

Identity Politics of Kazakhstani Koreans

Cultural Anthropological approach

Soon-ok Myong

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The research data are based on anthropological methodology - participatory observation, in-depth and informal interview - by participating in Koreans' activity sphere in Almaty. Applying qualitative and microscopic method, the study represents and interprets the significance and value of the Post-Soviet Koreans' lives in Kazakhstan by exploring inside dynamic ethnic group, and thus identifies that the identity of Kazakhstani Goryeo-in is seen as variable and dynamic, not so much essential. The monograph was revised for the readers of Korean Studies, Oriental Studies, and Cultural Studies

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Book Review

(Отзыв)

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The significance of **Soon-ok Myong**'s research can be pointed out in several aspects: First, research on overseas Koreans has been conducted in Korea for the past 30 to 40 years. Most overseas Koreans are living in China, the U.S., Japan, and Central Asia, as put in order. Except the case of China, Korean diaspora has emerged mainly under the 20th century Japanese Imperialism. In case of Japan, the colonial power drafted and relocated Koreans for the wartime labor, but in most other countries, Koreans immigrated by escaping from the Japanese Imperialism. Particularly, the history of Central Asian Koreans bears the grief of Korean modern history.

Accordingly, as the research on overseas Koreans became full-blown, a special focus of interest was put on the Central Asian Koreans. When the former Soviet Union was under the communist regime, South Koreans under the capitalist regime were lacking not only the understanding on the existence of Central Asian Koreans under communism, but also the chances to approach them, and even the interest in them. By the way, as the Soviet communist regime dissolved, the existence of Central Asian Koreans began to be highly noticed. Their forcible relocation by Stalin from the Maritime Province to the Central Asia, successful adaptation through the unyielding power of survival, and the activities of independence activists who had been hardly known to Koreans thus far were the emerging themes of research by Korean scholars. However, most Korean scholars' research has been conducted mainly through literature research, otherwise indirectly through the collection of data from Kazakhstani Korean informants. For these cases, the longest duration for fieldwork was less than a month. Thus, those researches on Central Asian Koreans inevitably stayed at superficial approaches.

In contrast, Soon-ok Myong's research has a special meaning. Having lived almost for six years on the field, she was the first to utilize the

anthropological fieldwork method in its fullest sense: the important methodological characteristics of anthropological research included holistic approach, comparative studies, and field work. Also, she was able to conduct direct in-depth interviews with Kazakhstani Koreans by learning their actual language. This means she researched with the competence no previous Korean scholars could have had: in other words, she was able to attempt a comprehensive approach. Therefore, this research can be seen as a representative case of cultural anthropological research.

Second, Soon-ok Myong had the critical quality of ranging over the recent significant theories at issue and actively utilizing them for researching Kazakhstani Koreans. This point is very pleasant for this international advisory professor. The issues of *identity politics* are directly related to the globalization and diaspora phenomena that have begun to develop all out since the late 20th century. For the lives of people, the matter of identity has an important weight for social living. In particular, research on this matter has begun to progress earnestly since the late 20th century when multiethnic and multicultural situations became increasingly ordinary.

Her notice on where the matter of identity Kazakhstani Koreans experienced is, which was not only the problem of distinguishing their identity from that of the neighboring ethnic groups, but also the *identity politics* in their own group, was a landmark discovery by the researcher. Both the Korean settlers relocated forcibly by Stalin in the 1930s and the Korean immigrants from Sakhalin due to the end of the 2nd World War in 1945 have experienced an endless process of conflicts to unity, and to schism again between them on different historical backgrounds. Research on this point is that which no previous Korean scholars had noticed, and its research themes could not have been observed, interviewed, or approached without the theoretical understanding and training on contemporary cultural anthropology.

The researcher closely investigates the historical background, particularly in detail what impacts and confusions of identity were given by the 1988 Seoul Olympics to Kazakhstani Koreans. Until the Olympics, the Central Asian Koreans had identified their motherland with the communist regime of Democratic People's Republic of Korea on

the North Korean peninsula in alliance with the Soviet regime. However, the economic development of South Korea they had witnessed through the Seoul Olympics gave them a large change of identity consciousness. The landmark event of the Seoul Olympics established a moment to bind the bisected Kazakhstani Koreans into “one Koreans.”

Collecting and reviewing these data, the researcher proves that the characteristics of identity discussed in the recent theory of contemporary cultural anthropology are “not essential, but an endlessly reconstructed discourse.” The researcher analyzed in detail in what form the ethnic boundary distinction progressed through the tensions, harmonies, and re-splits inside the Kazakhstani Korean group. She clearly uncovered the inner contradiction and dynamism of identity that the former Soviet Koreans themselves had covered up. The advantage of this research is that it fully elucidates this actual condition with concrete fieldwork observation and in-depth interview data.

Finally, this research provides an important clue for the research on multiethnic and multicultural societies. As the researcher indicated, this in-depth identity politics would not be involved only with former Soviet Koreans. Further, it would not only be the matter of Kazakhstan as well. The difference of intensity as there is, the matter of identity would also be of an inevitable process of life wherever people lives in multiethnic and multicultural societies. Thus, this research can be said to provide an important clue for understanding other ethnic groups and societies. Particularly, it is a landmark achievement in terms of Korean research on overseas Koreans. At this point of time when the collaborative relationship between Kazakhstan and Korea is increasingly extending, this research as well can be evaluated as an important contribution to this movement.

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And finally, I am deeply indebted to my husband, my daughter, and my son who endured the long process of my research and showed tremendous understanding. And special thanks to my sisters and brothers in hometown in Korea who gave me their love and encouragement. This book is dedicated to my mother and to the memory of deceased father who would have been very happy to hear the news of the completion of my research work.

January 01, 2019
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ABBREVIATION AND NOTATION

АПРК	The Presidential Archive of the Republic of Kazakhstan
ГАПК	The State Archives of Primorski Krai
ТАХК	The Archives of the State Archive of the Khabarovsk Krai
АҢК	The Assembly of People of Kazakhstan
АКК	Korean Association of Kazakhstan
АКНЦ	Almaty Korean National Center
КАСАК	Korean Scientific & Engineering Society
СОБНАРКОМ	Council of People's Commissars
ВКП-б	Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks
АО	Autonomous oblast
Joseon	The former name for Korea in the last Dynasty era before Japanese annexation of Korea
Wonho	Korean name for citizenship holders of Russia
Yeoho	Korean name for citizenship non-holders of Russia
Kazris	First Korean Kolkhoz for Rice farming in Kazakhstan before forced migration under Stalin regime
Koryeo Ilbo	Korean ethnic newspaper in Kazakhstan
Lenin Kichi	The former Soviet Goryeoin newspaper
Haezo Shinmun	The former Korean nationalist newspaper against Japanese colonialism in the Far East
Daedong Gongbo	The former Korean nationalist newspaper against Japanese colonialism in the Far East
Daeyangbo	The former Korean nationalist newspaper against Japanese colonialism in the Far East
Kwoneop Shinmun	The former Korean nationalist newspaper against Japanese colonialism in the Far East

INTRODUCTION

Based on anthropological approach, this study attempts to explore Kazakhstani Koreans' dynamic identity politics in social cataclysm due to a series of landmark events such as the 1988 Seoul Olympics, dissolution of the Soviet Union, and independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Traditionally, anthropology has attempted communications with other world and pursued self-reflections constantly. Western anthropologists' intellectual efforts called 'ethnography' since the Enlightenment with the fieldwork to understand colonial societies for imperialist necessities have contributed to studies on others. The studies to which Western anthropologists have devoted were based on such definite boundaries as 'we and they' in their works.

The sights of looking at other cultures as being fixed while assuming that cultures within specific boundaries are essential and homogeneous have become challenged [1, p.354]. After the emergence of post-Fordism in the 1970s that rejected staying at traditional industry and production methods any more, global society has faced to multi-layered and complicated situations. In the situation that global village became smaller by compressed space-time, and the boundary of a state that have been believed as a unified, independent, and separated space was weakened, new terminologies were come into being such as globalization, trans-nationalism, and postmodernism. Also, the emergence of various personal identities raised a question on the existing frame in which identity had been considered essential [2, 1]. While post-colonialist theorists noticed boundary sites which are agitated in the constant correlations between confronted subjects as regards the matter of the dominant and the dominated [3, 4], postmodernists focused on indeterminate and fragmented subjects, and other cultural studies theorists explained identity as a matter of «becoming» instead of «being», as a constructive process of becoming unstable and fluidic subjects [5].

Just as the past imperialists aimed one united and homogeneous society and then united constituents, the Soviet system has integrated all people while allotting territory and ethnics artificially according to

the power's willingness, and thus made them «homo sovieticus». The Soviet downfall made independent states of indigenes, which could become the characteristic of liberation to indigenes even though the past pains remained, but migrants became left over as ambiguous beings as neither the people of the motherland, nor the perfect citizens of the independent state. As this kind of ambiguous being is laid in scopes that cannot be subsumed by existing identity theories along with the emergence of various post-colonial beings, new research scopes such as diaspora, hybridity and fluidic subject are arising nowadays.

Goryeoin as the research target are the same nationals with the motherland Koreans, having the homogeneous blood-tie but completely different cultural topography. Unlike defining Goryeoin as the homogeneous russianized Koreans in the existing researches, the Goryeoin have suffered from deep-seated schism among diverse inner groups, and from renewal pain of fitting for citizens in new independent country. Futhermore they spured despair and resentment to motherland and made noise with Koreans in Kazakhstan, unlike having identified with motherland people by which Korea emerged as the wealthy capitalist homeland during the '88 Seoul Olympics.

Based on cultural anthropological approach, the study discloses Kazakstani Korean's diversity and dynamics in political process of which Goryeoin appeared inner tension, harmonization and re-division making cultural boundaries with the others. The study establishes following tasks so as to identify the dynamic identity politics of Goryeoin as an ethnic minority in the new external conditions of the dissolution of Soviet Union and Kazakhstani independence.

1. To discuss theoretical background of terms on ethnos, nation and diaspora, and cultural-anthropological methodology with the conduct of fieldwork: participatory observations; in-depth interviews; informal interviews;

- 2 To examine the settlement history of immigrant Korean as an ethnic minority, and then identify limitations and positions in the host society according to the social change;

3. To explore the historical process of Goryeoin migrants' identity formation, and then examine the inner variety and differentiation process of the group;

4. To represent the political process through the narratives of *Goryeoin* shown in schism, tension, and harmonization in *Goryeoin* society.

5. To interpret and analyze cultural significance from many voices of *Goryeoin* noticing the disturbance of boundaries between: major and minor groups; themselves and motherland Korean; themselves and indigene, due to the external structural change such as the '88 Seoul Olympics, the open-door wave, the disruption of existing host society and the independence of host country.

The methodological approach is characterized and based on as follows:

1. The research data from participatory observation, in-depth and informal interview, which is applied with developmental research sequence of ethnography by James P. Spradley [6, 7] who gives a professionalized and systematized model for participatory observations and interviews;

2. Experimental ethnography centered on insider's view, the exploration of researcher and polyphonic voices in writing, cultural relativism;

3. Thick description by Clifford Geerts [8] which explores the hidden structure and context of hierarchically multi-layered meanings beyond the limitations of phenomenal and superficial observations.

Activities and information on fieldwork are as follows:

4. Research subject is Kazakhstani *Goryeoin* in Almaty, elderly (average age: 71 years old) experienced in former Soviet System;

5. Fieldwork places are *Goryoin* Chorus practice room and Almaty Korean National Center, Korean Evangelical Church and Korean Won Buddhism;

6. The performed period of fieldwork is from June 2010 to October 2011.

7. Participatory observation was conducted in worships, chorus rehearsal, and subsequently in-depth interview and informal interview were done;

8. Informal interview was done by 19 Informants in their convenient time and comfortable place such as personal home, cultural center, church and outsides;

9. Ethic principles [6, 7] adapted for cultural anthropologists in Council of the American Anthropological Association in 1971 are applied to the research.

Beyond the previous superficial studies on Goryeoin society that stayed at utilizing document-based data or questionnaire survey, this study analyzed the inner depths of Goryeoin society through anthropological research based on participatory observation and in-depth interview, which provides new significance of research as follows:

1. Avoiding a homogenous-ethnic perspective in approaching ethnic minority or migrants, this study revealed the variety and dynamics inside the Kazakhstani Korean ethnic group based on the insiders' view;

2. Escaping from a viewpoint of considering identity fixed and essential, this study highlighted the fluidity and vulnerability of its boundary, capturing the scenes at which an inner boundary built by the Korean subgroups was augmented or dissolved by the relative change of heterogeneity and homogeneity according to the context of external environment;

3. Instead of the existing researches' cyclical discussion of identity on how much an ethnic group assimilated to the residential society and how much it kept the traditional and cultural elements of the motherland, this study analyzed the value and significance of life interpreted by the Goryeoins themselves disclosing correlations and tensions inside the group;

4. This study suggested a viewpoint that productions of exclusive discrimination and oppositional dichotomous frame toward a minor subgroup within the Korean ethnic group were not so much ascribed to essential difference, as to a stereotype with negative emotion strengthened by past experiences and memories;

5. The study revealed for the first time in Korean Studies that internal conflicts between different groups of Goryeoins positioned unequally by external power led to constant cognitive violence to the weak who had been marginalized by the strong, using a new power-methodology in cultural anthropology;

6. The study disclosed an emotional psychological aspect of the Kazakhstani Koreans. The weak and repressed group psychologically as a

non-subjective being who concealed themselves from the power could not speak out their subjective voice to the outside in residential society. The conflict of linguistic identity is due to past social and psychological traumas which lasted across generations from fearful experiences and memories of extremely being repressed by the Soviet power.

The book consists of abbreviation and notation, introduction, 5 chapters, conclusion, and references. The first chapter gives the methodological and theoretical perspective of the research, and reviews previous work on nation and ethnic identity and Goryeoin studies. In the second chapter the author investigates status and boundary of the former Soviet Koreans in Kazakhstan. The third chapter shows the identity formation and division of Goryeoin ethnic group in historical context. The fourth chapter represents narratives of Kazakhstani Goryeoins and interprets and analyses their political essentializing process of identity in transitional period. In the last chapter the author interpreted the identity politics of Koreans who constructed the authenticity of self-identity.

