘yār al-tadayyun*” was possibly expected to serve as a theoretical framework for protest against the then-Shi‘i establishment represented by Grand Vizier Mulla Jan Mirza Qoshbegi as well as Grand Treasurer Astanaqul-biy Divanbegi.

Latent anti-Shi‘i feeling amidst such atmosphere may have been amplified by the revelation of gross misconduct by a Shi‘i state financier. A search of archival documents reveals that, in early 1898, Mulla Muhammad Gavhar Divanbegi, who had served for years as the keeper of the treasury under Astanaqul-biy Divanbegi, was found guilty and arrested on the orders of the amir for embezzling large sums of government money (reportedly 479,666 rubles) that had been secretly brought, over the course of several years, from Bukhara to his hometown of Mashhad by his brother, who lived in Mashhad but who would often visit Bukhara and each time carry off misappropriated money and valuables.¹⁰⁷ In this case, there was apparently also suspicion against Astanaqul himself, who was, as it turned out, found innocent of participation in this financial abuse, yet was obliged to officially account in writing for the whole story of this misconduct to the Russian authorities, who regarded it as a very serious affair.¹⁰⁸

As can be easily imagined, the Bukharan government was then facing a dilemma over the issue of sectarianism. Certainly, the amirate, which would have customarily presented itself as a distinct Sunni state was actually under the control of several Shi‘is. An avowal of Shi‘ism or overt sectarianism by the government, however, would have immediately invited severe denunciation from the Sunni ‘ulama. Even an indication of the performance of the *ta‘ziya* ritual was never neglected by them, and it became an object of condemnation. Thus, for the time being there was no official permission granted by the government for performing Shi‘i

rituals publicly.¹⁰⁹ In fact, while the grand *qāzī* Badr al-Din was alive, he kept Shi‘i public religious activities under strict observation. After his death in April 1908, however, the situation changed considerably. Astanaqul-biy Qoshbegi, the grand vizier, granted the Shi‘is permission to openly celebrate the festival of ‘*āshūrā*.¹¹⁰ Accordingly, at the beginning of Muharram 1327 (January 1909), the Shi‘is performed the ritual of ‘*āshūrā* openly in the city, which offended Sunni ‘ulama, who regarded it with antipathy and with the view that it was unlawful.

At this time, presuming this celebration was a *bid‘at*, some of the Sunnis were determined to prohibit it by requesting a *fatvā* from Damulla Ikram, a renowned *mufī* known for his scholarship and justice. However, Damulla Ikram rejected their request. He first enumerated the *bid‘ats* among the Sunnis, and then said, “eventually, if we tried to remove the ritual of *ta‘ziya* without remedying these unlawful affairs and *bid‘ats* among us, this would not at all be beneficial to God, but would only be a tribute to fanaticism.”¹¹¹ While Damulla Ikram did not deny that the *ta‘ziya* ritual was a *bid‘at*, he thought it important to first eliminate all *bid‘ats* in practice among the Sunnis.

On Muharram 10, 1328 (January 22, 1910), bloodshed between Sunnis and Shi‘is broke out in Bukhara. This was directly caused by an insult delivered by a group of *madrasa* students to the Shi‘i procession being held to celebrate the festival of ‘*āshūrā*. It developed into a large-scale riot involving a number of casualties and was finally suppressed by Russian troops dispatched to the city. As a result, Grand Vizier Astanaqul-biy Qoshbegi was dismissed from office along with several of his fellow Shi‘i officials.¹¹²

This event created a great sensation within and beyond the Russian Empire, with the emergence of a number of articles and reports in Muslim newspapers and periodicals, such as *Turkistān vilāyatīnīng gazīti* [Gazette of the Turkistan Region] (Tashkent), *Burhān-i taraqqī* [Proof of progress] (Astrakhan), *Vaqt* [Time] and *Shūrā* [Consultation] (Orenburg), *Bayān al-ḥaqq* [Declaration of truth] (Kazan), *Mullā Naṣr al-Dīn* (Tiflis), *Tarjumān* [Interpreter] (Bakhchisarai), and *Ṣīrāt-i mustaqīm* [Straight path] (Istanbul). In its tone, the Muslim journalism tends to criticize the Bukharan Sunni ‘ulama’s fanaticism and tends to stand up for the oppressed Shi‘is in Bukhara.

Broadly speaking, as far as local contemporary sources are concerned, we can see a tendency to emphasize the “heretical” nature of the Shi‘is, and some works in fact explicitly present very negative views of Shi‘ism, using the derogatory and denunciatory words of *kuffār* or *kafara* [infidels], *ravāfiṣ* [apostates], *ahl-i bid‘at* [heretical people], *mal‘ūnān* [cursed people], *i‘tizāliyān* or *mu‘tazila* [secessionists], and so on to describe them.¹¹³ This, of course, may have been purely rhetorical, but it does reflect an established prejudice against Shi‘ism, rather than against Shi‘is themselves. For example, Sharifjan Makhdum, or Sadr-i Ziya (1867–1932), who was the grand *qāzī* of Bukhara in 1917 and a famous compiler of *tazkiras*, could not help criticizing Majnun for expressing a Shi‘i creed that was reflected in the latter’s poems as well, while favorably evaluating this poet’s literary endowments.¹¹⁴

A relatively “reserved” attitude may be noticed in the writings of the Bukharan Shi‘is on the issue of beliefs,¹¹⁵ in contrast to the “aggressive” character of the

Sunni writings. In the preface to his *hajjnāma*, for instance, Vazih carefully declared that he would try to report everything he saw and heard as it really was, “regardless of sectarian formality and artificiality as well as religious partisanship.”¹¹⁶ However, as Sadr-i Ziya described Shar‘i as “manifest proof [of faith] for the Shi‘is (*bar shī‘iyān hujjat-i bāhira*)”¹¹⁷ and related that he was famous among people for his “accusations (*si‘āyatgarī*),”¹¹⁸ Shar‘i indeed discussed religious matters quite frankly and resolutely.¹¹⁹ In his *tazkira*, Shar‘i argues in support of his fellow sectarian Vazih:

Because of his Iranian and Indian ethnic origin, people today do not address him with any title nor do they hope for his promotion. They favor neither accepting him nor consulting him. Above all, most of those who are unaware and ignorant [of the truth] are blind and most of those who are brainless praters presume to reproach and slander people like him as a source of self-satisfaction and lead simple-hearted novices astray. They presume his devotion to Twelver Shi‘ism and Imamism (*iṣnā-‘ashariyyatash va imāmiyyatash*) as a reason for slandering the absolute text [the Qur‘an] even though our [Bukharan Sunni] ‘ulama quote words and attestations from a number of different scholars and follow numerous agreed propositions. Such contentions and baseless stories can neither detract from his scholarly endowments nor slander his perfect qualities, for faith in God and scientific perfection are not bound to each other, unless it is the universal custom and natural condition of every region and contemporary people that every group of foreigners and aliens neither retains their own religion as an object of respect nor regards it as an anchorage of dignity.¹²⁰

It can be said from this that Shar‘i tried to rationally rebut the Sunni slanderers who discriminated against and cast aspersions upon Vazih merely for his extraction and his devotion to Shi‘ism, and that he had the intention of defending the rights of Shi‘is as a religious minority in light of the contemporary world situation. In this connection, Shar‘i enjoyed a good opportunity to get information about the outside world, since he not only made *hajj*, but stayed to study in India for many years before coming back to Bukhara.¹²¹

After the riot of 1910, on behalf of “the twenty thousand” Shi‘is in the amirate of Bukhara, the *mujtahid* Hajji Mir ‘Ali¹²² implored the governor-general of Turkistan, A. V. Samsonov (adm. 1909–13), to order the amir to properly accept the Shi‘is as his subjects and to protect them against possible offences from the Sunnis.¹²³ The uneasy atmosphere, however, was unlikely to have cleared up quickly. The Russian authorities continued to be deeply concerned about the latent, ongoing tensions between the two sects.¹²⁴ In 1916, the Russian Political Agency urgently demanded that the Bukharan government take strict action against the public performance of *ta‘ziya* during the days of *‘āshūrā* by Shi‘is, including *ahl-i parsīyān* (subjects of Iran), in Bukhara and other cities in the amirate.¹²⁵ According to an official report submitted to Grand Vizier Mirza Nasr Allah-biy Qoshbegi (adm. 1910–17), Hajji Mir ‘Ali was then put in charge of Shi‘is celebrating the

'*āshūrā* festival privately indoors, based on permission from the grand vizier.¹²⁶ Thus it is apparent that public practice and observance of Shi'ism in Bukhara was again placed under strict watch – effectively, prohibition – after the sectarian conflict of 1910.

Concluding remarks

Deprived of the right to confess their faith in Shi'ism and to perform its rituals openly under the Sunni-centric ideology of the Manghit amirs, the Shi'i Muslims in Bukhara were obliged to practice *taqiyya* for decades. It was the political change caused by the Russian Empire's expansion into Central Asia that led to a transformation in this framework of religious oppression. That is to say, it was not until Bukhara was a Russian protectorate that the Bukharan Shi'is started to abandon *taqiyya*, although they did not do this all at once. In this process, facilities for their religious practices, such as *ta'ziya-khāna*, were established in Bukhara, and even some *mujtahids* emerged as leaders of the followers of Shi'ism there. Late nineteenth-century Bukhara witnessed an "emergence," as it were, of the Shi'i community. Apparently, their group identity as a religious minority was further strengthened through increasing ties with the heartland of Shi'ism and under the aegis of Shi'i officials in the central government.

There existed, however, negative stereotypes of Shi'ism, which were deep-rooted in Bukharan society, above all, among the Sunni 'ulama. It was natural, therefore, that the more tangible the things associated with Shi'ism became, the more severely that that sect would be criticized. This also aroused fractious dispute between the two sects. The sectarian relationship in Bukhara, meanwhile, had the potential to be harmed by abuses of power by Shi'i high officials, whose increasing political and economic influence was associated by the Sunni 'ulama with the presence and rule of the Russian Empire as a matter of course. In the general context of all this, the 1910 conflict—its background, course, results, and significance—seems to require further detailed consideration from a long-term historical perspective.

As is shown in a remark by 'Abd al-Ra'uf Fitrat (1886–1938) that "this incident [in 1910] must be explained with complete neutrality,"¹²⁷ an explicit difference between older and younger generations of Bukharan 'ulama in their views on sectarian matters can be observed. This may be demonstrated by the accounts of another representative of a new generation, Sadr al-Din 'Ayni (1878–1954). According to 'Ayni, it was soon after the 1910 conflict and through the medium of newspapers and journals as well as the activities of the young people that there began to appear a growing tendency to try to remove sectarianism as well as other social problems in Bukhara. At this germ of the Young Bukharan movement, "both Sunnis and Shi'is started to live together like brothers very quickly."¹²⁸ One may, however, read some idealization in the last passage. In this sense, a better understanding of the issues yet to be addressed concerning Sunni–Shi'i relations in Bukhara will be gained by a combination of closer reading and proper contextualization of works by the authors of such different generations.

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Notes

- 1 O. A. Sukhareva, *K istorii gorodov Bukharskogo khanstva* (Tashkent, 1958); idem, *Bukhara: XIX–nachalo XX v. (Pozdnefeodal'nyi gorod i ego naselenie)* (Moscow, 1966); idem, *Kvartal'naia obshchina pozdnefeodal'nogo goroda Bukhary (V sviazi s istoriei kvartalov)* (Moscow, 1976).
- 2 Sukhareva, *Bukhara*, 154–162.
- 3 The issue of Shi‘i minorities in Sunni states would certainly be an intriguing and challenging subject of study, and we have some examples of such study in Alessandro Monsutti et al., eds., *The Other Shiites: From the Mediterranean to Central Asia* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2007).
- 4 Sukhareva, *Bukhara*, 160.
- 5 Another ethnic term to be noted is *parsiyān* (pl. *parsiyān-hā*), which was probably derived from the Russian word *persiianin* (pl. *persiiane*), i.e., Persian. It is very possible that the term *parsiyān* passed into local usage after Bukhara became a Russian protectorate and was used to refer to the residents from Iran, who came to stay in the amirate of Bukhara or Russian Turkistan in general for commercial or other purposes.
- 6 Mir Abdoul Kerim Boukhary, *Histoire de l'Asie Centrale (Afghanistan, Boukhara, Khiva, Khoqand)*, ed. and trans. Charles Schefer, vol. 1 (Paris, 1876; repr., Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1970), 59–63 [Persian text]; Muḥammad Ya‘qūb Bukhārī, *Risāla*, Institut vostochnykh rukopisei Rossiiskoi akademii nauk (IVR RAN), MS no. C 1934, fol. 6b. For more details see Anke von Kügelgen, *Die Legitimierung der mittelasiatischen Mangitendynastie in den Werken ihrer Historiker (18.–19. Jahrhundert)* (Istanbul: Orient-Institut, 2002), 353–359.
- 7 Sukhareva, *Bukhara*, 156.
- 8 Alexander Burnes, *Travels into Bokhara*, vol. I (London: John Murray, 1834), 344.
- 9 N. V. Khanykov, *Opisanie Bukharskogo khanstva* (St. Petersburg, 1843), 70–71.
- 10 Georges de Meyendorff, *Voyage d'Orenbourg à Boukhara* (Paris: Dondey-Dupré père et fils, 1826), 155.
- 11 Abdoul Kerim Boukhary, *Histoire de l'Asie Centrale*, 64 [Persian text].
- 12 Muḥammad Ya‘qūb, *Risāla*, fol. 6b.
- 13 Khumūlī, [*Ta‘rikh-i Khumūlī*], Institut vostoovedeniia Akademii nauk Respubliki Uzbekistan (IVAN RUZ), MS no. 37/VI, fol. 237a; Kügelgen, *Die Legitimierung*, 359.
- 14 Khumūlī, [*Ta‘rikh-i Khumūlī*], fols. 234a–236a.
- 15 Al-Ḥājj Zayn al-‘Abidin Shīrvānī, *Bustān al-siyāḥa* (Tehran, 1338 HSh [1959/60]), 161.
- 16 In a report submitted to the Qajarid government, he mentions “Ḥusayn-khān Īrānī,” the amir’s governor of Qarakol, who “really holds in hand his own faith [i.e., Shi‘ism], but practices *taqīyya*.” See [‘Abbāsquī-khān Sartīp Kurd], *Safar-nāma-i Bukhārā (‘aṣr-i Muḥammad-shāh Qājār): 1259–1260 HQ* (Tehran, 1373 HSh [1994/95]), 31.
- 17 Khanykov, *Opisanie Bukharskogo khanstva*, 71.
- 18 Arminius Vámbéry, *Travels in Central Asia* (London: John Murray, 1864), 371.

- 19 Mohan Lal, *Travels in the Panjab, Afghanistan, & Turkistan, to Balk, Bokhara, and Herat* (London: Wm. H. Allen, 1846), 129.
- 20 For the cultural intercourse between Sunnis and Shi‘is in the two neighboring regions in the seventeenth century, see Robert D. McChesney, “‘Barrier of Heterodoxy?’ Rethinking the Ties between Iran and Central Asia in the 17th Century,” in Charles Melville, ed., *Safavid Persia: The History and Politics of an Islamic Society* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), 231–267.
- 21 Mīrzā Mahdī-khān Astarābādī, *Jahāngushā-yi Nādirī* (Tehran, 1341 HSh [1962]), 359.
- 22 Muḥammad Kāzīm, *Nāme-ii ‘ālamārā-ii nādirī* (*Miroukrashaiushchaia nadirova kniga*), ed. N. D. Miklukho-Maklai, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1965), fol. 285a.
- 23 Khwāja ‘Abd al-Karīm b. Khwāja ‘Āqibat-maḥmūd Kashmīrī, *Bayān-i vāqi‘* (Lahore, 1970), 76–77, 89.
- 24 Meyendorff, *Voyage d’Orenbourg*, 285.
- 25 Sukhareva, *Bukhara*, 159.
- 26 Joseph Wolff, *Narrative of a Mission to Bokhara, in the Years 1843–1845* (London: John W. Parker, 1845), vol. 1: 328; vol. 2: 125, 194.
- 27 For instance, see Burnes, *Travels into Bokhara* 1: 342–345; Khanykov, *Opisanie Bukharskogo khanstva*, 70–71; Wolff, *Narrative of a Mission* 1: 326–328; Vámbéry, *Travels in Central Asia*, 180, 370–371.
- 28 Burnes, *Travels into Bokhara* 1: 275–276.
- 29 Vámbéry, *Travels in Central Asia*, 371.
- 30 Abdoul Kerim Boukhary, *Histoire de l’Asie Centrale*, 67 [Persian text]; Wolff, *Narrative of a Mission* 1: 327; Vámbéry, *Travels in Central Asia*, 189–190; P. Shubinskii, *Ocherki Bukhary* (St. Petersburg, 1892), 4.
- 31 Aḥmad Makhdūm Dānish, *Risāla yā mukhtaṣarī az ta’rīkh-i salṭanat-i khānadān-i manghitiyya*, ed. ‘Abd al-Ghanī Mīrzāyif (Stalinabad, 1960), 32.
- 32 Khanykov, *Opisanie Bukharskogo khanstva*, 182.
- 33 Dānish, *Risāla yā mukhtaṣarī*, 86.
- 34 A. L. Troitskaia, “Voennoe delo v Bukhara v pervoi polovine XIX veka,” in *Sbornik statei po istorii i filologii narodov Srednei Azii, posviashchennyi 80-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia A. A. Semenova* (Stalinabad, 1953), 212–213.
- 35 *Ibid.*, 214; [‘Abbāsqli-khān], *Safar-nāma*, 53; Wolff, *Narrative of a Mission* 2: 44; Sayyid Aḥmad-khwāja Naqīb, [Siyāhat-nāma], IVAN Ruz, MS no. 4292, fol. 48a.
- 36 Khanykov, *Opisanie Bukharskogo khanstva*, 71.
- 37 Dānish, *Risāla yā mukhtaṣarī*, 86–87.
- 38 Generally, under the Manghits, the grand vizier was known by the title of *kull-i qūshbīgī* (in the early period) or *qūshbīgī-yi bālā* (in the late period).
- 39 Such situation is also fully affirmed by a trustworthy account in L. Kostenko, *Sredniia Aziia i vodvorenii v nei russkoi grazhdanstvennosti* (St. Petersburg, 1871), 46.
- 40 The primary meaning of the Arabic/Persian adjective *sharīf* is “noble,” but it may be more accurate to translate it as “holy” when used as an epithet for Bukhara. This idea seems to be current in its own way among the present local population, too.
- 41 V. V. Vel’iaminov-Zernov, “Monety bukharskie i khivinskie,” *Trudy Vostochnogo otdeleniia Imperatorskogo Russkogo arkhelogicheskogo obschestva* 4 (1859): 413; E. A. Davidovich, *Istoriia monetnogo dela Srednei Azii XVII–XVIII vv. (Zolotyie i serebrianye monety Dzhanidov)* (Dushanbe, 1964), 164, 179; R. Z. Burnasheva, “Monety Bukharskogo khanstva pri Mangytakh (seredina XVIII–nachalo XX v.),” *Epigrafika Vostoka* 18 (1967): 120, ill. 1. As to when Bukhara was given the epithet, we have a concise remark in Maria Eva Subtelný, “The Making of *Bukhārā-yi sharīf*: Scholars and Libraries in Medieval Bukhara (The Library of Khwāja Muḥammad Pārsā),” in Devin DeWeese, ed., *Studies on Central Asian History in Honor of Yuri Bregel* (Bloomington: Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, Indiana University, 2001), 79 n. 2.

- 42 Hamid Algar, “A Brief History of the Naqshbandī Order,” in Marc Gaborieau et al., eds., *Naqshbandis* (Istanbul: Institut Français d’Études Anatoliennes d’Istanbul, 1990), 22–23.
- 43 Anke von Kügelgen, “Die Entfaltung der Naqshbandīya muğaddidīya im mittleren Transoxanien vom 18. bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts: Ein Stück Detektivarbeit,” in Anke von Kügelgen et al., eds., *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries*, vol. 2 (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1998), 103; idem, *Die Legitimierung*, 349–350.
- 44 Komatsu Hisao, “Bukhara and Kazan,” *Acta Asiatica* 86 (2004): 83–84.
- 45 Kügelgen, *Die Legitimierung*, 354–355.
- 46 Mīrī [Mīr Ḥusayn], *Makhāzin al-taqvā*, IVAN RUz, MS no. 51, fols. 51b, 69a–b. The author would like to thank Dr. A. von Kügelgen for kindly directing him to these accounts.
- 47 Burnasheva, “Monety Bukharskogo khanstva,” 125.
- 48 TsGA RUz (Central State Archive of the Republic of Uzbekistan), f. I-126, op. 1, d. 3, ll. 2, 4; f. I-323, op. 1, d. 1295, passim; Bukharskii gosudarstvennyi arkhitekturno-khudozhestvennyi muzei-zapovednik, document no. 10997/11. Apparently, the same motto was inscribed on Shahmurad’s seat, although the English translation by Malcolm seems to be a mistranslation. John Malcolm, *History of Persia*, vol. 2, rev. ed. (London: John Murray, [1829]), 173.
- 49 For instance, see TsGA RUz, f. I-126, op. 1, d. 4, l. 9; d. 5, ll. 5, 6; d. 6, ll. 3, 7, 11, 16, 17, 19–22; d. 7, ll. 1, 2.
- 50 [*Munsha‘āt va manshūrāt*], IVAN RUz, MS no. 299/I, fol. 61b; Mehmet Saray, *Rus İşgali Devrinde Osmanlı Devleti İle Türkistan Hanlıkları Arasındaki Siyasi Münasibetler (1775–1875)* (Ankara, 1994), 26.
- 51 Ibid., 24.
- 52 Rizāqulī-khān Hidāyat, *Mulḥaqāt-i tārikh-i ravzat al-ṣafā-yi nāshirī*, j. 9 (Tehran, 1339 HSh [1960/61]), 499–500.
- 53 [‘Abbāsquī-khān], *Safar-nāma*, 52; Wolff, *Narrative of a Mission* 2: 129–130.
- 54 *Travels and Adventures of the Rev. Joseph Wolff*, vol. 1 (London: Saunders, Otley, 1860), 460.
- 55 Vámbéry, *Travels in Central Asia*, 193, 436; Anonym, *Zafar-nāma-i khusravī* (Tehran, 1377 HSh [1999]), 241.
- 56 A. A. Semenov, “Bukharskii traktat o chinakh i zvaniikh i ob obiazannostiakh nositelei ikh v srednevekovoï Bukhare,” *Sovetskoe vostokovedenie* 5 (1948): 137–153; idem, *Ocherk ustroistva tsentral’nogo administrativnogo upravleniia Bukharskogo khanstva pozdneishego vremeni* (Stalinabad, 1954).
- 57 *Zapiski o Bukharskom khanstve (Otchety P. I. Demezona i I. V. Vitkevicha)* (Moscow, 1983), 59.
- 58 Burnes, *Travels into Bokhara* 1: 283.
- 59 Probably, this figure can be identified with “the heretical *mujtahid* from Mashhad, called Darvīsh Ishāq” whose execution in Bukhara is related in Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm Sāmī, *Mir‘āt al-yaqīn fī radd al-ravāfiṣ al-shayāṭīn*, Bukharskaia oblastnaia biblioteka (BOB), MS no. 70, pp. 241–243 [fols. 125b–126b].
- 60 Aḥmad Makhdūm Dānish, *Mi‘yār al-tadayyun*, IVAN RUz, MS No. 553, fol. 4a–b.
- 61 TsGA RUz, f. I-1, op. 34, d. 8, l. 177ob.
- 62 Mīrzā ‘Abd al-‘Azīm Sāmī, *Tuḥfa-i shāhī*, IVAN RUz, MS no. 2091, fol. 219b.
- 63 Mullā Kamāl al-Dīn, [*Risāla-i Mullā Kamāl al-Dīn*], IVR RAN, MS no. C 1690, fols. 4a–6b.
- 64 Seymour Becker, *Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 320–321.
- 65 S. P. Pokrovskii, “Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia Rossii i Bukhary v dorevoliutsionnoe vremia i pri Sovetskoi vlasti, do natsional’nogo razmezhevaniia sredne-aziatskikh

- respublik: Chast' 2," *Biulleten' Sredne-aziatskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta* 17 (1928): 32.
- 66 Becker, *Russia's Protectorates*, 88.
- 67 TsGA RUz, f. I-126, op. 1, d. 188, ll. 1–37.
- 68 V. V. Krestovskii, *V gostiakh u emira bukharskogo* (St. Petersburg, 1887), 279.
- 69 *Ibid.*, 229–236, 292–297.
- 70 *Ibid.*, 292. In Khoroshkhin's work we find a similar episode in which one of the Bukharan grand viziers, a certain Hakim, concealed his slave extraction and pretended to be of the Alchin, an Uzbek tribe. A. P. Khoroshkhin, "Narody Srednei Azii (Istoriko-etnograficheskie etudy)," in *Sbornik statei, kasaiushchikhsia do Turkestanskogo kraia A. P. Khoroshkhina* (St. Petersburg, 1876), 507. This figure probably can be identified as Muhammad Hakim-biy Qoshbegi, about whose origin Mohan Lal sounds somewhat concordant with Khoroshkhin: "... This policy, of liking the Persians, is not agreeable to the inhabitants of Bokhara, who secretly call their Qosh Begi a Qizal Bash slave, and not a real Uzbek." Lal, *Travels in the Panjab*, 139.
- 71 Sāmī, *Mir 'āt al-yaqīn*, 8–9 [fol. 9a–b].
- 72 *Ibid.*, 10–11 [fol. 10a–b].
- 73 This title is the revised one that appears at the beginning of the table of contents of the work, prepared later by the author himself (fol. 5b), as well as in the preface to the sequel (p. 220 [fol. 115a]). In the text, the title is given as "*Mir 'āt al-yaqīn va rujūman li-l-shayā'īn al-māridīn*" ["The mirror of faith and the stones for punishing the refractory Satans"] (p. 11 [fol. 10b]). The Arabic phrase "*rujūman li-l-shayā'īn*" is a quotation from the Qur'an (67:5). The work also seems to have had another different version of the title: "*Maṣābīh al-yaqīn va rujūman li-ravāfiẓ al-shayā'īn*" ["The lamps of faith and the stones for punishing the satanic apostates"] (fol. 5a).
- 74 Sāmī, *Mir 'āt al-yaqīn*, 9 [fol. 9b].
- 75 *Ibid.*, 217 [fol. 113b].
- 76 Judging from a *ta'rikh* chronogram giving the year 1315, which was written by the author himself into the margin of *ibid.*, 225 [fol. 117b].
- 77 *Ibid.*, 257 [fol. 133b].
- 78 Dānish, *Mi 'yār al-tadayyun*, fols. 4b–5a.
- 79 Mīrzā 'Abdal'azīm Sāmī, *Ta'rikh-i salāṭīn-i manghūīya (Istoriia mangytskikh gosudarej)*, ed. and trans. L. M. Epifanova (Moscow, 1962), fols. 107b–108a; Sadridin Ainī, "Ta'rikhi amironi manghitiyai Bukhoro," in *Kulliyot*, jildi 10 (Dushanbe, 1966), 106–107.
- 80 Sāmī, *Ta'rikh-i salāṭīn*, fol. 107b.
- 81 Krestovskii, *V gostiakh*, 233–234.
- 82 Shubinskii, *Ocherki Bukhary*, 24–25.
- 83 TsGA RUz, f. I-126, op. 1, d. 193, l. 2.
- 84 Becker, *Russia's Protectorates*, 138–139.
- 85 TsGA RUz, f. I-3, op. 1, d. 271, ll. 8–10.
- 86 Muḥammad Ma'ṣūm Shīrāzī Nā'ib al-Ṣadr [Ma'ṣūm-'alī-shāh], *Ṭarā'iq al-ḥaqā'iq*, j. 3 (Tehran, [1345 HSh (1966/67)]), 685.
- 87 *Ibid.*, 690.
- 88 H. W. Bellew, *From the Indus to the Tigris: A Narrative of a Journey through the Countries of Balochistan, Afghanistan, Khorassan and Iran, in 1872* (London: Trübner, 1874), 459.
- 89 As to the *tazkīras* of Vazīh and Shar'ī, see R. Khadi-zade, *Istochniki k izucheniiu tadzhikskoi literatury vtoroi poloviny XIX veka* (Stalinabad, 1956), 17–48.
- 90 Qārī Raḥmat Allāh Vāzīh, *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb fī tazkirat al-aṣḥāb* (Tashkent, 1332 AH [1913/14]), 238.
- 91 More than twenty years later, he published a collection of poems dedicated to 'Alī, entitled "*Ifṭīṭāh-i dīvān-i manāqib dar taḥmūd-i ḥazrat-i bārī va . . . 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib*" [Introduction to a poetic collection of virtues in praise of God and . . . 'Alī b. Abī