CHAPTER I

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

This chapter identifies how ethnic group and national community have been defined and which academic debates have been processed on the existences of various identities having risen after the empires' disruption, and reviews the previous researches on former Soviet Koreans. This study looks into anthropological methodology and fieldwork in which the researcher communicates with Goryeoin and collects significant data from them. The study approached cultural-anthropological research that revealed implicit knowledge and cultural geography of the inside rather than the explicit culture shown easily to the outside, and also contemplated on the emerging experimental ethnography together with academic reflections of contemporary anthropology.

1.1 Conceptions of Ethnicity, Diaspora, and Nation

Only half a century has passed since the terminology «identity» came into being from psychoanalytical concepts, it has become an important debatable theme in each disciplinary field. It can be seen that identity matters have already been dealt with variously for explaining and defining individual, group, and community before the terminology appeared. Just as human's ways of thinking and behaviors have continued to change variously, individual or group identity cannot be defined with a distinct concept. Identity has been defined reflecting the times with various contents, from the Enlightenment era when human was considered the subject with rational abilities of reasoning to the contemporary postmodernism that speaks for deconstruction of the subject.

Erikson E. H., a German psychoanalyst, firstly used the terminology in *Identity and Life Cycle* in 1959 [1, p.345]. He expressed identity with such psychoanalytical concepts as «self-image», «self-esteem», and «individuality» that individuals come to feel when playing roles in social groups, and assumed this identity to be integrated, having continuity and consistent consciousness. Psychoanalysts analyzed identity as individual's psychological characteristics, but socialists noticed the

ability of «identity negotiation» cultivated through personal learning experiences of assuming roles in the group as a concept of behavioral role [9]. The general meaning of identity in social science comprehends matters on group affiliations, personal characteristics, national identity, and cultural identity.

Regarding group community, there are various terminologies according to how much kinship, and cultural and social identity are shared. That is, words like ethnic group, race, tribe, nation, and minority are used in crossed meanings with each other. Ethnic group is defined mainly by cultural configuration and established cultural boundaries, while race is emphasized with biological characteristics such as skin color, physique and physical constitution. However, both are described in some common terms as ethnic group is combined with biological characteristics and race is also with culture. Nation involves political boundaries such as state, territory, and sovereignty, as well as others like history, tradition, lineage, language, and religion together, thus is common with ethnic group in terms of considering culture and traditions important. Ethnicism and nationalism are the same in making the other by emphasizing cultural identity among constituents. However, state and ethnic units are not necessarily correspondent. Ethnic group does not constitute a state necessarily, but nationalism implies an ideological tendency of insisting correspondence between state and ethnic units. Generally, state has a tendency of enforcing assimilation to a specific culture so as to integrate many ethnic groups and nations into one homogeneous cultural community [10, p. 21-22].

In the ethnicity paradigm, the bulk of literatures has been concerned with processes of assimilation, integration and accommodation or ethnic conflict and exclusion assuming that the dominant group within the state does not possess an «ethnicity» [11, p. 558] But recent debates on ethnicity often take place in the discourse of diaspora with the emerging terms of globalization, trans-nationalism, postmodernism and multiculturalism as the weakness of boundaries among the states, transnational population movement and the co-existence of multi-culture within one state are coming up.

Diaspora had been used originally as a negative meaning that designated the Jews who had been scattered and wandering about Pal-

estine after «Babylonian exile». However, researches on diaspora have been activated from the early 1990s, and it has been used in a broad sense covering other nation's international migration, exile, refugees, migrant workers, an ethnic community, cultural difference, and identity as well as the Jew's experience [12, p.4-5]. W. Safran [13] defines diaspora as minority communities that are expelled to the outside, suggesting their characteristics as follows: first, they or their ancestors were dispersed to surrounding areas or foreign countries; second, they have collective memories or visions, myth; third, they were alienated and isolated because of not being accepted from the residential society; fourth, the motherland is a real hometown, which is thus considered a place where the offspring have to return some day; fifth, they believed the necessity of committing to the motherland's revival and development; sixth, they intend to have constant ties with the motherland through various ways. Although diaspora is called as the group that has nostalgia to the motherland after leaving their hometown as in Safran's suggestion, it is explained that the dream of returning to the motherland could be differentiated according to the actual conditions of the group, the motherland, and the host society while being locked by inevitable external factors against their own willingness. That is, their cultural life could not be seen as nationalist certainly even if they have a pure nationalist ideology, and they come to live on after adapting to the local society's norms although they resist it sometimes. It is likely that this group could belong to the society where the assimilated ideology is dominant, or where autonomous rights are also permitted.

Hall (1990) [14, p. 235] suggests different perspective of diaspora, that is, "The diaspora experiences is defined, not by essence or purity, but by the recognition of necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of «identity» which lives with and through, not despite, difference; by hybridity. Diaspora identities are those which are constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and difference."

The definitions of community identity assumed that has certain boundary with cultural characteristics have been challenged. F. Barth uses the concept of «boundaries», suggesting the conceptual scope of ethnic group be based not so much on cultural and regional character-

istics as on social boundaries [15]. He insists that although the same culture and region are shared, the same boundaries are not guaranteed when the relationships of social interaction, i.e. the common interests or stakes, are differentiated, and these elements can be the criteria to distinguish the self and the other.

B. Anderson (2007) [16] views the nation as «imagined communities», eschewing such essentialist viewpoints as which ranges and boundaries it has. He says that nation is an imagined outcome as the state's constituents in the process of colonial domination by imperialism that intended to integrate ethnic groups. This is different from the cyclical discussions on nation, and challenges the existing dominant definition of nation, also rejecting its inevitability. Unlike the existing discussions on nation which have listed its components such as language, territory, and tradition, based on the substantiality that nation has originally existed, Anderson suggests that the vast and divine values of nation are from imagination, as «specific sculpture» and «political community» that have appeared during the period of capitalist development after the decline of dynasty states. According to him, the development of nationalism had a relationship with the expansion of capitalism and imperialism. Imperialism had necessity of uniting such state constituents so as to inroad other areas. In this process, aggressive nationalism was very effective, and they could achieve prosperous country and powerful army through national solidarity. Here in particular, the development of print capitalism that made newspapers and novels had large influence on forming a community imagined as a specific nation. After millions of people became recognized that they existed in the same linguistic sphere, a completely new concept called «concurrency» has settled down in their heads.

Meanwhile, indigenes had not used the concept of nation before they were conquered by imperialists, and managed lives with village or tribal units. Ironically, nationalism that had been used for expanding imperialist powers came to spread out over colonials dominated by them. It was because nationalism developed by Western powers was contradictory from the standpoint of colonials. The fact that administrative districts made artificially by Western imperialists for the effective colonial rule of vast territories later became the regional

boundaries of national liberation movement and of pursuing divine communities was an example of well-exemplifying the generative process of nation.

Bhabha [17] suggests the necessity of viewing nation as a narrative, not as a substance. Pursuing a unique community called nation involves an educational state narrative that requires the removal of private spheres, that is, oblivion of memories and history to be ruled. He, however, criticizes that the state's narrative mobilization shows a schismatic aspect that requires oblivion of the violence for nation-state establishment. Also, M.B. Jensen insists that individuals are always exposed to the national discourses to form a national identity, and tend to identify themselves with the contemporary mainstream group. Regarding the accidents occurring in the affiliated group as occurrence to themselves, people come to be easily excited and have endless passions on national matters. Individuals form their own personality through the socialization process with national discourses produced and distributed constantly. Nationality can be explained in terms of mutual actions between personal-psychological and social elements, and defined as the outcomes constructed and fashioned by unique social, economic, and political conditions. That is, the character of a specific nation has dynamic meanings that can be easily changed [18].

In non-essentialist discussions on national identity, nation implies possibilities of ambiguity and contradictoriness that make it hard to clarify the boundaries. S. Hall explained the subject noticing its fluidity. Stuart Hall points out that an atypical structure in late 20th century has changed the modern society, and such a change is moving the individual identity that had firmly settled down. He explains the periodical change of identity concepts in three aspects [19], showing how human identity has been defined in existing academic approaches.

First of all, the Enlightenment concept of subject regards human as having a perfect «center» as an integrated individual, who is thus endowed with the abilities of reasoning, consciousness, and behaviors, so that this is also the Cartesian subject that is rational, equal, and continuous, the same as the Lockean subject. Unlike the Enlightenment subject, there is also the concept of social subject that is positioned in the interaction with surroundings within social environments. This is

formed in relation to «meaningful others»; that is, the social subject is formed by projecting the self into the other's cultural identities and internalizing the new meanings and values, so as to make them as a part of the self.

The postmodernist concept of subject attempts to deconstruct the Enlightenment subject. Unlike the previous integrated and stable subject, this is fragmented and mixed with not so much one as several identities, sometimes contradictory or undetermined. The process itself of projecting the self, internalizing and identifying with the other cultural identities is regarded as limitless and variable: as there are contradictory identities that lead different directions inside ourselves, the identification with cultures ceaselessly moves, thus cannot be united consistently in the self.

S. Hall points out cultural identities are being hesitated and moved between different locations everywhere such as fundamentalism, diaspora, and hybridity; this shows connectivity with the postmodernist subject. J. Derrida suggests that there is no realm of central meaning in our communication, explaining «différance» (a French derivative he coined from «différer» that means both «differ» and «defer»), which means «endless deferral of meaning», and that the signifier we use does not reach the signified at all. This is because meaning is deferred and postponed endlessly, sliding so as not to be touched by our hands. That is, a meaning of «hot» is not represented by the signifier perfectly, but only generated with the meaning of «cold» ensured and differentiated as «something not hot», thus the meanings are serially deferred [20, p. 222]. Hall differentiates his assertion from the poststructuralist suggestion, but not escaping from or perfectly depending on it. The subtle difference between Hall and Derrida is shown in Hall's assertion that identity is not firmly settled and fixed, but neither perfectly freely fluidic. Hall's assertion of differentiation from Derrida's is as follows [20, p. 223]:

Can any action or identity really exist in this world with no arbitrary suspension like the necessity of finishing a sentence to make a meaning?" Virtually, there is no end in discourses. There is only endless effect of the signifier toward significance. However, discussion has to be suspended so

as to tell certain specifics. Surely all periods are tentative. . . . It is not permanent, neither true perfectly or universally, nor guaranteed perfectly. However, this is what I mean right now. This is precisely I (Period).

What Hall suggests is that the signified means the significance that occurs when the signifier effect came to be «suspended». The period is not decisive or fixed but always arbitrary and context-dependent. The period indicates contextual and arbitrary positioning. In this context, Hall says that identity is not nomadic, wandering or deferred, but situated and positioned in a certain culture, language, and history [20, p. 224].

Hall explains identity through difference, context-dependency and self-reflection, but complementarily accounts for the politics of «articulation» that forms new combination by connecting or binding individual things together [20]. Hall's positioning and articulation theory is related to the discussion of diaspora's identity that crosses boundaries. Hall considers the identity of diaspora as the crossed and mixed outcome of unique cultural traditions and common elements. He also asserts that «translation» of identity is inevitable for permanent diasporas from their hometowns. That is, although they have strong ties with the motherland, they do neither have a false image of returning to the past; even though they cannot perfectly assimilate to the host society nor completely lose their own ethnicity, they can neither be separated from their immediate culture. They have traces of specific culture, tradition, language, and history that have formed themselves. However, the traces have characteristically not been sustained as the same as previous meanings and would not so in future. Belonging to mixed culture, they rejected dreams or ambitions of intending to re-discover some kind of lost cultural purity or ethnic absolutism. In this sense, they can be said to have become translated. They are the outcome of new diasporas that have been made by migration in the post-colonial era.

Diasporas or hybridity noticed by Hall are being interpreted as arbitrary and contextual «positioning» and «translation» of the subject. However, psychological and emotional elements also work in such subject's movement [10]. It is necessary to attend a fact that attachment

and emotion easily work in specific groups that have shared history and experience, displaying or debilitating the community's centripetal forces. C. Geertz [8, p. 304] explains that group's community is bounded by the power derived from primordial bonds, and that not to say kinship, the fact of speaking specific language, of following specific social customs, and of being born in certain religious community is regarded as the «given», thus it comes to display forcibility of itself. Having one such kinship, language, and customs is so absolutely important as to be unbearably indescribable in itself. A case in point of this viewpoint is Koreans who showed a collective fever as with their «Red Devils» at the 2002 FIFA World Cup Korea Japan. At the time, the informally and voluntarily organized «Red Devils» to cheer the Korean soccer team for victory led all nationwide Koreans into wild excitement with the outcry of “We are Red,” or “Be Red.” The power of the Red Devils had not withered under the hot sun in summer and heavy showers of rain. A certain unstoppable «absolute power» that made Korean moved is related to the «power of primordial bonds» that is displayed through one international event. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether such common emotional elements could have a stable continuity even though it could be the power of sustaining the community. Also, behind this primordial emotion Geertz's asserted, dangerous arms are inherent that easily exclude others while displaying the binding and forcible power of itself.

Besides, a same nation cannot be even seen as keeping unitary, uniformed, and consistent characteristics. E. Gellner [21] emphasizes that there are driving forces toward integration in the national culture of group constituents. That is, he says that national culture has an orientation to unite its constituents into one cultural identity by representing that they belonged to the same nation even though they are different in class, gender, and races. Here, this perspective hints that the nation is not so much essential substance as the constructed identity from imagination or discourse.

Meanwhile, a group community's displaying solidarity, integration, and centripetal forces often causes a problem of causing violence and schism with other groups. There is a scholar who notices that identity is a matter of selection in the relation of power and various interests,

and this selection becomes a mechanism of schism and oppression. The Nobel Economic Prize winner Amartya Sen [2] as an Indian economist and philosopher values understandings on plural characteristics of human identity in his book «Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny», as well as alarming the risk in simplifying the classification of identity. He considers that humans have multiple identities, and what is important is a matter of «selection» from certain specific social contexts. This means that individuals have plural identities as members of many groups and affiliated organizations, thus coming to decide on which is more important relatively at certain specific contexts. If an idea that only one unrivaled identity should be kept disregarding various identities of individual or groups develops, it causes separatist conflicts and violence, and also gets fierce challenges to humanity accordingly. Nowadays the tragedies in human history as no natural but man-made disasters are derived from the belligerence of classifying identities into a sole dominant classification system. Also in Amartya Sen's assertion, humans ultimately acquire various identities by making correlations, involved with identity's plurality and dynamics of endlessly selecting the specific identity according to the social context.

Moreover, identity is described as a political process, and the terminology of «identity politics» begins with the political character much inherent in the term of identity. Regarding identity matters, concentrations have been made to negotiate, strategic, fluid characters nowadays rather than fixed and essentialist viewpoints. Identity politics is based on the awareness of collective identity suppression. It is the reactionary assertions and voices revealed by the groups marginalized in the post-colonial process to culturally escape from imperialism and with the emergence of various social movements. That is, it is based on the recognitions that a specific identity has been fixed, marginalized, and excluded politically by the dominant power. Therefore, identity politics are used generally by marginalized and oppressed groups to comprehensively indicate political behaviors or attitudes to clearly expose and insist their own identity.

Stuart Hall said that culture is a political action, and a site of struggle where victory is not guaranteed at all [20]. His cultural studies are to ceaselessly trace the contexts of power relations existing in the so-

ciety in order to investigate how subordinate and dependent groups keep and win their cultural spaces. That is, the identity of culture is not a static concept, but described as an on-going process that is always conditioned in history and inevitably incomplete.

Concepts of identity or identity politics have frequently appeared in discussions on globalization, multiculturalism, transnational phenomena, and the like, and are importantly mentioned in definitions on globalization and localization, universality and uniqueness. Regarding discussions on multiculturalism, the unique identity of nation was compelled in the past based on the clear boundaries along the borders of nation-states, but now the logic is being reversed: in the present-day situation of weakened nation-state boundaries, the various identities of nation do not mean unrest or schism but rather bring the national unity and stability [1, p. 357]. Multiculturalism is targeting migrant societies which have strong fluidity, while being criticized for stressing fixed cultural and nationalist identities.

Along with the criticisms on multiculturalism, various strategies of identity politics have been discussed. The politics of assimilation and difference can be firstly mentioned: assimilation politics means disregarding existences of various differences bases on homogeneity; difference politics highlights heterogeneity that cannot be assimilated to the name of universality and requests recognitions on it. However, difference logics have a separatist tendency that one excludes the other who does not share the same viewpoints and experiences. Eventually in an epistemological aspect, the politics of assimilation and difference are criticized in that they do not escape from an essentialist viewpoint. Essentialist recognitions on identity regard the characteristics representative of individuals or groups as fixed to the actual world, and tend to seek «foundations» that can form identity such as interests, stances, and experiences [22].

Counter to the essentialist viewpoint, a constructivist perspective exists as well: there is not so much an identity inherent in the social reality, but the signification has been socially constructed. It is asserted that power relations and struggles of the society are inherent in the process of representation. Identity is not a prior given, but defined as being in the process of unstable and constant changes. In this way,

debates on identity matters are continuing while essentialist and non-essentialist viewpoints are endlessly crossed.

Identity research in anthropology has firstly approached uniqueness and characters by which individuals show their differences from others, then staying at such matters as how individuals exert mutual influences on others and specific groups in social contexts, and gradually moving to new subjects. With the emergence of ethnicity or social movement in the 1970s, there arose the consciousness that the matters on class, race, and ethnos should be highlighted in individual, political, and historical contexts.

Anthropological approach in this study notices migrants' interpretations and meanings of their life experiences, escaping from the existing questions on their identities such as how much unique ethnicity is sustained, how much they dream of homecoming, and how much they are assimilating to the host society. In this process, insiders come to expose subject formation processes such as how they define and represent themselves, what fixed images are produced in the representation, and what they mobilize to construct themselves.

Also, this study does not premise identity's constancy from an essentialist viewpoint, but notices its contingency and negotiability [23] as well as its fluidity, intending to notice strategies and representations on the meanings and values pursued in specific contexts. Kazakhstani Goryeoin displayed ethnos-subjective abilities with strong ethnic ties at the Far-East period. However, they belonged and assimilated to the Soviet system after compulsory migration, but the sudden Soviet dissolution is debilitating their basis of existence again. By the independence of republics, changes of leading nationals and system are marginalizing the values that have endowed meaning to them. This study will look into the subject's fluidity in the Kazakhstani Goryeoin's process of reconstructing, creating, and representing historical experiences and memories while suffering from social changes that deconstructed their basis of lives.

1.2 Literature review on the former Soviet Koreans

After the end of closed and long disconnected history due to the Cold War system's dissolution, the former Soviet Koreans who had

called them “Joseonin”, “Joseonsaram”, or “Goryeosaram” were exposed to South Korean who named them “Goryeoin”, attracting many interests from the motherland scholars. Opening to the public of Soviet secret documents along with the open-door policy since the 1990s enabled the motherland scholars to approach and share the data via Goryeoin and to make notable research performances, leading them to a pilgrimage of constant research.

Although research data in the pre-open Soviet Union were extremely few, they could be approached through some researches attempted by Soviet or Korean scholars who did research activities overseas. Researches on Goryeoin at the time included «Ocherki po istorii sovetskikh koryeitsev» (Essays on the History of Soviet Koreans) (1965) [24] by Kim Seung-Hwa who dealt with Goryeoin history until pre-compulsory migration of the Far-East Asia; «Koreans in Soviet Union» (1987) [25] by Suh Dae-Suk, an overseas Korean scholar; and several research data on the history of Soviet Goryeoin’s living and culture by the Soviet Union scholar R. Dzhrylgasinova. They were important basic data although partial and limited. Shin Yeon-Ja, a Korean scholar in the U.S., publicized «Soviet Koreans» (1988) [26] as a result of her firsthand tours to various regions of the Soviet Union before the 1988 Seoul Olympics, making the existence of Goryeoin publicized to Koreans through the press and attract their interests. The Korean scholar Ko Song-Mu based in Helsinki introduced «Koreans in Soviet Central Asia» as an English edition in 1987, and followed it through «Korean in the Soviet Union» in 1990 [27], a research showing strenuous efforts with data collection and fieldwork. He showed a wide range and delicate contents of research on Goryeoin including the background of migration, the general living of Goryeoin, rice farming, language and press, and artistic and literary activities.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union a lot of researches centered on Goryeoin immigration history have been come out by Goryeoin scholars, such as Nikolai Bugay, Dmitri Men, German Kim, and George Kang, based on the publicized secret documents of the early Soviet Union. The Soviet scholar Nikolai Bugay illuminated the history of Goryeoin’s compulsory migration through «Suffering history of Koreans in the Soviet Union» (1996) [28] and «Deportation of peoples» (2004) [29]. Also,

the treatises of the Korean scholar Shim Hyeon-Yong who studied in Moscow, such as «Honor-Recovery policy on compulsory migration of ethnic groups in Russia» (1999) [30], «Korean ethnic group in the system of international relations SSR» (1998) [35] as his PhD thesis, and «Study on occurrence mechanism of compulsory migration and characteristics of ethnic relations: focusing on Soviet Union's cases» (1999) [32], attempted to highlight the history of compulsory migration under the Soviet regime, which applied to a number of nationalities under the rule of Stalin in the frame of the universal perspective in world history and the Soviet policy of nationalities.

Freer visits and opening of Soviet secret documents after the treaty of amity with the Soviet Union in 1991, activated exchanges in various sectors between Korea and independent states. Research was performed in such various realms not only as anthropology, sociology, and history, but also as regional study, Korean studies, and politics. In anthropological studies, «Anthropological approach to Koreans in the Soviet Union» (1993) [36] of Lee Kwang-Gyu and Chun Kyeong-Su who attempted fieldwork right before the Soviet dissolution reports comprehensive information and actual status ranging from Goryeoin's migration history to the landscape of Kolkhoz that was their life-base, to rituals, and to literary and artistic activities. «Koreans in Kazakhstan» (2002) [37] of Chun Kyeong-Su supplements the situation after the independence of Republics that was not reflected by previous researches, also showing their own lifestyle including cultural traditions and practices. «Who are we?» (1999) [38] of Sergey M. Han and Valery S. Han is speaking out their firsthand experience of compulsory migration from the Far-East and other particular experiences of themselves or the neighbors in the Soviet era. This data is giving many important contexts in understanding Goryeoin's identity by showing the facts that had been hidden in the hitherto publicized data.

Based on the unveiled Soviet documents, «White Paper on the Deportation of Koreans in Russia's 1930-40 First, Second Book» (1992;1997) [39-40] of Lee Woo-hae, and Kim Young-Un shows main decision documents including those of the USSR Communist Party Central Committee, the local Republic Party Committee, and the Party Conference of Oblasts and Raions. And subsequent materials, which

were partially translated to Korean only on Goryeoin-related contents from vast volumes of archives, the triple volume «Istoria koreitsev Kazahstana» (The history of Koreans in Kazakhstan) (1998; 1999; 2000) [41-43] was published by reference to the archives of the State Archive of the Khabarovsk Krai (ГАХК) and the Presidential Archive of the Republic of Kazakhstan (АІРК) as a result of joint works of Goryeoin and Korean scholars. However, a question has not been clarified to date: what was the exact ground of the tragic accident (compulsory migration) that changed the destiny of Goryeoin under the Soviet power. This leaves a suspicion that somewhere is still undisclosed data that could provide important clues on the policies or actions of the Soviet authority at the time.

«Lenin Kichi» (1938-1990) [44] as Goryeoin's ethnic newspaper in the Soviet era is an organ of the Communist Party, thus having limitations of exposing contents against the Party's ideology and policies, but it is written in Korean so as to be a basic data for research on the former Soviet Goryeoin. This newspaper is regarded as important historical data in that it contained franker voices of Goryeoin themselves since the '88 Seoul Olympics and the liberation of republics.

Despite Korean scholars' efforts to delineate Goryeoin's migration and settlement around compulsory migration and the social change in the new condition after independence, their specific beings have rarely been disclosed. This shows the limitations of research approach depending on repetitive quotations of limited data used in Goryeoin study and relying on local translators in a short term because of linguistic matters; also, it is hard to see qualitative and in-depth research results approached from an insider's view. Besides, Korean researchers' viewpoints are inclined to ethnic consciousness and emotional solidarity rooted in the same ethnicity. These stances led to such works as to put weight on ethnic and homogenous viewpoints within the frame of «overseas Korean studies», thus overlooking variety and dynamics inside the group.

1.3 Cultural anthropological methodology

Main interests of anthropology are laid in communication with others. To communicate with strange others who are in different spheres

from their own culture, anthropologists are devoted to qualitative research methods because there are limitations with quantitative research utilizing metric analysis which is commonly used in social science. Qualitative research methods in anthropology are based on direct fieldwork. The fieldwork is to grasp the language and culture of native people from their viewpoints while the researcher lives on with them at research area. Bronislaw Malinowski, a British anthropologist, has earlier stressed the importance of fieldwork, emphasizing feeling and grasping their life and world views from the native's viewpoint [46]. This means that the fieldwork delivers vivid voices and viewpoints in the field and enables direct confirmation by eyes, as well as having the comprehensive viewpoints and insights to identify relations between many variants [6].

In anthropology, ethnography describes specific cultures based on the fieldwork. Writing ethnography is the basic form of anthropology. Anthropologist James P. Spradley systematically specialized ethnography by suggesting developmental research sequence on the participatory observation method and interviews for writing ethnography. According to him, cultural researchers deal with such things as cultural actions, cultural knowledge, and cultural artifacts that are learned and shared by a group's constituents [6, p. 6]. Namely, researching culture is to read how to interpret their experiences, and then generate language, signs, images, and emotion on the group constituents' actions, cases, and cultural artifacts. Also, he explains that there are two levels in cultural knowledge: one is explicit culture that is in the level of enabling easy communication; the other is implicit culture that is shared beyond our consciousness that is not easily understandable. Regarding implicit cultural knowledge beyond consciousness that occupies most of our cultural knowledge, Edward Hall [49, p. 9-10) explains well about his directly- experienced episodes in his book, «The Silent Language»:

I can still remember a Christmas dance I attended some twenty-five years ago at one of the pueblos near the Rio Grande... At seven thousand feet the ordeal of winter cold at one o'clock in the morning is almost unbearable. Shivering in the still darkness of the pueblo, I kept searching for a clue as to when the dance would begin... nobody knew.

Suddenly, when the whites were almost exhausted, there burst upon the night the deep sounds of the drums, rattles, and low male voices signing. Without warning the dance had begun.

The Pueblo Indian's dance party has been processed according to implicit promises on their temporal concepts. "When the event becomes ripe" in their expression was indicating their own time of beginning the party. The party came to begin after the proper waiting time according to their temporal concept based on the cycle of nature unlike the mechanical temporal concept in the industrialized society, such as seeding when time was approached, harvesting when grains became ripen sufficiently, and getting married when promised time was at hand.

As implicit knowledge is a communicating system that cannot be easily known explicitly, cultural researchers attempt to reveal hidden and shared knowledge in group constituents as intelligent works, and show the cultural meanings used in their daily lives, thus awakening the possibility of escaping from ethnocentrism that is easily kept to cultural ethnographers [6].

Clifford Geertz, who developed interpretive theory of culture, emphasized the work of «thick description» in writing ethnography. His frequently quoted phrase, "Man is an animal suspended in the web of significance he himself has spun. Culture is a web spun in such a way, so cultural analysis is not an experimental science that seeks after regularity, but an interpretational science that pursues significance" are saying the linkage between meanings and symbols. That is, symbols are the carriers to load and deliver meanings. However, it is not that "The truth as it is" is inherent in specific symbols, but that specific people gave specific meanings to the symbols [50, p. 188-189].