- Talib], in Mashhad in 1310/1892-93. O. P. Shcheglova, *Katalog litografirovannykh knig na persidskom iazyke v sobranii Leningradskogo otdeleniia Instituta vostokovedeniia AN SSSR*, chast' 2 (Moscow, 1975), 528.
- 92 Hājji ‘Abd al-‘Azīm Shar‘ī, [*Tazkirat al-fuḏalā’* (*Tazkira-i Hājji ‘Abd al-‘Azīm*)], IVAN RUZ, MS No. 3396/III, fol. 76a–b.
- 93 Ibid., fol. 76a.
- 94 Hājji Qārī Raḥmat Allāh al-Bukhārī [Vāziḥ], *Gharā‘ib al-khabar fī al-‘ajā‘ib al-safar* (*Savānih al-masālik va farāsikh al-mamālik*), IVAN RUZ, MS no. 2336/II, fols. 240b–262b.
- 95 Mīrzā Muḥammad Sharīf Ṣadr Ziyā’, *Tazkirat al-ḥumaqā’* (*Zikr-i chahār nafar ‘ulamā’-i davr-i ākhir*), Institut vostokovedeniia i pis’mennogo nasledii Akademii nauk Respubliki Tadjikistan (IVPN AN RT), MS no. 230/V, fol. 136a.
- 96 BOB, documents nos. 546/460–554/468. See also Bahadır Kazakov, *Bukharan Documents: The Collection in the District Library, Bukhara*, trans. Jürgen Paul (Berlin: Verlag Das Arab, 2001), 38–39.
- 97 BOB, document no. 548/462.
- 98 Sāmī, *Mir ‘āt al-yaqīn*, 220 [fol. 115a].
- 99 Ibid., 244 [fol. 127a].
- 100 Among the firsts on the list of such dignitaries must have been the grand treasurer, Astanaqul-biy Divanbegi. In fact, one of the Russian officials speculated that Astanaqul-biy could have been involved in the Shi‘is’ unofficial economic activities, including their offering of financial support to fellow sectarian pilgrims; the official stated that “it is also possible to assume that he [i.e., Astanaqul-biy], taking advantage of his present position, could exercise influence not only on the levies from Shi‘is in the form of ‘khums’ but also on expenditures for pilgrimages to Mecca, Medina, and Karbala.” TsGA RUZ, f. I-3, op. 1, d. 127, l. 1. The above-quoted passage appears in a secret letter dispatched from the Diplomatic Division of the Turkistan Governor-Generalship to the Russian Political Agent in New Bukhara at the end of 1897.
- 101 There were indeed such scholars. One was Hājji Mirza ‘Abd al-Karim Marvazi, a Bukharan Marvi, mentioned by his fellow sectarian (who was in Bukhara in 1898) as *sharī‘at-madār*, i.e., a center of *sharī‘at*. He “has a house of good taste, furnished with an excellent library; he studied for long in *amākin-i musharrafa* [sacred Shi‘i sites], and accomplished the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina; he has no child, but does show great opulence.” Shīrāzī, *Tarā‘iq al-ḥaqā‘iq* 3: 692.
- 102 Dānish, *Mi‘yār al-tadayyun*, fol. 136a.
- 103 Ibid., fol. 2b.
- 104 Ibid., fol. 6a–b.
- 105 Ibid., fol. 6a.
- 106 Ibid., fol. 5a.
- 107 This affair is related with regret by Muhammad Ma‘sum Shirazi in his travel journal, too. Shīrāzī, *Tarā‘iq al-ḥaqā‘iq* 3: 674–675, 686–687.
- 108 TsGA RUZ, f. I-3, op. 1, d. 127, ll. 52–55ob.
- 109 In Bukhara and Khiva, public prayer was still forbidden to Shi‘is around the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I. I. Geier, *Putevoditel’ po Turkestanu* (Tashkent, 1901), 29. Given Vazih’s utterance that “in our country during the days of Muharram the mourning and *ta‘ziya* of the oppressed Imam [Husayn] is held in several places with participation of men and women by the order of our monarch,” one can assume that the *ta‘ziya* ritual may have then been practiced with the tacit permission of the amir, provided it was performed privately. Vazih reported stating the above-quoted words in his conversation with “Sayyid Javād,” who was the *mutavallī* and *kalīd-dār* [keyholder] of the shrine of Imam Husayn in Karbala, on the occasion of Vazih’s visit there at the end of 1886. Vāziḥ, *Gharā‘ib al-khabar*, fol. 246a.
- 110 TsGA RUZ, f. I-1, op. 11, d. 653a, l. 3.
- 111 Ṣadr al-Dīn ‘Aynī, *Bukhārā inqilābīning ta‘rīkhī*, ed. Shimada Shizuo and Sharifa

- Tosheva (Tokyo: Department of Islamic Area Studies, Center for Evolving Humanities, The University of Tokyo, 2010), 73.
- 112 For a general description of the event, see ‘Aynī, *Bukhārā inqilābīning ta’rikhī*, 71–81; Fitrat, *Davrai hukmronii amir Olimkhon* (Dushanbe, 1991), 18–26. As to the course of this event, we have some special references and monographs already published as follows, yet this issue nevertheless needs further investigation and consideration: A. Kh. Khamraev, “K voprosu o ianvarskikh sobytiakh 1910 goda v Bukhare,” *Trudy Sredneaziatskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta im. V. I. Lenina*, Novaia seriia, vyp. 57 (1954): 65–75; T. G. Tukhtametov, *Russko-bukharskie otnosheniia v kontse XIX–nachale XX v.* (Tashkent, 1966), 83–99; Stéphane A. Dudoignon, “La question scolaire à Boukhara et au Turkestan russe, du ‘premier renouveau’ à la soviétisation (fin du XVIII^e siècle–1937),” *Cahiers du Monde russe* 37, nos. 1–2 (1996): 171–172; Adeeb Khalid, “Society and Politics in Bukhara, 1868–1920,” *Central Asian Survey* 19, nos. 3–4 (2000): 378–379; Valery A. Germanov, “Shiite-Sunnite Conflict of 1910 in the Bukhara Khanate,” *Oriente moderno*, n.s., 26, no. 1 (2007): 117–140.
- 113 For instance, see Mullā Maḥmūd-khwāja Baljuvānī Khuttalānī, *Dāstān-i jang-i irāniyān bā ahl-i ‘ulūm-i Bukhārā-yi sharīf*, IVAN RUz, MS no. 4309, fols. 1b–26b; Mullā ‘Alī-khwāja Šudūr [Mahjūr], *Tašvir-i jang-i shī‘ī va sunnī*, IVPN AN RT, MS no. 1243/IX, fols. 120b–121a; ‘Ālim-khwāja b. Mīrzā Sayyid-khwāja Mushrif Bukhārā‘ī, [*Ta’rikh-i amirān-i manghit-i Bukhārā*], IVPN AN RT, MS no. 2354/IV, fols. 673b–677b.
- 114 Sharīfjān Makhdūm Šadr Zīyā’, *Tazkār-i ash‘ār*, ed. Muḥammadjān Shakūrī Bukhārā‘ī (Tehran, 1380 HSh [2001]), 213–214.
- 115 Into some phrases in his poem, quoted by Sadr Ziya, we may read a kind of defensive justification by Vazīh of his extraction and faith. For example, Vazīh lamentably declares to certain of his Sunni companions: “if you say, ‘there is a defect in your sect,’ it is nothing but a slander, a calumny against me.” Šadr Zīyā’, *Tazkār-i ash‘ār*, 231, 234–235.
- 116 Vāzih, *Gharā‘ib al-khabar*, fol. 158a.
- 117 Šadr Zīyā’, *Tazkār-i ash‘ār*, 121.
- 118 [Sharīfjān Makhdūm Šadr Zīyā’], *Rūznāma-‘i šadr-i Zīyā’*, ed. Muḥammadjān Shakūrī Bukhārā‘ī (Tehran, 1382 HSh [2003/04]), 129.
- 119 In his *tazkīra*, Shar‘ī made some critical comments on Danish’s interpretation of the *sharī‘a* and his writing. Shar‘ī, [*Tazkīrat al-fuḍalā’*], fol. 72a. Although it is not clear exactly what point made Danish so angry, the latter wrote a poem on Shar‘ī’s *tazkīra*, which contains the following phrases: “That book caught a wise man’s eye and he said, ‘right now shave off the beard of both the praiser and the praised [for authoring the book, i.e., Shar‘ī].’” Šadr Zīyā’, *Tazkār-i ash‘ār*, 121.
- 120 Shar‘ī, [*Tazkīrat al-fuḍalā’*], fol. 79a–b.
- 121 Šadr al-Dīn ‘Aynī, *Namūna-‘i adabiyāt-i tājīk*, qism-i 2 (Moscow, 1926), 375.
- 122 He is referred to as *katta mujtahid* [grand *mujtahid*] in an article in the Turkic-language Russian gazette. [Anonym], “Bukhārā-yi sharīfda paydā būlghān bī-tartīblīk khuṣūṣīda,” *Turkistān vilāyatīnīng gazīti*, no. 6, Jan. 21 [Feb. 3], 1910. This *mujtahid* probably can be identified as “Mīrzā ‘Alī Ṭāhiruf,” who is mentioned as *āqsaqāl-i irānī* [the elder of Iranians] in an administrative register of the Bukharan government. TsGA RUz, f. I-126, op. 1, d. 150, ll. 3, 139ob. The record suggests that this *āqsaqāl* was dispatched to Iran on some unknown mission in November 1915.
- 123 TsGA RUz, f. I-1, op. 11, d. 653a, ll. 48–49.
- 124 For example, in the summer of 1913, a secret investigation was made by the Russian public security force into the conduct of a Bukharan Sunni official named “Mīr Šahbā,” who was suspected of plotting to slaughter Shi‘is. This suspicion turned out to be unfounded, but the report does not fail to notice the ugly tension and mutual distrust between the two sects. TsGA RUz, f. I-3, op. 2, d. 150, ll. 26–29ob. A secret letter addressed to a Russian political agent in Bukhara (dated Nov. 13 [Nov. 26], 1915)

reports that Astanaqul, who was then the governor of Khatirchi, started to gather the Shi‘is around him again, which created dissatisfaction among people, including some central government officials. TsGA RUz, f. I-3, op. 2, d. 161, l. 8.

125 TsGA RUz, f. I-126, op. 1, d. 1949, ll. 3–5.

126 Ibid., l. 5.

127 Fitrat, *Davrai hukmronii amir Olimkhon*, 19.

128 ‘Aynī, *Bukhārā inqilābīning ta’rīkhī*, 85–86.

Not for Distribution

10 The open and secret diplomacy of Tsarist and Soviet Russia in Tibet

The role of Agvan Dorzhiev
(1912–1925)

Nikolay TSYREMPILOV

Tibet in the history of the Great Game

The rivalry between Great Britain and Russia in the vastness of Asia, which historians, following the British cavalry officer Arthur Connolly, metaphorically call the Great Game, began in the early eighteenth century and continued until Britain handed power in India to the Indian National Congress. Some specialists are inclined to see differences in the motivations of the two main players in the game. It has been noted more than once that if expansion was an inseparable part of Russia's imperial ambitions, Britain mainly pursued the goal of curtailing Russian ambitions in Asia. Very often Britain's aggressive expansionist policy was dictated by the wish to strengthen her influence over territories adjacent to the British Empire in order to keep Russia from filling the power vacuum. Russia readily realized this peculiarity of British policy in Asia and used it toward her aims, with various degrees of effectiveness.

It is not surprising therefore that the rivalry between these two powers was named the Great Game: the character of the intrigue, in which diplomatic, intelligence, and military tools were deployed, cannot but thrill anyone who has ever investigated its details. For all that, however, very often the specialists pay only partial attention to the contributions of intermediary players. Based on hitherto unknown letters from the Thirteenth Dalai Lama,¹ this chapter considers how these players contributed to the Great Game by focusing on the activities of Agvan Dorzhiev (1854–1938), the chief intermediary in Russian–Tibetan dialogue.

In the middle of the last decade of the nineteenth century, suddenly and surprisingly for both sides, the Russo-British rivalry became focused on Tibet. This geographic shift in the Great Game did not happen accidentally, but was conditioned by a chain of events that in outward appearance were not mutually connected. In 1895, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, who by that time had reached the age of maturity, was officially inaugurated as the head of state in Lhasa. For Tibet this event had special meaning, since it interrupted the protracted period of regency that was accompanied by corruption and substantial degradation of the state apparatus. The Dalai Lama Tubten Gyatso (1876–1933) survived an assassination attempt by parties loyal to the deposed regent. The subsequent arrest of the regent and his

retinue² meant a dramatic change in the young ruler's circle. These events resulted in the unexpected rise of Ngawang Lozang, a monk from Gomang College of Drepung Monastery, who having won the high confidence of the theocratic head of state was becoming one of the most influential figures on the political Olympus of the Snowy Land.

Enter Agvan Dorzhiev

Ngawang Lozang, better known as Agvan Dorzhiev, was born in Central Transbaikalia two centuries after the territory was annexed by the Russian Empire. Dorzhiev was a Buriat-Mongol, one of a large group of Mongol-speaking communities that have long inhabited the area around Lake Baikal, at least since the first Russian Cossack detachments reached Eastern Siberia. From the early eighteenth century, contemporaneous with Russia's firm establishment in Transbaikalia, the southern part of the Buriat territories had been flooded with Buddhist missionaries from northeastern Tibet and Mongolia. Subsequently, Buriat Buddhists continued to communicate with the main religious centers of Tibetan-Mongolian Buddhism, despite the Nerchinsk and Kyakhta treaties that Russia concluded with China, the settlement of the border, and the establishment of the autonomous Buddhist Church. In his youth, Agvan Dorzhiev boldly undertook a difficult and dangerous trip to Tibet in order to pursue a highly prestigious Buddhist education. In 1888, after earning the supreme scholarly degree of Tibet Geshé Lharampa, Dorzhiev was promoted to a position that was to give him the opportunity to communicate directly with the head of the Tibetan state, the Dalai Lama.

Tibet had been a protectorate of the Qing Empire since the middle of the eighteenth century. By the late nineteenth century, as a result of the gradual decline of the Qing Empire, there was an upsurge of political discourse in Tibet. The situation was aggravated by an increase in the expansionist tendencies of the British Raj, which by that period had already put under control the adjacent Himalayan kingdoms of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan. The isolationist policy imposed by the Qing Empire in Tibet created an atmosphere of hostility toward the Western powers there, yet the Tibetans themselves knew very little about those powers. At the same time, however, they considered Tibet to be a stronghold of Buddhist Dharma and thus saw an urgent need to protect their country. The early years of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama's rule are sometimes thought to have witnessed a factionalization of his government into three camps: pro-Chinese, pro-British, and pro-Russian. The firsthand materials we cite in this chapter, however, suggest that this picture may require revision. They suggest that the number of factions should be reduced to two: those who supported further integration with China, and those who adhered to Tibetan independence, even if that independence would have required protection by a third power. Using his direct access to the Dalai Lama, Agvan Dorzhiev persistently attempted to convince him of the advantages of an alliance with Russia. The basic arguments presented by the adherents of rapprochement between Tibet and Russia cited the military might of the latter, Russia's liberal policy toward her Buddhist subjects, and

a geographically distant position that virtually excluded the menace of potential annexation.

As a result, between 1897 and 1901, under the instructions of the Dalai Lama, Agvan Dorzhiev undertook three journeys to Russia and Europe. During these trips, he entered into official negotiations with Nicolas II, high officials of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and members of the General Headquarters (Ministry of Defense). The subjects of the discussions and consultations were Russian political and military assistance to Tibet and the possibility of a Russo-French alliance to resolve the Tibet problem.

Tibet's fate: tossed about by great powers

In 1899, a conservative majority came to power in Great Britain and British foreign policy changed. To implement these policy changes, George Curzon, a popular proponent of active confrontation with Russia, was appointed viceroy of India. Curzon was the first head of the British administration of India to give close attention to Tibet as a potential zone from which a Russian menace could materialize. Despite the well-organized efforts of a secret network of disguised British agents throughout Tibet, British India had not yet managed to establish direct relations with the Snowy Land. Earlier, the British had tried to establish relations through Beijing; however, they soon came to realize that China was neither eager nor able to exert any visible influence on the Tibetans, who refused to make contact with India. Attempts to establish direct contacts with Lhasa, undertaken by Curzon in 1900 and 1901, yielded no results; letters addressed to the Dalai Lama and sent by Curzon through intermediaries were returned unopened. Tibet's protracted refusal to engage in contact with the British was unfavorably affecting the image of the British Crown in the Himalayan region, and it pushed the British to the idea of coercion. Curzon's deliberation over plans to dispatch a military expedition to Tibet drastically intensified after sensational news reached him in 1900 via the *Journal de Saint Petersburg*, an autumn issue of which reported that the Dalai Lama's envoy Agvan Dorzhiev had journeyed to Europe and had met with the Russian monarch.

Thus, even as it ignored messages from Calcutta, Lhasa seemed to be openly challenging the British by negotiating directly with St. Petersburg. The final straw prompting the decision to dispatch a military expedition to Tibet was the publication in the *China Times* of an alleged secret Russo-Chinese treaty.³ According to one of its clauses, Russia was to be allowed some degree of control over the government, mines, and the construction of railway roads in Tibet. The publication was clearly a fake, an act of intentional provocation, but it catalyzed British aggression against Tibet.

Confident that Russia would come to the aid of Tibet in the event of an emergency, the Dalai Lama and the deputies of the Tibetan National Congress (Tsondu) opted to disregard British demands. Interestingly, Agvan Dorzhiev and his old allies, the ministers (Kalöns) Shölkhang and Shedra, who had a reputation of being Anglophiles, insisted on immediate dialogue with Britain. The two Kalöns

were even suspected of treachery and were imprisoned, until released and restored to their former positions in 1912. This additionally proves that the Tibetan political environment was never sharply divided between Russophile and Anglophile factions. Quite often, these supposedly separate groups jointly supported the idea of constructive collaboration with a third power, whether Britain or Russia.

To lead the military mission to Tibet, Curzon appointed an experienced regular officer of the Royal Army, Colonel Francis Younghusband. Late in 1903, Younghusband crossed the Tibet–Sikkim border. After briefly skirmishing with ill-trained and ill-armed Tibetan troops, he entered Lhasa in the summer of 1904. Prompted by reports of the British advance, the Dalai Lama in the company of Dorzhiev had already fled to Mongolia, a region that was firmly within the sphere of Russian influence. The Dalai Lama would spend the next three years in exile in Mongolia. Despite his many personal appeals to Russian authorities and to the Russian emperor to put pressure on Britain, and despite the tireless diplomatic activities of Dorzhiev and the support of influential Russian politicians, Russia refused to take decisive action in support of the Tibetan cause.

Disillusioned by the lack of Russian support, the Dalai Lama had to find a compromise with the Qing Empire, but the rude attempts of the last members of the Manchu imperial family to subjugate the rebellious vassal and the aggressive Chinese incursions into Eastern Tibet again led to the flight of the Dalai Lama, this time to his former enemies, the British.

Russo-British rapprochement in Asia soon resulted in the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 concerning Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. Both powers committed themselves to a policy of non-interference in Tibetan affairs and pledged to conduct future relations with the country only through the intermediary of Beijing. Yet the history of Russo-Tibetan relations was far from over. The start of the Xinhai Revolution and the collapse of the Qing Empire provided entirely new perspectives in Asian politics. In 1912, Tibetan resistance forces led by the Dalai Lama from abroad brought the Chinese occupation of Tibet to an end. The head of Tibet triumphantly returned to Lhasa after eight years of forced exile and declared Tibet to be independent from China. Thus opened a new page in the modern history of the Snowy Land.

An indifferent Russia, a suspicious Great Britain: 1912–17

After triumphantly re-establishing himself in the capital of Tibet and declaring his country independent from China, the Dalai Lama set himself the task of convincing other powers, primarily Russia and Britain, to recognize Tibetan independence. In April 1913, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Sazonov received the Dalai Lama's letter to Nicolas II, which constituted a request for Russia to recognize Tibetan independence. The text of the Russian translation (or the Russian-language version) of this letter has been published in a collection of archival documents on Russo-Tibetan relations.⁴ What is the background of this letter? The Russian researcher Alexandre Andreyev, discussing this period of Russo-Tibetan relations, argues that Agvan Dorzhiev, who had delivered the Dalai

Lama's message to the Russian authorities, faced "obstruction from the side of the MID [the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs]"⁵ owing to Russian reluctance to endanger its interests in Outer Mongolia by contacting Lhasa directly.

In his letter the Thirteenth Dalai Lama thanked the Russian emperor for his assistance during his exile to Mongolia and India. The text of this letter, known to scholars in the translation and interpretation of Agvan Dorzhiev, reads as follows:

1. On the establishment of friendly relations between Tibet and England, and on the protection and acknowledgement of Tibetan independence by Russia and England;
2. On the dispatching of diplomatic representatives of Russia and England to Lhasa, or, if the institution of diplomatic representation in Tibet is found to be impossible according to the terms set by the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, then On finding other means for establishing new guarantees of Tibet's inviolability and neutrality, via negotiations with England or other world powers;
3. On the selling of arms and the command of military instructors, or, if for some reason the acquisition of arms in Russia is found to be unacceptable, then On permission to transport them through her territory and on her roads;
4. On the increase of a loan from the Beijing Department of the Russo-Asian Bank up to 1 million rubles;
5. On the legalization of the status of our representative, Tsannid Khanchen Agvan Dorzhiev;

On the swift resolution of these urgent issues, on the preservation of eternally unshakeable friendly relations between Russia and Tibet, and on the establishment between them of lively trade and economic ties by means of a special treaty agreement, I rely, remembering the former favor and protection of Your Imperial Majesty. *Rossia i Tibet*, 195

In the letter that was found recently in the History Museum of Buriatia, we see rather different versions of the above requests:

[We wish] to discuss [issues concerning Tibet] with the British and to direct the envoys to immediately declare Tibet's independence. It would be best if both Britain and Russia could establish offices of their representatives in Lhasa. If it is difficult for Russia and Britain to sign a treaty, let Germany, France, Japan, or other countries not bound by treaties take action. And, of course, Russia may delegate people as well.⁶

In both versions of the letter, the essence of the requests is the same. However, the original version names specific powers (Germany, France, and Japan) which might be persuaded to take active part in the resolution of the Tibet problem, asks

St. Petersburg's permission to establish contacts with them, and requests official acknowledgement of Dorzhiev's diplomatic status and the furnishing of a passport for international travel. The final Russian-language version of the letter may have emerged only after consultation with Dorzhiev. We may reasonably suppose that he would have advocated dropping direct mention of Germany, France, and Japan, recognizing clearly that Russia would object to any proposed increase of their influence in Tibet. However, the difference between the two versions of the letter perhaps also testifies to a secret scheme to secure Tibet's independence about which the Tibetan government was then deliberating. The heart of the scheme was the organization of secret Russo-British, Russo-French, and Russo-German agreements regarding Tibet, though the idea of intrigue with Japan also was never entirely rejected. By involving France, Germany, and Japan, the Lhasa government aimed to encourage decisive British action in the region – yet the scheme needed to remain secret, since the official positions taken by Britain and Russia did not allow for Tibet to engage in any independent negotiation with other countries.

The Lhasa government secretly aimed to encourage decisive British action in the region by involving France, Germany, and Japan. To complete the secret task, one of the Dalai Lama's new favorites, Lungshar Dorjé Tsegyel, was dispatched to London. Officially, the purpose of his visit was to escort four young Tibetans to study at a London college, and to present gifts from the Dalai Lama to King George V of Britain. Lungshar's stay in London is considered by historians today to be one of the most enigmatic episodes in the history of Anglo-Tibetan relations.

Upon his arrival in Europe, Lungshar's activities quickly aroused suspicions among the British. Worrying that Lungshar sought to realize goals other than those of a simple escort or bearer of gifts, the British authorities had him tailed and sought to have him called back to Tibet. Later, Scotland Yard would be informed that on his way back to Tibet, Lungshar had managed to visit several European countries; however, no information was forthcoming regarding the outcome of those visits.

The real goals of Lungshar's travel to the West are stated in one of the letters of the Dalai Lama to Agvan Dorzhiev, dated 1913. It contains a description of the entire scheme.

A delegation consisting of Tsipa Lungshar and students has been sent to London to offer gifts to the British king and ministers. [They will] hold discussions with the British on a wide range of issues, without missing anything, including [the following]: increasing essential resources for Tibetan development; a recent unspeakable violation by the Chinese of treaty terms; and [measures for] prohibiting Chinese troops from marching into Tibet to seize control of territories, citizens, and laws – [incursions that] have already occurred and will [likely] occur in the future.

The British may suspect that Tibet still has sympathies with Russia, as before. In case you are not able to travel to London, you should contact the British through correspondence – but under cover of maximum secrecy. In order to maintain Tibet's peaceful and self-reliant [status], without the evil

dominance of the Chinese, [Lungshar] has been sent with a detailed order to secure the engagement of Russia and Britain in an open and serious discussion [on Tibet . . .] Therefore, [you should] meet him [in London] without delay and discuss Tibetan affairs in detail. The British assume that Tibetans are compelled to accord themselves with the British government due to Tibet's geographical proximity to India; however, [the British also suspect that] the [Tibetans] are still on Russia's side and that it is Russia on whom they secretly rely. Such suspicions are circulating in many newspapers. Moreover, when news of the signing of a new Tibetan-Mongolian allegiance and solidarity agreement appeared in newspapers, [British] sahibs instituted an inquiry about it. Thus, Russia has suggested that Britain and Russia, [adopting a position of] mutual trust different from their earlier [relation] to each other, should [jointly] help Tibet. [. . .] had the British and Chinese mutually reached an agreement to allow the Chinese to march troops into Tibet, Russia would not be [in a position] to help Tibet at all, because of the great distance [between these countries].⁷

It is clear from this letter that the real goal of Lungshar's mission to Europe was to reanimate Anglo-Russian dialogue regarding the Tibet problem. The mission was undertaken in close relation with the efforts of Agvan Dorzhiev in St. Petersburg and was kept secret. The urgent requests of the Lhasa government to provide Dorzhiev with the right to travel to other countries⁸ cannot but be connected to Lungshar's secret mission to Europe and was a part of the overall plan. The plan aimed to secure the replacement of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, whose wording was extremely disadvantageous for Tibet, with a new agreement between the two powers. As Dorzhiev states in a note to the Russian Prime Minister, V. Kokovtsov, this new agreement was to provide Britain and Russia with equal rights in Tibet and protect Tibetan independence against forthcoming Chinese aggression. However, notwithstanding all efforts made by the Lhasa government, Britain and Russia agreed in their approach to the Tibet problem, choosing to embrace a policy of non-interference in Tibetan internal affairs. Russia's real interests at the time were in Mongolia, and she did not interfere with affairs developing between Britain and Tibet. Britain, for its part, had as an objective the promotion of Tibetan autonomy within China.

The only obstacle to complete trust that the two powers faced was the Tibet-Mongolia Treaty of 1913. From the above-quoted letter it is apparent that the treaty, having suddenly appeared, aroused in the British serious doubt as to Russia's putative disinterest in Tibet. When the story broke, British diplomats began to suspect that Russia was involved in new intrigues in Tibet, although Russia swiftly denied accusations that she had played a role in crafting the treaty and rejected its juridical validity. In light of the new materials presented here, it can be suggested that the idea of the Tibet-Mongolia treaty came from Dorzhiev and that he may have acted independently in pursuing it, despite the claim common among scholars that "the Russians had 'inspired' the agreement, 'dictated' its terms, and inserted such provisions as would make it a practical instrument of policy."⁹

Moved by the urgent necessity of prompting activity toward Tibet, the Dalai Lama's attendant used the idea of Mongolian–Tibetan rapprochement to reanimate the Great Game, which by that time was drawing to a close. The letter at times gives the impression that the Dalai Lama is looking to restrain Dorzhiev's eagerness and avoid aggravating the British. Notwithstanding Russian denials of the agreement, the British were still eager to neutralize its potential danger, inserting an additional article into the Simla Accord of 1914 under which Tibet had no right to grant concessions for railways and automobile roads, telegraph construction, and mining to countries other than China and India. Moreover, the core idea of the Simla Accord – the division of Tibet into outer and inner parts, as in the case of Mongolia – was a direct consequence of the Tibet–Mongolia agreement.

The political activities of Agvan Dorzhiev in Tibet caused open anxiety and irritation on the part of the British, who seemed to regard Dorzhiev as an independent wildcard in Tibetan politics. As a result, during the discussion of corrections to the 1907 convention, Britain tried to secure a clause that would prohibit Russian Buddhists from entering Tibet via India, because such entry would, as they explained, “[make] easy access to Tibet for the Russian Buddhist who holds dubious intentions,”¹⁰ a phrase that unambiguously refers to the tireless attendant of the Dalai Lama. The meeting between Dorzhiev and the Dalai Lama at Phari in 1912 would be the last in their lives. Although the Dalai Lama tried to secure Dorzhiev's participation in the Simla talks in 1914, under British pressure Lönchen Shedra in fact had to promise to regard Dorzhiev as *persona non grata* in Tibet. In reality, this did not imply a refusal by the Tibetan government to collaborate with Dorzhiev.

In any case, their relationship [that between the Dalai Lama and Agvan Dorzhiev] was a substantial one: it spanned nearly a quarter of a century and ran deep and through many levels; they had been through many crises and accomplished much together. Any British official, however lofty, who therefore believed that it could be easily terminated was deluding himself. Though they never saw each other, these two powerful personalities remained in touch until the Dalai Lama died in 1933.¹¹

Russia expressed discontent with open attempts by Britain to deny Russian Buddhists access to Tibet, and that became the subject of discussions between the British ambassador George Buchanan and Sazonov, but the start of World War I removed Tibet from the agenda and suspended all discussions indefinitely. Dorzhiev had to focus solely on the internal problems of Russian Buddhists. Soon, however, his services would once again come to be demanded by Russia and Tibet.