Analyzing culture means dynamic establishment of meanings just like reading texts. Cultural research is made by researcher's reading and analysis of the text read by the research subjects who give meanings to it, so could be the second or third interpretations [50, p. 199]. The word «Thick description» he explains in cultural interpretation is originally borrowed from the «thick» context the philosopher Gilbert Ryle said. Ryle explains «thick context» with easy examples. If a boy wrinkles his

eye, this behavior cannot be distinguished only through the explicit gesture whether it is to deliver a message to a specific person, simple imitation or exercise, or eye's diseased spasm. This means that for explaining such things, the multi-layered structure of meanings formed hierarchically has to be highlighted because hidden contexts are not shown through «thin descriptions» depending on phenomenal observations like photographing [8, p. 14-17]. A series of works to understand other cultures by anthropologists are to represent natives' lives by interpreting and reinterpreting their experiences as the researcher enter the local culture and live together with them. In this regard, the field research methods for participatory observations and interviews and the thick descriptions in ethnography are important keys to make an insider's view and hold cultural-relativist attitudes.

There is another dilemma in cultural research. It is that cultural researchers are hard to reach an insider's view perfectly even though very strong rapport is formed. Human life and culture are primarily based on interactions between the self and the others. In this way, researchers and research subjects are equal subjects of understanding each other and affecting influences, and research results could be seen as outcomes of active interactions by both subjects. True understanding is not unilateral, and depends on «actions of mutual understandings». These recognitions easily appear in writing researcher's results for readers. An idea that the researcher can be able to understand and thus describe all things incapacitates productive criticisms by absolutizing anthropologist's viewpoints. As an effort to overcome this matter, researchers have to expose the self in writing to prevent their exclusive viewpoints and relativize their viewpoints. Efforts of exposing and reviving the researcher's self are recognized as a merit that can imply more things despite a demerit of subjective description.

The most important and basic matter in ethnography is to observe ethic principles. As ethnography reveals details in which personal behaviors and contexts appear due to the characteristic of academic work, there is some difficulty in keeping the anonymity of subjects. Ethical issues have to be considered so as not to infringe individual privacy in the fieldwork. Ethical principles [6] selected for cultural researchers in the Council of the American Anthropological Association in 1971 are

becoming important guidelines for overcoming ethnic dilemmas such as misunderstandings or conflicts encountered between researchers and research subjects [6, p. 27].

Through anthropological works, this study intends to reveal the political process of identity unfolded with the tensional relations, schisms, and compromises of Kazakhstani Goryeoin in experiencing the change of outside environment. In this process, anthropological approach enables analysis about how Goryeoin themselves give meanings and values to their lives and feel their troubles, and how to represent and analyze their life experiences and memories from an insider's view. Disclosing cultural topography inside the Goryeoin group by unveiling historical, political, and thick contexts is an important work to highlight the specificity, individuality, and variety of the beings that are not easily seen from outside.

1.4 Fieldwork and research method

The most fundamental data for this research were from the participatory observation, in-depth and unofficial interviews conducted from June in 2010 to June in 2011, and referenced literature included the Soviet archives, the White Papers, and the Soviet Koreans' ethnic newspapers such as «Lenin Kichi» (1938-1990) and «Goryeo Ilbo» (1991-current).

Participatory observation by the researcher was carried out by regularly participating in the Goryeoin chorus affiliated with Almaty Goryeoin Cultural Center and the Goryeoin religious activities held by Korean Evangelical Church and Won Buddhism: the Church services on every Sunday for three months, Won Buddhist services on every Sunday for two months, and the chorus activities on every weekend for one month. Mainly after such events as chorus practice or the Church and Buddhist services ended, free conversations with the members progressed on the spots, and in-depth and informal interviews followed since. Besides, additional arrangements with individuals were naturally made without temporal and spatial restrictions, at their convenient places such as houses, offices, restaurants, or parks.

The total participants from those activity groups numbered 110, lesser than the total registered membership of about 200, and the ratio

of men to women was 1:3, which means women overwhelmed men in number. The average age 71 years old (from 53 to 88 years old), and the majority of them were intellectuals who had once worked as teachers, professors, public servants, «Lenin Kichi» journalists, or broadcasters but now were retired and leading leisure time on culture and religion with pension granted. Some of them were doing activities as teachers, ethnic newspaper editorial staff, and businesspeople, and they valued associations with peers no less than the services or activities.

The in-depth interview participants numbered 19 in total, which included 4 Koreans from Sakhalin, 2 North Korean exiles, 1 descendant of a North Korean laborer, and the other 12 of which were descendants of Koreans from the Maritime Province. Amongst them, there are 5 main informants who actively collaborated with three to ten times of in-depth interviews over two hours by each and were freely available for telephone interviews whenever necessary.

As for their language, all but one of the participants were Russo-phone Koreans, amongst whom mother-tongue speakers were 4 from Sakhalin and 2 former exiles; 3 people could understand and speak Korean a little but hardly communicate with it; and the rest knew some Korean words but could barely or never write their names with the mother tongue. 2 of the participants were Kazakh-speakers; 3 could understand Kazakh a little but not speak or write it; and the rest knew nothing of Kazakh, 1 of whom was learning and another 1 planning to learn it.

The communicative languages between the researcher and the research subjects were Korean and Russian. The researcher (South Korean) speaks Korean as the main language and Russian at not so perfect a level as natives', so that amongst the informants, the fluent Korean speakers who were from Sakhalin and the former exiles were better to share in-depth conversations.

To discuss the difficulty of research, some of the Koreans showed such attitudes as to estrange themselves from or cynically respond to the researcher, and tended not to show their inner secrets, conflicts, or individual feelings since they knew well each other having led activities in the same space, so that it was not easy to make comfortable and natural conversations before enough rapport was formed with

them. Explaining the research purpose before recording the in-depth interviews, the researcher followed the ethical principle of American Anthropological Association in 1971 in order to protect their privacy

This research mainly targeted the senior generation who has participated in official group activities and religious associations, thus having a limit to generally apply to the other generations who have not experienced the Soviet regime or those who live outside Almaty.

KEY QUESTIONS OF THE CHAPTER FOR READERS

1. W. Safran's conception of diaspora;
2. S. Hall's perspectives of 'ambiguity' and 'hybridity' on identity of diaspora;
3. B. Anderson's view on the nation as 'imagined communities';
4. H. Bhabha's view on the nation as 'narrative';
5. Postmodernist concept of 'fluidic subject';
6. The terminology of «identity politics»;
7. Possible factors that determine ethnic identity;
8. Diverse names to call for Soviet and Post-Soviet Koreans;
9. Research works on Soviet Koreans by Soviet Korean scholars and South Koreans;
10. Ethnography and field work as research methodology;
11. 'Implicit' and 'explicit' cultural knowledge;
12. Insider's view and outsider's view.

CHAPTER II

KOREAN DIASPORA'S STATUS AND BOUNDARY

This chapter investigates the history of Goryeoin's migration and settlement from the Imperial Russia to the Soviet Union eras, and examines the change of their status and boundary as both an ethnic minority and Kazakhstani citizens at the critical turning point of the Soviet dissolution and Kazakhstani independence. The first section of this chapter looks into the periodic backgrounds of Korean migrations that occurred in the Imperial Russia and the Soviet regime before compulsory migration; the fatal limit of the Korean immigrant group's position determined by the attitudes of residential countries; and how they had nevertheless written their history of displaying the ethnic competence. The second section identifies their severe experience of compulsory migration to the deep inland Central Asia under the general Soviet policy of persecution; how they overcame the distressing condition of the new settlement as a matter of life and death by constructing material and social foundations; and the limitation of their social status. The third section examines the stir of Goryeoin society since the Soviet dissolution and the 1988 Seoul Olympics in the new relationship with the motherland; who the subject nationals, Kazakhs, of the changed residential society is; and the changed status of Goryeoin in Kazakh's nation-state construction and national identity revival movement.

2.1 Korean Diaspora Formation in Primorski Krai

Migration History of Primorski Koreans

The existence of Goryeoin who are dispersed over Central Asia, the vast area of the former Soviet Union afar off their motherland whose nationals could hardly feel the sense of distance, has the crumpled history of one-and-a-half century ranging from the late Joseon era through the Japanese Imperialist era, the Soviet era, and to the Soviet dissolution and the independence of Republics. Before the compulsory migration to the inland Central Asia by the Soviet regime, Koreans had settled in Primorski Krai at the Far-East, belonging to Russia territo-

rially, but not far from the Koreans' motherland over the in-between river. Thus, the Koreans had a dream of coming home some time. Primorski Krai is the place where Koreans fought against the Imperial Japan, which had deprived them of their motherland, with the strong spiritual bond with the motherland.

Primorsk Krai toward which Koreans crossed over the border during the famine and confusion at the late Joseon era had once been the territory of Goguryeo and Balhae, but then belonged to Russia. Referred to as the Far-East at the Imperial Russian era, Primorski Krai was a nonfreezing port with a significant geopolitical meaning as the littoral region of the Pacific Ocean. The Imperial Russia turned its eyes to this area since the mid-17th century, foregrounding the mercenary troop of Cossacks and heading toward the East. Along with continuous exploration and reclamation of the Far-East Pacific-littoral region, they advanced into Alaska, Kamchatka Peninsula, Kuril islands, and so on until the mid-18th century [51, p. 145]. Next, by the Beijing Treaty between Qing and Russia in 1860, they came to occupy the eastern region of the Ussuri River: Primorski Krai, bordered by the Tuman River of the Korean Peninsula that enabled the encounter with Koreans in the Joseon Dynasty at the time.

Koreans' migration to Primorski Krai was caused by the distressing condition of their native country. Unlike the initial exploration of new farmland, the character of their migration changed as time went on, along with the native country's loss of sovereignty under the rule of Japan which dreamed of the empire at the Far East. By periods, the backgrounds of migrations are classified into three phases. The first phase (1863-1884) is the initial period of Korean migration. In the late Joseon era, social disorders such as power-holder politics and corruption of three tax systems, Hong Gyeong-Rae's Revolt and persecution of Catholicism were aggravating social unrest and increasingly impoverishing the lives of people. Besides, Primorski Krai was also the land of promise for the Koreans who sought after new farmland due to a poor crop and famine. In this period, the Koreans who came in the vacant land were accepted affirmatively and favorably. The emergence of Koreans in Primorski Krai was firstly discovered by the Russian patrol squad established in the Posiet Coast, and the Russian authority's of-

ficial permission for Koreans to reside began to be recorded since 1863 [52, p. 38]. Initially, only several households lived on the Tizinkhe riverside, but as the number of villages increased in many places along the Suyfun River at the north of the Tuman River over the northern border of the Korean Peninsula, the number of Koreans came to amount to nine thousand people by the 1870s [42, p. 137].

The second phase (1884-1904) is the period when the increase of Korean immigrants in Primorski Krai led to the limitation of migration by policy unlike the initial permission of Korean migration by the Russian authority. Also, their native country Joseon explored the action of limiting migration by negotiation with Russia to reinforce the control of the emigrants. By conclusions of the Joseon-Russia Amity in 1884 and the Joseon-Russia Commercial Treaty in August, 1888, the Russian authority's restriction of Korean migration confronted a new phase [27, p. 12]. By the treaties between both countries, Russia recognized the necessity of more systematic management of Korean immigrants and classified them into three kinds: first, the immigrants who had come before June 25, 1884, so were qualified for receiving the Russian citizenship; second, the immigrants who had come after 1884, so should come back to their native country within two years; and finally, the sojourners who should pay taxes as much as Russian farmers do, but had no right [24, p. 37-38]. However, as shown in the Table 1, while Koreans increased gradually, those who acquired citizenship were less than those who did not so.

Table 1 – Primorski Koreans' Acquirement of Citizenship by Years

Year	Citizenship Holder	Citizenship Non-holder	Total
1882	-	10137	10137
1892	12,940	3,624	16,564
1900	16,125	11,775	27,880
1906	16,965	17,434	34,399
1909	14,799	36,755	51,554
1910	19,080	36,996	54,076
1911	17,476	39,813	57,289
1912	16,263	43,452	59,715

1913	19,277	38,163	57,440
1914	20,109	44,200	64,309
1923	34, 559	72,258	106,817
Source – Anosob S.D. (1928) [53]			

Whether to become a Russian citizen or to come back to Joseon was a dilemma, and there was a tough barrier to acquire the citizenship by which they would lead in many advantageous lives such a way as to receive land allotment. The barrier, so to speak, included a kind of implicit promise to be baptized to the Russian Orthodox Church and to learn Russian so as to be completely affiliated with the Russian society.

Those who lived in Russian farmland without citizenship could not claim any right, but had only to be assigned a forcible duty and receive discriminative treatment. The citizenship non-holders degraded to tenant farmers who could not help farm rent to the landowner, as well as conforming to the Russian authority's threat to impose various taxes and deport them from Russia. Increasing population in Primorski Krai by the Russian authority's immigration policy of the White émigrés and the subsequent settlement of laborforce shortage aggravated this distressful situation of Koreans.

The third phase (1905-1917) was the period when Korean political exiles immigrated as Joseon lost its sovereignty, and Russian and Japan entered into an oppositional relation due to the Russia-Japan War in 1904 and the Japanese colonization of Joseon in 1910. The immigrants included not only the exiles who fled away from the Japanese stratocracy and political persecution, but also the landowners and peasants who lost their lands by the Japanese extensive land survey project and economic exploitation after the Korea-Japan Annexation. In 1911, 2,253 Korean workers came to Vladivostok from January to September, allegedly almost 600 to 700 workers a month arriving [52, p. 53]. As an overseas basis of the national liberation movement, Korean independence activists gathered into Primorski Krai. Particularly, the national rebellion of 3/1 Independence Movement in 1919 was supported by the independence organization of the overseas Koreans, who moved to Manchuria or Primorski Krai to continue the independence movement after the failure of 3/1 Independence Movement. In 1923, the number

of Primorski Koreans went beyond 100 thousand people; in 1926, to 130 thousand; and in 1927, to 170 thousand [27, p. 13]. However, considering many actually did not register their residence to avoid taxation, the number of immigrants would have been much more, and perhaps in 1927 and 1928, it is presumed to have amounted to 250 thousand people [54, p. 45]. It can be presumed that more Koreans than the number actually lived there, because many Koreans avoided the registration of residence to shun taxation [52, p. 53; 10, p. 168]. Since the Japanese rule, it is characteristic that Koreans strove for receiving the land allotment and the benefit of tax reduction by collective acquirement of citizenship [52, p. 54]. The loss of their native country by the Korea-Japan Annexation led those who had not acquired citizenship with aspiration for homecoming to choose another option: becoming a Russian citizen rather than a Japanese subject.

The migration of Koreans to Primorski Krai was basically to cultivate farmland and prepare a new home for life. In the early time, the vast and almost uninhabited land was none other than a new world for Koreans. The immigrants who mainly consisted of farmers cultivated farmland beginning to grow such crops as barley, beans and corns; in 1905, they already attempted rice farming, and in 1917, full-blown rice farming without special facilities for irrigation around the river [52, p. 60]. The occupations of Korean immigrants consisted mainly of farmers, but became diversified by the period of settlement and whether or not to have acquired the citizenship. On the one hand, there were those who had early settled in Russia so as to receive the land allotment and been living with leisure; on the other, the citizenship non-holders could not help working as tenant farmers for Korean or Russian landowners. They must endure all kinds of exploitation including payment of expensive farm rent or cultivation of a waste land. Koreans lived on by working in various industries such as agriculture, fishery, coal-mining, gold-mining, factory work, construction, and woodcutting. Amongst them, the rich farmers who did both gold-mining and commercial activities and the exile farmers and others of wealth who fled from Joseon are said to have become the important material sources to sustain the partisans for Korean independence movement and armed fight [55, p. 29; 52, p. 62].

The most characteristic of Primorski Koreans were their highly autonomous and cultural activities. These are deeply related to the early establishment and development of nationalist organizations, newspapers, and schools to deploy Korean militia and enlightenment activities for independence movement. At the time of 1927, the Koreans who amounted to about 200 thousand people at the Far-East represented around 10% of the whole population there, enough to operate schools, newspapers, and theaters. As a nationalist newspaper, Avangard came into being in 1923, but became an organ of the Far-East Communist Party in 1928. As a nationalist school, Joseon Special School of Education was established in 1924, and other Korean schools increased in Primorski Krai day by day. In 1923, Korean ethnic schools and private schools numbered 82 and 129, respectively; in 1924, both numbered 119 and 33; and afterwards, all were converted to the Soviet national schools, so that in 1931 and 1932, such 756 schools of Koreans were operated. Publication of Korean-based textbooks and other books began regularly since 1925, when totally 17 copies were published, and amounted to 176 copies in 1932. Including newspapers and magazines, the total publications were 1,250 copies in 1925, and increased to 1,703,700 copies by no less than 325 times [42, p. 112].

Despite the residential country's exclusive policy, Primorski Koreans were displaying the strong national centrifugal force, committed to the subjective journalistic activities and nationalist education to restore national sovereignty and enlightenment movement such as publication of Korean-based newspapers, unlike the motherland Koreans who were forced to change their names into Japanese and to learn Japanese.

Status and Ethnic Competence of Primorski Koreans

The Koreans in the Far-East who had found a new land to avoid the disorderly situation and persecution in the motherland were differently fated by the attitudes of the officials in the residential countries. So weak as the legal device to guarantee their immigrant lives was, they had to lead unrest lives. Although there were Russian governors-general who took humanitarian and favorable attitudes to the immigrant Koreans, the Russian authority's treatment of them in most

cases differed thoroughly by Russian interests or strategic affiliation with the external powers. To fill up the vacant land in the Far-East, it allowed their residence in order to utilize them in farmland cultivation as the laborforce. However, the Korea-Russia Treaty of Amity restricted the Korean migration, and the Act on Employment of Foreigners once limited the immigrants' activities for living, but another time released the limitation to supply the wartime laborforce. The increase of immigration to the Far-East caused population increase and land shortage, which subsequently made conflict between Koreans and Russians, so that Koreans were forced to be dispersed into uncultivated lands in Primorski Krai. After all, along with this conflict between the Far-East ethnic groups, the unrest caused by Japanese invasive ambition became the motive for the Soviet government to force all immigrant Koreans to the deep inland of Central Asia.

The early Korean immigrants in Primorski Krai could succeed in comparatively stable settlement by cultivating farmland; by 1861, they were encouraged to relocate based on a specific practicable law to provide migrants with such benefits as settlement loan, lands and tax exemption [57, p. 153]. The Russian governors-general's stance to actively utilize Primorski Koreans based on the acceptive attitude that it is good for the state interests to encourage them to acquire Russian citizenship by providing land allotments increased the Koreans who were assimilating to Russia by attending Russian Orthodox Churches, learning Russian and receiving Russian-style names [57, p. 153]. In contrast, a Russian governor-general who took exclusive attitude to the Korean immigrants gave hardship to the citizenship non-holders, who could not receive a land, but had to lead hard lives working as tenant farmers and enduring various kinds of taxation, particularly exposed to the powers of landowners and the local authority. The article of a Goryeoin, Ta Ten, contributed to the magazine «Revolution and Nationality» in 1937, shows the tax imposed unfairly on the Koreans at the time [27, p.14-15]. This article expressed the taxation policy of the Russian authority as the level of robbery to Korean workers, serving for the Czarist officials and military policemen. So to speak, the officials imposed taxes on the following pretexts for instance: cutting an old tree in a forest; not making children baptized; even tying a topknot; and not believing in God.

In the First World War, the Far-East Koreans encountered a new environment. In the War, Koreans were mobilized for the labor such as coal-mining or woodcutting, and in the era of socialist revolution, they mainly joined the Red Army. In the Russian Civil War from 1917 to 1922 when the Soviet was constructed, Korean Independence Army supported the Bolshevik, from which the Koreans had received the promise to give them land allotment and finance their independence movement, but after the war, had to be left behind the Russian domestic migrants in the priority to receive the land allotment, without any explanation [52, p. 64]. A document of the State Archives of Primorski Krai (ГАПК) recorded in 1925 described Koreans did not throw up their lands without the forced deprivation by the owner or labor union, and warned not to allow Koreans to acquire citizenship or rent the land because such actions would attract more of them. Also, there was an opinion to naturalize them to the Soviet citizen but relocate them to the northern Sakhalin oil field [42, p. 24-26]. The matter of Korean migration was consistently discussed; a plan was raised to deport Koreans to the northern Primorski Krai and forcibly disperse them; and actually, they were forcibly relocated to the tough environment of the northern Primorski Krai.

In 1929, the Soviet socialist economic system entered a new transition period rooting out the rich farmers and collectivizing farming. However, Primorski Koreans showed lowered productivity due to the lack of lands allotted in each Kolkhoz, while more lands were allotted to Russians, so that the conflict between Koreans and Russians were deepened. The unbalance of farmland supply and demand developed to a serious social problem, which meant that whether Koreans or Russians, someone should be excluded in the area. The inter-ethnic conflict and social unrest caused by the problem of land shortage in the Far-East area around the border led in the end to deport the Koreans to the uncultivated land. In particular, the Trans-Siberian Railway's Far-East lines completed respectively in 1904 and 1916 during the 25 years' construction project became the driving force to make the domestic people in Russia, who were mainly Europeans including Russians, endlessly immigrate to the Far-East. Russian policy of migrating Koreans to the uncultivated land was to stabilize the peripheral Far-East area

by filling up the area mainly with the White émigrés. Several governmental attempts to migrate the Far-East Koreans to the inland ended in the all-out compulsory migration in 1937.

Primorski Koreans have taken a dual strategy to utilize the power of their residential country even in the endless discrimination and exclusion in the society and to display the active power in augmenting and sustaining the independence army by financing their struggle for the motherland's independence. Their anti-Japanese struggle was not one time, but consistent and organized. They organized myriads of nationalist schools and independence army troops to inspire the national spirit, establishing and revitalizing the press organization to explore the cooperation with the international society for displaying the rightness

Underlying this organization were the elements of collecting human, mental and material resources efficiently. As the deprivation of diplomatic right due to the conclusion of the Korea-Japan Protectorate Treaty in 1905 and the loss of sovereignty due to the Korea-Japan Annexation Treaty in 1910 made the domestic anti-Japanese movement impossible, many patriots and militia looked for a new foreign base of movement for autonomous independence of the motherland, thus gathering in the Far-East, which was close to the motherland but out of the border, and securing the volunteer human resources. Financial support of the rich Koreans who had built up the wealth with farming, commerce and industry became the material basis of enabling systematic and consistent independence movement such as establishment of nationalist organizations and independence army, and publication of nationalist newspapers. Plentiful material support also became the dynamic for attracting many farmers to the independence army.

However, as the Far-East Koreans were not firmly guaranteed the legal rights of residence, the situation of independence activists against Japan depended on the interests of Russia in the Russia-Japan relationship. Nevertheless, they persistently kept the thread of life, with many nationalist organizations repeating disruption and reestablishment, and many nationalist newspapers repeating discontinuance and re-foundation. Distinguished in the foreign base of independence movement were the activities of the nationalist press, mainly concentrated in Primorski Krai, particularly the New Korean Village in Vladivostok,

Ussuriysk, and Kraskino. The Korean newspapers based in the Far-East were translated not only to Korean, but also to Russian, English and French, as well as distributed to the motherland and publicized to the overseas, thus linked to the overseas Korean leaders and cooperated with Korean independence activists in the U.S.

At the time, the overseas Korean press played an enormous role of educating and enlightening the Far-East Koreans, significantly contributing to inspiring the national consciousness by stressing the movement to restore the national sovereignty. The initial nationalist newspapers founded by the Far-East Koreans included «Haezo Shinmun», «Daedong Gongbo», and «Daeyang Bo». Particularly, «Daedong Gongbo» criticized the brutal activities of Japan, organizing the assassination squad led by Choi Jae-Hyong and Ahn Jung-Geun targeting the Japanese resident-general Ito Hirobumi, and Ahn's successful assassination of him highly inspired the overseas anti-Japanese movement [60, p. 83]. These newspapers were published overseas to censure the Japanese Imperialism, but their distribution into the motherland led to their discontinuance by Japanese persecution. Some were discontinued by Russia as the country approved Japanese domination of Korea. Still, as a strategy to overcome this critical situation, Primorski Koreans succeeded in immediate foundation of the pro-Russian newspaper «Daeyang Bo». The Far-East Koreans' nationalist newspaper Kwoneop Shinmun and the nationalist organization Kwoneop Association were characterized by participation of main Russian figures and absolute support of the then-Russian authority [60, p. 85]. Introducing the occupation and labor of Korean residents in Russia as a source of justification, Kwoneop Association was to deploy anti-Japanese movement by utilizing Russian influential power in escaping Japanese interference [60, p. 86]. This vigorous activity of the Korean nationalist press in collusion with the residential society came to confront a great turning point due to the First World War that formed a friendship between Russia and Japan. Requested by Japan, Russia dissolved the Korean organizations that had deployed this large-scale national independence movement.

Russia confronted the great turning point: the outbreak of the First World War and the February and October Revolutions in 1917. During

the chaotic period of Revolutions, Russia entered into the Civil War by domestic schism, with which Korean Independence Army became involved, thus leading the Far-East Korean society also to a chaotic period. [61, p. 111]. The February Revolution in 1917 ruined the Czarism, giving birth to the Kerenskii provisional government, which subsequently brought about the Civil War between the Bolshevik Red Army consisting of workers and soldiers and the Menshevik White Army supporting the provisional government. In the Siberian Intervention that the armed forces including Japan, the U.S. and the U.K. forces expedited to Primorski Krai, Korean independence activists should side with either the Red or the White Army. This situation promoted the schism within the Far-East Korean society between the haves and have-nots. In the early days of revolution, the Koreans with Russian citizenship and the members of Korean People Association (Hanminhoe) led the position of adopting the anti-Bolshevik Siberian independent government for ethnic autonomy and extension of rights. That is, the anti-Bolshevik Koreans were the haves who led stable and established lives as citizenship holders (Wonho) with the land given by the residential society. In contrast, the citizenship non-holders (Yeoho) established a separate assembly, Central General Association of Koreans, in Khavarovski in 1918. Later on, these two Korean factions were integrated and consolidated again, but behind the apparent association, basically potential schism was interent.

As the Revolutionaries increasingly prevailed in the Siberia and the vast Far-East, Korean organization became also inclined to the pro-Bolshevik revolutionary vanguardism. In May, 1918, with the uprising of the anti-Bolshevik Czech force, the Bolshevik camp became at stake and hoped for consolidation with the Korean force. The uprising's aftermath even debilitated the Bolshevik government, and in the Far-East Primorski Krai, quelled the Japanese and united forces with the military power [61, p. 118]. At this time, the Korean Socialist Party of the Korean non-holder group who allied with the Bolshevik fought against the White Army that formed an alliance with the united forces.

In the early 1920s, the White Army in Primorski Krai waned and the Russian Revolutionaries prevailed, and Koreans aimed to expel the Japanese power in such a way as to seek out Japanophiles and boycott Japanese products. Sensing a crisis from Koreans' increasing consoli-

darity with the Russian Revolutionaries, Japan committed “April Incident” in which it assaulted New Korean Village, the political center of Korean society. In this way, Japan sacrificed a number of Koreans and destroyed the nationalist movement power, thereby gradually making the New Korean Village pro-Japanese. Hence, the base of nationalist movement was disrupted and the Korean nationalist movement activists moved to other places such as Irkutsk, Chita, Blagoveshchensk, Svobodny Gorod, and Khavarovsk [61, p. 123-124].

Allying with the Bolshevik to confront the White Army and the Japanese united forces, the Koreans received large human and material damage: particularly, there was large sacrifice of Korean nationalist leaders. As the Bolshevik power spread over the Russian Far-East from the late 1919 to the early 1920, the Far-East Korean organizations spread to the Communist Party organizations in each area. The Korean organizations’ joining the Communist Party was due to the disappointment and frustration with failure of the 3/1 movement in 1919 as a nationwide occurrence in Korea and the result of appealing to the international society’s support. Having already suffered from many sacrifices, they recognized it as impossible to succeed in efficient anti-Japanese struggles only with Korean armed fight, thus turning the way to the form of espousing Communism [61, p.138].