Soviet missions and Tibetan reforms: 1921–24

Russian participation in World War I had a fatal effect on the tsarist regime, and in October of 1917 the Bolsheviks came to power. This meant not only a drastic change of domestic and foreign policies but also the abolishment of all standing

agreements, including the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, that were the basis of Anglo-Russian relations in Asia. Soviet Russia did not recognize itself as being bound by any obligations to Britain in Asia.

In 1918, Agvan Dorzhiev, who was engaged in the construction of Buddhist temples in the land of the Kalmyks, was arrested by the new authorities on suspicion of exporting items of cultural value. Despite all lack of evidence, Dorzhiev was sentenced to death; however, intervention by old friends among the Petersburg orientalist not only saved his life but once again drew attention to him from the authorities. Thus did Agvan Dorzhiev reappear on the stage of Asian diplomacy.

The period of 1918–20 is characterized by the resolve of the new regime to export revolutionary ideas to the East, especially after the success in Turkestan. The Soviets openly declared that the final goal of their Asian policy was to render direct assistance to the Indian revolutionary-liberation movement, in contrast with the imperial designs of the Russian tsars toward India from the eighteenth century.

However, in 1920 the expansionist rush of the Soviet regime was replaced by the cold strategy of bargaining with Great Britain for control of Inner Asia. Once again the advantageous Tibetan card became a trump in the Great Game. Thus, the Soviet policy, in its basic principals and objectives, proved to be the same as the Tsarist policy of seeking to blackmail British India.

In 1920, the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, G. Chicherin, approved the first Bolshevik mission to Lhasa, which included Kalmyks and Buriats disguised as Buddhist pilgrims. The expedition was nominally headed by the Buriat Lama Dava Yampilon, although real leadership was in the hands of the Kalmyk Bolshevik Vasily Khomutnikov, who worked in Mongolia as a military instructor under the direction of the Mongolian–Tibetan section of the Secretariat of Eastern Peoples (from 1921: the Far Eastern Secretariat) of the Comintern. Preparations for the mission were conducted with the close collaboration and support of Dorzhiev, who seemed to be renewing his interrupted association with the theocratic ruler of Tibet and gradually starting to form a positive attitude toward the new Russian regime.¹² The Dalai Lama, however, seemed to have his own sources of information, independent of Dorzhiev, on what was going on in Soviet Russia. As he wrote in a personal letter to Dorzhiev:

The developing news concerning [the criticism of] the Red Russians would not alter my thinking. However, there are many rumors circulating here that the Red Russians have harmed Buddhism greatly, and that you also stand on their side. As [I] do not take these [rumors] to be true, do not worry about them. The Red Russians have set their mind against Christianity, and they all respect Buddhism.¹³

By the time Khomutnikov's expedition to Lhasa arrived, news had reached the Dalai Lama of a pogrom by Red Army soldiers at the Petrograd Buddhist temple, a temple that was a testament to the tremendous efforts of Dorzhiev and the main symbol of Tibetan–Russian friendship. In addition, Kalmyk refugees, members

of the “Buddhist union” that they had created in Turkey, disseminated rigid anti-Soviet propaganda in Lhasa. One of the leaders of the Buddhist union, Sambo Khaglyshev,¹⁴ openly and baselessly accused Dorzhiev of supporting the Soviet’s antireligious policy. Agvan Dorzhiev was well aware of what was going on in Lhasa and of how the refugees were criticizing him.¹⁵ This is proved by another letter to Dorzhiev from the Dalai Lama:

[In your letter, you] discuss a monk named Sangpo of the Great Durbet, who recently escaped from his native land to Turkey. [You report that] the opponents of the new regime came to know [about this incident] and took him with them. He [Sangpo] told them that he had taken full ordination vows from you, and that he had been your disciple and had received many teachings from you, but [that when] you objected to his consuming alcohol, he started to dislike and rebuke [you]. Concerning your request that this incident not be misunderstood, [I would say] that this is only natural [for such things to happen], and [that you] need not be worried.¹⁶

As a result, Khomutnikov’s expedition was initially given a cold, watchful reception in Lhasa. The newcomers asserted the solidarity of the Soviets with Buddhism, whose evidence, they stated, was liberal legislation, the newly established autonomy of Buddhist peoples of the country and Dorzhiev’s collaboration with the new regime. It was only these assertions that broke the mood of distrust and redirected the talks in a constructive way.¹⁷

When the Soviet envoys arrived in Lhasa, Tibet was on the very important path to independence. Ten years after the Dalai Lama returned from India, he managed to conduct important reforms in the country: The administrative apparatus was restructured toward more rigid centralization, tax rates were raised and revenue was increased, a new national currency was introduced, and the army was increased in number of soldiers and quality of training.

The main supporter of the Dalai Lama in his course of forcible modernization was his favorite, Tsarong Dazang Damdül, who had the prestigious rank of Shappé. Of humble origin, Dazang Damdül had been granted aristocratic status and a position as a member of the Government (Kashak), Commander in Chief of the Tibetan Army and Head of the Arsenal-Mint for his heroic protection of the Dalai Lama from the Chinese troops near the Chaksam river crossing in 1908.

At the time of the first Bolshevik mission to Lhasa, Tsarong Shappé was one of the most powerful people in Tibet. Enjoying the confidence of the head of the state, Tsarong was a living symbol of the reforms and this inevitably set him up as a target of criticism from the conservative party of monks. In today’s studies of Tibet’s modern history, the figure of Tsarong occupies a very important place primarily as an indisputable leader of the Tibetan Anglophiles. The British envoys who visited Tibet during those years invariably enjoyed the hospitality and support of the then Dalai Lama’s favorite and counted on him confidently in their efforts to modernize Tibet. According to the authoritative British historian Alex

McKay, in 1924, the British in the person of the Sikkim political officer Bailey and the British agent Laden-la were even preparing a coup with the purpose of ousting the Dalai Lama from his superior position and handing real control of the government to the radical reformer Tsarong:

Bailey had apparently come to the conclusion that the only way to modernize Tibet to the extent where it would provide a secure modern border for India and exclude Russian influence in the region was by establishing a secular government in Tibet under Tsarong Shape's leadership.¹⁸

As McKay notes, Bailey's plans were motivated by a worrisome increase in Bolshevik activities in Tibet.¹⁹ The conservative forces in the Tibetan government, however, managed to uncover the coup plot and inform the Dalai Lama, eventually leading to the dismissal of Tsarong from his positions as Commander in Chief of the Tibetan Army and Head of the Arsenal-Mint. The result was a substantial decrease in Tsarong's governmental influence and a considerable scaling-back of the reform programs with which he had been associated.

Today, most researchers are inclined to view Tsarong as a strong advocate of pro-British policy in Tibet, and this view is generally correct. However, in addition to – or perhaps in spite of – his pro-British views, Tsarong Shappé seems to have been concerned with furthering the interests of Soviet Russia as well. One can see evidence of this in materials drawn from the second Bolshevik expedition to Tibet. This mission, the so-called Borisov-Vampilon mission, has already been mentioned above. It was dispatched to Tibet by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (the Narkomindel) in collaboration with the Comintern in 1924, some two years after the return of the Khomutnikov expedition. The mission, led by the Narkomindel official S. Borisov (a.k.a. Tsyrendorji) and by Bayarto Vampilon, a member of the Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern, arrived in Lhasa in August 1924. Upon their arrival, they contacted the Dalai Lama and Tsarong Shappé. *Inter alia* documents from the mission show the following:

Even the head of the Anglophiles, Tsarong, “showed a sincere disposition” toward Russia and had to acknowledge that the Tibetan friendship with the British was “a policy of necessity.” “We are yours and theirs simultaneously,” he confessed to Borisov. “Our head is with them (the British), but our hearts are with you (Russians).” Surprisingly, Tsarong had some knowledge of Bolshevik doctrine, although he himself did not share it to the slightest extent . . . To Borisov, nevertheless, he seemed to be a man of the new mentality, pragmatic and receptive, proud of the innovations that he had introduced personally.²⁰

Recently revealed documents from the secret Soviet missions to Lhasa evidently show that even if Tsarong's political views did not entirely agree with those of Dorzhiev, they also did not completely contradict them. They both were confident in the Dalai Lama and confidants of him; both supported his course of

modernization and anti-Chinese Tibetan policy. Earlier experts in the modern history of Tibet had no definite information regarding the personal relationship between Dorzhiev and Tsarong. This is not surprising, since Tsarong obtained the greater part of his political power only after the final departure of Dorzhiev from Tibet. In his autobiography, Agvan Dorzhiev mentions the name of Tsarong Dazang Damdül only once, praising his heroic assistance to the Dalai Lama during the course of the latter's flight to India in 1910.²¹ The secret correspondence of Tsarong to Agvan Dorzhiev discovered in the archives of the History Museum of Buriatia changes our understanding about Tibetan *realpolitik*:

Since it is clear that my life does not belong to myself, I have decided that when the Chinese implement external control over Tibet, I will not stay in this land, but will ask for asylum in another country. Three powers can help or damage Tibet. Those that can help are Russia, Britain and China; yet the same three can also damage [Tibet]. I am deeply convinced that an independent Tibet can free itself from these three dangers if negotiations are conducted [stipulating that] Russia, Britain and China cease their interference in Tibet's foreign and domestic affairs. I am confident [in this outcome] only under the condition that that the Chinese do not meddle in Tibet's internal or external affairs. Taking into account the advice of the Buddhist savants of Tibet, I have decided to leave my homeland and have determined the place to which to flee. If the possibility is granted by Russia, please take into account that for Tibetan interests [I] would ask [their] asylum.²²

This letter was written during months of sharp opposition between the military and the monks, on the eve of a new crisis. Interestingly, Tsarong does not conceal his distrust of the British. From the remarks in this letter, it can be suggested that Tsarong's displays of affection toward the Soviets were not simply due to politeness or an awareness of diplomatic decorum; he may well have seriously considered making Russia his ally. This fact should encourage scholarly reconsideration of the role played by Tsarong in Tibetan–Soviet relations. Tsarong's letter provides clear evidence that Agvan Dorzhiev's liaisons with Tibet were not restricted to his personal ties with the Dalai Lama, but included other influential Tibetan officials.

The Soviets were greatly inspired by the results of the Borisov mission, which prompted them to cherish the hope not only for the Dalai Lama's sympathies but also for a possible alliance with Tsarong who, by his own words, was only superficially Anglophile. Nevertheless, Soviet authorities enthusiastically welcomed word from the British press in 1925 that the Dalai Lama had dismissed Tsarong; regardless of the final position held by Tsarong, the Soviets viewed his dismissal as a defeat for the Anglophiles in Tibet.²³ However, this dismissal was followed by a chill in relations between the Dalai Lama and Soviet Russia. This resulted in the failure of several subsequent attempts by the Soviets to develop stronger diplomatic ties with the Snowy Land.

Dorzhiev and the Panchen Lama affair

The letters from the Dalai Lama to Agvan Dorzhiev dating from the period of another Bolshevik mission to Lhasa, known as the Borisov-Vampilon mission, shed light on the attitude of the head of Tibet toward the attempts by the Soviets to establish mutual collaboration. Notwithstanding the British pressure, the Dalai Lama realized that contacts with Moscow were able to reanimate the importance of the Tibet problem in the eyes of other powers and that it would be advantageous in the latter's stubborn assertion of independence. Negotiations between Borisov and the Dalai Lama were conducted concurrently with two events of the utmost importance for Tibet: the official visit to Beijing by the Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia, L. Karakhan, and the sudden escape to China of the second most important religious hierarch of Tibet, the Panchen Lama.

Bolsheviks considered it disadvantageous to secure full independence for Tibet, not only out of fears of direct confrontation with Britain, as had been the case with Tsarist Russia, but also out of apprehension that such confrontation would automatically cause Tibet to be annexed by Britain. For its part, the Tibetan government was watching the progress of Karakhan's negotiations with the Guomindang and Wu Peifu, having some hopes for their results.

The arrival of Karakhan, the great minister of the Red Russians, to Beijing on an official visit coincides with the All-Knowing's surrender [to the Chinese]; this is not good, since Russia and China are bound with ties of great friendship. But he has promised to announce that the Tsang administration falls under the jurisdiction of Lhasa and that, in addition, the Red Russians [will] help weaker countries, including Tibet. In the same spirit, he has promised to speak to Wu Peifu and the Northern Military Generals about the Panchen. It is very good, and very clear, that there need be no doubt regarding the Russians.²⁴

The conflict between the two Tibetan hierarchs resulted in the Panchen Lama's flight from Tibet in 1923 and caused a real political crisis in the Snowy Land. Although the conflict outwardly appeared to have a purely economic background, its real reason was political. The institute of the Panchen Lamas was established on the direct initiative of the Fifth Dalai Lama in the seventeenth century. The Dalai Lama had bestowed on his spiritual master Chökyi Gyeltsen the title of Panchen, implying succession by reincarnation. The Panchen Lamas were given huge estates that included the entire district of Tsang, some territories of the Southern Himalaya, and regions in Western Tibet.

Both China and India attempted to use the Panchen Lamas to undermine the influence of the Dalai Lama. During the flight of the Dalai Lama Tubten Gyatso to Mongolia, the Sixth Panchen Lama, Chökyi Nyima (1883–1937), accepted the invitation of the British administration to visit Calcutta for an audience with the Prince of Wales. The real goal of that visit, as considered then by the British hawks, was a project for separating the Tsang district from the rest of Tibet. Thus did the

British try to create a buffer zone with a puppet government; however, the subsequent change of government in London suspended all these plans indefinitely and put the Panchen Lama in an awkward position vis-à-vis Lhasa.

In January 1913, after the return of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, the two lamas met. In Tibetan society this meeting was interpreted as a kind of reconciliation. In reality, however, the Dalai Lama and his loyal retinue concluded that it would be necessary to gradually decrease the Tsang district's autonomy and the privileges of the territories controlled by the Panchen. In the same year, the Dalai Lama informed the Tsang administration that it must pay one quarter of all government expenses for the Tibetan–British military conflicts of 1888 and 1904, following the precedent of the 1791 Tibet–Nepal military conflict. The Panchen Lama refused, paying only part of the sum. This in no way satisfied Lhasa. In 1917, the government implemented a new tax law under which Tsang was ordered to start paying a corvée tax from which the Panchen's subjects traditionally were exempted. In 1923, when the taxes to be paid by Tsang were again increased and fines were imposed for the delay in paying off the debt, the Panchen Lama desperately appealed to the government of the British India to mediate the conflict. The British, however, refrained from mediation, not wishing to interfere in Tibetan affairs. As a sudden result, on December 26, 1923, the Panchen Lama secretly fled north, escorted by around one hundred armed men and leaving behind an explanatory letter in which he justified his flight by the intention to raise funds from his Mongolian almsgivers. The flight of the Panchen Lama gave start to a very dangerous crisis, which gave the Chinese a trump card in their attempts to return Tibet to the embraces of China. To cause the Panchen to come back, the Dalai Lama had now only diplomatic tools.

The task of intercepting the Panchen Lama, convincing him to stay in Mongolia, and if possible, sending him back to Tibet was entrusted to Agvan Dorzhiev by the Dalai Lama. Under the instructions of Tubten Gyatso, Dorzhiev immediately set off to Amdo but failed to meet the Panchen Lama there. Risking his life, Dorzhiev traveled all the way to Beijing in search of the Panchen, but again he faced failure since the Panchen was still en route there. In his message to Dorzhiev, Tubten Gyatso wrote the following:

as soon as the news of the Panchen's secret flight reached Russia, you immediately departed for Beijing. As the cable message from Jampa Thokmé of Namgyel Monastery and Jabtui Lama stated that the Panchen would arrive in Beijing on the 15th day of the 8th month [September 17, 1924] and that you had to meet him in person to tell him about the advantages and disadvantages [of the situation], you went to Beijing without any hesitation on the 17th day of the 8th month [September 19, 1924], despite all the hardships [of doing so]. Moreover, letters from me and from each Kalön also reached China.

Regarding the activities of Tsang officials, it is as reported by Khenchung, Drönnyer, Lotsawa and Jampa Thokmé of Namgyel Monastery. Because of the current ongoing civil war in China, it is hard to predict the Tsang officials' way of thinking, so what we plan is to eavesdrop on the situation and carefully observe [it].

Regarding the baseless claims and false rumors to the effect that the Panchen holds [real] control over half of the territories existing under the control of the government [of Lhasa], [I] intend to publicize [explanations] based on historical facts in the newspapers. If [you are] not able to meet the Panchen in person and tell him about the advantages and disadvantages [of the situation], all conceivable attempts should be made in consultation with Khenchung, Drönnyer and others. In addition to your delivery of the invitation [for the Panchen to return] from Mongolia, there is also a plan to send lay and monk officials [to meet with him].²⁵

In one of his books, Russian researcher Alexandre Andreyev mentions Dorzhiev's attempts to resolve the conflict between the two supreme Tibetan lamas. Andreyev cited hitherto unknown testimony of Sharap Tepkin, a close confidant of Dorzhiev:

As Sh. Tepkin informs, as soon as Dorzhiev learned about the location of the Panchen Lama and his plans to travel to Beijing under invitation of General Wu Peifu, the leader of the Jili militarist group that controlled the government, he hurriedly set off to Urga hoping to meet him on the way but missed him somehow. Having gone all the way to Beijing without encountering the Panchen, he decided to leave a written message for him, in which he urged the Panchen to find a compromise with the Dalai Lama, and then he returned to Urga.²⁶

Andreyev concludes, "It is hard to imagine that Dorzhiev would undertake such an important political trip exclusively on his own initiative, without consulting with Soviet authorities."²⁷ Though the materials published here leave unanswered the question of Dorzhiev's consultation with Soviet authorities, they do reveal that Dorzhiev did not act exclusively on his own initiative: his journey was at the request of the Tibetan government – more specifically, at the request of the Dalai Lama Tubten Gyatso himself. As for Dorzhiev, he probably tried to involve Narkomindel and apparently promised the Tibetan government that the Panchen problem would be discussed by L. Karakhan during his negotiations in Beijing.

The new sources convincingly demonstrate that Tibet was very interested in securing political support from Soviet Russia, especially with regard to issues involving China. Balancing the desire to interact with the Soviets and the desire to maintain the status quo with Britain was not a simple matter; accordingly, the Lhasa government was forced to maintain strict confidentiality in its communications with Russia.

The radical changes in the religious policy of the USSR that resulted in the severe repression of the Buddhist clergy of Buriat-Mongolia and Kalmykia inevitably led to frustration in the Soviet–Tibetan dialogue. In 1927, Agvan Dorzhiev himself secretly asked the Dalai Lama through his own agents²⁸ to sever all ties with the Soviets. Thus, one can conclude that it was Dorzhiev who initiated Russo-Tibetan relations and who, 30 years later, had to unofficially put them to an end.

Conclusion

Acting under the instructions of tsarist, Soviet, and Tibetan authorities, Dorzhiev remained an independent player on the Tibetan front of the Great Game. But to what end? Dorzhiev's ultimate dream may well have been the establishment of a confederation of Buddhist peoples in Inner Asia, under the leadership of the Dalai Lama. Being personally loyal to Dalai Lama Tubten Gyatso, Dorzhiev considered him a person able to realize the potential represented by the institution of the Dalai Lamas – historically a fruit of the collaboration between Mongols and Tibetans – to unite Tibet and Mongolia into one state. Dorzhiev realized that the guarantor of such an alliance might be found in Russia, a Russia whose “natural urge” (*estestvennoe stremlenie*) was control over the Eurasian mainland, as forward policy supporters in St. Petersburg would have it. At the same time, Dorzhiev recognized that China posed a real threat to the realization of his plans. For the neutralization of this Chinese menace, Dorzhiev did not exclude the possibility – and sometimes the necessity – of Tibet's entering into collaboration with Britain and other powers, especially France and Japan. This fact helps to explain his close relationships with the so-called Tibetan Anglophiles: Tsarong, Lungshar, and Shölkhang. The following was once noted by a well-known British historian, in words that are especially true with respect to Dorzhiev: “. . . descriptions of this or that official . . . as ‘pro-British’, [or] ‘pro-Chinese’ [are] too facile. The only thing the Tibetans have been ‘pro’ is the preservation of their Religious State.”²⁹

The British agents in Tibet, undoubtedly, treated Dorzhiev as one of the chief enemies of the British Empire in that part of the world. Beginning in the early twentieth century, Dorzhiev's activities raised British anxieties for several decades. Behind the missions to the Tsar, the escorting of the Dalai Lama during his flight to Mongolia, the Tibet–Mongolian Treaty of 1913, the alleged import of Russian arms to Tibet, and the Bolshevik missions, the British saw the hand of the person they described as “the mysterious Dorjjeff,” and they were justified in seeing this. Their attempts to neutralize him, though not completely fruitless, were largely ineffective. As one researcher rightly noted:

Ideally, what the British wanted was an individual who could match the status and talents of Agvan Dorzhiev, a Russian citizen, but also a member of Lhasa's religious elite. He was a formidable opponent for the British, but they recognized that he was the ideal type of intermediary; a loyal citizen of the imperial power, but highly placed in the local society. After meeting Dorzhiev in 1912, Gould described him rather enviously as “a man who impresses one a great deal . . . [by his] frank manner and . . . earnest purpose . . . [He is] certainly respected by the Tibetan officials.”³⁰

The established view of Dorzhiev as a Russian agent in Tibet has been seriously reconsidered over the last few decades by Western historians. Most of them today agree that Dorzhiev should be viewed mostly as an agent of Tibet in Russia

serving primarily the interests of the Tibetan state, for preservation of this unique religious state, rather than as an agent of Russia in Tibet.

Dorzhiiev's fate in the years following these letters turned out to be very sad. In 1937 and 1938 he was forced to watch as the results he had worked so hard to achieve in the service of Tibetan–Soviet rapprochement and of the protection of Buddhism in the USSR completely unraveled. Many of his Buriat, Kalmyk, and Russian friends fell victim to Stalinist repression, and in the fall of 1938, he himself was arrested, having falsely been incriminated as an alleged participant in liaisons with Japanese secret agents and in terrorist activities whose purpose was the overthrow of the Soviet regime in Transbaikalia. After several hours of interrogation, Agvan Dorzhiev died in the prison hospital of Ulan-Ude, probably of a heart attack.

The death of Dorzhiev brought to an end a whole epoch of Russo-Tibetan dialogue. The USSR was uninterested in pursuing an active policy toward Tibet, and after the Communists came to power in Beijing in 1949, the Soviet government swiftly recognized Tibet as an integral part of the People's Republic of China. Even during the cooling of Soviet–Chinese relations from the 1950s through the 1970s, the USSR never disputed China's claim over Tibetan territories, and today's Russia strictly keeps to this established policy, considering it a token of friendship toward her mighty neighbor.

Notes

- 1 The letters, written between 1911 and 1925, were recently discovered by the author of this chapter in the archives of the M. N. Khangalov History Museum of Buriatia (Ulan-Ude).
- 2 Melvyn C. Goldstein, *A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 42–43.
- 3 *China Times*, July 18, 1902. See Tatiana Shaumian, *Tibet: The Great Game and Tsarist Russia* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 34.
- 4 E. Belov, O. Sviatetskaia, and T. Shaumian, eds., *Rossiiia i Tibet: Sbornik russkikh arkhivnykh dokumentov 1900–1914* (Moscow: Vostochnaia literatura, 2005), 194–195.
- 5 Aleksandr Andreev, *Tibet v politike tsarskoi, sovetskoi i postsovetskoi Rossii* (St. Petersburg: Narthang, 2006), 202.
- 6 Letters, OF 18617 (dated 1912), Khangalov History Museum.
- 7 Letters, # 18579, Tibetan collection, Khangalov History Museum.
- 8 *Rossiiia i Tibet*, 195.
- 9 Parshotam Mehra, “The Mongol-Tibetan Treaty of January 11, 1913,” in Alex McKay, ed., *The History of Tibet*, vol. 3, *The Modern Period, 1895–1959: The Encounter with Modernity* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 179.
- 10 Andreev, *Tibet v politike*, 216.
- 11 John Snelling, *Buddhism in Russia: The Story of Agvan Dorzhiev, Lhasa's Emissary to the Tsar* (Shaftesbury, Dorset: Element Books, 1993), 149.
- 12 For details on this mission, see Andreev, *Tibet v politike*, 227–247.
- 13 Letters, OF 18578 (dated April 1, 1925), Khangalov History Museum. The period when this letter was composed was characterized by Bolshevik repression of Orthodox Christianity. Islam and Buddhism would face Communist persecution in the Soviet Union only a few years later.
- 14 Sambo Khaglyshev (Khaldinov in the British documents) provided secret information

- to the political officer Sikkim Bailey about the activities of the Bolsheviks in Lhasa.
- 15 It is necessary to note here that the archive documents evidence the existence of Dorzhiev's network of agents in Tibet, a network that does not seem to be connected with Soviet Russia.
 - 16 Letters, OF 18590 (dated December 14, 1924), Khangalov History Museum.
 - 17 Andreev, *Tibet v politike*, 241.
 - 18 Alex McKay, "Tibet 1924: A Very British Coup Attempt?" in McKay, *History of Tibet*, 3: 414.
 - 19 Alex McKay, *Tibet and the British Raj: The Frontier Cadre, 1904–1947* (Richmond: Curzon, 1997), 112.
 - 20 Alexandre Andreyev, "Soviet Russia and Tibet," *The Tibet Journal* 21, no. 3 (1996): 16–17.
 - 21 Agvan Dorzhiev, *Zanimatel'nye zametki: Opisanie puteshestviia vokrug sveta (Avtobiografiia)*, ed. and trans. A. D. Tsendina (Moscow: Vostochnaia literatura, 2003), 61.
 - 22 Letters, OF 18587 (dated August 23, 1924), Khangalov History Museum.
 - 23 Andreyev, "Soviet Russia," 21.
 - 24 Letters, OF 18598 (dated November 15, 1924), Khangalov History Museum.
 - 25 Letters, OF 18601 (dated October 31, 1924), Khangalov History Museum.
 - 26 AMBRK (Arkhiv Ministerstva bezopasnosti Respubliki Kalmykii), R-940, sheet 53 (Testimony of Sh. Tepkin); Andreev, *Tibet v politike*, 262.
 - 27 Andreev, *Tibet v politike*, 262.
 - 28 Snelling, *Buddhism in Russia*, 220.
 - 29 H. E. Richardson, *Tibet and Its History*, rev. ed. (Boulder: Shambhala, 1984), 129.
 - 30 McKay, *Tibet and the British Raj*, 124.

Not for Distribution

Part IV

Asiatic Russia as a space for national movements

Not for Distribution

Not for Distribution

11 Muslim political activity in Russian Turkestan, 1905–1916

Salavat ISKHAKOV

What was the reason for the politicization of Turkestan Muslims?

A quest was taking place in the Russian Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century for ways to adapt the Muslim community to the demands of a changing world. At this time, in the Muslim environment, a process of rethinking social and political positions was also observed, and many facts indicated changes in the attitude of Muslims in the empire to political reality, that is, a politicization of their consciousness.

Since then, there have been different views among scholars on the most important reasons for political activity by Muslims at the beginning of the twentieth century. For example, following a trip to Turkestan in 1902, even such a great authority in Russian Oriental studies as V. V. Bartol'd expressed doubt that local Muslims would support Russians and the Russian Empire if it was in danger of collapse.¹ Bartol'd's prediction about the national liberation movement pursuing political separatism, of which he practically accused the local Muslims, was not borne out either during the revolution of 1905–07, or in 1917–20. According to another view, their political activity was caused by the influence of pan-Islamism. So, in the book by the famous German scientist, historian and specialist in Russian studies, Professor O. Hetch of the University of Berlin, *Russian Turkestan and the Tendency of Modern Russian Colonial Policy* (1913), which was outlined by V. I. Lenin in Zurich in 1916, it was noted:

A link with the Muslim population of Turkestan is being created, however, by itself; and, indeed *the pan-Islamic unrest from the north* is already contributing to it. The Russian government is afraid of this infiltration of Tatar adherents of Islam and is striving to keep them out of Turkestan.²

Despite some changes in modern historiography, it is dominated by the old dogmas. For example, it is argued that pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism spread in Turkestan from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and played a “reactionary role,” that the revolution of 1905–07 was “actively supported by the masses” of Turkestan, and that the “revolutionary camp” united workers, “national” peasants and artisans, etc.³ From the point of view of H. Carrère d'Encausse, Turkestan's Muslim masses were largely immune to the attempts of elites, often inspired by the

Tatars, to raise national consciousness, and just as alien to the ideas and political movements of Russia.⁴ The purpose of this chapter is to identify the main causes, factors and forms of development of political activity of the Muslim population of Turkestan conquered by Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century, a region commonly known as Russian Turkestan in pre-Soviet literature.