Korean Independence Army’s active Communist turn in their organization was to deploy continuous independence movement by active accommodation of the power of residential society, but the internal schism during the process of siding with the Soviet Red Army brought serious damage to the status of Korean Independence Army. As the Communist Party organizations spread into the Siberian area, the late 1920s saw the registration of 16 Korean Communist Party organizations and 2,305 members and candidates of the Party; as the scale increased, they strove for establishing the central headquarters to integrate Koreans generally [61, p. 126]. However, the Korean Communist Party entered into a schism between two factions: the Irkutsk and the Shanghai, both supported by other powers respectively, and finally the former came to take the lead. These antagonism and schism led to the enormous sacrifice of the Svobodny Gorod Incident in June, 1921. Korean independence activists had received the promise of the

Soviet Union led by Lenin to keep their allied frontier, but after the rupture of military aid negotiation between them, the Soviet suddenly requested the disarmament of the Korean Independence Army.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had promised Japan to disband all Korean anti-Japanese armed forces in its territory during the talk over the matter of fishery around the Kamchatka Peninsula. The general forces of Korean Independence Army that had gathered in Svobodny Gorod were requested to disarm by the Soviet Red Army, and the Irkutsk force in Svobodny Gorod disarmed obediently. However, the Shanghai force that had complaint about deciding the right of general command as a reward of disarmament seceded from the Independence Army, thus becoming attacked by the alliance of the Irkutsk force and the Soviet Army: there occurred over one thousand casualties. This tragic incident originated from the internal conflict between the leaders of the Independence Army on the one hand [27, p. 40], but on the other, it was also an intention of the Soviet Union to achieve a dual effect of expelling the Shanghai force which had been regarded as nationalists during the schism with the Korean Communist Party as well as keeping the promise with Japan to disband the Independence Army.

In October, 1922, Japanese forces withdrew giving up the ambition to invade Primorski Krai, subsequently the Far Eastern Republic converted to the Russian Republic. In the late December, 1922, with the command of disbanding all Korean united partisan forces and returning the participants in the Civil War to their home, the Korean Independence Army in the Soviet area was dissolved, and some of them moved to Manchuria or Joseon and continued the independence movement [55, p. 50].

While Koreans had contributed to constructing the new socialism in alliance with the Revolutionaries in the residential society, the latter regarded the former not so much as the appreciated people of merit but as the target of conquest. The Revolutionary government regarded the anti-Japanese independence movement of Koreans at the border areas in Primorski Krai and Manchuria as unwelcome nationalism, which always became troubles during the negotiation with Japan, thus attempting the dissolution of the Independence Army and anti-Japanese organizations recognized as an obstacle to the stability in the Far-East.

To avoid the intervention from or the conflict with Japan due to the Korean Independence Army, the government victimized the Koreans.

In the First World War, Russia and Japan in alliance controlled Korean independence movement from the Japanese pressure, utilizing Koreans in the wartime labor. In 1917, the Revolutionary government had allied with the Korean Independence Army to eliminate the Japanese power that supported the White Army and constructed the Soviet with support of the Koreans. After Japanese withdrawal, however, the anti-Japanese activities in the Soviet area were regarded as unacceptable nationalism. In this way, the position of Korean Independence Army depended upon the relationship between Russia and Japan or upon the needs of Russia; the internal schism of Koreans was utilized as a chance to completely absorb them into the Soviet Communist power; and after all, the Independence Army came to be dissolved.

History always becomes what the winner takes. In the early Russian Revolution, the Korean have such as national capitalists mainly sided with the Russian White Army to fight against the Red Army, so that they became the enemy of the Bolshevik and the nationalists that should be conquered. In contrast, the other Koreans who sided with the Red Army, drove out the White Army in the Far-East, won a complete victory against Japanese forces, and participated in the anti-Japanese partisan troops, are called a leading part of the Soviet construction. This experience of schism between Korean nationalist activists in the early Soviet era has left its vestiges within the society of their offspring today.

2.2 Settlement of Soviet Koreans in Central Asia

Persecution and Hardship of Compulsory Migration

Border transgression, an option which the northernmost Koreans in Joseon chose due to the social unrest and political pressure, did not guarantee their stable lives which depended on the residential country's attitude to accept them. Primorski Koreans had collected ethnic competence despite the restriction imposed by the local authority, but the establishment of the Soviet government completely changed their previous living environment. The Soviet power cried out the au-

tonomous rights of all nationalities, but regarded nationalism as an obstacle to integrating the Soviet people: so after the Soviet regime achieved stability, the Korean Independence Army lost its use value and came to end its destiny.

Coming to the era of Stalin after Lenin, the misfortune of this Korean ethnic group became aggravated, spreading not only to some Koreans but over the whole Far-East Korean group. Compulsory migration of the Far-East Koreans under Stalin’s dictatorship is referred to as the persecution of ethnicity that victimized and deported a number of Koreans who accordingly lost their settlement for living they had cultivated. This compulsory migration can be analyzed in terms of its purpose, means, and periods, considering universality and particularity. In the aspect of Korean history, it must be an extraordinary incident which Koreans had to experience in an extraordinary period. Meanwhile, the compulsory policy of deporting or exiling a resident or ethnic group has been universally utilized as a policy measure of the power group governing the society [32, p. 210]. Although one cannot say that this extreme measure occurred only in such a socialist regime, it was most frequently utilized under the oppressive rule of Stalin regime around the Second World War.

During the 1930s to 40s, about no less than 60 ethnic groups compulsorily migrated, amongst which 15 groups including Koreans migrated by groups with millions of compulsory immigrants [32, p. 206]. The main condition of compulsory migration by the fist law of Stalin is as follows:

Table 2 – Compulsory Migration in the Former Soviet Union by Ethnic Groups

Date	Place of Initial Residence	Targeted Group and Approximate Number	Destination
1936.4	Border regions of Ukraine and Belarus	35,000 Poles	Kazakhstan
1937.7	Border regions of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan	1,325 Kurds	Central Asia

1937.8	Russian Far-East	180,000 Koreans	Central Asia, Volgograd
1941.8	The whole regions of German residence, including the Volga German ASSR	800,000 Germans + 118,000	Central Asia, Siberia
1943.11	Karachay-Cherkess ASSR	69,000 Karachaies	Siberia
1943.11	Kalmyk ASSR	9,400 Kalmyks	Kazakhstan, Russia
1944.2	Chechen-Ingush ASSR	459,000 Chechens and Ingush	Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz
1944.3	Kabardino-Balkar ASSR	37,000 Balkars	Central Asia, Siberia
1944.5	Crimean ASSR	194,000 Tartars, 12,000 Volgars, 14,000 Greeks, 9,000 Armenians	Central Asia, Udmurtia
1944.11	Ajarian ASSR and Southwestern region of Georgian SSR	100,000 Turks, etc.	Central Asia
Note - Compiled by the author based on the source [32, p.209]			

Including the Slavics unexceptionally, the targets of compulsory migration accounted for the half of the total number of ethnic groups in the Soviet Union. This action was mainly to prevent them from allying with the enemy before the war or to punish the ethnic groups at border regions which committed actions counter to the Soviet regime or cooperated with the enemy forces. As the representative cases, the Koreans at the Far-Eastern border regions and the Poles at the North-western border regions compulsorily migrated in the similar periods, branded as «Japanese spies» and «German spies» respectively. At the time, 140 thousand Poles were sentenced or put to the Gulag [63, p. 184]. In 1944, Chechens and Ingush compulsorily migrated as a punishment for the charge of having committed guerrilla or harmful activities against the Soviet Union. In the same year, Balkars were deported

to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as those who allegedly intended to help the German force going on sabotage against the Soviet Army. To observe the characteristics of the targets of compulsory migration, the ethnic groups including some involved with spying were regarded as «Potential spies» as a whole, and the whole groups including some who cooperated with an enemy force were branded as «Potential cooperators». Even though the Soviet power's action of compulsory migration, which targeted a number of ethnic groups around the Soviet border regions, had no intention to discriminate and eliminate particular nationalities, it was undeniably a violent persecution of ethnic groups with particular purposes in particular situations.

The Soviet action of commanding the migration of Far-East Koreans was above all for security reasons. The directive at the time that came to be accessed after glasnost specified “the purpose of blocking the infiltration of Japanese spies”, and the action was implemented in the critical situation of the Far Eastern security. As the compulsory migration of other ethnic groups at the border regions occurred intensively around the Second World War, so the migration of Koreans occurred also in the extreme military tension of the Far Eastern region between the Soviet Union and Japan. The troubles and conflicts between both countries had been earlier than the emergence of the Soviet Union. In 1904, the Soviet was defeated in the Russo-Japanese War; in 1918 to 1922, Siberia was invaded by Japan; and in 1931, there occurred the Manchurian Incident by which Japan established the puppet state Manchukuo. Thus, the Soviet could not lower its guard against Japan. With the Second World War ahead, Japan regarded the U.S. and the Soviet Union as the largest enemies and brought about the Sino-Japanese War; in this tense atmosphere, the Sino-Soviet Nonaggression Pact was concluded in 1937. When the fist law of Stalin sought out and purged the internal enemies, the problem of foreign spies who infiltrated into the Soviet Union was discussed. The command of compulsory migration on Goryeoin that suddenly occurred during the summer of 1937 was from the resolution signed by Stalin and Molotov on August 21, 1937 [39, p. 64]. This document specified the reason of transferring Koreans that they might be utilized as Japanese spies, so that the Soviet took such a preventive action.

Before this resolution was transmitted down, the Soviet authority had spread through the press the idea that the Far-East Koreans were a problematic group threatening the security of the state. On March 3, 1937, an article named “Japanese Spying Network” was published in «Prawda», and on April 23, in the same newspaper was published ‘Activities of Foreign Spies in the Soviet Far-East’ written by Volodin I., who asserted that Japanese spies spread over Korea, Manchuria, and the northern China, dispatching Japanese, Korean, and Chinese spies to the Far-East [52, p. 69]. Particularly, some conceived Primorski Koreans could be easily utilized as spies because they could speak not only Korean, but also Russian, Chinese, and Japanese [27, p. 28]. Also, as Joseon was the Japanese colony, Primorski Koreans could be considered the Japanese people, who might debilitate the Soviet power in the Far-East and give a clue for a war to the belligerent Japan. During the compulsory migration, indeed, hundreds of Koreans had been registered by the Japanese consulate in Vladivostok, so that Japan gained the information and protested at the Soviet action [63, p. 186].

The action of compulsory migration can be ascribed not only to the specified military and security reasons, but also to the social and economic reasons within the Soviet Union. That is, it can be also inferred as a decision to consider such reasons as the conflict between the Koreans and Russians over land shortage, Korean activities to establish their ethnic Autonomous Oblast (AO), and the economic advantage from transferring Koreans to the uncultivated land. Since the Imperial Russia, there has consistently been the policy to reinforce the control of state territory by mainly locating the state national Russians in the Far-East Primorski Krai instead of the immigrants from outside. The Soviet government was prioritizing Russians more than Koreans in the matter of land allotment, and regarding the resultant conflict between both ethnic groups as a serious problem which was difficult to resolve. Unfairness was not only in the land allotment, but also in the delivery quota per hectare (cultivated land): for example, in Suchanski Raion, the authority imposed as many as over ten times higher quota on Korean collective farms than on Russian ones. Against this unfair action, Koreans showed an uncooperative move in collectivization process, and their resistance came to be regarded by the Soviet government as

a threatening situation [63, p. 189]. In the process of liquidating rich farmers and collectivizing farming, this matter caused the Soviet endless attempts to transfer Koreans to the uncultivated land. In the late 1920s, some were already utilizing Koreans who had been sent to Central Asia for cultivating the land. «Kazric», a Kazakhstani group consisting of 200 Koreans at the time, was well-known as a 'Korean collective farm.' This is likely to have been a reason for compulsory migration of Koreans who, from the Soviet power's eyes at the time, were likely to be regarded as largely contributing to the whole Soviet food supply with their excellence in rice farming on the vacant Central Asian lands.

Another background of compulsory migration could be that their nationalist competence was too distinguished. Although their target was Japan, their armed fight by establishment of the Independence Army was watched by the Soviet power; besides, an immigrant ethnic group's organizational power at border regions in the Soviet Union is a serious matter, so allowing it could be regarded as a disadvantageous action in the relationship with Japan or Japanese colonial policy. It is for the same reason that the Soviet central government rejected the proposal of Han Myong-Se, who had been a committee member of «Goryeobureau» in Primorski Krai, to construct Korean AO. This was an extraordinary case compared to the others of such ethnic groups as Yakuts, Buryats, Kyrgyzes, Tartars, Caucasians, and Uzbeks, all of whom were allowed to construct their AO; thus, this case seems to support the same reason [63, p. 190]. Korean movement of AO establishment was regarded as contrary to the Soviet policy of dispersing nationalities to integrate the Soviet people. In addition, when the «Jewish Autonomous Oblast» was allowed, Koreans raised the matter of their AO again. However, the Soviet government recognized this as an obstacle to the Sovietization, rather dissipating their request of Korean AO through the extreme choice of compulsory migration.

The background and cause of compulsory migration were analyzed and inferred generally in terms of international security and of the policy toward immigrants by the Imperial Russia and the Soviet. However, the cause can also be found in the furious character of Stalin, the supreme power who executed apprehension and purge in a large scale. The Stalin era is characterized as authoritarianism, strong cen-

tralization, oppression, purge, emergency measures, and so on. Stalin did not lower the guard against the inside and outside “enemies”, often repeating the words of ‘surrounded by the enemies’ [38, p. 46]. He suffered from paranoia all his life, stressing the importance of oppression for the construction of socialism. Stalin pointed out the ‘enemies of people’ as the victims of oppression, including the comrades of Lenin, the think tank of the Party, farmers, high-ranking military officers, intellectuals, elder statesmen of the Party, expert groups, and all people unexceptionally. Surveillance and punishment compactly spread all over the society, and all lands of the state changed like a colossal concentration camp. During the Great Famine in 1932 to 1933, people came to die of starvation throughout the state. To make matters worse, a number of people were arrested, since women in Kolkhoz gave ears of grain to children who were near to death: this was executed in the name of exterminating “socialist property embezzlers” [38, p. 48]. In 1937, the central figures including Trotsky were purged or sentenced; from May to September in the year, about half of the commanding officers were purged in almost all troops [38, p. 48].

In order to justify the Great Purge, Stalin suggested that the ‘enemies of people’ should also be searched out in ethnic groups, including Goryeoin, Germans, Chechens, and a number of ethnic minorities. It is said that Stalin insignificantly treated and had no interest in the matter of ethnic groups from the outset since his working as a member of the People Committee in charge of ethnic minorities, and naturally considered national self-determination to be unnecessary [38, p. 49].

In this sense, the background of Goryeoin’s compulsory migration can also be ascribed to the synthesis of the unstable political atmosphere in the Far East and Stalin’s paranoid and compulsive personality: in other words, the imperialist powers’ ambitions and a dictator with destroyed personality. The Soviet action of compulsory migration on the ethnic groups at border regions was a commonly executed means on the charge of anti-revolutionary, anti-regime, or pro-enemy activities counter to the Soviet social, political, and military interests. In addition, on the part of the dictator who was executing his omnipotent power with pathological symptoms, the compulsory migration of the Far-East Koreans in the crisis of the Far Eastern security was not so extraordinary.

The Far-East Koreans' migration to Central Asia was forcibly carried out in a short term as completely different from the Koreans' previous volunteer migration for the right to live toward Primorski Krai near the northern Korean Peninsula. The Koreans who heard about the command of migration clamored that the action violated the Stalin Constitution and the Communist policy of nationalities. To quell this complaint, however, the authority arrested them at midnight and eliminated them on the charge of «Anti-revolutionaries» or «Anti-Sovietists». Those who were taken away in the fearful “chorni voron (prison van)” were the Koreans called the anti-regime or anti-revolutionary elements, entering a way in which one can hardly come back. These alleged culprits were forwarded to a simple trial by the troika established in each administrative level from gorod to raion, oblast, and krai. The troika consisted of each one representative from the Communist Party Committee, the Soviet Executive Committee, and the People's Committee of Internal Affairs. Their trial period was usually less than ten days, and the trial included neither a prosecutor nor a lawyer. No more than a formal inquiry on the accused, a formal check of the accused's confession, and reading of the prepared ruling decided the case, the ruling of which was then immediately executed [64, p. 254; 38, p. 49]. That is, far from a real trial, it was just a formality with the charge and ruling predetermined.

The compulsory migration of Goreyoin occurred even as Stalin extensively purged the anti-regime figures during the “Great Purge” in the late 1930s, and the targets of purge ranged from the real powers around Stalin to the powerless, estimated as thousands of victims [64, p. 254, 257].

Before the joint resolution on Korean migration, the purge progressing in the Far-East Krai covered all classes including the Party organizations, military troops, punishing organizations, armed organizations, intelligentsia, and tens of thousands of general laborers. The totalitarian surveillance and punishment were extremely terrifying also to the managers and workers in charge of compulsory migration. Hundreds of Communist Party members were brought to account for negligence of command implementation, violation of the Party platform, and mistake, so that they were confiscated the Party member-

ship, dismissed, even arrested and sent to the Gulag [57, p. 208]. G.S. Lyushkov, who was the representative of the Far-East Committee of Internal Affairs and oppressed Koreans as the general manager of compulsory migration, was also pointed out as the target of purge unexceptionally after the migration, thus exiled himself to Japan.

In this violent and terrifying atmosphere that anyone could be the target of surveillance and purge, Korean migration was quickly decided and implemented. To eliminate the obstacles and noises against the migration, the Internal Affairs Committee forged a document specifying the armed uprising of Koreans against the command of compulsory migration. Amongst many Koreans, firstly, Kim Anapashi, the First Secretary of the Communist Party Posiet Raion Committee, was sentenced to face a firing squad [57, p. 202]. Also at the night before compulsory migration, innumerable Koreans were arrested, but even after the migration, as many as 2,500 Koreans were purged in Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan.

The targets of arrest were almost known as Korean intellectuals, but according to an unveiled secret document, simple workers or farmers were not an exception in reality. Table 3 shows the occupations of some purged Korean victims who were arrested in Almatinskaya Oblast and Almaty City, unveiled by Special National Archives after the Soviet dissolution.

Table 3 – Occupations of Goryeoin Vicitims after Compulsory Migration

Occupation, Area	Almatinskaya Oblast	Alma-Ata City	Total
Manager	5	4	9
Kolkhoz Member	25	5	30
Technician	10	5	15
Educator	6	4	10
Serviceworker	2	4	6
Accountant	1	9	10
Others	10	29	39
Total	59	60	119
Note - Compiled by the author based on the source [65]			

This table demonstrates that the Goryeoin victims in both areas included many leaders like the Party executives, intellectuals like educators and technicians, but the general laborers in Kolkhoz represented 20% of the whole. It follows that everyone who objected or complained must be branded as anti-regime elements under the forced absolute obedience to the command from the higher.

The Resolution No. 1428-326 [39, p. 64-65] on the compulsory migration, drafted by the central government (COBHAPKOM CCP) and the Party central committee (BKII-6) and signed by the Soviet power Stalin, specified the rational and administrative actions for comfortable migration of Koreans, but there have been many testimonies that such actions were not practiced in reality.

The transfer by freight trains began from September to November in 1937, usually taking weeks to over a month to arrive at each area in Central Asia. It was reported that Korean migration was executed largely in two phases for 36,442 households and 171,781 people in total [52, p. 71-72]. It is already reported by those who experienced the compulsory migration that a number of casualties occurred in the process of transfer by trains. However, the unveiled documents on compulsory migration never mention the reality of Korean victims. The accurate numbers of Korean population and victims at the time are unknown, so that such statistical data depend on the reports from the Soviet authority. Still, the testimonies and partial information from the experienced Goryeoin make it possible to conjecture the miserable situation at the time.

There is also a presumption that the population statistics of Primorski Goryeoin before compulsory migration are indeed much more than the reported figures by the Soviet authority. According to Ko Song-Mu and Petrov A.N. [27, p. 13], the Korean population in 1927 was 170,000, and including those who did not register themselves not to pay the registration fees, it was estimated as about 250,000. An official secret document dated August 19, 1937, of the Soviet Union recorded the Korean population as 199,500 based on the census on January 1, 1932 [41, p. 3]. Five years later, the Far-East Korean population would be much more than 200,000, which supports the aforementioned two scholars' suggestion. The transferred population by trains on the re-

cord was 180,000 and many casualties occurred in the destinations, so that the victimized Koreans around compulsory migration are conjectured as at least over tens of thousands. Considering a series of casualties occurred even after the migration due to the tough condition, the victims were probably much more. Regarding this, there is no accurate statistical data at present.

The internal environment of trains was the worst condition for life. The Resolution on Korean migration specified that they could carry the household goods and things, and each train car should have a toilet. However, it is said that these specification was only a formality: although they could buy boiled water and food at large stations in the early phase, such conditions became unavailable afterwards [44, August 17, 1990]. It is also said that the carry-on luggage was limited to 40kg per capita, so that they must leave behind all household goods: for example, a family had to carry only bedding, several kinds of clothes, temporary foodstuffs like rice, hulled millet and potatoes each by 10kg, and simple household goods including cookers and kettles [64, p. 264].

It can be known through testimonies how poor condition of eating for survival and physiological necessity they were in. It is said that as the surroundings of train stations became latrines, the trains stopped even far ahead of the stations. Except what the emigrants prepared themselves, there was no water or food supply, which means the matter of potable water and meals were not resolved. In a train car, there was someone who had prepared jerked beef, but nobody would look toward it because there was no water for eating such salty food. Those in the train cars could not resolve anything like hunger or thirst. Even physiological excretion was limited only to the allowed time.

People should die of unsanitary environment, coldness and illness, and the dead should be buried at a nameless land. Given many data and testimonies, the condition of freight trains for migration is analogized to the infernal prison of death that sustained for over a month. They had to ride not on passenger cars, but on freight cars which had accommodated loads or livestock, and through which cold air passes at night: this is seen as a cause that increased the victims who could not overcome coldness, illness, and hunger. Even those who survived the crisis of death must confront another hardship at the new destination.

Adaption and Status of Soviet Koreans

For the Koreans dropped on a strange place, there was no provision for survival. The nightmarish situation as in the train continued: they must survive on a vast expanse of plain in the severely cold winter, and fight with coldness, illness and hunger remigrating again to another place afar away. The joint resolution on Korean migration, dated August 21, 1937, specified that «both Republics shall establish Korean residence and provide necessary support and actions for them.» However, although it prescribed that immigrants could bring their own property or livestock and receive the compensation for the amounts of personal property and seeding area, there was no organized support in the destination just as there had been almost no implementation in the Far-East. According to the Resolution No. 1571-356 by the Soviet People Committee, dated September 1, 1937, all Korean immigrants should have received the payment for the last two weeks and 5 Ruble everyday during the immigrant period. However, those who received the payment were extremely few [63, p. 194].

Some Koreans occupied deserted houses Kazakhs left behind or lived in huts. For the Great Famine and the Soviet policy of collectivizing farming in the 1930s had led Kazakhs not to continue their nomadic lives, but only to die of starvation or leave far away. Those who acquired huts or deserted houses were of the very fortunate cases. On a riverfront field of reeds, they should build a hut with reeds; on a desert area, they should make a cave to live through the winter. Already diseased and weakened, they were easily stricken with diarrhea and malaria and easily victimized. Some Koreans were said to have not overcome diarrhea after eating the milk of a sheep or horse. Babies under two years old almost died, and there were indeed few Goryeoin born around 1938. The larger sacrifice occurred during the late 1937 to 1938 when they who had no provision prepared in the destination had to remigrate again to another place. Regarding this, M. Rywkin suggests in his work «Moscow's Lost Empire» (1994) [63, p. 198] that the People Committes of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan had no basic information of Korean immigrants although they could not reject their influx under the command of the central Soviet government, so that they provided no support and almost neglect Korean immigrants, 22% of whom died accordingly and the most of the dead were children, the old and feeble.

A year after living through the harsh winter in the destination, the administrative authority identified the immigrant data and began to relocate and remigrate them to uncultivated or waste lands, or state-run and collective farms. Goryeoin's effort to do rice farming in the new destination provided them with an important foundation to survive, and became a chance to display the existence of them who had felt alienated in the residential society.

The main settlements of Goryeoin in Central Asia were Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In the former area, they settled at Kyzylorda and Taldykurgan, the drainage basin by the Karatal and Illy Rivers amongst the seven rivers flowing into the enormous Lake Balkash (Semirechiye region); in the latter, they settled at the southern Tashkent by the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers. In spring, Koreans made waterways digging the ground, and successfully cultivating a field to plant rice seeds they brought from the Far-East, formed the Korean autonomous Kolkhoz. This gave them the lesson that rice farming in Central Asia is not so difficult if they supply water to the field utilizing the favorable condition of tropical climate compared to the Far-East. These Kolkhozes were specialized mainly in rice farming and cotton growing. It is said that the Korean immigrants in Central Asia received the aid from the authority such as tax exemption for several years and the supply of farming machines, investment, fertilizer, and construction materials [27, p.35]. Also, not a few Korean fishery Kolkhozes were organized and operated in 1938 to 1939. By 1939, such Kolkhozes numbered 13 amongst about the total 70 in Kazakhstan.

Although there were those who founded Korean Kolkhozes and adapted to the better condition, indeed many immigrants were neglected without any occupation. The latter must live on by selling all they had, and the problems of employment and residence accounted for the majority of complaints from Koreans for years until their residence was supplied. Moreover, many households had to suffer from many difficulties leading the worst lives without any financial support [72, p.54]. Despite the worst condition, the Koreans were gradually becoming the Soviet people, leading collective lives based on their Kolkhoz.

Still, their social and legal status in the residential society was vulnerable to others. Particularly, the rights of Koreans, who were branded

as the potential cooperators with the enemy and compulsorily migrated under the strong power's control, could not help being extremely limited. Above all, the most disgraceful for them was the deprivation of their basic right: the limitation of residence relocation. Before the compulsory migration, the Far-East migration manager Yesov accepted the suggestion of Lyushkov to retrieve the citizenship and issue the residence certificate specifying the name of residential area as a device to make the immigrants not to escape from the designated residential area during or after the migration [52, p.78]. The Soviet action of limiting residence relocation left confusion and the pain of dispersed family again to a number of Korean diaspora over Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. This proved to have often been caused by the opportunism and mistakes of the migration administrators. For instance, some old parents were transferred to Gurden Gorod in Khorezm Raion but their children were transferred to Andijan Gorod, and this is said to be from the migration managers' mistake of letting the parents ride on another train car. Worrying the old parents who had no ability to live by themselves, their children earnestly requested to relocate the parents to Andijan, but had to submit the petition not only to the local internal affairs committee, but also to the gorod and even to the Tashkent Committee of Internal Affairs. After all, with no guarantee that the petition could be accepted, it took long time and administrative procedures: a number of petitions like these are today piled up in the old document archives in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan [72, p.54].

The Soviet action of limiting the immigrants' residence relocation was to efficiently surveil and control them afar from the border regions. In case of Koreans, the authority had to prevent them from the possibility of contacting Japanese and from flight, so that it transferred them away from the railroad. Also, for efficient control, the authority made it mandatory to gather over 1,000 households in a Kolkhoz, so that without the Kolkhoz's permission, no one could step out of the place nor even have a passport [69, p.116]. While the Soviet classified the rich farmers (Kulak) as "Special settlers", it treated the immigrant Koreans as "The administratively exiled" as different from the deported rich farmers. For example, the former were given the right to dispose their own property immediately before the compulsory migra-

tion; the compensation for the property confiscated by the authority; the pay right before the migration; and the pension of 200 Ruble each for students and soldiers. There were the chances to take a Turkish bath. However, for Koreans, these benefits stayed at the nominal promises that had almost not been realized [63, p. 199].

The Soviet prescription of limiting the residence of Koreans had not been consistent in its contents until the death of Stalin. In the early phase, 'the administratively exiled' Koreans were banned from escaping from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan within five years of the compulsory migration [40, p.71; 63, p. 199]. To visit other areas for a particular purpose, Koreans had to visit the Internal Affairs Committee and receive the special certificate with the residential duration specified, signing the attendance to the committee. In 1942, five years after they became "The administratively exiled," the limitation should have been expired, but lasted until the death of Stalin. In 1945, a regulation on the «Rights of Special Settlers» applied to Koreans, having reinforced the forcible arrangement of employment and the limitation of free relocation for the immigrants [72, p.52]. During August, 1946 to March, 1947, still, prior to the complete revocation of residence relocation limit since the 20th Communist Party Convention during the Khrushchev era, the authority issued the residence certificates according to a new command, and issued the normal citizenships to some Goryeoin, who were thus not limited in their residence but others were still bound up with the residence limitation [52, p.79].