Religious and political “agitation” of Turkestan Muslims

In the 1890s, representatives of the Muslim elite in different parts of the Russian Empire, including Turkestan, entirely understood the necessity of creating their own organizations and also a common organization that could comprehensively and effectively represent the interests of all Muslims before the government, as Muslims had many different reasons to be discontented. For example, the famous Tatar and Muslim writer G. Iskhaki, in his autobiography *The Days of My Life*, written years later after he emigrated, recalled:

The nineteenth century was counting to an end . . . The mysterious years of the twentieth century were approaching . . . For me, it was becoming firmer and clearer that the despotic shackles of this political regime fettered my youthful aspirations toward a broader field of activity and to a deeper penetration into the depth of the masses . . . Naturally to a reaction of my soul and of my ‘self’, an anger flared against all passive and active defenders of the double-headed eagle. I had a stronger desire: to find friends and to immediately start training – psychological, for a moment – of activists for the struggle against the regime . . . In these days of awakening . . . I had already mastered the Russian language, started to expand the circle of friends outside of the Idel-Urals.⁵ I organized ideological contact with the student community of kindred nations of the Crimea, the Caucasus, Idel-Urals and Turkestan. Following this inspiration came impulse and decisiveness . . . After impulse and decisiveness came our illegal activity! We established an illegal circle⁶ . . . We outlined a very modest program for a moment: a review of the state of national culture compared to the European one; a review of the legal restrictions on our people, in comparison with the rights of the people in the free countries . . . Over time it became necessary to start also propaganda activities . . . We started to produce an illegal newspaper *Taraqqi* (Progress!).⁷

This title of this newspaper was not without justification, and the process of Europeanization of certain aspects of Muslim life, including that in the territory of Russian Turkestan, was reflected in this episode.

No less a famous Tajik writer, S. Ayni, also noted in his memoirs that in 1900 an event happened that started a “real spiritual revolution” inside him, after he read a book by Danish, a Bukharan thinker who sharply criticized the existing order of the amirate of Bukhara, the amir’s power, officials and others. The impact of this book on Ayni was so strong that his attitude – not only to the amir and his officials, but also to the mullahs – changed almost “completely.”⁸

In the climate of the Russian Revolution which started in January 1905, the ruling regime began to liberalize its religious policy in order to weaken the dissatisfaction of the non-Orthodox peoples. A royal decree on the reinforcement of religious tolerance, issued on April 17, 1905, commissioned a special conference on tolerance to draft a bill establishing religious offices for various Muslim regions, including Turkestan.⁹ Following this decree, the Interior Ministry was given the task of creating new muftiates (Islamic high councils). Meanwhile, fearing the loss of their positions in Turkestan, in May 1905 the Ministry of War ordered the Turkestan Governor-General, N. N. Teviashov, to prepare a document for the government justifying the “harmfulness” of the creation of muftiate in this region. Soon after, appropriate representation was made to St. Petersburg, and the muftiate was not created.¹⁰

The Russian Revolution and the Muslims’ attitude toward it

The representatives of the Muslim population, in the meantime, were actively defending their vital interests. The first empire-wide congress of Muslims took place in August 1905 in Nizhny Novgorod, attended by the representatives from Turkestan. This congress started a new era in the public life of the country’s Muslims, marking their entry into the major political arena in order to resolve, primarily, the contradictions in their relations with the authorities. Having returned to their regions, the delegates faced, as before, the incomprehension and indifference of local officials to the question of various issues of Muslim life, including those in Turkestan. Here, as in other Muslim parts of the empire, illegal organizations appeared. The first secret organization of Jadids, called “Progressive Society,” was founded in Andijan in 1905. Its members included Abdulkadyr Kushbegiev,¹¹ Sagdulla Tursunkhodzhaev,¹² and others.¹³ The Russian Revolution of 1905, recalled S. Ayni, had a great impact on Turkestani people: the movement for progress, which previously included only a narrow circle of people, now had become much broader. But the progressive movement, Ayni emphasized, could not be called revolutionary. It demanded only the implementation of some reforms: the modernization of schools and *madrasas*, replacement of a number of obsolete statutes and orders, and in the field of political reform of the administrative apparatus in the amirate, the elimination of arbitrariness of officials and certain adjustment of the tax system.¹⁴ The emerging progressive secret societies were, of course, taking into the consideration the psychology of the people.

Meanwhile, the Muslim masses, as noted by contemporaries, were accustomed to thinking that nothing should be done, because “Heaven still attends to us,” and arranges their affairs as well as possible. At the same time, people believed that the provision of national and religious freedom depended to a degree on keeping out of politics. In fact, such attitudes, as noted in a Baku newspaper of May 1905, contradicted the Qur’an, which places the whole destiny, the whole fate of man as dependent on his energy and work (*laysa lil’insāni ’illā mā sa’ā*), from which the newspaper concluded: only at work will a man find happiness.¹⁵ Bakhchisaray’s newspaper mentioned that Muslims lacked “energy and serious attitude toward

life and its challenges . . . almost completely denying the values of mind, energy and knowledge in everyday human destiny.” When considering one of the verses of the Qur’an, it made it clear that there was no point in waiting for manna from heaven, as a person’s position depended directly on his personal qualities and efforts.¹⁶ Little by little, however, the Muslim masses, including those in Turkestan, began to show an interest in politics and in the revolutionary events taking place around them.

A manifest of Nicholas II promulgated on October 18, 1905 in Tashkent prompted a mass demonstration on the streets of the city. The protesters headed to the city jail, where they demanded the release of political prisoners, but they were met with a refusal by the authorities.¹⁷ The crowd was followed, according to eyewitnesses, by many Muslims, but they were not involved directly in the actions of the demonstrators.¹⁸ In Soviet historiography, such facts were usually cited as evidence of the involvement of the Muslim masses in the revolution, in the struggle against the autocracy, but at the same time it was quite rightly observed that in Central Asia the revolution and its slogans were not understood by the vast majority of Muslim. For them it was mostly an internal war between different Russian groups,¹⁹ or, in other words, a Russian civil war. Muslims were not going to get involved in such a social maelstrom either in Turkestan or other Muslim parts of the Russian Empire.

Muslims gathered separately to express their protests. The Muslim rallies held in late 1905 in Tashkent discussed the needs of Turkestan Muslims, who were dissatisfied primarily with harassment from the authorities and their missionary policy. As a result, an appeal “to Muslims” was published in the Tashkent newspaper *Russkii Turkestan* on January 13, 1906. The first of the 23 paragraphs of this document demanded the submission of the Sharia affairs of all Turkestan Muslims to their own spiritual authority. To do so, they should elect a supreme guardian from among themselves – *valī-yi muslimīn* (“Ruler of the Muslims”). The authority was supposed to address issues and solve practical matters relating exclusively to faith and religion, not to interfere in governmental and administrative action, but the power structures would have to consult with it. Moreover, the Russian authorities should not interfere in religious matters or prevent the function of this institution, but instead should provide possible assistance.

On the same day, in St. Petersburg, the Second Universal (All-Russian) Muslim Congress began. The participants included nine representatives of Turkestan, namely: Izmail Abdullatypov and Usman Abdulmashidov (Syr-Darya oblast), Azisulla Al'betkov and Mukhamedzhan Shakunov (Samarkand oblast), Izmail Gabdul and Mukhamedzhan Urazaev (Tashkent), Zii'autdin Kulaev (Semi-palatinsk), and Hadzhi Gafurov and Tagirov (Kokand).²⁰ They indicated that they felt the need to act in solidarity with Muslims from other parts of the country interested in all-Russia political life, and hoped that they could contribute to the democratization of the religious and civil government of Muslim life. The Russian political agent in Bukhara, Ia. Ia. Liutsh, in a private letter from Bukhara to St. Petersburg, wrote on 19 October that all the excitement in Turkestan was due primarily to the ill-preparedness of military Russian administrators for the

management of Central Asia, their ignorance of the situation in the province, and their unfamiliarity with local Muslims, their language, life and religion.²¹

Fearing the growing mood of protest from the Muslim inhabitants of Turkestan, St. Petersburg sent a new Governor-General, Lieutenant-General D. I. Subotich, to Tashkent in January 1906. This administrator, flexible, tolerant and liberal (unlike his predecessor), was willing to meet the needs of the local Muslim community. This in particular manifested itself in the authorization of a number of Muslim periodicals, in which can be detected the signs of a politicization of the Muslim worldview among local residents, and a reflection of the interests of particular social groups. The first Jadid newspaper in Turkestan, *Taraqqi* (“Progress”), was published in Tashkent on June 14, 1906. The publisher and editor was a Tatar Socialist Revolutionary, Izmail Gabitov.²² The newspaper did not have a radical character, however, in contrast to the Socialist Revolutionary publications in central Russia. Here is what Turkestan Jadid leader Mahmud Behbudī wrote in this newspaper on July 9, 1906: “Thank God, we hold the same position as Russia and in the future we are ready to cooperate with the Russian government.” This article, focusing on the problems of education among Muslims, discussed how, firstly, Jadids and representatives of Russia, meaning Tatar educators, had common views on the reform of Muslim education. Second, Behbudī noted that the Turkestan Jadids were willing to help the authorities in the fight against scholasticism, to keep pace with the times, and with progress. These intentions were not political in character.²³ In other words, local Jadids on the pages of newspapers published by the Social Revolutionary Tatar, as well as Muslim revolutionaries in other parts of the empire, firmly and consistently spoke out against the participation of Muslims in revolutionary movements, and particularly against being drawn into ethnic conflicts.

This newspaper, which had primarily expressed the aspirations of Turkestan Muslims to escape from their humiliating state of suppressed identity, was immediately completely misunderstood by local officials. “Actually, I must say,” Tashkent police chief N. N. Karaul'shchikov reported indignantly to his supervisors on 15 September, 1906, “that the natives have recently started to behave in front of the administration less respectfully than before, and immorality is observed among them.” In his opinion, the *Taraqqi* newspaper played a significant role in this.²⁴ Russian officials in Turkestan were disgusted by the fact that during the “disturbances” Muslims were trying to emphasize their indifference toward them.²⁵ As a result, in November 1906, its publisher, I. Gabitov, was found guilty of publishing a critical article about the authorities and was sentenced to a large monetary fine,²⁶ and the acting Governor-General of Turkestan, V. A. Matsievskii, even accused the newspaper of inciting national and religious hatred.²⁷ In this way the government tried to discredit local Muslims, who, of course, could not really criticize the actions of the Russian administrators.

The existing situation in Turkestan at that time was well commented on by A. Ibragimov²⁸ in his St. Petersburg newspaper, *Ulfat*. On September 6, 1906, he noted that the prime purpose of the Russian government in Turkestan was the rapid Russification or even enslavement of Muslims, using techniques such as

their total intimidation and harassment. During the time of Governor-General D. I. Subbotich they felt a little calmer, but the government had decided to replace him by General of Infantry N. I. Grodekov (who ruled Turkestan province from December 1906 to 1908), who had already caused great harm to local Muslims. Further, the author appealed to them to remember their national rights, which they were entitled to defend, and recommended to them not to carry out illegal instructions from those in authority.

Understandably, such an analysis, exposing the essence of politics carried out by St. Petersburg in Russian Turkestan, and also the appeal for passive resistance, provoked the particular anger and hostility of the local bureaucrats, who struck back at it, and in particular the *Taraqqi* newspaper. A part of the Muslim “hierarchy” took a similar attitude, because *Taraqqi*’s pages also contained serious criticism of them, based on the fact that they distorted Sharia, that the Qur’an actually does not deny science, and instead encourages secular knowledge, that knowledge is indispensable for both men and women, and so on. As a result, mullahs repeatedly appealed to the authorities to close down this newspaper, and finally succeeded in doing so on August 19, 1906. Conservative circles won, but *Taraqqi*’s place was taken by another Tashkent newspaper, *Khurshid* (“Sun”), which had as a subtitle: “The organ of Muslims . . . A scientific-literary, political, and everyday-life newspaper.” From September 6, 1906 it was published and edited by the Uzbek public figure Munavvar Kari Abdurashidov, another leader of the Tashkent Jadids. The editorial of the first issue stated that the ideological trend of the newspaper was orientated toward the further strengthening and development of Islam.²⁹ Reflecting progressive views, the newspaper continued to educate local Muslims by explaining to them that Islam and progress were compatible, and that it was necessary to fight for their rights and for a decent place among other nations. But that is exactly what provoked the violent displeasure of Islamophobes, both locally and from St. Petersburg, who had at their disposal a variety of means to discredit the intentions of Turkestani citizens.

It was not a coincidence that the promulgation of electoral rules in Turkestan occurred very late. News about it was published in the gazette *Turkestanskije vedomosti* only on May 3, 1906. One of the most suitable candidates, according to the Turkestan Jadids, was a lawyer named S. A. Lapin,³⁰ but the authorities were opposed to this and excluded him from the electoral rolls under false pretexts. The holding of the election was postponed until August 1906. By doing this, the government, in fact, deprived many millions of people throughout the province of participating in the work of the first State Duma.³¹ As a result, no deputies from Turkestan entered the Tauride Palace, because the Duma was dissolved on July 8, 1906.

Other harsh measures against Turkestan Muslims followed. In particular, a state of emergency was declared in Ferghana oblast on September 12, 1906, following a government meeting, on the basis of information received from local officials about the “continuous robberies, murders and criminal assault on officials.” The tsar signed a corresponding decree on September 17.³² Soon, Adjutant General K. K. Maksimovich was sent from St. Petersburg to Turkestan by the tsar to investigate the revolutionary events in this trouble spot. After dispassionately analyzing

the situation there, he reported to St. Petersburg on December 10, 1906, that the revolutionary movement in the province involved only a part of the Russian population, while the indigenous people maintained complete calm.³³ On 11 December, Matsievskii, reporting to St. Petersburg, was also obliged to admit that the “native” population “remains so far faithful to the tsar.”³⁴ Local administrators who were managing everything there, but in fact were not responsible for anything, were constantly scaring St. Petersburg with the specter of rebellion by local Muslims against the central government, and also against the Russian population in general. Such people as Grodekov and Matsievskii were, naturally, not respected by Muslims, and these officials understandably wished to deflect this disrespectful attitude toward the whole government, to which, on the contrary, local Muslims were loyal. Like their co-religionists in other parts of the empire, that did not stop the political activity of their representatives in the center of the empire.

Having not succeeded in getting into the Duma because of the machinations of the authorities, the Turkestan representatives participated in the Third All-Empire Muslim Congress, which took place in August 1906, again in Nizhny Novgorod. The congress elected a fifteen-member Central Committee of the Union of Russian Muslims: eleven Tatars, two Kazakhs, one Azerbaijani, and one Bashkir. In addition, it was decided to co-opt five members into it – one representative from each of the following regions: Baku, Elisavetpol, Orenburg, Erivan (Yerevan) and one from Turkestan.³⁵

This single representative was possibly Behbudi, judging by what he wrote in the Tashkent press. The ideas of the Social Democratic Party “are an illusion, and joining the party is very bad for our Muslims,” Behbudi declared in the newspaper *Khurshid* in October 1906, because sections of the Social-Democratic program for financial, family and other issues “are totally unacceptable from the point of view of Sharia, and in other respects.” Other socialist and revolutionary parties “hourly” contributed to popular rebellion, disobedience, unrest, etc. However, Behbudi also criticized monarchists, calling them “the party of bureaucracy,” which “in fact stands for the old government regime.” But he spoke in a most favorable way about the Constitutional Democrats: “Now in Russia, there are many followers of the Cadet party from every nation and religion.” This party, he said, promoted peace and order among the people. He called on all Turkestan Muslims to join the Cadet party,³⁶ which was fully consistent with the policy of the Union of Russian Muslims. The representative of Turkistan in the Central Committee, presumably, played a major role in carrying out the election campaign in his region for the Second Duma, with the help of the Union of Russian Muslims. During this campaign, the locals involved themselves in political activity and became acquainted with the political program of certain parties through the *Khurshid* newspaper. This angered the authorities, which closed it down on November 16, 1906.

It was during the election campaign for the Second Duma that the best-organized local political groups, which included Muslims, showed themselves as striving for the victory of their candidates. These were the Uzbek merchant (according to other information, a Tajik) Tashpulat Abdulkhalilov (in 1917 a candidate for the All-Russia Constituent Assembly), the Kazakh merchant Tleuli Allabergenev,

Uzbek mullah Abduvakhit-kari Kariev (in 1917 one of the leaders of Turkestan Muslims), Uzbek merchant Salikhdzhan Mukhamedzhanov, and Turkmen landowner M. Nurberdykhanov.

Features of Muslim behavior after the defeat of the revolution

The dissolution of the Second Duma in June 1907, meaning the end of the First Russian Revolution in historiography, had a strong influence on the level of political activity of Turkestan Muslims in the sense that, according to a new election law, Turkestan was completely deprived of its Muslim deputies. According to A. V. Piaskovskii, the reason for this demarche by the authorities was that the result of the Second Duma elections in Turkestan, where tsarism was particularly concerned about its prestige among the allegedly “restive native population.”³⁷ In fact, by that time, Prime Minister P. A. Stolypin had started to carry out a policy of land appropriation (a real robbery) of Muslim people in Turkestan. Land-measuring expeditions determined the “scientific” rules of local people’s needs for land, and all areas exceeding these were transferred to the Resettlement Fund and into the property of the treasury. In total, more than one and a half million acres of land was seized from the indigenous population in Turkestan.³⁸ This government tactic meant that an economic offensive against Turkestan’s Muslims had begun.

Despite the fact that the still nascent political activism of Turkestan Muslims had suffered a major blow from the center, their representatives showed restraint. The Muslim opposition was forced to express its dissatisfaction in the pages of newspapers in a muted way. On August 21, 1907, publication of the newspaper *Tujjār* (“Merchants”) began in Tashkent, financed by a major Uzbek businessman and Tashkent City Duma councilor S. Azimbaev. In particular, the editorial program of the first issue stated that it intended to become “a powerful tool for the protection of national and financial rights.” The editorial of the second issue stated that Muslims were “ignorant” on the point of providing study for the younger generation and, in fact, contributed to the situation whereby “precious time of our children passes uselessly and in vain.” Therefore, the paper stated, “we must use time,” as an unnecessary waste of it “is complete ignorance.” Such a situation had occurred, according to the paper, because Muslims did not know how to improve their lives,³⁹ and had been severely hampered in this primarily by Russian policy in Turkestan, especially after the dissolution of the Second Duma.

On December 4, 1907, this newspaper declared: “In those places where Muslims live, it has always been quiet, no riots were noticed and discipline was not lost . . .”⁴⁰ Meanwhile, Cavalry General V. I. Pokotilo, the military governor of Ferghana region in 1904 and Semirechie region in 1907, assured St. Petersburg that all of the revolutionary unrest was allegedly started by the Tatars and so they had to be thoroughly suppressed.⁴¹ Some modern authors take such arguments seriously. The American R. Crews is correct when he writes that Muslim political activity grew significantly in 1905–06,⁴² but to that we must add that it had a non-revolutionary character.

Many contemporaries testified that Muslims in Central Asia during the revolution were generally calm and, as recalled by B. Baikov (a Cadet), disposed themselves quite loyally.⁴³ The masses of Turkestan Muslims – as noted by Lapin on November 2, 1909, in his petition to the chairman of the Council of Ministers Stolypin – were totally trustworthy in a political sense and had not show any hesitation in their devotion to throne and their new fatherland during the recent years of “general alarm.”⁴⁴ However, although Lapin could not openly declare that the anti-Muslim campaign, which began under Stolypin after the suppression of the revolution, displeased Muslims, especially those in Turkestan, who had been, as noted, totally deprived of their representatives in the Third Duma. For example, a proclamation was discovered in Tashkent in 1909, addressed to “docile Muslims.” It was written, according to the representatives of the authorities, by the deputy of the Second Duma, Tashkent mullah Kariev. The leaflet pointed out that Muslims had fallen into a time of troubles, their faith and life were exposed to blows every day, but the time would come when troubles would fall upon the heads of the Russians, and then the Muslims would rise up and fight, and if God wanted it, would free Turkestan from Russia, and select its own rulers from among themselves.⁴⁵ This was not a call for the overthrow of autocracy, but it made it clear that when the next socio-economic and political crisis occurred, Muslims would refuse to support a government pursuing a policy of oppression of their religious feelings and leading a planned course of discrimination against their civil rights. Such leaflets produced an sense of panic in the local administrators. “In the strictly orthodox world outlook of Muslims a great turnover has occurred,” the Turkestan Governor-General wrote in a secret report addressed to the Minister of War in March 1909, “and we are on the brink of the real implications of this revolution, mysterious in their obscurity. There are signs that these implications are perhaps even threatening to our present situation in the province.”⁴⁶ Understandably, in the same year, 1909, Kariev was arrested and exiled for five years on charges of preparing “an armed uprising by the native Muslims with the aim of separating Turkestan from the empire,”⁴⁷ which, of course, did not correspond to the political aspirations of their elites.

“There are no weighty reasons” for pan-Islamism

It must be taken into consideration that information on the promotion of pan-Islamism, particularly in the Ferghana region, came to the attention of the secret police from the Jews and Armenians, as reported to St. Petersburg in January 1915 by the Tashkent prosecutor.⁴⁸ They tended to be anti-Muslim, and constantly tried to scare not only the authorities, but also the Russian public, suggesting that a threat to the state was posed by the Muslim masses, allegedly seized by a pan-Islamic spirit. In turn, the ranks of the secret police were very interested in this misinformation, unlike the prosecutors, who were as a rule more dispassionate and informed with reliable information regarding the Muslim population.

There was nothing to hide in that officials did not consider or did not promptly respond to the requests of the Muslim inhabitants. This was precisely the cause

of their increasing displeasure. The Turkestan Governor-General A. V. Samsonov reported to the Chief of the General Staff of the Ministry of War N. P. Mikhnevich in St. Petersburg on May 11, 1913, that “the ideas of ‘Pan-Islamism,’ now fashionable in Europe . . . are by no means” characteristic of “the broad masses of the Muslims of Central Asia.” Samsonov believed that “there are no weighty reasons” for speaking of the “manifestly hostile attitude to us among all the natives of our Central Asian possessions.” In a confidential letter to Mikhnevich of May 20, 1913, Samsonov made an even more frank confession: “It is no secret that it is not the dubious ideas of pan-Islamism, but our recent peripheral policy . . . which is . . . one of the major reasons for this dissatisfaction among the Kirgiz [Kazakhs], which they are talking about now so much.”⁴⁹ In November 1914, the Tashkent prosecutor reported to St. Petersburg that the Turkmen population en masse was strongly sympathetic to Russia and to the Russians.⁵⁰ There were people who disagreed with Russian policy in Turkestan, but they were not pan-Islamists but representatives of various opposition political groups, which included representatives of various peoples, including Tatars born in this region, for example Gaziz Ialymov⁵¹ and Islam Shagiakhmetov.⁵²

Europeans and Turkestan people

After the revolution, a process of political dialogue began between European politicians and representatives of the Muslim peoples of the Russian Empire, including Turkestan and the adjacent amirate of Bukhara. For example, a teacher, Mukimdzhan (Mukim-Bek), a resident of Old Bukhara and a Jadid-progressivist, had gone to Turkey after the revolution, where he joined the Young Turks.⁵³ This is probably the same person as Mukimeddin Begkan, who was linked, according to a Finnish researcher, to the Committee for the Protection of the Rights of Muslim Turkic-Tatar Peoples in Russia (Comité pour la Défense des Droits des Peuples Turco-Tatars Musulmans de Russie), which was established in 1915 in Istanbul.⁵⁴ The situation in Turkestan was well known to this Committee.

The Committee delegation, which included this Bukharan teacher, traveled in Europe at the end of 1915 and was received by the Prime Ministers of Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria, and also by the Foreign Minister of Germany.⁵⁵ A number of materials, including a memorandum entitled “Denkschrift des Komitees zum Schutze der Rechte der mohammedanischen türkisch-tatarischen Völker Russlands” (“Memorandum of the Committee for the Protection of the Rights of Muslim Turkic-Tatar Peoples of Russia”) were presented to the governments of these countries. This document contained the following demands: restoration of the statehood of these peoples, freedom for the Bukharan and Khiva khanates from Russian influence, and provision of administrative autonomy to the Kazakhs. In addition, the document entitled “Die gegenwärtige Lage der Mohammedanischen Turko-Tataren Russlands und ihre Bestrebungen” (“The present situation of Turk-Tatar Muslims in Russia and their aspirations”)⁵⁶ was presented to Europeans. During all of these visits, the delegates were assured that they would be provided

with assistance from Germany and Austria-Hungary. The experience of solving such problems already existed in the Habsburg Empire. As a result, the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina received religious autonomy before the war, of which the Muslims in the Russian Empire could only dream.

The Committee for the Protection of the Rights of Muslims in the Russian Empire participated in the Third Congress (Lausanne, June 27–29, 1916) of the “Union of Nationalities,” established in 1911 in Paris. The congress was attended on different days by up to 400 representatives from virtually all of the small nations of Europe. Representatives of Russian Muslims also spoke here, including one representative from Bukhara,⁵⁷ unnamed in the minutes of the congress, who like other Muslim speakers asked the Europeans to save Turkestan’s people from the rule of the Russian capital. As a result, the congress, which was attended by representatives of 23 nations, adopted the Declaration of Rights of Peoples. The right to free expression of will was proclaimed for any nation, that it be recognized as a juridical entity subject to international law; and it was stressed that neither conquest, nor peaceful annexation could give anyone the right to decide the destiny of peoples or their territories. A people occupying a defined territory had the right to autonomy, but in regions with mixed population the representatives of this or that ethnic group had a right to cultural-national autonomy. Besides territory, sovereign nations had the right to decent living conditions and development along the same path as civilized nations.⁵⁸ The speeches of Muslim participants in this forum showed the deep resentment of the Muslim population in the Russian Empire toward the system and management practices of both the central government and local administrators.

“Turkestan’s people are absolutely hostile to the government”

About a month after the Lausanne Congress, a major Muslim rebellion broke out in Turkestan, which was the logical finale of the anti-Muslim policies pursued here by St. Petersburg. And, as was later recorded by the exiled M. Chokaev, a major Turkestan politician in 1917–18, Russian troops massacred Muslims throughout Turkestan in August 1916 simply because they refused to obey the command of the Russian tsar to work for the military.⁵⁹ This command was issued by the center precisely in the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, which aroused a strong protest from the masses. In essence, this event showed how they could defend themselves from what was, in their point of view, the illegal orders of the government, interfering in a sacred area. “How should Jadid politicians have acted during this uprising?” Chokaev wondered in 1935, “Call unarmed population of Turkestan to fight against the soldiers of the tsarist army, armed to the teeth . . . ? No, of course not. But the Jadids were looking for ways to cancel the ‘high command’ and if that was found impossible, at least to mitigate its terms. And the arrival of deputies of the State Duma in this respect brought significant benefits.”⁶⁰ Chokaev was part of this delegation. According to his testimony, mullahs in Andijan told deputies of the Duma, who arrived in August 1916, that they could not encourage people to obey the imperial decree, because they believed that the decree was unjust to the

people. That is why, after returning to the capital, the deputies K. M. Tevkelev and A. F. Kerenskii told their colleagues at the Duma and government members of the general discontent of the people in Turkestan toward the government. Kerenskii added: "Turkestan's people are absolutely hostile to the government."⁶¹ This is understandable, as some half a million Turkestani nomads were beaten because of their participation in the uprising, and some one million escaped to Chinese territory. Representatives of the tsarist authorities, as the *Manchester Guardian* newspaper pointed out on November 28, 1917, carefully concealed the slaughter of Muslims in Turkestan.⁶² This disappointing situation does not suit many modern Russian researchers who are trying to contest it by idealizing the results of Russian rule up to 1917. Thus, D. B. Vasil'ev noted: "It must be recognized that it was exactly under the influence of Russia that Central Asia has entered a new phase in its history – a period of flourishing of national culture, economy and the emergence of civic foundations."⁶³

Conclusion

Thus, no appreciable political activity among the Muslim masses in Russian Turkestan during the First Russian Revolution was observed, since at that time there were no substantial religious and political reasons for popular resistance to the authorities. At the same time, from 1905, changes occurred among the representatives of their elite toward the existing political situation, expressed in different forms of political activity, mainly in the appearance of a number of newspapers, reflecting the all-imperial Muslim-Jadid (reformist), progressivist movement, in the establishment of small opposition groups, which manifested themselves most notably during the election campaign to the Second Duma, in the work of the Muslim faction of this Duma, and in the activities of the Union of Russian Muslims. The subsequent increase in the mood of protest among Turkestani politicians was due primarily to the absence of Muslim representatives in the Third Duma, secondly, to the increasing seizure of indigenous lands, and thirdly, to the anti-Muslim campaign unleashed after the revolution. All this led to an increase in internal tensions and appeals to the European public and the European powers. The participation of a Bukharan teacher in negotiations with the Europeans, and the speech by a representative of the Turkestan opposition at the Lausanne Congress of Nationalities in June 1916, expressing dissatisfaction with Russian government, reflected the political activity of the local Muslim population, which emerged in a relatively short period of time. This strong protest was expressed a month later in the form of a large Muslim uprising. This was the culmination of St. Petersburg's inefficient policy in Russian Turkestan. It was precisely this rebellion that became a real popular revolution against Russian power, which took place several months before the February Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd, and led to the fall of the autocracy.

(Translated from Russian by Anna Zudina)

Notes

- 1 O. P. Zhalmenova, “V. V. Bartol'd: uchenyi i vlast' (politicheskii mir nauchnoi intelligentsii),” in *Vlast' i nauka, uchenye i vlast': 1880-e – nachalo 1920-kh godov: Materialy Mezhdunarodnogo nauchnogo kollokviuma* (St. Petersburg, 2003), 45.
- 2 *Leninskii sbornik*, vol. 28 (Moscow, 1936), 311.
- 3 M. L. Kudelia-Odabash'ian, *Turkestan v sostave Sovetskoi Rossii: problemy sotsial'no-ekonomicheskogo i politicheskogo razvitiia (oktiabr' 1917 g. – oktiabr' 1924 g.)* (Moscow, 2003), 70, 71, 78.
- 4 E. Karrer d'Ankoss [H. Carrère d'Encausse], *Evraziiskaia imperiia: Istoriia Rossiiskoi imperii s 1552 g. do nashikh dnei*, trans. from French (Moscow, 2007), 125.
- 5 This refers to the territory of the Volga-Ural region.
- 6 This secret society was founded in Kazan in 1901.
- 7 S. M. Iskhakov, *Pervaia russkaia revoliutsiia i musul'mane Rossiiskoi imperii* (Moscow, 2007), 75–78.
- 8 S. Aini, *Korotko o moei zhizni* (Stalinabad, 1958), 62–63.
- 9 *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii*, sobranie 3, vol. 25 (St. Petersburg), 262.
- 10 A. Iu. Bakhturina, *Okrainy Rossiiskoi imperii: gosudarstvennoe upravlenie i natsional'naiia politika v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny (1914–1917 gg.)* (Moscow, 2004), 297.
- 11 Abdulkadyr Kushbegiev became one of the Turkestan leaders after the February Revolution of 1917, and Deputy Nazir (Minister) of Agriculture of the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic (1921).
- 12 Sagdulla Tursunkhodzhaev was a Left Socialist-Revolutionary (1918), People's Commissar for Health of the Turkestan ASSR, a member of the Russian Communist Party (b) since 1919, executive secretary of the Communist Party of Bukhara (1921), then one of the leaders of the Turkestan ASSR.
- 13 R. T. Shamsutdinov, “Russkie demokrati i turkestanskii dzhadidy: ikh sovmeštinaia bor'ba,” in *Istoriia: problem ob'ektivnosti i npravstvennosti (materialy nauchnoi konferentsii)* (Tashkent, 2003), 220.
- 14 Aini, *Korotko o moei zhizni*, 72–73.
- 15 A. Agaev, “Chto ia vynes iz moego puteshestviia v Peterburg?” *Kaspii*, 20 May 1905. See Qur'an 53:39.
- 16 I. L., “Stoit zadumat'sia,” *Perevodchik-Terdzhiman*, 16 August 1905. See Qur'an 13:11.
- 17 *Revoliutsiia 1905–1907 gg. v Rossii, dokumenty i materialy: Vserossiiskaia stachka v oktibre 1905 g., chast' 2* (Moscow, 1955), 305.
- 18 A. V. Piaskovskii, *Revoliutsiia 1905–1907 godov v Turkestane* (Moscow, 1958), 432.
- 19 S. Dimanshtein, “Natsional'nosti v revoliutsii 1905 g.,” *Revoliutsiia i natsional'nosti*, no. 1 (1931), 71.
- 20 GARF (State Archive of the Russian Federation), f. DPOO, op. 1911, d. 74, ch. 5, ll. 60b–7. Tatar merchant M. Urazaev had considerable influence among the Tatars of Tashkent (GARF, f. DPOO, op. 1913, d. 74, ch. 84 B prodolzhenie, l. 67ob.). Ethnicity and occupation of other representatives of Turkestan are missing in the summaries of the Police Department.
- 21 AVPRI (Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire), f. 147, op. 485, d. 1280, ll. 25ob., 26, 27ob.
- 22 Information about this person is contradictory: according to French researchers, after the February Revolution of 1917, Ismail Abidi (Gabitov) was a member of the editorial board of the Tashkent newspaper *Shūrā-i Islām* published in May 1917. A. Bennigsen and Ch. Lemerrier-Quelquejay, *La presse et le mouvement national chez les musulmans de Russie avant 1920* (Paris: Mouton, 1964), 161, 265. According to Kazan researchers, the member of the editorial board of *Shūrā-i Islām* was Ismail

- Gabidi. R. R. Gainanov, R. F. Mardanov, and F. N. Shakurov, *Tatarskaia periodicheskaia pechat'nachala XX veka: bibliograficheskii ukazatel'* (Kazan, 2000), 197. D. M. Usmanova wrote about Ismagil Bilialietdinovich Gabitov (1890/91–?), a native of Kazan province, who graduated in 1910 from a *madrassa*, and was a mullah in Kazan in 1913–17. After the February Revolution, he became member of the editorial board of *Shūrā-i Islām*, but soon returned to Kazan. *Tatarskaia entsiklopediia*, vol. 2 (Kazan, 2005), 10. On the same page a nameless article is posted, which mentioned the publisher of Samarkand (?) newspaper *Taraqqi*, Ismail Sharafetdinovich Gabitov (?–1937). According to the secret police information, I. Gabitov, who in 1906 worked on *Taraqqi*, arrived in Bukhara from Orenburg in June 1913. GARF, f. DPOO, op. 1913, d. 74, ch. 84 B prodolzhenie, l. 68ob.
- 23 In Soviet historiography, to show the “reactionary character” of Muslim leaders, L. M. Landa, a specialist in Turkestan studies, interpreted this sentence in the following way: “Thank God, we are together with Russia and will support the existence of the Russian government also in the future.” L. M. Landa, “Panislamistskaia i pantiurkistskaia agentura v Turkestane (Konets XIX v. – 1917 god)” (diss. k.i.n., Tashkent, 1953), 178. According to A. V. Piaskovskii, Behbudi allegedly said the following: “Thank God, now we are helping and in the future will help the Russian government.” Piaskovskii, *Revoliutsiia 1905–1907 godov v Turkestane*, 552–553.
- 24 *Revoliutsiia 1905–1907 gg. v Uzbekistane: dokumenty i materialy* (Tashkent, 1984), 271.
- 25 A. V. Piaskovskii, *Revoliutsiia 1905–1907 godov v Uzbekistane* (Tashkent, 1957), 221.
- 26 GARF, f. 124, op. 57, d. 279, l. 112ob.
- 27 *Revoliutsiia 1905–1907 gg. v Uzbekistane*, 284.
- 28 Abdrashed (Abdurrashid, Gabderashit, Rashid, Rashit) Ibragimov (1857–1944) was a Siberian Tatar of Bukharan origin, religious and social activist, journalist, one of the leaders of the Muslim movement in the Russian Empire in 1904–07.
- 29 Piaskovskii, *Revoliutsiia 1905–1907 godov v Turkestane*, 557, 560.
- 30 Ser-Ali Lapin (1870–?) was a Kazakh, private attorney, translator, orientalist, Turcologist, and one of the Turkestan Muslim leaders in 1917–18.
- 31 T. V. Kotiukova, “Problemy Turkestana v tsentral'nykh zakonodatel'nykh organakh vlasti Rossiiskoi imperii, 1905–1917 gg.” (diss. k.i.n., Tashkent, 2001), 33, 48–49.
- 32 *Osobyie zhurnaly Soveta ministrov tsarskoi Rossii, 1906 god*, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1982), 350; Piaskovskii, *Revoliutsiia 1905–1907 godov v Turkestane*, 578.
- 33 *Revoliutsiia 1905–1907 gg. v Rossii, dokumenty i materialy: Vtoroi period revoliutsii, 1906–1907 gody*, chast' 2, kniga 3 (Moscow, 1963), 403.
- 34 *Revoliutsiia 1905–1907 gg. v Uzbekistane*, 284.
- 35 *Kaspii*, 3 September 1906. As a result, the Central Committee of the Union of Russian Muslims consisted of 11 Tatars (from the Volga region, Crimea, and St. Petersburg), four Azerbaijanis, two Bashkirs, two Kazakhs, and one from Turkestan.
- 36 A. V. Piaskovskii, “Revoliutsiia 1905–1907 gg. v Turkestane,” in *Revoliutsiia 1905–1907 godov v natsional'nykh raionakh Rossii: sbornik statei* (Moscow, 1949), 608; Piaskovskii, *Revoliutsiia 1905–1907 godov v Turkestane*, 559; Z. Radzhabov, *Turkestan na stranitsakh bol'shevistskikh gazet perioda pervoi russkoi revoliutsii 1905–1907 gg.* (Dushanbe, 1970), 86.
- 37 Piaskovskii, *Revoliutsiia 1905–1907 godov v Turkestane*, 537.
- 38 A. M. Anfimov, *P. A. Stolypin i rossiiskoe krest'ianstvo* (Moscow, 2002), 239.
- 39 Piaskovskii, *Revoliutsiia 1905–1907 godov v Turkestane*, 557, 558.
- 40 *Ibid.*, 554.
- 41 P. P. Litvinov, “Antitatarskaia politika tsarizma v Srednei Azii i Kazakhstane,” in *Materialy po istorii tatarskogo naroda* (Kazan, 1995), 386–387.
- 42 Robert D. Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 343.

- 43 B. Baikov, “Vospominaniia o revoliutsii v Zakavkaz'e,” in *Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii*, vol. 9 (Moscow, 1991), 94.
- 44 AVPRI, f. 147, op. 485, d. 1266, ll. 87, 89.
- 45 GARF, f. 124, op. 47, d. 954, ll. 1–1ob.
- 46 Piaskovskii, *Revoliutsiia 1905–1907 godov v Uzbekistane*, 251.
- 47 T. V. Kotiukova, “O deiatel'nosti turkestanskikh deputatov vo vtoroi Gosudarstvennoi Dume,” in *Obshchestvennye nauki v Uzbekistane*, no. 3 (2001), 46.
- 48 GARF, f. 124, op. 53, d. 313, l. 2ob.
- 49 S. M. Iskhakov, *Rossiiskie musul'mane i revoliutsiia (vesna 1917 g. – leto 1918 g.)* (Moscow, 2004), 30.
- 50 GARF, f. 124, op. 52, d. 316, l. 6–6ob.
- 51 Gaziz Ialymov (1885–1937) was born in Petropavlovsk, Aqmola oblast, studied at St. Petersburg University, member of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party since 1905, after the October Revolution of 1917 participant of the First Congress of the Comintern (Moscow, 1919) as a representative of the delegation of peoples of Eastern Russia, left the Russian Communist Party (b) in 1922.
- 52 Islam Shagiakhmetov was born in Tashkent, graduated from St. Petersburg University, became a journalist; in 1917 a deputy of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, one of the leaders of Turkestan Muslims in 1917–18. In modern Uzbek historiography, his name and surname, like many other Tatar leaders of that era, were made to sound Uzbek – Islom Shoahmedov.
- 53 GARF, f. DPOO, op. 1915 g., d. 74, l. 106–106ob.
- 54 Seppo Zetterberg, *Die Liga der Fremdvölker Russlands 1916–1918: ein Beitrag zu Deutschlands antirussischem Propagandakrieg unter den Fremdvölkern Russlands im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Helsinki: Finnische Historische Gesellschaft, 1978), 70.
- 55 AVPRI, f. 151, op. 482, d. 4323, ll. 19, 20.
- 56 Hakan Kırımlı, *National Movements and National Identity among the Crimean Tatars (1905–1916)* (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 203, 204.
- 57 According to secret police information, it was Alibek Gusein-zade (GARF, f. DPOO, op. 1916, d. 336, tom 2, l. 1ob.). This famous Azerbaijani scholar and writer graduated from St. Petersburg University, participated in the revolution of 1905–07, after which he was forced to go abroad. He acted, of course, not as the representative of Bukhara (in fact, Bukhara was under the rule of the amir), but of the population of Russian Turkestan, and he must have received a request from Turkestan opposition. Apparently there was no one among the latter with knowledge of German or French to speak in front of the participants of the congress.
- 58 “III-me Conférence des Nationalités,” *Les Annales des Nationalités*, nos. 9–11 (1916), 261–262, 263, 264; *Compte rendu sommaire de la III-me Conférence des Nationalités réunie à Lausanne 27–29 juin 1916* (Lausanne-Ouchy, [1916]), 30, 31, 32, 43–45.
- 59 RGVA (Russian State Military Archive), f. 461-K, op. 1, d. 417, l. 306.
- 60 RGVA, f. 461-K, op. 2, d. 142, l. 29.
- 61 RGVA, f. 461-K, op. 2, d. 142, l. 31.
- 62 Iskhakov, *Rossiiskie musul'mane i revoliutsiia*, 269.
- 63 D. B. Vasil'ev, “O politike tsarskogo pravitel'stva v Russkom Turkestane (k voprosu o ‘rusifikatsii’),” in *Sbornik russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva*, no. 5 (2002), 69.

12 On the cultural front lines

Muslim reformers and communities in late imperial Russia

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The movement for Muslim cultural reform, or “Jadidism,” has long been a popular subject of investigation in the historiography relating to Muslim communities in late imperial Russia. While scholars have examined Jadidism in different ways over the years, in most cases the movement for Muslim cultural reform has been discussed mainly in terms of the “ideas” of a rather small number of well-known activist-intellectuals.¹ Muslim opposition to Jadidism, meanwhile, has likewise been discussed primarily in terms of the “arguments” and “debates” taking place in the Muslim periodical press between Jadids and their conservative rivals, often referred to as “qadims.”² Although idea-based approaches to Jadidism have at times provided valuable insights into subjects like the nature of elite rivalries in Muslim communities,³ at the same time such approaches can also leave the impression that the issue of Muslim cultural reform was something that concerned only a relatively small number of people.⁴

This chapter examines the movement for Muslim cultural reform beyond the margins of the periodical press. Rather than discuss “Jadidism” as an abstract concept, I focus upon individual Jadids, their projects, and the responses of other Muslims to these projects. By using state archival sources and other materials that have traditionally not been employed in studies of Jadidism, I look at the ways in which the movement for Muslim cultural reform played out in the mud-spattered villages and obscure schools which constituted, in many ways, the front lines in the culture wars taking place within Muslim communities in the late imperial era. While intellectual debates and “cultural capital” no doubt constituted important components in these battles,⁵ divisions within Muslim communities over the post-1905 expansion of Jadidist education also stemmed from much more tangible concerns, including those related to money and power. Focusing comparatively upon three distinct geographical areas of the empire – the Volga-Ural region, the Crimea, and the southern Caucasus – I look not only at the ways in which Muslim cultural reform was received within various Muslim communities in the empire, but also at the question of what Muslim divisions over the issue of Muslim cultural reform can tell us about the nature of Muslim–state relations in the empire.

“New method” schools and Muslim communities

In a number of ways, the movement for Muslim cultural reform resembled cultural and intellectual movements taking place in many parts of the Islamic world and beyond, with an international community of publicists and activist-intellectuals engaging “reformist” issues like the “women’s question,” the Muslim encounter with European imperialism, and Muslim cultural modernization.⁶ While Muslim cultural reformers in Russia and elsewhere advocated a variety of reform positions, within Russia the Jadid movement was known mainly in the context of educational reform. Jadids advocated the teaching of literacy, usually in the form of local vernaculars or in “Turkic,”⁷ and were critical of traditional Muslim educational approaches which emphasized the acquisition of skills such as the memorization and recitation of sacred texts written in Arabic.⁸ Jadids also favored the introduction of what they considered to be more “orderly” approaches to Muslim education, advocating the stricter regulation of both space and time by seating students in rows and dividing the day into separate periods devoted to the study of different subjects. Notably, the teaching of Russian was also advocated by most Jadids, as well as the study of secular subjects alongside religious ones. Schools and teachers which subscribed to such approaches were known in Russia as adhering to the “new method,” or *usul-i cedid*.⁹

The best-known Muslim cultural reform figure in Russia was İsmail Gasprinskii. Gasprinskii not only wanted to change the manner of Muslim education through the teaching of literacy, but also hoped to overhaul the entire culture of Muslim education in Russia. In the 1880s and 1890s, Gasprinskii traveled frequently across the Crimea, the Volga-Ural region, and Central Asia in his efforts to popularize new method education.¹⁰ Elsewhere, other Jadids, such as Rizaeddin Fahreddin, Galimcan Barudi and Musa Bigi, opened schools in the Volga-Ural region, mostly in urban areas, such as Kazan, Chistopol, and Orenburg.¹¹ In the southern Caucasus, meanwhile, a small number of new method schools were opened in the largest of cities, such as Tbilisi, Baku, and Yerevan. By 1895, Gasprinskii estimated there existed a little over one hundred new method schools in all of Russia.¹²

Estimates relating to the number of new method schools in Russia vary, particularly with regard to the growth in number of new method schools taking place after 1905. Indeed, in this respect – as is the case regarding many other aspects of Muslim life in imperial Russia – tsarist state estimates were often wildly off the mark and frequently contradicted one another. In 1909, for example, officials in Orenburg indicated that there were no new method schools operating in their province,¹³ whereas sources written in the languages of Muslim communities themselves indicate that the province of Orenburg was actually one of the major centers of new method activity in Russia.¹⁴ In another government report from 1909, it was stated that in the province of Kazan there were only 191 new method schools out of a total of 913 Muslim schools in the province.¹⁵ This finding contradicted the opinion of a separate report, written in the same year, which stated that in the province of Kazan “up to 90 percent of all Muslim confessional schools are currently run according to the new method.”¹⁶

The confusion of tsarist officials over the numbers of new method schools stemmed from several factors. First of all, most tsarist officials who worked on issues pertaining to Muslims could not read or communicate in the languages of the empire's Muslim populations, and knew little or nothing about the Muslim communities in the empire. Second, the schools themselves were often short-lived, while the degree to which these schools followed new method educational programs also varied. The fact that many new method schools had been opened without official government permission was also a major factor in sowing confusion among tsarist officials charged with tracking the growth of new method education.

In the Crimea, for example, tsarist officials – working with the Crimean Müfti – undertook a survey in 1908 of schools in the province and found that in one of its *uezds* “only eight out of 126 *mekteps* were operating with the permission of the Muslim spiritual assembly.”¹⁷ The number of illegal Muslim schools in the Crimea was estimated at “more than 600” in an August 1910 article appearing in the journal *Sotrudnik*.¹⁸ In 1912, a study on new method education in the province of Kazan found that the great majority of new method schools opened since the placement of Muslim schools under the authority of the Ministry of Education in 1870 had been opened illegally.¹⁹

While dependable numbers relating to the expansion of new method education are difficult to come by, tsarist officials were nevertheless consistent in detecting a considerable spike in the number of new method schools in the years following the Revolution of 1905. In 1909, the director of Tatar, Bashkir, and “Kirgiz [Kazakh]” education in the province of Kazan wrote that the “fermentation” (*brozhenie*) of new method education in the province had begun in earnest only in 1906, with most new method schools having been established only “recently, about 3–4 years ago.”²⁰ In 1905, the Russian Orientalist Agafangel Krymskii estimated that there were approximately five hundred new method schools operating in the whole of Russia. Within three years he had increased his estimate by more than ten times, to six thousand.²¹

Meanwhile, demand in Russia for experienced teachers in the new method approach attracted many teachers from the Ottoman Empire, where new method approaches to the teaching of literacy had been standard practice since the era of the *Tanzimat*.²² Many Russian Muslims, moreover, chose to study in the Ottoman Empire because they felt that they would receive better training in Istanbul and other Ottoman cities than in Russia.²³ Muslim community activist figures from Russia who were living in Istanbul after 1908 would sometimes help their young protégés secure work as new method teachers in Russia,²⁴ while Russian Muslim students in Istanbul themselves often contacted wealthy or connected Jadid figures in Russia, asking for assistance with their education.²⁵

Although conditions at new method schools could vary substantially with respect to resources,²⁶ teachers working at the more prestigious new method schools in cities like Kazan, Ufa, and Simferopol often received salaries that traditional *medrese* teachers could only dream of. The contrast could be stark. Most traditional *medrese* teachers were lower-level personnel in the Muslim spiritual

assemblies who received no fixed salary, and teaching the village's children often represented one of their few opportunities to earn cash.²⁷ Otherwise, compensation to spiritual personnel consisted mainly of in-kind payments such as an allotment of the village's harvest or else a small plot of land upon which they could grow their own food, arrangements which could be quickly overturned during periods of famine.²⁸ And famine would indeed strike during the years following the 1905 Revolution. Beginning no later than 1909, Müfti Soltanov of the Orenburg Assembly appealed on numerous occasions to government authorities in an effort to receive funding to help Muslim spiritual personnel buy food. These requests were only met in 1912, when the government agreed to provide the Orenburg Assembly with a loan of 50,000 rubles to feed spiritual personnel considered to be in danger of starvation.²⁹

Even as spiritual personnel were going hungry, the merchants who established some of the most prestigious new method schools during these years were offering salaries that sometimes seemed exorbitant by comparison. Salaries among teachers at the Hüseyiniye *Medrese* in Kargalı (Qarghali), established by Ahmet Bey Hüseyinov in 1903, averaged 336 rubles per year in 1903–05, and almost 400 rubles per year in 1913–14.³⁰ A 1908 job advertisement for teachers at the new method *Medrese-yi Usmaniye* in Ufa offered monthly salaries ranging from 10 to 25 rubles, depending on the applicant's qualifications.³¹ In 1910, an official in the Department of Spiritual Affairs observed that "unlike teachers in traditional ['old method,' or *starometodnyi*] schools, all of the teachers [in new method schools] receive a predetermined salary, ranging from 100 to 700 rubles per year, or even more, depending on the specific qualifications and experience of the teacher,"³² while other reports estimated these salaries at between 200 and 600 rubles per year.³³ Meanwhile, other remunerative opportunities for new method teachers came in the form of stipends and grants (sometimes as much as 500 rubles) provided for projects such as the production of new textbooks, with money provided by philanthropists such as the Hüseyinov brothers.³⁴

Faced with the arrival of new method teachers in their villages, traditional teachers fought back, appealing to the Orenburg Assembly and civil officials in efforts to have recently opened new method schools closed down. In 1906, for example, an imam named Mehmed Zakir Abdürrahimoğlu from the village of Bik Shikte in the province of Simbirsk wrote to the Orenburg Assembly to complain that his students had been stolen from him. While Abdürrahimoğlu had been in Ufa on business pertaining to the Orenburg Assembly, the village *muezzin*, Mehmed Arif Alimoğlu, had set up a new method school in his absence, and Abdürrahimoğlu now turned to the Orenburg Assembly in his effort to get the school closed down.³⁵

In a similar case in 1912, the Orenburg Assembly ruled on two complaints that had been made in 1909 regarding the teaching of an Imam Beyazitov at a *medrese* in the village of Sair-Novyi. The school in the village, it was explained in the ruling, had been constructed on the specific condition that new method education would not take place there. Habibullah Hüseyinov, an imam in the village, had already driven away two teachers for teaching in the new method in 1907 and 1908, and

then attempted to drive away Beyazitov as well. In 1909, both Hüseyinov and his co-plaintiff, “the wife of İmankulov” (the widow of the previous teacher), appealed to the Orenburg Assembly to remove Beyazitov from the school. In his defense, Beyazitov acknowledged that he had indeed originally taught according to the new method. However, he said, he had switched to traditional methods of teaching in the face of opposition from the community. The assembly concluded that, while “it is not the place for the Orenburg Assembly to determine the correct style of education for children, the complaints of Hüseyinov and the wife of İmankulov do not appear to be well founded,” and ruled that Beyazitov should be allowed to stay at the school.³⁶

On some occasions, tensions were created within a community when Jadids attempted to open a new method school in a community where a school already existed. In the Crimean city of Karasubazar, an organization calling itself the “Muslim charitable organization of Karasubazar” requested permission from the Simferopol inspector for non-Russian education to open a new method *mektep* “with the goal of teaching Russian language.” The school, they wrote, would be located in the building where a government operated Russian-Tatar school currently existed.³⁷ Students attending the existing school, it was envisioned, would become students at the new Jadid school.

In response to this plan, a group of twenty-three “Tatar residents of the city of Karasubazar” petitioned the inspector in opposition to these plans, arguing that they could not afford to pay money for their children’s education, something which was required at the new method school. The fees demanded by the school, they argued, were too expensive and would “serve only a small portion (*neznachitel'naia chast'*) of the population.”³⁸ In October, supporters of the new method school wrote again to the inspector. Pointing out that their numbers represented “all fifteen Tatar parishes (*prikhody*) of the city of Karasubazar,” the petitioners argued that “the complaints don’t have any basis” and that “the community is very pleased by the opening of the new method schools by the Muslim Charitable Society.”³⁹

Sometimes, opponents of new method teachers would take matters into their own hands, running a new method teacher out of town or threatening him with violence. In March 1909, Fatih Kerimi⁴⁰ received a letter from an imam in the city of Tiumen named Selim Giray bin Khayri al-din Gabidov. Gabidov was a new method teacher who had spent nearly two years on the educational front. After studying in Kazan, Gabidov had taken a teaching job outside Penza at a school sponsored by the Akçurin family of Simbirsk.⁴¹ Before long, however, a coalition of “old rich people” (*kart baylar*) and “old mullahs who were trying to close the school” managed to convince enough people to withdraw their children, forcing the school to shut down. From Penza, Gabidov traveled to Tiumen, where he again taught according to the new method, this time thanks to the sponsorship of a local merchant. In his letter to Kerimi, Gabidov describes once being descended upon by a mob of “forty to fifty” people demanding he leave town. Nevertheless, he wrote that he had met with some success in Tiumen, developing seven groups of students and earning between 5 and 10 rubles per month cash, while his

wife brought in still more money by teaching three classes of girls. Ultimately, however, Gabidov and his wife were driven out of Tiumen by pressure from “the enemies of the community,” sending them off to start again elsewhere.⁴²

The relationship between Muslim communities and new method education was a complicated one. On the one hand, the number of new method schools increased exponentially after 1905, particularly in the Volga-Ural region and the Crimea. While many of these schools closed soon after they were opened, many others stayed open for years. Jadids working in the hinterlands often complained against the machinations of tyrannical mullahs who set the community against them, but in at least some cases it seems clear that new method schools failed either because of a lack of local interest in new method education more generally, or because of the shortcomings or lack of experience of the teachers employed at the school.⁴³ On some occasions entire villages, or at least significant portions of them, were actively involved in repelling new method teachers from a school or village, but in most cases the individuals who appear to have been the most galvanized in their opposition to new method schools were the teachers whose earnings and prestige were most threatened by the arrival of new method education to their locality.

Denunciation campaign

While there were numerous cases of individual villages turning against new method teachers such as those discussed in the preceding section, there was also a much more organized campaign against both well-known and obscure Jadids which took place in the Volga-Ural region between 1908 and 1911. During the course of this campaign, Muslim spiritual personnel in the Orenburg Assembly contacted tsarist security officials with accusations that Jadids were involved in a vast plot aimed at encouraging separatism, “pan-Islamism,” and “pan-Turkism” among the region’s Muslim communities.

The denunciation campaign occurred in the context of an increasingly bitter struggle taking place within Muslim communities over the question of how to re-organize the empire’s four Muslim spiritual assemblies. While most Muslims supported the idea of greater administrative autonomy for the Muslim spiritual assemblies, there was nevertheless strong disagreement over the question of how the assemblies should be reformed and by whom. Jadids sought to use *İttifak*, the “all-Russian Muslim” movement which became a political party in 1906, as a means to place Muslim education under the control of the Muslim assemblies and put the Muslim assemblies under the control of *İttifak*. Divisions between Jadids and non-Jadids over the future of the Muslim assemblies was sharpest in the Volga-Ural region and (albeit to a lesser extent) the Crimea, where state intervention into Muslim affairs had been particularly sharp in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In general, the future of state institutions like the Muslim assemblies was of less concern to non-elite Muslims in the southern Caucasus, and still less so in the northern Caucasus and Central Asia.⁴⁴

While the leadership of *İttifak* was dominated by Jadids and Jadid sympathizers, a number of non-Jadids were also active in the movement’s activities. Non-Jadids

participated in the movement's early meetings and stood as candidates for parliament and sat in the Duma as *İttifak* representatives,⁴⁵ while the journal *Din ve Mağışet* – which was well-known for its opposition to Jadidism – regularly printed *İttifak*'s communiqués to Muslim communities. Although relations between the leaders of *İttifak* and the leaders of the empire's four Muslim spiritual assembly were often strained and marked by suspicion,⁴⁶ the leaders of the assemblies and the leaders of the Muslim political party in parliament were able to work together on a number of occasions, such as when they joined forces in opposing a new set of education regulations proposed by the government on March 31, 1907.⁴⁷ The leaders of the spiritual assemblies had more clout with government officials than did the leaders of *İttifak*, but the *İttifak* leaders were the only Muslim representatives in a position to work legislation through parliament. As long as the Duma itself was considered an important institution, the *İttifak* movement (later party) was a force whose potential (if not actual) power could not be dismissed.

The relationship between the *İttifak* leadership and its non-Jadid supporters changed drastically in the wake of the Third Muslim Congress in Nizhny Novgorod in August 1906. By this time, Yusuf Akçura, who was the general-secretary of the movement and its chief of communications, was gaining increasing decision-making power within *İttifak*, and it was Akçura who successfully pressed for the movement to be transformed into a political party. By becoming a political party, argued Akçura, *İttifak* should also adopt a political platform, and therefore must move away from the spirit of inclusiveness which had dominated in the early days of the movement.⁴⁸ Despite criticism even from the supporters of Jadid projects, who complained that the congress had not been properly advertised,⁴⁹ and amid the strenuous protests of some of the Muslims attending, a very pro-Jadid program was adopted, one that also called for the *İttifak* party to be given unprecedented control over Muslim administration.

The party program endorsed at the Third Congress included, for example, an ambitious project regarding the establishment of a standardized (*umumi*) program of education for Muslim schools in every region of Russia.⁵⁰ This program envisioned the creation of a standardized curriculum for Muslim *medreses*, something which had long been a feature of the idealized versions of Jadidist education described in the writings of Gasprinskii and others. The establishment of teacher training schools was also planned, and teachers would have to take examinations in order to become licensed. Licensing would be the responsibility of the Orenburg Assembly, which would become a unified body consolidating all of Russian Muslims into a single institution.⁵¹

In addition to creating teacher training schools and establishing examinations, the standardized educational program that was accepted at the Third Muslim Congress also called for Muslim schools to teach, “to the extent possible,” in the “common language” (*umumi lisan*), or “Türki,”⁵² a proposal that was clearly influenced by İsmail Gasprinskii, who had been campaigning for the adoption of a “common literary language” on the pages of *Tercüman* for most of 1906.⁵³ The 1906 meeting also called for increasing Russian language courses in Muslim schools,⁵⁴ a position that had long been supported by Jadids in spite of the fact that thousands

of Muslims in the Volga-Ural region had been campaigning against mandatory Russian-language education for much of the previous twenty-five years.⁵⁵ Even more galling to non-Jadid followers of *İttifak*, however, was the proposal, also accepted at this congress, that “all Russian Muslims will be educated according to the new method.”⁵⁶

Indeed, for many people in attendance, the Third Muslim Congress represented the final victory of Jadidism over traditional education. In the triumphant words of one delegate to the congress, the new method teacher Ahmedcan Mustafa, “the battle over *usul-i cedid* is over.”

No fear remains. The fantasy that *usul-i cedid* would harm religion did frighten people, but now they understand that it is harmless. So, we must now try as hard as possible to reform our schools, and if we so endeavor we will accomplish these reforms.⁵⁷

According to the program of the Third Congress, the Muslim spiritual assemblies were also scheduled to undergo major changes. The four assemblies would continue to exist, but would be subsumed within a single body, which would be concerned with the affairs of both Shiite and Sunni Muslims across the empire. The head of this body would be called the sheyh ul-Islam, who would be elected to a five-year term.⁵⁸ Muslim judges, or *kadis*, would also be elected to five-year terms. Moreover, both the sheyh ul-Islam and the *kadis* would be assisted in their duties by a lawyer trained in Russian civil law – that is, by an individual who, by training, was considered more likely to be sympathetic to the proposals of the Jadid intellectuals who dominated the leadership of the *İttifak* party.⁵⁹

Following the Third Congress, Muslim opposition to *İttifak* increased considerably, with lower-level spiritual personnel in the Orenburg Assembly constituting the center of this opposition.⁶⁰ According to *Din ve Mağışet*, a group of imams from villages in the vicinity of Orenburg had sent a telegram to the Interior Ministry complaining about *İttifak*, and arguing that its policies concerning Muslim education and turning the müftiate into an elected position were contrary to Islam.⁶¹ Meanwhile, the pro-*İttifak* and pro-Jadid Muslim periodical press also began reporting that Muslim spiritual personnel were supporting right-wing monarchist parties, such as the Union of Russian People (*Soiuz Russkogo naroda*).⁶²

Beginning in 1908, Muslim spiritual personnel undertook denunciation campaigns in which they reported to police, either in person or anonymously, that new method teachers were secretly spreading “pan-Turkist” or “pan-Islamist” propaganda.⁶³ In August of 1908, a petition signed by twelve imams from the Orenburg Assembly was sent to the Minister of the Interior. The imams were complaining about what they described as the “revolutionary activities” of new method teachers in the area. Emphasizing the special relationship shared between the Russian government and the regional spiritual authorities in the definition and policing of “Islam,” the imams began their petition by invoking the reliability and loyalty of the Orenburg authorities.

We Muslims pray every Friday for the long life both of our great Tsar and for its excellence the Russian government to which we are subjects. How could we not pray, given the fact that our great leader has granted us full freedom in our religious activities? He created the spiritual assembly for the appointment of imams, for the construction of mosques and *medreses*, and for the regulation of our religious affairs.

“In recent years,” wrote the mullahs, “a number of teachers belonging to revolutionary organizations” had appeared in their villages. “Though they are ostensibly undertaking a religious duty,” they wrote, “in fact they are turning the Tatar population against the Russian government.” The twelve mullahs wrote that the new *Medrese-i Muhammediye* of Kazan, one of the best known new method *medreses* in the region, “is producing teachers who teach children according to the new method, who train them by filling their blood with hatred for the government.”⁶⁴

The complaints of the twelve licensed mullahs seem to have been designed to place the question of new method education in a context that would attract as much attention as possible among security-conscious tsarist authorities. The mullahs wrote that teachers who studied at the *Medrese-i Muhammediye* wanted to say the Friday prayer in Tatar, “in accordance with the plan of the Young Turks and Persian mullahs.” The twelve mullahs also wrote that these teachers,

want to put the [Orenburg] Spiritual Assembly into Muslim hands and, having taken the Assembly out of the hands of the government, then hold elections for the position of müfti and for the *kadis* because they want to carry out through the assembly undertakings such as the publication by the assembly of newspapers and journals with the aim of creating evil in Tatar society.⁶⁵

The twelve mullahs named names, giving the first and last names of ten *Muhammediye* graduates as well as the village and *uezd* in which they lived. The mullahs requested that the government force the Orenburg Assembly to stop allowing graduates of the new method *Medrese-i Muhammediye* to teach in schools and that the government permit the Friday prayer to be read only in Arabic “just as prayers are read for Orthodox Christians in Slavonic.”

This was the first of what would ultimately constitute a wide-scale campaign of secret denunciations about new method figures in the Volga-Ural region, most of which were organized by an imam in the town of Tiunter named İshmöhämmät Dinmöhämmät (1849–1919). Dinmöhämmät, also known as İshmi İshan, was the author of a number of pamphlets denouncing new method teaching, and the new method Bubi *Medrese* of Tiunter in particular.⁶⁶ From 1909 to 1911, several dozen individual Muslims, most of them licensed mullahs from the Orenburg Assembly working in villages across the province of Kazan, wrote letters and, more frequently, visited police stations, to personally grant depositions denouncing their new method rivals. In these depositions, the mullahs claimed that new method figures, both famous and of purely local renown, were pan-Islamists and pan-Turkists plotting to territorially separate Muslim lands from the Russian Empire.

Some of these denunciations (*donosy*), like the one submitted in 1908 by the twelve imams, incorporated the characteristics of Jadidism into a broader argument concerning risks to the established order. Those which were associated with İshmi İshan, on the other hand, focused more closely upon Jadidism itself. Some denunciations, in fact, focused exclusively upon the evils of Jadidism for two or three paragraphs before finally getting around to mentioning that the Jadids in question were actually “pan-Turkists,” and therefore of danger to not only Muslim communities, but also the Russian state.⁶⁷

Denunciations were made about both famous Jadids and local new method *medrese* teachers. In 1911, for example, Ahmet Faiz Dautov and Mirsaid İnusov, both teachers in the village of Saropol, informed police *rotmistr* Budagoskii that among a group of people “spreading the idea of pan-Islamism” among Muslims were prominent Jadid and *İttifak* figures such as Shakir Tukaev, Sadri Maksudi, Ali Merdan bey Topçibaşev, Yusuf Akçura, and Aliasgar Sirtlanov.⁶⁸ Others denunciations implicated not only well-known Jadids, but also recently graduated teachers from large Jadid *medreses* such as the Galiev *Medrese* in Kazan and the Bubi *Medrese* of Tiunter.⁶⁹

The individuals named in these denunciations were usually identified as having committed similar types of offenses. Usually, their alleged activities involved some sort of plan to entice Muslims to separate territorially from Russia. Samigulla Makhlisullin told a police officer in the province of Viatka that some of the new method mullahs in Malmyzhskii *uezd* were spreading rumors and agitation among Muslims in the region. The Jadids, said Makhlisullin, were telling people, “Muslims need to have their own ruler elected in three years by Muslims.” New method teachers, he charged, “want all Muslims to leave the subjection of the Russian Emperor and unite with Turkey.”⁷⁰ Meanwhile, a licensed mullah in the Orenburg Assembly named Bilal Muzafarov made a similar charge against Nazip Kamaleddinov, a new method teacher and mullah in the village of Musa Kabak. In his deposition to the police, Muzafarov implicated both his local rival, Kamaleddinov, as well as the well-known Jadid Muhammadcan Galiev, who had been active in promoting new method education in Kazan since the 1880s.

Kamaleddinov had become familiar with the new method from a Mullah Galiev in Kazan, I can’t remember his first name. He says Tatars need to separate themselves from Russians. This came from the influence of the Kazan Mullah Galiev, who studied in Turkey, to which Galiev has traveled a number of times over an extended period of time.⁷¹

While these denunciation campaigns were often directed against specific individuals (usually new method teachers) residing in or nearby the communities where those making the denunciations themselves lived, many of these denunciations also included the names of several figures from the *İttifak* leadership. In early 1911, for example, an imam named Samigulla Mukhlisulin reported to the police that Abdullah Apanaev had been telling Muslims at the Muslim congresses that Russian Muslims “should live under the Turkish Sultan, not the Russian Tsar,”

and that Abdullah Bubi advocated that Tatars elect a *padişah* of their own and separate from Russia.⁷² In July of that year, İshmöhämmät Dinmöhämmät himself informed the police that “the main spreaders of pan-Islamist propaganda” were Abdürreşid İbrahimov, Sadrettin Maksudov, Galimcan Galiev, Abdullah Apanaev, Yusuf Akçura, Ali Merdan Bey Topçibaşev, the Bubi brothers, and Fatih Kerimi.⁷³ These denunciations resulted in far-reaching police investigations and the arrest of many of the individuals they implicated. In 1911, the Bubi *Medrese* was shut down on suspicions that it had become a “pan-Islamist” breeding ground,⁷⁴ while figures such as Galiev, Akçura, Fatih Kerimi, and many of the village *medrese* teachers named in the denunciations were arrested, or else came under increased surveillance and investigation.⁷⁵

Although the most active opposition to *İttifak* consisted of lower-level spiritual personnel in the Orenburg Assembly, a decline in support for *İttifak* also appears to have occurred among Muslims more generally. In the Third Duma elections, held in 1907, *İttifak* representation in the Volga-Ural region dropped from fifteen representatives to seven. While there were several factors contributing to the demise of the *İttifak* party, including the adoption of a more restrictive election law prior to the Third Duma elections, *İttifak* members themselves took notice of a rise in Muslim opposition to the party.⁷⁶ In the elections to the Fourth Duma in 1912, the number of *İttifak* representatives elected from the Volga-Ural region dropped still further, to four.⁷⁷

Muslim cultural reform in the southern Caucasus

Compared to the Volga-Ural region and the Crimea, circumstances concerning Muslim education in the southern Caucasus were quite different, especially as there was a much smaller number of new method schools in the province of Baku at the turn of the century than in the other two regions.⁷⁸ After 1905, however, new method education in the southern Caucasus increased, though not at the pace seen in the Volga-Ural region or the Crimea. New schools opening in the southern Caucasus tended to be located in big cities like Baku, Tbilisi, and Yerevan, or else in towns like Shushe or Shekke. In this respect, the expansion of new method education in the southern Caucasus likewise differed from that of the Volga-Ural region and the Crimea, where growth in new method education after 1905 was characterized by rapid expansion not only in big cities, but also in villages.

One of the most important reasons behind the comparatively slow pace of new method expansion in the southern Caucasus stemmed from the relative lack of freedom in the region. Due to the greater powers afforded to the vice-regency of the Caucasus in the aftermath of the labor unrest and armed Armenian–Muslim conflict which occurred during the years 1902–06, far more controls were placed upon organized activity than in the Volga-Ural region or the Crimea. Thus, while in the Volga-Ural region Jadids were able to open hundreds of schools without official permission, supporters of new method education and community reform in the Caucasus were more closely monitored and circumscribed in their actions. New method schools opening in the southern Caucasus after 1905 tended to be

opened by officially sanctioned organizations which described the schools as “Russian-Tatar” educational facilities which taught literacy in both Russian and “Turkish.”⁷⁹ Because the organizations establishing new method schools usually worked through official channels, fewer schools were opened and it took more time in order to gain official approval for opening them.⁸⁰

Within Muslim communities, new method education was a far less controversial issue in the southern Caucasus than it was in other regions of Russia. Unlike the Volga-Ural region and the Crimea, where even very poor villages often had a teacher of their own, in the Caucasus there were many villages, even in the relatively central province of Baku, with no nearby school or teacher.⁸¹ While Jadids in the Volga-Ural region often upset existing teachers and communities alike by moving into communities where teachers were already working, in the southern Caucasus communities were often grateful to be provided with any teacher at all.⁸² Consequently, in the southern Caucasus new method schools tended to be founded in communities where local inhabitants actually wanted to host them.⁸³

In the southern Caucasus, supporters of new method education made much more of an effort to reach out to traditional teachers working in village *medreses* than was the case in either the Volga-Ural region or the Crimea. According to a report written by an official working in the Baku branch of the Interior Ministry, supporters of new method education in Baku had been in contact with more traditionally-minded teachers in the hinterlands with offers of support. These offers were made in exchange for a promise from traditional teachers to allow new method teachers to work part time at the schools, where they would teach literacy and, if possible, Russian language.

Without doubt there has been enmity between the reformers and the mullahs. However, the reformers are trying to gradually bring the spiritual personnel and *kadis* over to their side and with their financial support reform the religious schools a little bit, disseminate their program, carry out education through the oral method and, in this way, slowly but surely realize their goals.⁸⁴

One of the best-known organizations promoting literacy in Baku was *Neşr-i Maarif*, which was established in 1908 by the Baku millionaire Abdul Zeynal Tagiev.⁸⁵ The director of *Neşr-i Maarif* was Ahmet Ağaoğlu, who was also active in *İttifak* and was a well-known publicist whose articles appeared in *Kaspii*, *Hayat*, and *İrşad*. In some ways, the efforts of this organization to promote literacy among Muslims in the southern Caucasus is comparable to the activities of Jadids in the Volga-Ural region, and in the historiography of Azerbaijan *Neşr-i Maarif* is generally celebrated for its reformist activities and as an Azeri variant of “Jadidism.”⁸⁶ Yet there were also many differences between *Neşr-i Maarif*’s activities and those of the Jadids in the Volga-Ural region.

Neşr-i Maarif operated a relatively small number of schools. In 1908 the organization operated a teachers’ school, a temporary literacy course for adults, and three other schools in Baku. In 1911, *Neşr-i Maarif* opened another eleven schools, including three more in Baku and another eight in villages elsewhere in the

province.⁸⁷ These schools were all opened officially, and all paperwork regarding the teachers working there and the types of classes taught at the school was passed on to the inspector for Muslim schools in the province.⁸⁸ Whereas teaching applicants contacting cultural power-brokers in the Volga-Ural region like Fatih Kerimi often emphasized their ideological activism and belief in the Jadidist cause more generally, prospective teachers sending in lists of references and teaching experience did not invoke national slogans in appealing for work, but rather emphasized their teaching qualifications and need for employment.⁸⁹ Salaries were good, but not as high as in the Volga-Ural region, with teachers working for *Neşr-i Maarif* earning between 400 and 500 rubles per year.⁹⁰

Largely because of this, *Neşr-i Maarif* tended to work through official channels in acquiring formal permission to open its schools and send its teachers to existing schools.⁹¹ While this led to a greater degree of approval for *Neşr-i Maarif*'s activities among tsarist administrators responsible for policing Muslim education, this cooperation with the authorities also contributed to the opening of far fewer schools in the southern Caucasus than was the case in the Volga-Ural region.

Conclusions

Differences among Muslims with respect to the movement for Muslim cultural reform were not limited solely to the arguments and ideas of well-known activist-intellectuals, but also were closely bound up with much more tangible matters pertaining to economics and political power within Muslim communities. Traditional teachers resisted the expansion of new method schools in their villages not only to protect their cultural capital, but also in defense of their actual capital – not to mention their ability to feed themselves and their families. In the Volga-Ural region, resistance among spiritual personnel to the spread of new method education eventually developed into a coordinated denunciation campaign occurring over a span of three years, contributing to the closing of new method schools and the jailing and exile of both famous and obscure Jadids. Traditional teachers working as spiritual personnel in the territories of the Orenburg Assembly were the most galvanized in their opposition to the spread of new method education, but they were not the only ones to oppose the expansion of Jadidist educational facilities or the efforts of the *İttifak* leadership to impose new method education upon Muslim communities.

As the regional and comparative nature among the other contributions to this volume likewise confirm, there was no single “Muslim policy” in imperial Russia. Like subjects of all faiths in Russia, Muslim communities were administered through a variety of institutions which varied according to a number of factors (including estate), and particularly with respect to region. In the territories of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly (and, to a lesser extent, in the Crimea), where Muslim communities had been targeted in recent decades by integrationist and assimilative policies to a degree unseen by Muslims living elsewhere in the empire, issues concerning education and the study of Russian language were much more controversial than they were in the southern Caucasus. Similarly, Muslims

tended to attach importance to institutions of tsarist administration, particularly the Muslim spiritual assemblies and the Duma, in more or less direct proportion to the amount of time their region had been governed by tsarist institutions and the degree to which these institutions had actually penetrated Muslim communities. In all three of the regions discussed in this chapter, the greater the degree of state intervention into the lives of Muslims in a particular region, the more divided that region's Muslims were over the question of what to do about tsarist institutions of Muslim administration.

Although the activist-intellectuals were often unpopular within Muslim communities, the success or failure of Jadid projects was by no means irrelevant to the concerns of Muslims outside of activist-intellectual circles. To varying degrees according to region, the activist-intellectuals and their projects relating to Muslim cultural reform were of importance to not only their supporters, but also their opponents. This was because no matter how unsuccessful individuals like Gasprinskii, Akçura, Ağaoğlu, and the parliamentary leaders of *İttifak* ultimately were in carrying out their proposals for Muslim cultural reform, activist-intellectuals and the Jadid-dominated *İttifak* party nevertheless appeared, during the months and years accompanying and following the Revolution of 1905, to be in a strong position to play an important role in shaping the future of Muslim administration in imperial Russia.

Notes

- 1 Throughout this chapter I employ the term “activist-intellectuals” to refer to well-known publicists and writers like İsmail Gasprinskii, Yusuf Akçura, and Ahmet Ağaoğlu, and to distinguish such figures from more obscure jadid figures, such as the teachers discussed in this article.
- 2 Particularly in the older literature on Jadidism, the “qadims” are discussed as if they were an intellectual “camp,” while the Orenburg-based journal *Din ve Mağışet* is presented as the center of “qadimism” in Russia. İbrahim Maraş notes that “qadims” did not use this name among themselves, and that the term was generally used as an epithet by Jadids. İbrahim Maraş, *Türk Dünyasında Dini Yenileşme, 1850–1917* (Istanbul: Ötüken, 2002), 22.
- 3 By far, the most original and important study on the Jadids to have emerged in many years is Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). One of the main benefits of this study lies in nuanced reformulation of a narrative had long been quite hagiographical with respect to Jadids and generally dismissive of the concerns of their opponents.
- 4 Some other well-known studies which discuss Jadidism include Serge Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejay, *La presse et les mouvements nationaux chez les musulmans de Russie* (Paris: Mouton, 1964). An early and still valuable source on İsmail Gasprinskii is Edward J. Lazzerini, “İsmail Bey Gasprinskii and Muslim Modernism in Russia, 1878–1914” (PhD diss., University of Washington, 1973). Alan W. Fisher, “A Model Leader for Asia, İsmail Gaspirali,” in Edward A. Allworth, ed., *The Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988), 29–47; Alan W. Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978); Tadeusz Swietochowski, *Russian Azerbaijan 1905–1920: The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim Community* (New York: Cambridge University

- Press, 1985); Azade-Ayşe Rorlich, *The Volga Tatars: A Profile In National Resilience* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1986); Audrey L. Altstadt, *The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1992); Hakan Kırımlı, *National Movements and National Identity among the Crimean Tatars* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996); Ahmet Kanlıere, *Reform within Islam: The Tajdid and Jadid Movement among the Kazan Tatars (1809–1917): Conciliation or Conflict?* (Istanbul: Eren, 1997); İa. G. Abdullin, *Dzhadidizm sredi tatar: voznikonovenie, razvitie i istoricheskoe mesto* (Kazan: Iman, 1998); S. Y. Süleymanova, *Azərbaycanda ictimai-siyasi hərəkət (XIX yüzilliyin sonu–XX yüzilliyin əvvəlləri)* (Baku: Azərbaycan Dövlət Kitab Palatası, 1999); D. Iskhakov, “Dzhadidizm,” in *Islam i musul'manskaia kul'tura v Srednem Povolzh'e: Istoriia i sovremennost'* (Kazan: Institut istorii Akademii nauk Tatarstana, 2002); Maraş, *Türk Dünyasında Dini Yenileşme*; D. B. Seyidzadə, *Azərbaycan XX əsrin əvvəllərində: müstəqilliyə aparan yollar* (Baku: OKA, 2004).
- 5 Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform*, 5–7.
 - 6 See, for example, Akram Khater's discussion of Christian Lebanese reformist publicists in the United States. Akram Fouad Khater, *Inventing Home: Emigration, Gender, and the Middle Class in Lebanon, 1870–1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), esp. 93–105. Also see, for example, essays written by Muslim modernists in Indonesia, India, and elsewhere in Charles Kurzman, ed., *Modernist Islam, 1840–1940: A Sourcebook* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Akram Fouad Khater, ed., *Sources in the History of the Modern Middle East* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004), esp. 66–111. Also see Lazzarini, “Ismail Bey Gasprinskii,” 144–170; Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in The Late Ottoman State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 175, 199–205.
 - 7 “Turkic” (*Turki*), was the language in which İsmail Gasprinskii wanted Muslim textbooks to be printed. See later in this chapter.
 - 8 Adeb Khalid perceptively notes the tendency within an earlier generations of scholarly literature to uncritically adopt the Jadids' own rhetoric concerning traditional education. Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform*, 25.
 - 9 Lazzarini, “Ismail Bey Gasprinskii,” 188–189.
 - 10 Lazzarini, “Ismail Bey Gasprinskii,” 24–40.
 - 11 See Munir İusupov, *Galimdzhan Barudi* (Kazan: Tatarskoe knizhnoe izd-vo, 2002), 60–102. On Barudi, also see Yusuf Akçura, *Damla Galimcan Al-Barudi* (Kazan: Şerif Matbaası, 1907).
 - 12 Kırımlı, *National Movements*, 49; “Bahçesaray,” *Tercüman*, July 23, 1895; Meyer, “Turkic Worlds: Community Representation and Collective Identity in the Russian and Ottoman Empires” (PhD diss., Brown University, 2007), esp. 97–104. On new method expansion in the 1890s, see Mustafa Özgür Tuna, “Imperial Russia's Muslims: Inroads of Modernity” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2009), esp. 235–236.
 - 13 Russian State Historical Archive (RGIA), f. 821, op. 133, d. 472, l. 49.
 - 14 A 1912 report published in the Jadid journal *Ang* in 1913 reported that “there are more new method schools in the province of Orenburg than anywhere else.” See Borhan Sherif, “Orenburg gubernasında möselmannar,” *Ang*, June 2, 1913, pp. 29–31.
 - 15 RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 472, l. 49.
 - 16 RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 826, l. 85.
 - 17 State Archive of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (GAARK), f. 100, op. 1, d. 2360, ll. 190–192, 230–231. In the Crimea, unlike the territories of the Orenburg Assembly, schools were under the direct supervision of the Muslim spiritual assembly leadership.
 - 18 “Turketskije prosvetiteli v Krymu,” *Sotrudnik*, 40, August 8, 1910, 631, 630–632.
 - 19 National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan (NART), f. 160, op. 1, d. 1576, ll. 203–253.
 - 20 NART, f. 92, op. 2, d. 8777, ll. 68–71.
 - 21 Tuna, “Imperial Russia's Muslims,” 237.
 - 22 Regarding Ottoman subjects working as teachers in the Crimea, see GAARK, f. 100,

- op. 1, d. 2360. On public education reforms in the Ottoman Empire, see Benjamin Fortna, *Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Bayram Kodaman, *Abdülhamid Devri Eğitim Sistemi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988); Selçuk Akşin Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839–1908: Islamism, Autocracy, and Discipline* (London: Brill, 2001).
- 23 Meyer, “Turkic Worlds,” 245–247. Also see the article which discusses the history of Russian Muslims studying in the Ottoman capital. İslamoğlu, “İstanbul’da Rusyalı İslam Talebeleri.” *Taze Hayat* 66, April 3, 1907. Tsarist officials studying new method education in the Crimea would report similar sentiments among local Muslims, GAARK, f. 100, op. 1, d. 2362, l. 165.
- 24 Meyer, “Turkic Worlds,” 247–248. Also see letter from Yusuf Akçura to Fatih Kerimi, 10 March 1909, NART, f. 1370, op. 1, d. 20, l. 24.
- 25 See, for example, the letter written by a Russian Muslim student in Istanbul to Fatih Kerimi on March 8, 1908. NART, f. 1370, op. 2, d. 24, l. 3. Also see NART, f. 1370, op. 2, d. 28, l. 50 and f. 1370, op. 2, d. 28, l. 69. A fund-raising letter written from a Russian Muslim student in Istanbul that was intercepted by tsarist security officials can be found in RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 826, ll. 67–68.
- 26 Indeed, a common complaint among some Jadid publicists was that many teachers and schools were “new method” in name only, a development that was at least in part a consequence of the fashionableness of new method education during the post-1905 years. Abdürreşid İbrahimov, “Bize ait,” *Hayat*, November 11, 1905. Also see Borhan Serif, *Gani Bey* (Orenburg: Izd-vo “Vakit,” 1913), 48.
- 27 A petition circulated by Rizaeddin Fahreddin at the April 10, 1905 Ufa meeting chaired by Müfti Soltanov envisioned pegging the salaries of teachers associated with the Orenburg Assembly at 240 rubles per year, but this proposal did not bear fruit. Bigi, *İslahat Esasları* (Petrograd: Tipografiya M. A. Maksutova, 1915), 76.
- 28 In April of 1900, for example, Orenburg authorities in Ufa received a petition from one Abdullah who was working as a licensed *akhund* in the *uezd* of Orenburg. Abdullah wrote that, according to the agreement he had with the inhabitants of his village, he was allowed to grow wheat on one-half *desiatina* of the village’s land. In recent months, however, thieves had been sneaking into his fields and stealing his wheat, despite the fact that the villagers in question were doing well, harvesting up to 500 *pud* per year from their own fields. Without financial or other forms of material support from the village, Abdullah feared that he would be unable to feed his family. Central State Archive of the Republic of Bashkortostan (TsGIA RB), f. I-295, op. 10, d. 205, ll. 130–131. A *pud* is equal to 16.38 kilograms.
- 29 For the original document detailing the plans for assistance, see Kazan State University Lobachevsky Library, Department of Rare Books and Manuscripts (KSU), Document T-1235, “Orenburg dukhovnoe sobranieseneng khökümet tarafinnan birilmish ssudalarnı mokhtadzı imamnarga ulashıp biru hakındaki tedbirleri.” Ufa, 1909. On the difficult conditions of Muslim spiritual figures in the Volga-Ural region, see “İmamların haline bir nazar,” *Din ve Mağışet* 16, May 4, 1907, 253–254. Also see Naganawa Norihiro, “Molding the Muslim Community through the Tsarist Administration: *Mahalla* under the Jurisdiction of the Orenburg Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly after 1905,” *Acta Slavica Iaponica* 23 (2006), 114.
- 30 Madina Rakhimkulova, *Medrese “Khusainiia” v Orenburge: 2-e dopolnennoe iubileinoe izdanie, posviashchennoe 160-letiiu Akhmet baia Khusainova* (Orenburg: Yanga Vakıt, 1997), 14.
- 31 *Mağlumat* 15, August 15, 1908, p. 333.
- 32 RGIA, f. 821, op. 133, d. 626, l. 12.
- 33 NART, f. 160, op. 1, d. 1576, l. 3.
- 34 Rakhimkulova, *Medrese “Khusainiia,”* 9–10.
- 35 TsGIA RB, f. I-295, op. 11, d. 205, l. 279.

- 36 TsGIA RB, f. I-295, op. 11, d. 523, esp. ll. 152–159.
- 37 GAARK, f. 100, op. 1, d. 2374, l. 87.
- 38 GAARK, f. 100, op. 1, d. 2374, ll. 79–81.
- 39 GAARK, f. 100, op. 1, d. 2374, ll. 83–87.
- 40 Kerimi was the editor of the Orenburg newspaper *Vakit* and was closely involved in Jadid projects in the region.
- 41 This is the family of Yusuf Akçurin, later Akçura.
- 42 NART, f. 1370, op. 1, d. 20, ll. 21–23.
- 43 Allen Frank makes this argument, but bases his conclusions upon a single manuscript relating to just one district. Allen Frank, *Muslim Religious Institutions in Imperial Russia: The Islamic World of Novouzensk District and the Kazakh Inner Horde, 1789–1910* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 315.
- 44 Non-elite Muslims living in regions where the assemblies had longer institutional roots – the Volga-Ural region and the Crimea in particular – were far more involved in discussions and political maneuvering relating to the future of the assemblies than was the case in the southern Caucasus. In the northern Caucasus and Central Asia, such institutions did not exist at all.
- 45 Hayrullah Usmanov, an *akhund* from Orenburg who was appointed to the position of kadi in 1906, sat in parliament as an *İttifak* member and became the fraction's parliamentary secretary. While contributing articles to the Jadidist press (such as Fatih Kerimi's *Vakit* newspaper), he was also a regular contributor to the anti-Jadid *Din ve Mağışet*, where he addressed petitions he received from Muslim spiritual personnel who were angry about *İttifak*'s education policies. Usmanov was hardly the person from the non-Jadid ulama to sit in parliament as an *İttifak* representative. See Meyer, "Turkic Worlds," 164–165.
- 46 On relations between the *İttifak* leadership and Müfti Soltanov of the Orenburg Assembly, see Meyer, "Turkic Worlds," 151–156. On tensions between Gasprinskii and Müfti Karashaiskii of the Tavridian Assembly, see 156–159. On tensions in the southern Caucasus between community activists and spiritual assembly leaders, see 160–162.
- 47 The list of articles that were changed as a result of these negotiations is published in "31 mart pravilası," *Ural* 5, January 21, 1907. On the March 31 Regulations, also see Bigi, *Islahat Esasları*, 236–238.
- 48 Yusuf Akçura, "Rusya musulmanları ittifağı, programma laihasının tedkiki IV," *Kazan Mukhbiri* 131, August 9, 1906. Also see Meyer, "Turkic Worlds," 167–168.
- 49 This was particularly the case in the Caucasus. "Uçüncü umum Rusya müsülman içtimama dair," *İrşad* 197, August 21, 1906. Ali Merdan Bey Topçibaşev was one of the chairmen with this congress, but Topçibaşev had spent most of his time since 1905 in St. Petersburg. Muslims who had stayed in Baku throughout the Armenian–Muslim fighting and its aftermath included Ahmet Bey Ağaoğlu and Ali Bey Hüseyinzade. Ağaoğlu, in particular, was involved in a number of activities devoted to community welfare, and was appointed to the Muslim side of the peace talks sponsored by the regional vice-regency.
- 50 *1906 sene 16–21 Avgust'ta ictimâ etmiş Rusya Müslümanlarının nedvesi* (Kazan: Brat'ia Karimony, 1906), 60–61.
- 51 *Ibid.*, 60–61.
- 52 *Ibid.*, 76–77.
- 53 See, for example, "Can yani dil meselesi," *Tercüman* 6, January 25, 1908. Also see Lazzerini, "İsmail Bey Gasprinskii," 211–213. Gasprinskii had been the most prominent Muslim reformer calling for the establishment of a "common literary language" (known as *Türki*) since early 1906. For more on the so-called "language issue," see Meyer, "Turkic Worlds," 203–206.
- 54 Indeed, İsmail Gasprinskii and Abdürreşid İbrahimov had advocated the study of Russian among Muslims for decades.

- 55 Muslim protests against mandatory Muslim education constituted just one of a series of issues which generated petition campaigns and protests among Volga Muslims from 1878 onwards. Meyer, "Turkic Worlds," 74–91.
- 56 *1906 sene 16–21 Avgust'ta*, 84–85.
- 57 *Ibid.*, 70.
- 58 *Ibid.*, 108–109.
- 59 *Ibid.*, 124–125.
- 60 *Din ve Mağışet* 19, May 25, 1907, 297–299.
- 61 "Zamanlar üzgäre bit efendilär!" *Din ve Mağışet* 19, 299–300.
- 62 "Asıl Ruslar ve İslam," *İrşad* 95, May 23, 1907; "Acip tedbirlerdir!!" *İrşad* 25, February 28, 1908.
- 63 RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 826, ll. 55–56.
- 64 RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 826, ll. 45–56.
- 65 RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 826, ll. 55–56.
- 66 İshmhämmät Dinmöhämmät (1849–1919) was a mullah who ran a school in the village of Tiunter. See "İshmhämmät Dinmöhämmätev," *Tatarstan Entsiklopediia Süzlege*, 202.
- 67 See, for example, NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, esp. ll. 6, 71. On complaints regarding the denunciations, see "Ulemaga gariza," *Beyan ul-hak* 25 and "Mühim bir mesele," *Beyan ul-hak* 32.
- 68 NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, l. 52; f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, l. 246; f. 199, op. 1, d. 795, l. 92; f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, l. 67.
- 69 NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 675, ll. 17–18.
- 70 NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, ll. 33–34.
- 71 NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, l. 67. Other denunciations can be found in NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 675, l. 66; f. 199, op. 1, d. 785, ll. 98, 151, 153; f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, ll. 58, 67, 69, 88, 99–101, 103, 114–115, 116–118, 251–261, 288–89, 323–324, 331–334, 336–346; f. 199, op. 1, d. 795, ll. 30, 83, 92.
- 72 NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, ll. 33–34.
- 73 NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 795, l. 92.
- 74 For investigations into Bubi, see NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 675, ll. 26–33; RGIA, f. 821, op. 8, d. 826, ll. 84–94.
- 75 See, especially, NART, f. 199, op. 1, d. 675, ll. 34, 37, 43, 55, 69, 76, 83, 175; f. 199, op. 1, d. 785, l. 109; f. 199, op. 1, d. 786, l. 44; f. 199, op. 1, d. 857, ll. 19, 39; f. 92, op. 2, d. 8777, l. 67; f. 199, op. 1, d. 948, ll. 103, 263.
- 76 Letter from Kazan Gabishev to Fatih Kerimi, June 3 1912. NART, f. 1370, op. 1, d. 23, ll. 6–7. On contemporary newspaper articles in both the Jadid and non-Jadid press relating to mounting Muslim opposition to *İttifak* see "Möselmannarga," *Vakit* 156, June 7, 1907; *Din ve Mağışet* 19, 297–299; "Zamanlar üzgäre bit efendilär!" *Din ve Mağışet* 19, May 25, 1907, 299–300; "Protest," *Beyan al-Hak* 66, September 12, 1906; "Piterburg'da Müslüman fraksiasının ihtilafi," *İrşad* 52, March 25, 1907.
- 77 Tables showing the total number of *İttifak* deputies sitting in the four Dumas can be found in *Musul'manskaia fraksiia i problemy "svobody sovesti" v Gosudarstvennoi Dume Rossii (1906–1917)* (Kazan: Master Lain, 1999), 128–146. Also see M. F. Usal, *Birinci, ikinci, ve üçüncü Dumada müslüman deputatlar [häm alarning kalğan eshlere]* (Kazan: Tipografiia I. N. Kharitonova, 1909).
- 78 In 1905, for example, the governor of the province of Baku had been able to report that the entire reform movement in the province consisted of just "a number of Muslims living in the city of Baku," including Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Ali Merdan Bey Topçubaşev, and a handful of others. Azerbaijan State History Archive (ADTA), f. 45, op. 1, d. 35, ll. 34–36.
- 79 ADTA, f. 312, op. 1, d. 39, l. 1.
- 80 ADTA, f. 312, op. 2, d. 9, l. 3; f. 312, op. 8, d. 2; f. 312, op. 1, d. 30, l. 1.
- 81 See, for example, Ahmet Ağaoğlu's travelogue "Menim Seyahatım," published in the

newspaper *İrşad* from mid-December 1906 until mid-January 1907, especially “Menim Seyahatım,” *İrşad* 7, Jan 10, 1907. Also see *İrşad* 3, January 4, 1907.

- 82 ADTA, f. 312, op. 2, d. 2, ll. 1–7; f. 312, op. 1, d. 63, l. 6a; f. 312, op. 2, d. 10, ll. 1, 3; f. 312, op. 2, d. 9, l. 1.
- 83 See, for example, ADTA, f. 312, op. 1, d. 39, l. 2 for a copy of a petition sent by a village to the organization *Neşri Maarif* asking that they construct a school in their locale.
- 84 ADTA, f. 524, op. 1, d. 11, 22.
- 85 For a report on Neşri Maarif’s activities, also see *Baku Müslüman “Neşri Maarif” cemiyetinin 1907–1911 yıllara mahsus dahil-hariçnin hesabnamesi* (Baku: Kaspîi Matbaası, 1912).
- 86 Altstadt, *The Azerbaijani Turks*, 33, 56–57.
- 87 ADTA, f. 312, op. 1, d. 6, ll. 1–5; f. 312, op. 1, d. 39, l. 1.
- 88 ADTA, f. 312, op. 1, d. 6, ll. 1–5.
- 89 ADTA, f. 312, op. 2, d. 5, l. 3; f. 312, op. 2, d. 8, ll. 10, 12; f. 312, op. 2, d. 9, l. 1; f. 312, op. 2, d. 10, ll. 1, 3.
- 90 ADTA, f. 312, op. 2, d. 5, ll. 2, 4, 6; f. 312, op. 2, d. 1, l. 2; f. 312, op. 2, d. 12, l. 3; f. 312, op. 2, d. 16, l. 9.
- 91 ADTA, f. 312, op. 2, d. 9, l. 3; f. 312, op. 8, d. 2; f. 312, op. 1, d. 30, l. 1.

13 The Alash Orda's relations with Siberia, the Urals, and Turkestan

The Kazakh national movement and the Russian imperial legacy

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The study of the national movements that arose during the Russian Revolution and Russian Civil War was popular in the first half of the 1990s, but it seems to have gone out of fashion. Western, Russian, and Japanese scholars are busy studying the institutional, confessional, and mental-geographical aspects of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Scholars in Central Eurasia are more concerned with the glorious history of the premodern heroes and dynasties that are thought to prove the historical legitimacy of their countries' statehoods. This is unfortunate, as there is much interesting source material on the history of national movements that remains underused. The study of this field should be revived.

Needless to say, it is naive to view national movements as something that could have built an alternative to the "evil empire" of the Soviet Union, but this is exactly how some Western scholars viewed these movements during the Cold War. There is also no basis for regarding leaders of national movements as direct heirs to the rebels who fought against Russian expansion (as some Kazakh scholars do) or as throwbacks to feudal rulers (as some Russian scholars do). What is common to these approaches is their treatment of national movements as something opposite or alien to tsarist Russia. However, the February and October Revolutions did not change everything instantly, and it is reasonable to assume that national movements were affected by the legacy of the Russian Empire.

The influence of the Russian Empire on national movements can be divided into two aspects: the style of work of non-Russian leaders and the environment of their activities. I have elsewhere pointed out that paternalism and authoritarianism were mixed with a highly ethical and self-sacrificing attitude in the thoughts and deeds of Kazakh intellectuals during the tsarist and Revolutionary eras. These intellectuals thought they were obliged to protect, lead, and command ordinary people.¹ This can largely be explained by their style of discourse, which was influenced by the Kazakh tradition of didactic literature, and by the need to minimize disorder in times of turbulence. However, it is probable that they were also influenced by the style of work of tsarist officials, especially the protectionism and paternalism that characterized nineteenth-century officials such as Gerasim Kolpakovskii (the first Steppe governor-general)² and Konstantin von Kaufman (the first Turkestan governor-general). After the turn of the century, paternalistic policies were largely

replaced by the policy of merciless land confiscation, but some Kazakhs were nostalgic for the old days, as evidenced by Mūkhamedjan Tīnīshbaev, who praised Kolpakovskii and Kaufman in his testimony following the revolt of 1916.³ Tīnīshbaev would later be a leader in the Turkestan Autonomous Government and the Alash Orda.

In this chapter, however, the imperial legacy is traced not so much in the thoughts and deeds of national leaders as in the environment and contexts of their activities. In examining the environment of national movements, the Kazakh movement is an especially interesting case, because the vast Kazakh Steppe made the Kazakh autonomous movement difficult for outsiders to interfere in and relatively long-lived, and it also obliged the movement to interact with political forces in the various surrounding regions. Just as pre-Revolutionary society had to interact with the tsarist administration, the Kazakh national movement in the Revolutionary period depended on its relations with other self-proclaimed governments and movements; at the same time, it tried to use those relations for its own goals. The relations between these governments were influenced by ideologies, idioms, practices, and geography that were shaped in the periods of the tsarist government and the Russian Provisional Government. Thus, my aim is to combine the study of national movements with the approaches developed in recent studies of the Russian Empire – studies that have realized many new findings concerning the interactions between state institutions and ethnic/religious communities.

Specifically, four imperial legacies that influenced the Kazakh national movement are analyzed: first, the memory of Muslim institutions, which affected relations between the Kazakhs and other Muslim peoples; second, a political geography that did not correspond to ethnic boundaries; third, the perception by Russians of Central Asians as being *inorodtsy*;⁴ and, fourth, the presence of Cossacks around the steppe. I mainly cover the years 1917–20, when the Kazakh congresses were convened on the oblast and all-Kazakh levels (April–December 1917) and the Alash Orda autonomous government operated (December 1917–March 1920), although I refer to earlier periods where necessary.

The failed revival of a religious legacy, and the unaccomplished Turkic-Muslim unity

As researchers have recently pointed out, the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly (the Muftiate), established in 1789, played a crucial role in regulating local religious life and creating institutional ties among Muslims in the Volga-Urals and Siberia.⁵ The Spiritual Assembly originally controlled the Kazakh Steppe as well, but later the tsarist administration's fear of Muslim unity and misgivings about the Tatars grew, and the provisional statute for the administration of the steppe oblasts removed the Kazakhs (with the exception of the Kazakhs of the Inner or Bökey Horde,⁶ situated inside the Astrakhan province) from the jurisdiction of the Spiritual Assembly in 1868. However, Tatar mullahs continued to play important roles in education of the Kazakhs and the mufti (the head of the Spiritual

Assembly) remained an authoritative figure among them. In the late 1880s, a number of Kazakhs began petitioning either for a return to the jurisdiction of the Orenburg Spiritual Assembly or for the appointment of a mufti for the Kazakhs. One of their motives was to protect themselves from Christian missionary activities.⁷ They sought to defend their religious rights by restoring the Muslim institution that had been created but abandoned by the Russian administration.

The petition signed by 12,767 people in Qarqaralī in June 1905, which powerfully kick-started the Kazakh national movement, pointed to the great difficulty in receiving permission from the regional administration to build mosques and schools and to make pilgrimages to Mecca, and it requested that a spiritual directorate for the Kazakhs be organized and family registration be transferred to its organs.⁸ However, a difference of view of Islam soon emerged. In 1914, a group of intellectuals who wrote for the journal *Ay-qap* accused the main contributors to the newspaper *Qazaq*, especially Ālikhan Bökeykhanov, of being hostile to Sharia.⁹ *Ay-qap* soon ceased publication, and Islamic-oriented intellectuals who had been associated with it, such as Baqītjan Qarataev and Mūkhamedjan Seralin, broke with the more secular-oriented group led by Bökeykhanov, which became the main stream of the Kazakh national movement.

From April 1917, Kazakhs started to convene congresses in oblasts to discuss political plans for the future. Practically all the oblast congresses, as well as the First All-Kazakh Congress in July, discussed the issue of spiritual administration.¹⁰ The Kazakh congresses of Torghay, Uralsk, and Aqmola oblasts and the All-Kazakh Congress resolved to temporarily join the Orenburg Muftiate, whereas the congresses of Semirechie and Semipalatinsk oblasts and of Turkestan Krai resolved to establish a separate spiritual assembly for the Kazakhs. Even those congresses that resolved to temporarily join the Orenburg Muftiate demanded that a Kazakh department be created within it.¹¹ The draft program of the Alash Party, published on November 21, 1917, also provided for a separate muftiate to be established.¹² Thus, Islamic factors did not disappear from the Kazakh national movement, but the Muftiate gradually became a question simply of the Kazakhs' needs rather than of Muslim unity.¹³

Moreover, the most urgent problems of this period were not religious issues, but questions of the future political and administrative system, as well as land problems. The Second All-Kazakh Congress in December planned to discuss the question of the muftiate, but after declaring the establishment of a provisional people's council (a de facto autonomous government) called the Alash Orda and discussing other hotly contested issues, it decided to remove that question from the agenda. The congress required the oblast *qādīs* to present a plan for reforming spiritual administration to the future constituent assembly of the Alash Autonomy,¹⁴ but no such assembly was ever convened.

In the end, the revival of a Muslim spiritual administration unifying the Volga-Urals and the Kazakh Steppe was never realized. The Orenburg Muftiate itself was reorganized into the Spiritual Department of the Central National Administration of Muslim Turk-Tatars of Inner Russia and Siberia (*Millī Idāre*) in January 1918,¹⁵ and it became an even more purely Tatar organ than before.

Another possible form of Muslim unity was cooperation among movements of various Muslim peoples. This was based on their experience in politics during the tsarist era, namely their work in the Muslim faction of the State Duma.¹⁶ After the February Revolution, the bureau of the Muslim faction took the initiative in holding the All-Russian Muslim Congress in Moscow that May. At this congress, as is well known, “unitarists” (mainly Tatars) who advocated cultural autonomy, and “federalists” (mainly Central Asians and Azerbaijanis) who advocated territorial autonomy, engaged in a bitter exchange of opinions. Here the Kazakh intellectuals’ mistrust of Tatars, which had been occasionally expressed before the revolution, reemerged. The Kazakh doctor Jūmaghali Tileulin indignantly reported to *Qazaq* that the leading unitarists Akhmed Tsalikov (an Ossetian) and Gayāz Iskhakov (a Tatar) had called the Kazakhs, Sarts, and Caucasians dark and ignorant. According to Tileulin, unitarists opposed the formation of autonomies in the Kazakh Steppe and Turkestan as federal subjects because it would hamper the Tatars’ migration and acquisition of land in these regions.¹⁷

When the Muslim Congress established the All-Russian Muslim Council (*Shūrā-yi Islām*, or *Millī Shūrā*), Bökeykhanov, Akhmet Baytūrsinov, Mırjaqıp Dulatov and other leading Kazakh intellectuals issued a statement declaring that Kazakh participation in the congress was small because of the near absence of railroads on the steppe and that the Kazakhs were seriously underrepresented in the council. They alleged that the delegates to the congress were not entitled to become representatives to the council because they had not been elected as such by the people.¹⁸ Despite these disagreements, Kazakh representatives, including Jihansha Dosmūkhamedov and Wālidkhan Tanashev (both future members of the Alash Orda), actively participated in the work of the council.

However, coordination between the Kazakh and Tatar activists remained low. On June 24, Kazakh and Turkestani representatives to the All-Russian Muslim Council announced plans to hold respective congresses. Although the First All-Kazakh Congress was planned well in advance, this was news to the Tatar representatives, who criticized the Kazakhs for being unwilling to work with them. To prevent a split, the council decided to convene the Second All-Russian Muslim Congress in Tashkent, but the decision was reversed the next day in favor of the original plan to hold the congress in Kazan, despite the objection of the Kazakh representatives.¹⁹

Soon the dates of the First All-Kazakh Congress were moved forward from August to July 21–26, in order to prepare for the election of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, which was scheduled to be held on September 17.²⁰ The Second All-Russian Muslim Congress, which was convened at almost the same time (July 17–25), turned out to be a mostly a gathering of Tatars. The First All-Kazakh Congress nevertheless resolved to enhance Kazakh representation in the All-Russian Muslim Council,²¹ but the council gradually became dysfunctional, and formally decided to cease its activities in February 1918.²²

During the civil war, when Muslim national movements were facing difficult situations, they occasionally cooperated with each other. At the State Conference (*Gosudarstvennoe soveshchanie*) in Ufa in September 1918, Muslim delegates

basically took a common position, and Bökeykhanov spoke on behalf of the Muslim deputies to the Constituent Assembly, the autonomies of Turkestan and Bashkurdistan (Bashkiria), the Alash Orda, and the National Administration of Turk-Tatars.²³ But each autonomous movement worked mostly in isolation, and neither the legacy of the Orenburg Muftiate nor that of the Muslim faction effectively contributed to their unity.

The legacy of imperial geography: complicated relations with Turkestan and Russian “governments”

The political geography of the Kazakh Steppe shaped under the tsarist government had two peculiar features. First, the steppe was roughly divided into three parts: the northwest had been part of the Orenburg governor-generalship and was connected to the Southern Urals; the northeast constituted the territory of the Steppe governor-generalship and was often regarded as a part of Western Siberia; and the south, annexed to Russia more recently, was administered by the Turkestan governor-generalship. Second, major cities such as Uralsk, Orenburg, Omsk, Semipalatinsk, and Tashkent were on the edge of the steppe and Kazakhs were a minority in almost all of these cities. Transportation among the cities, not to mention between cities and villages, was underdeveloped.

These conditions resulted in the absence of a unified center for the national movement, and there was some complication with determining the place to convene the First All-Kazakh Congress. The Kazakh Congress of Torghay Oblast, held in Orenburg in early April 1917, organized a bureau to make preparations for the All-Kazakh Congress. The Kazakh Congress of Semipalatinsk Oblast in early May named Petropavlovsk as a desirable place to hold the congress.²⁴ On May 9, the Kazakh delegates to the All-Russian Muslim Congress proposed another place: Tashkent. However, the bureau finally decided to hold the congress in Orenburg, because it was equally accessible by train from Turkestan and Siberia (i.e., the eastern part of the Kazakh Steppe), whereas it was very inconvenient for Siberian Kazakhs to get to Tashkent.²⁵ Another reason might have been that many leaders of this period were from the north of the steppe,²⁶ but one might suppose that if the Turkestan–Siberian Railway had been built in the tsarist era, Tashkent could have become a more important center for Kazakh intellectuals and their movement.

The First All-Kazakh Congress passed a resolution that the Kazakh oblasts should acquire national-territorial autonomy, but Kazakh leaders were ambiguous as to when they would establish such autonomy. On the eve of the Siberian Oblast Congress²⁷ of October 1917, and in the wake of that congress, Bökeykhanov proposed that the Kazakhs join the Siberian Autonomy. He considered it too early to demand a separate Kazakh autonomy because there were very few Kazakhs capable of administering it, and the Russian peasants living on the Kazakh Steppe would not accept it. He argued that while a separate Kazakh autonomy would have a meager share in all-Russian matters, the position of Siberia in Russia would be significant and so would be the Kazakhs' position in Siberia, accounting for half or even a majority in the Siberian Duma together with the Yakuts, Buriats, and

other *inorodtsy*. He was optimistic that when the Kazakhs were ready for a separate autonomy, they would easily receive the right to realize it from the Siberian Autonomy.²⁸

Before the Siberian Oblast Congress, some reported that only the two “Siberian” oblasts (Semipalatinsk and Aqmola) and Torgʻhay oblast would join the Siberian Autonomy,²⁹ but Bökeykhanov attended the congress as a representative not only of these three oblasts, but also of the Semirechie and Uralsk oblasts and the Bökey Horde. His mandates were contradictory: whereas people in Semirechie and the Bökey Horde wanted to join the Siberian Autonomy, the Kazakhs in Uralsk oblast asked him to convey the All-Kazakh Congress’s resolution about Kazakh autonomy to the Siberian Congress. In the end, the nine-member Kazakh delegation decided to temporarily join the Siberian Autonomy. Five Kazakhs were elected as deputies to the Siberian Oblast Council: Khalel Dosmükhamedov (from Uralsk oblast), Erejep Itbaev (from Aqmola oblast), Saghündiq Dosjanov (from Torgʻhay oblast), and Bökeykhanov and Tinishbaev (elected as representatives of the Kazakhs as a whole, but natives of Semipalatinsk and Semirechie oblasts, respectively).³⁰ Thus, all five of the regions that were called “steppe oblasts” in the tsarist era were represented in this council.

Soon, however, the Bolsheviks extended their activities throughout Russia, and it became obvious that the Siberian Autonomy alone could not defend the Kazakhs from them. As mentioned above, Kazakh leaders established the Alash Orda with Bökeykhanov as its head in December 1917, although they did not formally declare autonomy nor did they clarify the Alash Orda’s relation to the Siberian Autonomy. On January 5, 1918, the Kazakh Committee of Semipalatinsk Oblast (headed by Rayimjan Märsekov), which was closely affiliated with the Alash Orda, confirmed its recognition of the Siberian government, but pointed out that the “Kazakh government” (i.e., the Alash Orda) should negotiate with the Siberian government on mutual relations.³¹

Another possibility was to form a common autonomy with the people of Turkestan. Bökeykhanov totally rejected this idea. In an article published in November 1917, he wrote:

It is not easy to manage state affairs . . . If we Kazakhs are generally ignorant and unenlightened, the ignorance of the people of Turkestan and their lack of skillful people is ten times more serious than ours. For the Kazakhs to form an autonomy with Turkestan is like tying a camel and a donkey to the cart of autonomy.³²

Although Kazakh intellectuals such as Mūstafa Shoqaeu (Chokaev) and Serali Lapin constantly participated in Muslim movements in Turkestan, Turkestan autonomy was not widely discussed at Kazakh gatherings. For example, the assembly of the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz of Turkestan Krai in August mainly discussed problems concerning the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, and not the whole of Turkestan.³³

In late November, the Fourth Extraordinary Regional Muslim Congress, held in Kokand, established a provisional government of Turkestan, with Tinishbaev

as its head (later succeeded by Shoqaev). This move does not seem to have been coordinated with Kazakh leaders outside Turkestan,³⁴ and the newspaper *Qazaq* published an article accusing the Kokand congress of having hastily declared autonomy without due investigation and in the near absence of representatives from Semirechie and other oblasts.³⁵ The Turkestan Autonomy also became an issue at the Second All-Kazakh Congress. When a bare majority voted to withhold an official proclamation of Kazakh Autonomy until the opinions of non-Kazakhs on the steppe could be known, a group of delegates urged immediate proclamation and threatened to join the Turkestan Autonomy otherwise.³⁶

Kazakhs in Turkestan themselves were similarly split. While Kazakhs from the Arghın tribe in Samarkand oblast declared their intention to secede from the Turkestan Autonomy and join the Kazakh Autonomy, Kazakhs in Syrdarya oblast did not wish to desert non-Kazakh co-religionists and Kazakh activists in the Turkestan government. The Alash Orda sent Dulatov and two other people to negotiate with them at the Kazakh-Kyrgyz Congress of Syrdarya Oblast, held in the city of Türkistan from January 4–9, 1918. The situation was complicated by the presence of delegates from Īrghız uezd (Torghay oblast), who declared their willingness to join the Turkestan Autonomy even though they lived outside Turkestan Krai.³⁷ After heated debates, the congress passed compromise resolutions that included three major points:

1. Syrdarya oblast would remain in the Turkestan Autonomy for the time being;
2. When the Alash Autonomy was declared and it formed a union with Turkestan, the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz of Syrdarya would join the Alash Autonomy;
3. When the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz of Syrdarya joined, the capital of the Alash Autonomy would be the city of Türkistan.³⁸

The uneasy question of relations between the Alash Orda and the Turkestan Autonomy abruptly became irrelevant when the latter was attacked and dismantled by the Soviets in February 1918.

One of the most important problems for the Alash Orda during the civil war was its relations with various Russian “governments”: that of Siberia (Omsk), those of the Orenburg and the Ural Cossacks, and the Committee of the Constituent Assembly (the Komuch) in Samara. These relations are examined in more detail in the following sections, but here I want to point out that Kazakhs tried to maneuver between these governments, especially between Omsk and the Komuch. The Siberian Provisional Government, originally set up by *oblastniki* (regionalists) and supportive of self-determination,³⁹ became increasingly hostile toward national autonomy, while the Komuch was more eager to maintain good relations with autonomous governments. The two were rivals, with the Komuch claiming to be an all-Russian power, even though the Siberian government was actually the most powerful White Russian government. Moreover, their spheres of influence were not clearly delimited, especially in regions situated in the middle, such as Torghay oblast.⁴⁰ These conditions gave the Kazakhs room to maneuver.

The central office of the Alash Orda resided in Semipalatinsk and naturally had to work closely with the Siberian government, but some Kazakh leaders cited the authority of the Komuch when they did not want to obey the Siberians. In September 1918, the chairman of the *zemstvo* board of Semipalatinsk oblast, Märsekov (the same person who had recognized the Siberian government in January in his capacity as the head of the Kazakh Committee), declared to the oblast commissar of the Siberian government that the Alash Orda recognized the “Samara government” (i.e., the Komuch) and not the Siberian government. Although the Komuch was already approaching its final days, the disobedience of the Kazakhs who administered *zemstvos* caused a serious headache for the Siberians.⁴¹ Even after the dissolution of the Komuch, its “recognition” served as a basis for the Alash Orda’s legitimacy.⁴² After the All-Russian Government (Omsk) decided to dissolve all the regional governments, its commissar in Torghay oblast, Fedorovich, demanded that Eldes Omarov, the commissar of the Alash Orda in Qostanay uezd, stop meddling in administrative affairs. Omarov replied that Qostanay had been admitted by the Komuch as a territory of the Alash Orda and that he had asked A. I. Dutov (the leader of the Orenburg Cossack Army) to sue Fedorovich for making an unjustified demand.⁴³ Such tactics remind us of Kenesari Qasimov, who had maneuvered between the hostile Gorchakov (the West Siberian governor-general) and the friendly Perovskii (the Orenburg military governor) in his battle for resurrection of the Kazakh Khanate around 1840.

The government of Oyil Walayati set up by members of the Alash Orda in Uralsk oblast, which was distant from Omsk and had close relations with the Orenburg and Ural Cossacks, did not need the help of the Komuch and took a highhanded attitude toward it. The plenipotentiary of the Komuch in Uralsk oblast complained that Jihansha Dosmukhamedov, the head of the Oyil Walayati government, regarded the Komuch as a government of Samara province.⁴⁴ Those Kazakhs who were opposed to the Alash Orda, in turn, used the conflict between it and the Siberian government for their own purposes. Ämre Aytbakin, the chairman of the Ust-Kamenogorsk uezd *zemstvo* board and a staunch opponent of Bökeykhanov, expressed his support of the Siberian government and sent to it negative information on the Alash Orda.⁴⁵

The legacy of the *inorodtsy* category and the fear of separatism

This section examines the imperial legacies in more detail, as shown by the attitudes of the successive governments in Omsk to the Alash Orda. During the half-year following its establishment, the Alash Orda existed largely on paper, as major parts of Kazakhstan were ruled by the Bolsheviks. The revolt of the Czechoslovak Legion turned the tide in favor of the anti-Bolsheviks, and in June 1918, the Alash Orda expelled the Bolsheviks from its provisional capital of Semipalatinsk. It declared the organization of a military council, oblast and uezd councils, and judicial courts, as well as a monopoly on tax collection.⁴⁶

Thereafter the Alash Orda made it clear that it was not a part of the Siberian Autonomy, but rather it was its partner. Bökeykhanov wrote to leaders of local

Kazakh committees and *zemstvo* boards in July that the Alash Orda was allied (*nakhoditsia v soiuzykh otnosheniakh*) with the Siberian and Bashkir autonomies.⁴⁷ Also in July, the Alash Orda made a proposal to the Siberian Provisional Government about mutual recognition.⁴⁸ Some Kazakhs' categorical statements about autonomy disturbed the Russians, and peasant deputies to the Aqmola oblast *zemstvo* assembly expressed their opposition to Kazakh territorial autonomy in their appeal to the Siberian government. Reporting this news, the Russian newspaper *Svobodnaia rech'* in Semipalatinsk called the Kazakh move "separatism" and noted the inseparable link between the steppe oblasts and other parts of Russia, as the former served as an important destination for Russian peasant migrants.⁴⁹

The Siberian government, together with representatives of the Alash Orda, held meetings of a commission to discuss mutual relations from late July to early August 1918. The minister of education of the Siberian government chaired the commission and other mid-ranking Siberian officials participated, while the Alash Orda was represented by Bökeykhanov and two other prominent leaders. The commission did not discuss mutual recognition, but adopted a draft agreement based on proposals of the Alash Orda. This draft agreement stipulated that *zemstvos* and the city dumas of Aqmola, Semipalatinsk, and Torghay oblasts (Uralsk oblast was already separate from Siberia) should be under the joint control of the Siberian government and the Alash Orda, and that Kazakh courts and other organs which dealt with Kazakh affairs should be under the exclusive control of the Alash Orda.⁵⁰ This draft, which resembled practical recognition of the Alash Orda, apparently was not supported by the Siberian government as a whole,⁵¹ and a formal agreement was never concluded.

Although increasingly negative to the autonomy of non-Russians, the Siberian government did retain some elements of the *narodniki* tradition of being sympathetic to minorities, which was clearly manifested in the Ministry of Native Affairs (*Ministerstvo tuzemnykh del*). As the ministry itself acknowledged, it had "no precedence in the history of state-building in Russia and Western Europe."⁵² It planned to establish a Council of Native Affairs consisting of non-Russian representatives and a Council of Scholars. It also cooperated with branches of the Russian Geographical Society.⁵³ However, a professor at Tomsk University, Viacheslav Gribovskii, considered it inappropriate to describe *inorodtsy* as "natives" (*tuzemtsy*), because Russians, having lived in Siberia since the sixteenth century, were also natives. He wrote that these uncultured *inorodtsy* could not be called "nationalities" from the "scientific point of view," and what they needed was not independence but protection.⁵⁴ Here reemerged a mixture of paternalism and contempt for Asian minorities that was characteristic of many tsarist officials.

Ultimately, the Ministry of Native Affairs could not function well. The minister, M. B. Shatilov, a Socialist Revolutionary who took a favorable attitude to the Kazakhs and the Alash Orda,⁵⁵ was powerless in a government that was increasingly dominated by rightists. Contempt for *inorodtsy* intensified, and when representatives of anti-Bolshevik governments from various parts of Russia gathered to prepare for a state conference in the summer of 1918, two Cadets (Constitutional

Democrats) from the Siberian government, namely V. N. Pepeliaev and P. P. Ivanov-Rinov, expressed opposition to participation by *inorodtsy* in the conference. They said that *inorodtsy* lacked the statist spirit and were anti-Russian, although other participants at the meeting did not support that opinion.⁵⁶

The dictatorship of A. V. Kolchak that was established in Omsk after the coup d'état in November 1918 and that claimed to be an all-Russian government did not have a Ministry of Native Affairs, but there was a plan to create a Department of Native Affairs in the Interior Ministry and a Conference (*Soveshchanie*) of Native Affairs under the same ministry with the participation of non-Russian representatives. Presenting this plan to an interdepartmental conference of the government in August 1919, Vice Minister of the Interior M. E. Iachevskii said that although the ministry was opposed to political autonomy, it was aware of the fault of the pre-revolutionary government in not quickly responding to local problems, and had a positive attitude to attempts at improving the natives' cultural and economic conditions. However, the conference rejected this plan. It alleged that participation by non-Russian representatives in the solution of other nationalities' problems would be harmful, because they did not know the peculiarities of other non-Russian nationalities.⁵⁷

The only major issue of self-government on which the Kolchak government and the Alash Orda agreed was that of courts. Kazakh intellectuals had long sought revival and improvement of the customary law courts, which had become corrupt and powerless under the tsarist regime. Bökeykhanov participated in the work of a commission on organizing courts among the Kazakhs under the Kolchak government, and Kolchak signed the Statute on Kazakh Courts in August 1919. The courts were to rely basically on customary law and use the Kazakh language.⁵⁸ Here, Kazakh intellectuals and the Kolchak government found a common language of particularism emphasizing customs and traditions, a situation that was also observed under tsarism.⁵⁹

Returning to the question of autonomy, it should be noted that the Siberian Provisional Government in principle admitted cultural autonomy. It drafted a provisional statute on cultural autonomy in July 1918, which served as a basis for rejecting territorial autonomy including Kazakh autonomy. However, the Siberian government did not actually recognize Muslim cultural autonomy.⁶⁰ The Kolchak government took an even more negative attitude toward the National Administration of Muslim Turk-Tatars, which pursued cultural autonomy, than to the Alash Orda, suspecting the former of pan-Islamism and aspiration to "Tatarize" other Muslim peoples.⁶¹

Apparently, what really mattered to the successive governments in Omsk was not the distinction between cultural and territorial autonomy, but the fear of threats to a "one and indivisible Russia." Oblast commissars of the Siberian government accused the Alash Orda of pursuing separatism and creating a situation of dual power.⁶² The Interior Ministry of the Kolchak government, trying to prove the danger of Turk-Tatar autonomy, argued that the collapse of Russian statehood had begun with the development of centrifugal national movements in Finland and Ukraine.⁶³

Bökeykhanov rejected the accusation of separatism at the State Conference in September 1918. He confirmed that the Kazakhs thought of themselves exclusively as part of a unified and federal Russia, and those who accused them of separatism were poisoned by the old mentality and were accustomed to thinking of *inorodtsy* as slaves and Great Russians as slave owners.⁶⁴

In some cases, leaders of the Alash Orda also used the idea of a “great Russia.” In Qostanay, Omarov, during his above-mentioned resistance to the commissar of the All-Russian Government in November 1918, wrote an appeal to Russian peasants in the uezd. He invoked the image of Russia as a great power before World War I and invited them to join the Alash Autonomy, saying that regional autonomies were needed to revive great Russia, given that people were not ready to directly participate in all-Russian affairs.⁶⁵

The legacy of Cossack military might

One of the crucial factors that determined the political-military situation of the Kazakh Steppe during the revolution and civil war was the presence of Cossack armies that were deployed by the tsarist government such as to almost encircle the steppe: Ural Cossacks, Orenburg Cossacks, Siberian Cossacks, and Semirechie Cossacks.

Although the Kazakhs had a history of sometimes difficult relations with the Cossacks, it was important for the Alash Orda to defend itself by setting up armed forces with the help of the Cossacks, as the Kazakhs did not have experience in serving in the tsarist army on a regular basis.⁶⁶ The Oyil Walayati government asked the Orenburg Cossack Army in June 1918 to provide weapons, instructors, and clothes in exchange for horses or money, saying that it had almost no arms.⁶⁷ Bökeykhanov also ordered the *zemstvo* board of Uralsk oblast in July to contact Dutov to receive weapons. He even proposed sending armed forces to Turkestan to fight against the Bolsheviks together with the Cossacks and Bashkirs (Kazakh troops from Semipalatinsk were already fighting in Semirechie).⁶⁸ Communicating with the Cossacks, the Kazakh leaders praised the “century-old liberty of the Cossacks,” and called them “glorious Cossacks” and “dear neighbors.”⁶⁹

Dutov, the leader of the most powerful Orenburg Cossack Army, had close connections with the Kazakhs and the Kazakh Steppe. When the Red Army occupied the land of the Orenburg Cossacks, Dutov and his army stayed on the Torghay Steppe from April to July 1918 with the support of local Kazakhs.⁷⁰ He hired Kazakhs as personal escorts and did not fail to congratulate Muslim soldiers on Islamic holidays.⁷¹

From the political point of view, Dutov was a rightist and had strained relations with Socialist Revolutionaries. In December 1918, after the Kolchak government started to violently suppress leftists and Dutov began to closely cooperate with Kolchak, some Socialist Revolutionaries and their non-Russian sympathizers (Shoqaev and the Bashkir leader Zaki Validov [Togan]) together with Dutov’s rival Cossacks planned to arrest Dutov and establish a joint government of Kazakhs, Bashkirs, and Cossacks, but the conspiracy failed.⁷² Shoqaev escaped to the

Caucasus and later emigrated to France, where he became a prominent leader of the movement for Turkestan independence in exile. If it had not been for this event with Dutov, then Shoqaev might not have emigrated, and he and the Turkestan Autonomy would not have acquired such great fame in the West.

The conspiracy seems to have heightened Dutov's caution about Bashkirs and Kazakhs, but he did not lose interest in them. In May 1919 he wrote a detailed report about Bashkiria, the Kazakh Steppe, and Orenburg province, in which he emphasized the inseparability of these three regions. He explained confrontation between the Alash Orda and its Kazakh opponents as tribal strife, and regarded "divide and rule" as the most appropriate Russian policy. He also proposed to actively use those Kazakhs who supported Russian state-building (he named the lawyer Jansūltan Seidalin as the best example), and to reward them with presents, ranks, and orders.⁷³ This proposal recalled the tsarist officials' favorite phrase that appealing to Central Asians' vanity was a good way to control them. Dutov's life was connected to the Kazakh Steppe until his death. Having been defeated by the Red Army in September 1919, Dutov moved across the steppe to Semirechie and then to Ili (a Kazakh region of China), where he was killed in 1921 by Soviet agents.

Ural Cossacks also played a crucial role in the Alash Orda's activities in Western Kazakhstan from the beginning, and Jihansha Dosmūkhamedov and Khalel Dosmūkhamedov (no relation) participated in a congress of the Ural Cossack Army in January 1918.⁷⁴

Soon, however, leaders of the Alash Orda approached the Soviets, which dominated most of Russia at that time, and sought mutual recognition. The negotiation was coordinated with leaders of the central Alash Orda in Semipalatinsk but was mainly carried out by the leaders of Western Kazakhstan. They met Stalin in Moscow and are said to have received a large sum of money. On their way back to Western Kazakhstan, they were caught in Saratov by the Soviets. Members of the Saratov Soviet suspected that they might have been sent by the Cossack Army Government, but wanted to take the opportunity to estrange the Cossacks and Kazakhs (who were thought to have an age-old hatred of Cossack oppression). Jihansha Dosmūkhamedov reacted swiftly, saying that the Kazakhs were willing to break with the Cossacks and fight against them together with the Soviets.⁷⁵ After returning to Uralsk, however, Khalel Dosmūkhamedov made a report to the Cossack Army Government denouncing the Bolsheviks and thereafter fought against the Soviets and Kazakh communists.⁷⁶

In May 1918, the Fourth Extraordinary Kazakh Congress of Uralsk Oblast resolved to energetically support the Ural Cossack Army in their fight against the Soviets, but made it clear that Kazakhs would cooperate with Cossacks, as long as they fought for their common rights to self-government and would not participate in battles of all-Russian significance.⁷⁷ This was in line with the preference of the Ural Cossacks themselves, who fought mainly on their own territory independently from other White forces, under the slogan "For the faith, Yaik [Ural river] and freedom."⁷⁸

However, the inconstancy of the Dosmūkhamedovs did not fail to leave traces behind, and their relations with Cossacks were not always smooth. The chairman

of the Ural Cossack Army Government, Fomichev, made the strange statement at a preparatory meeting of the State Conference in August 1918 that he was unaware of the existence of the Alash Orda, Oyıl Walayātī, and the Turkestan government.⁷⁹ But overall, the leaders of the western branch of the Alash Orda (the former Oyıl Walayātī government) were strongly dependent on Ural Cossacks. When they were faced with a riot of their own soldiers in the capital of Jīmpitī, they suppressed it with the help of Ural Cossacks, although most of the rebels were killed by another group of Kazakh soldiers.⁸⁰

Conclusion: a zigzag path to a new political geography

When we study national movements during the Russian Revolution and Russian Civil War, it is extremely important to address the geographical setting inherited from the tsarist era. The Kazakh Steppe remained divided into several regions with different political traditions, the cities and transportation were underdeveloped and became even more dysfunctional from disorder, and the Cossack presence was strong. These conditions were the causes of the dynamic but difficult interactions between the Alash Orda and other Muslim and Russian governments.

In terms of ideology and discourse, elements that derived from various periods of history were accumulated: imperial paternalism and *narodniki* idealism of the nineteenth century, narrow Russo-centrism of the late tsarist era, and the fear of dual power and separatism based on the experiences of 1917. Both non-Russians and Russian nationalists used various elements for different purposes, and sometimes interesting combinations emerged. Kazakhs invoked the image of great Russia, and officials of the Kolchak government criticized the nationalities policy of tsarism. Directions of change were varied and unpredictable.

However, the basic aspiration of the main leaders of the Kazakh national movement was clear. While occasionally giving nods to friendship with Siberia and the Cossacks as well as to Muslim unity, the main point was to unite the Kazakhs and their land – land that had lacked institutional and politico-geographical unity under tsarism. In August 1919, Tanashev told a commission of the Kolchak government that the Kazakhs, who had been administratively divided into Asiatic Russia, European Russia, and Turkestan, wanted to unite and that Siberian *oblast-nichestvo* (regionalism) was alien to them.⁸¹

Paradoxically enough, the revival of Muslim unity that had failed during the revolution and civil war was partially realized in the early Soviet period. A large number of Kazakh intellectuals, who faced difficulties in working in their native northern regions because of their past activities in the Alash Orda, came to Tashkent and worked together with intellectuals of other nationalities of Turkestan. Around 1923, the Kazakh Steppe was incorporated into the jurisdiction of the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate in Ufa.⁸² However, persecution of religion was just around the corner, and national delimitation in 1924 prompted intellectuals to compete with representatives of other nationalities in retaining and enlarging their territories.⁸³ The new Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic successfully incorporated the Kazakh regions of the former Turkestan Krai, while northern

cities such as Omsk and Orenburg were separated from the republic. Thus emerged a new political geography based on ethnic division and communist ideology.

Notes

- 1 Uyama Tomohiko, “‘Devotion to the People’ and Paternalistic Authoritarianism among Qazaq Intellectuals, from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to 1917,” in Stéphane A. Dudoignon, ed., *Devout Societies vs. Impious States? Transmitting Islamic Learning in Russia, Central Asia and China, through the Twentieth Century* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2004), 19–27.
- 2 Uyama Tomohiko, “A Strategic Alliance between Kazakh Intellectuals and Russian Administrators: Imagined Communities in *Dala Walayatining Gazeti* (1888–1902),” in Hayashi Tadayuki, ed., *The Construction and Deconstruction of National Histories in Slavic Eurasia* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2003), 237–259.
- 3 Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev, *Izbrannoe* (Almaty: Arys, 2001), 34–55, esp. 35–37.
- 4 *Inorodtsy* literally meant “people of different descent.” It connoted people who were thought to be inferior to Russians, to be unentitled to the same rights as them, and to need special treatment or protection. As a legal term, it included native peoples of Siberia and Central Asia, as well as Kalmyks and Jews. See John W. Slocum, “Who, and When, Were the *Inorodtsy*? The Evolution of the Category of ‘Aliens’ in Imperial Russia,” *The Russian Review* 57, no. 2 (1998): 173–190.
- 5 Naganawa Norihiro, “Molding the Muslim Community through the Tsarist Administration: *Maḥalla* under the Jurisdiction of the Orenburg Mohammedan Spiritual Assembly after 1905,” *Acta Slavica Iaponica* 23 (2006): 101–123; Robert Crews, *For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
- 6 For the unique cultural features of the Inner Horde, see Allen J. Frank, *Muslim Religious Institutions in Imperial Russia: The Islamic World of Novouzensk District and the Kazakh Inner Horde, 1780–1910* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 278–305; Uyama Tomohiko, “Historiography of Local and Regional Studies in Western Kazakhstan: An Alternative to National History?” *Central Eurasian Studies Review* 7, no. 2 (2008): 16–22.
- 7 Dmitrii Arapov, ed., *Islam v Rossiiskoi imperii (zakonodatel'nye akty, opisaniia, statistika)* (Moscow: Akademkniga, 2001), 302–304; TsGA RK (Central State Archive of the Republic of Kazakhstan), f. 64, op. 1, d. 464, ll. 4–6ob.
- 8 *Alash qozghalısı / Dvizhenie Alash: Sbornik dokumentov*, vol. 1 (Almaty: Alash, 2004), 33–39. For political activities of other Russian Muslim peoples during the 1905 Revolution, see the chapters by Meyer and Iskhakov in this volume.
- 9 *Ay-qap*, 1914, nos. 13, 14.
- 10 The only exception was, naturally, the Kazakh congress of the Bökey Horde, where religious life had always been supervised by the Orenburg Muftiate. *Alash qozghalısı* 1: 269–271.
- 11 *Alash qozghalısı* 1: 234–235, 263–264, 303, 372, 394, 407–408; AP RK (Archive of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan), f. 811, op. 20, d. 72, ll. 2ob.–3. The Semirechie congress deemed it necessary to establish a supreme Muslim spiritual directorate in Petrograd. TsGA RK, f. R-9, op. 1, d. 51, ll. 1ob.–2.
- 12 *Alash qozghalısı* 1: 439. The date of publication is mistakenly indicated as October 21.
- 13 Uyama Tomohiko, “Byla li islamskaia al'ternativa? Mesto islama v natsional'nom dvizhenii kazakhov nachala XX veka,” *Shygys*, 2008, no. 2 (Almaty, 2009): 143–148.
- 14 *Alash qozghalısı* 1: 474, 482.
- 15 See Articles 28 and 32 of “Osnovnye polozenia o Natsional'noi avtonomii Musul'man Tiurk-Tatar Vnutrennei Rossii i Sibiri”: GARF (State Archive of the Russian Federation),

- f. 1701, op. 1, d. 57, l. 12. The reorganization led to secession of the Bashkir clergy and was not admitted by the Siberian government. I. V. Nam, *Kul'turno-natsional'naia avtonomiia v istorii Rossii: Dokumental'naia antologiya, vol. 1, Sibir', 1917–1920* <<http://www.humanities.edu.ru/db/msg/24903>>.
- 16 Although the tsarist government excluded the Kazakhs and other Central Asians from the Third and Fourth Dumas, Bökeykhanov and Müstafa Shoqaeв (Chokaev) worked in the bureau of the Muslim faction.
 - 17 Jümaghali Tileulin, “Jalpi müsılman siezi,” in *Alash qozghalısı* 1: 325–327.
 - 18 Akhmet Baytürsinüli et al., “Shura-i-Islam,” in *Alash qozghalısı* 1: 330–332.
 - 19 Salavat Iskhakov, *Rossiiskie musul'mane i revoliutsiia (vesna 1917 g. – leto 1918 g.)*, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Sotsial'no-politicheskaiа MYSL', 2004), 195–196.
 - 20 Mirjaqip Dulatov, “Qazaq siezi,” in *Alash qozghalısı* 1: 381.
 - 21 “Rezoliutsii obshchekazakhskogo s"ezda,” in *Alash qozghalısı* 1: 374.
 - 22 Iskhakov, *Rossiiskie musul'mane*, 377–378.
 - 23 GARF, f. 144, op. 1, d. 1a, ll. 65ob.–66.
 - 24 *Alash qozghalısı* 1: 234, 305. Petropavlovsk is on the northern edge of the Kazakh Steppe, but it is roughly equidistant from Eastern and Western Kazakhstan, and the Trans-Siberian Railway runs through the city.
 - 25 *Alash qozghalısı* 1: 389–397.
 - 26 There were relatively few leading Kazakh intellectuals from Turkestan Krai, especially areas near Tashkent. See Uyama Tomohiko, “The Geography of Civilizations: A Spatial Analysis of the Kazakh Intelligentsia’s Activities, from the Mid-Nineteenth to the Early Twentieth Century,” in Matsuzato Kimitaka, ed., *Regions: A Prism to View the Slavic-Eurasian World* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2000), 70–99.
 - 27 Here “oblast” means the entire Siberian region, following the terminology of Siberian *oblastnichestvo* (regionalism).
 - 28 Sülтанmakhmüt Torayghırov, “Älikhanning Semeyge kelui,” in his *Eki tomdiq shıgharmalar jinaghi* (Almaty: Ghilim, 1993), 151–156.
 - 29 *Alash qozghalısı* 1: 423.
 - 30 Älikhan Bökeykhanov, “Jalpi Sibir siezi,” in *Alash qozghalısı* 1: 468–471.
 - 31 *Alash qozghalısı / Dvizhenie Alash: Sbornik dokumentov*, vol. 2 (Almaty: Alash, 2005), 62.
 - 32 Bökeykhanov, “Jalpi Sibir siezi,” 469.
 - 33 *Alash qozghalısı* 1: 324, 329–330.
 - 34 Dulatov testified to the OGPU in 1929 that he and his colleagues first knew about the Turkestan Autonomous Government when Shoqaeв joined the Second All-Kazakh Congress midway through the congress. Mämbet Qoygeldiev, *Alash qozghalısı* (Almaty: Sanat, 1995), 345.
 - 35 Bortang [pen name of an unknown person], “Qoqan siezi häm qazaq-qırghız,” in *Alash qozghalısı* 2: 55–58.
 - 36 *Alash qozghalısı* 1: 476–478.
 - 37 The Irghız uezd commissar Abdolla Temirov alleged that Siberia was a land of convicts with scant natural wealth, whereas Turkestan was a home of the Kazakhs and had rich soil. *Alash qozghalısı* 2: 68–71.
 - 38 Ibid., 85–89, 109–111. Türkistan had been the most important city of the Kazakh Khanate, and the famous saint Yasavı and a number of khans are buried there.
 - 39 See the resolutions of the Siberian Oblast Congress of October 1917. *Alash qozghalısı* 1: 444.
 - 40 GARF, f. 667, op. 1, d. 16, l. 16.
 - 41 GARF, f. 1701, op. 1, d. 6v, ll. 14–18ob. Märsekov then disputed with the Siberian government over the latter’s policy of not recognizing the Alash Orda and the Kazakh courts. Dina Amanzholova, *Kazakhskii avtonomizm i Rossiia: Istoriia dvizheniia Alash* (Moscow: Rossiia molodaia, 1994), 75.
 - 42 On September 25, 1918, the Komuch issued a declaration that recognized the Alash

- Orda, with some reservations. N. I. Martynenko, ed., *Alash Orda: sbornik dokumentov* (Kzyl-Orda: Kazizdat, 1929), 123–124; Amanzholova, *Kazakhskii avtonomizm*, 98.
- 43 GARF, f. 1701, op. 1, d. 6v, ll. 92–97ob.; Amanzholova, *Kazakhskii avtonomizm*, 107. Omarov's assertion was also based on the ambiguity of the All-Russian Government's decision itself. Ordering dissolution of the Alash Orda Government, it stipulated that the organs of the Alash Orda would be temporarily preserved and subordinated to the central departments of the All-Russian Government. *Alash qozghalisi* 2: 256–257.
- 44 Amanzholova, *Kazakhskii avtonomizm*, 93.
- 45 Ibid., 36, 66; *Alash qozghalisi* 2: 198.
- 46 Martynenko, *Alash Orda*, 91–93.
- 47 Ibid., 79.
- 48 Ibid., 102–108.
- 49 *Alash qozghalisi* 2: 212–215.
- 50 Martynenko, *Alash Orda*, 108–110.
- 51 See the critical comments of the consultant of the Siberian government, K. G. Dishler, on the draft agreement. One of the reasons he rejected it was that it “far exceeds the limit of cultural autonomy.” Dina Amanzholova, ed., *Rosssiia i Tsentral'naia Aziia, 1905–1925 gg.: Sbornik dokumentov* (Karaganda: Izd-vo KarGU, 2005), 133–134.
- 52 GARF, f. 1701, op. 1, d. 4, l. 27.
- 53 GARF, f. 1701, op. 1, d. 4, ll. 10–10ob, 15, 25, 27.
- 54 GARF, f. 1701, op. 1, d. 4, ll. 19–20.
- 55 GARF, f. 1701, op. 1, d. 6v, ll. 74, 84, 85.
- 56 Amanzholova, *Kazakhskii avtonomizm*, 99.
- 57 GARF, f. 1701, op. 1, d. 4, ll. 32–34ob., 43, 48–51, 54–54ob.
- 58 GARF, f. 1701, op. 1, d. 6a, ll. 73–79ob.
- 59 Uyama Tomohiko, “A Particularist Empire: The Russian Policies of Christianization and Military Conscription in Central Asia,” in Uyama Tomohiko, ed., *Empire, Islam, and Politics in Central Eurasia* (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2007), 23–63; Virginia Martin, *Law and Custom in the Steppe: The Kazakhs of the Middle Horde and Russian Colonialism in the Nineteenth Century* (Richmond: Curzon, 2001).
- 60 Nam, *Kul'turno-natsional'naia avtonomiia v istorii Rossii*, vol. 1 <<http://www.humanities.edu.ru/db/msg/24909>>; I. V. Nam, “Natsional'no-kul'turnaia avtonomiia v Rossii: istoricheskii opyt i sovremennye problemy” <<http://federalmcart.ksu.ru/conference/seminar3/nam.htm>>.
- 61 GARF, f. 1701, op. 1, d. 57, ll. 49–50.
- 62 GARF, f. 1701, op. 1, d. 6v, ll. 42, 59.
- 63 GARF, f. 1701, op. 1, d. 55, l. 5.
- 64 GARF, f. 144, op. 1, d. 1a, ll. 65ob.–66.
- 65 Martynenko, *Alash Orda*, 88–90.
- 66 GARF, f. 1701, op. 1, d. 6v, l. 158–158ob.
- 67 Martynenko, *Alash Orda*, 98–99.
- 68 Ibid., 79–80; Amanzholova, *Kazakhskii avtonomizm*, 52–55.
- 69 Martynenko, *Alash Orda*, 99–101.
- 70 Andrei Ganin, *Ataman A. I. Dutov* (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2006), 166.
- 71 Ibid., 353.
- 72 Ibid., 285–289.
- 73 *Alash qozghalisi* 2: 327–334.
- 74 Nikolai Chesnokov, “Istoricheskii proval,” *Nadezhda*, September 6, 2007 <<http://www.condensat.kz/nadezhda/nomer/060907/7.htm>>.
- 75 AP RK, f. 811, op. 7, d. 4, ll. 37–37ob., 40–41; Amanzholova, *Kazakhskii avtonomizm*, 38.
- 76 AP RK, f. 811, op. 7, d. 5, ll. 134–135.
- 77 Amanzholova, *Rosssiia i Tsentral'naia Aziia*, 129–130.
- 78 Amanzholova, *Kazakhskii avtonomizm*, 86.

- 79 GARF, f. 144, op. 1, d. 28, l. 7.
80 Martynenko, *Alash Orda*, 83–85.
81 Amanzholova, *Rosssiia i Tsentral'naia Aziia*, 163.
82 Kazakh representatives still wanted to create their own muftiate, and the Ufa directorate was compelled to establish a Kazakh department in it. G. D. Mukhtarova, *Islam v sovetskoi Kazakhstane* (Aktobe, 2007), 50–55.
83 For the role of intellectuals in national delimitation in Central Asia, see Arne Haugen, *The Establishment of National Republics in Soviet Central Asia* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

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