Under the Stalin regime, Koreans were limited to their designated residence as 'the administratively exiled', as a different treatment from the highly strong control and surveillance about Chechens, Ingush, or Crimean Tartars who were branded as the criminals to be punished. Anyhow, Koreans were basically banned from military service as "The exiled," while mobilized for the wartime labor belonging to the labor battalion in various places such as coal mines, construction sites, woodcutting fields, and armories [72, p.75]. The Soviet authority filled up the lack of wartime industrial labor with the compulsory immigrants. According to the Order No. 1123 by the Soviet State Defense Committee, dated January 10, 1942, 7,765 Koreans were mobilized to the labor battallion, and several more times, they were recruited as the

labor force. The status of Koreans in the labor force was the labor as same as the Gulag inmates affiliated to the Home Affairs People Committee and other compulsorily immigrated ethnics. Their conditions for residence and working were all the same. Still, the Koreans who participated in the labor frontier during the Second World War were acknowledged by the government as the industrious hero, thus raising the social status from the disgraceful “exiles.”

Along with compulsory migration, what mostly debilitated the basis of Koreans as an ethnic minority was the closure of Korean ethnic schools by the Soviet authority. Immediately after the compulsory migration, the Stalin regime commanded the “Reorganization of ethnic schools” on April 8, 1938. Regarding the special schools of ethnic minorities as the origins of nationalism and bourgeois anti-Sovietism, this order insisted all of them should be eliminated, instructing the conversion of ethnic schools into the general Soviet schools, which included the schools of Koreans, Germans, Volgars, Tunkans, and Uyghurs [42, p.186-187].

Despite the harsh condition right after the compulsory migration, Koreans formed a group of teachers and established ethnic schools in each republic. Until the Korean schools were closed in 1938, in the Republic of Kazakhstan were 32 schools of 160 quota, 11 schools of 280 quota, 1 school of 400 quota, and Goryeo University of Education [42, p.190]. In April, 1938, however, these schools were converted to the general Soviet schools by the command of the Soviet authority.

Further, the Party authority obliterated all publications based on ethnic languages which serve as the materials for ethnic language education, so as to eradicate the ethnic culture. On December 27, 1939, a «Directive on Korean Publication» was transmitted down: it decided the total disposal of Korean publication except for those including the contents of Marxist-Leninism authored by writers or Party leaders [42, p.335]. The national materials Koreans had preserved even undergoing the hardship in the trains during compulsory migration had to be burned before utilized rightly in the newly established nationalist schools. Still, the ethnic language newspaper «Avangard» maintained the thread of life with the name of «Lenin Kichi». Although the newspaper had the form of ethnic language, it was none other than a news-

paper translated into the mother tongue about the contents of the Soviet regime and the Party's propaganda. Thus, the national color was completely blocked through censorship by the authority.

Having strongly established their own root going through hardship in the Far-East, Goryeoin had to survive by transforming themselves to the Soviet people along with the distress of compulsory migration, and their national legacy was losing its meaning during the process of adapting to the residential society. The Soviet Goryeoin who had thoroughly depended on the residential society were doomed to renovate themselves again into the members of another new system, with the dissolution of the Soviet regime that was an unbelievable historical event.

2.3 Soviet Dissolution and the Status of Kazakhstani Goryeoin

Before compulsory migration, Primorski Koreans had adapted to the residential society and sustained as an ethnic group; particularly, the ethnic competence they displayed for the motherland's self-independence was utilized in the Soviet construction, and victimized in the relationship between the Soviet Union and Japan. Even under the oppression of compulsory migration and the threat of rights to live, Goryeoin strove for getting accustomed to the Soviet language and regime, and assimilating to the residential society. In the late Soviet era, the 1988 Seoul Olympics held in their motherland swayed the Goryeoin society that had established the Soviet foundation. This international sports event unveiled the power of a capitalist country in contrast to the weakening communist countries, and the emergence of the capitalist native country Korea in the Goryeoin society served as a chance to inspire their national pride in the residential country. However, the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union debilitated the foundation they had solidified and weakened the position of Goryeoin. In the independent republic of indigenes, their project of constructing a nation-state required the repositioning of Goryeoin.

The 1988 Seoul Olympics and Emergence of a New Motherland

Just before the Soviet dissolution, the 1988 Seoul Olympics held in Korea was a large event that stirred up the Soviet ethnic Goryeoin soci-

ety. It was a special meaning in the Cold War context for East European countries including the Soviet Union, which had consolidated people through sports, to participate in the Olympics held in Seoul in a capitalist country. Particularly, the Seoul Olympics held at the time when the Soviet Union attempted to reform the regime in the détente between the East and the West became an opportunity to make exchange between Korea and the East European countries including the Soviet Union. Above all, the rise of South Korea in a communist country came to form a new relationship with North Korea which the former Soviet Goryeoin had considered their motherland.

The Seoul Olympics not only stayed at consolidating the bond with overseas Koreans as a large event that stimulated their nationalism, but also caused a huge change in the social status of Goryeoin and their relationship with other constituents in the residential society. The historical break of national bond between Koreans and Goryeoin despite their biological homogeneity as the same blood is deeply related to the Communist turn of Russia by the Bolshevik Revolution and the division of the Korean Peninsula into the North and the South by intervention of the Soviet Union and the United States. As a kind of proxy war between both superpowers, the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950, causing the bloody fight between the same-blood nationals, and with different ideologies in the frame of the Cold War, South Koreans and the Soviet Goryeoin were no more than the enemy nationals. Before the compulsory migration by Stalin, the Far-East Koreans had been closely bonded with the motherland Koreans as the same nationals during national independence movement resisting the Japanese Imperialism; but in the Soviet regime, they regarded only its ideological brother North Korea as their motherland, and naturally had to be broken off the anti-ideological South Korea.

Although the Olympics became the field of propagandizing each ideology and regime in the Cold war, holding the international sports competition is generally regarded as a special event that displays and reflects the economic, diplomatic, and national competence of the host country. The Seoul Olympics not only left a huge footmark in history by recording the highest participations of countries and players covering both the Communist and Capitalist countries, but also has a

great significance in the world history that, as the then-IOC President Samaranch pointed out, it contributed to the global peace by promoting the dissolution of the global Cold War

In the Cold War frame, the most sensitive concern was whether or not communist countries would participate in the '88 Seoul Olympics, partly because there remained a nightmare of the previous two Olympics in which the other ideological camp against the host country had not participated. The Soviet Union, then confronting the internal limit in the late 1980s, decided its participation in the Seoul Olympics with the will to open door as a breakthrough in deadlock. At the time of decision, the Soviet Union was seeing the large-scale reformation (perestroika) and open door (glasnost) led by Gorbachev, but the domestic economic unbalance and downturn was leading to internal schism and crisis; the Soviet people confronting the serious lack of consumer goods supply overtly exhibited complaint and distrust against the government; and such situations were published in the ethnic newspaper, which was an propagandizing organ of the Party [44, July 7, 1988, 4]. The attempt to break through these difficulties in reality led to the foreign diplomatic policy, and through many statements on «New Asian Policy» as diplomatic declarations as a part of supporting economic reformation [73, p. 262], the Soviet government increasingly aimed at intensive pragmatic diplomacy in the foreign relations for collaboration. Establishing the frame of foreign collaboration beyond ideology, the Soviet Union realized the active exchange with Korea, and at last in December, 1987, signed the Agreement on Participation in the '88 Seoul Olympics after Hungary and East Germany. At the same time, on January 1, 1988, the USSR Sports Minister Marat Gramov officially announced the participation in the Seoul Olympics, leading to the collaborative atmosphere between Korea and the Soviet Union such as the Soviet Bolshoi Ballet's visiting performance in Korea and the permission of KAL airplanes' passage through the Soviet airspace. After the Olympics, unexpected as it was in the anti-Communist Korea, the amities with communist countries were concluded; and in 1991, even the Korea-Soviet Amity was concluded [69, p.252].

The driving force to develop relationship between Korea and communist countries covering the Olympics diplomacy, economic col-

laboration, and amity can be considered above all to be the striking economic development of Korea seen through the Olympics at the time when communist countries sought after change. Paradoxically, although the former Soviet Union made the Soviet «sports heroes» appear on the Olympics arena in order to reinforce the waning regime, it did not so much prove the victory of communism through sports, but came to be profoundly shocked by the transformation of Korea, previously considered the poorest capitalist country that had been ruined after the war. This aftermath served as debilitating the closed ideological frame that had been utilized thus far as an arena for propaganda between the ally and the enemy, capitalism and communism, borrowing the nonpolitical form of the Olympics.

Korean prosperity was a shock to the Soviet government and communist countries that were urgently feeling the necessity of change, and often recognized as the model they would like to follow. Before the Soviet dissolution, Han Marx, a Soviet scholar of international politics, stated how significant aftermath the '88 Olympics gave to the Soviet Union by suggesting the economic development of Korea to the Soviet society [76: June 7, 1990]. The amicable relationship between both countries began to develop through a series of events such as the exchange in sports sector before the Olympics [27, p. 202], the working-level exchange between both, and the Seoul Olympics, all of which publicized the real situation of Korea to the Soviet people as well as the authority officially through the Soviet press.

In the Soviet Union, the news of Korea had been thus far published through the representative newspaper «Pravda», which had expressed the Soviet official standpoint on the Korean news, staying at the level of quoting the news from Pyongyang or Japan where the Soviet correspondents were dispatched, which was an extremely limited report even without their own explanation [27, p.193]. The Soviet report on Korea was mainly focused on events, basically not including positive reports, which, if any, was not to express the interest in Korea, but to relate the event to the U.S. of the opposite camp. So much so that Korean history or culture could not be discussed or publicized to the public through the Soviet press.

Since the Seoul Olympics, the proportion of Korean news discussed in the Soviet press came to meet substantial change both in quantity

and contents. In the early 1989, «Prauda» included the total 37 articles on the Korean Peninsula amongst which 19 articles were on South Korea, excelling those on North Korea quantitatively [27, p.192-193]. Also in contents, Korean news was published regularly on the page of introducing the main international news by countries from March 2, 1989 [27, p.195]. The event articles mainly focused on demonstration like before, but the previous hostile expressions such as “Dictator Park Jung-Hee” or “Dictator Chun Doo-Hwan” were changed to the acknowledged appellations like «the South Korean authority» or «President Roh Tae-Woo».

In June, 1988, right before the Olympics was held, the economic development of Korea was introduced, and in August, 1988, the magazine Soviet Women featured the vigorous play of the Soviet players in the Olympics, conveying the Olympics facilities and atmosphere to the readers [27, p.192-193]. The huge interest and positive attitude of the Soviet broadcast and press in Korea were reflected at the same time in the ethnic newspaper Lenin Kichi as it is. Largely impressive to the Soviet Goryeoin was its introduction of South Korea, dated June 29, 1988, such as the specific articles that the amount of trade between China and South Korea were over two times of that between China and North Korea, and that South Korea was trading with the Soviet-allied East European countries.

The synergic effect of the Soviet favorable attitude to Korea, Koreans’ warm welcome to the Goryeoin, and remarkable development of Korea as an Olympics host country resulted in the passionate brotherly love between Goryeoin and Koreans through the Olympics. Particularly, the encounter between Koreans and the Goryeoin who participated as the Soviet arts performers was like an impressive drama of “Reunion of the same blood” both to the performers and the audience. The Culture & Arts Festival held from August 17 to October 5 in 1988, a month before the opening of the Seoul Olympics, was in the form of an international total arts festival including such sectors as theater, dance, folk arts, pop song, painting, chorus, and traditional music, as well as the performance of the Soviet Bolshoi Ballet and the Moscow Philharmonic. Amongst Soviet arts performers, the performance including Nam Liudmila known as the renowned Soviet soprano who had

rich voice and appeal as a prizewinner of Tchaikovsky Concours was sold out earliest, which evidenced the high interest of Koreans so well [75: Kyunghyang Daily, April 9, 2007].

As communist countries had promoted the project of making all people into the “Soviet athletes” as a means of maintaining the regimes, so their television broadcasting of the Olympics differed from the capitalist broadcasting based on a commercial logic. For the Soviet people, much weight was put on the sports broadcasting, which was an important means for a propagandizing effect to integrate all people by stimulating their patriotism through the “Sports heroes.” To these communist countries, the significance of the 1988 Seoul Olympics broadcasting was not only in the Olympics itself, but also in its role as a strong weapon to show Korean society. Aside from television broadcasting, the firsthand impressions of the Goryeoin who participated in the Olympics were vividly delivered through the ethnic newspaper «Lenin Kichi». For the Seoul Olympics, the previous hostile expressions toward South Korea quoted from North Korean “News on South Joseon” were changed to the emphasis on nationalism as in “The rich and powerful motherland”, “The same blood”, and “The same nationals.”

Before the Olympics, the former Soviet Goryeoin had continued to exchange with the Soviet-allied North Korea. Under the mutual support of the Soviet Union and North Korea, Goryeoin had participated in the regularly held Pyongyang Culture Festival, often visiting North Korea to see their relatives or by invitation [78, p.260-261]. As the status of the enemy Korea rose after the Olympics in the Cold War system, North Korea became so sensitive as to hold the World Grand Festival at the year after the Olympics and invite the former Soviet Goryeoin in a large scale in order to restore its weakened position around the former Soviet Union, its brother country. However, the parade of Goryeoin who visited the motherland was turning from North to South Korea.

The Seoul Olympics enabled the former Soviet Goryeoin to contact Korea in various aspects such as visiting Korea, cultural exchange with Korea, and the entry of Korean businesses into the Soviet society. Particularly, the mutual contact before the Soviet dissolution was not due to the Goryeoin-led autonomous exchange with Korea, but to the sup-

port and favorable action of the Soviet government which had positive consciousness of Korea. This collaborative attitude of the authority and the active move of Goryeoin served as a catalyst to enable themselves to retrospect the national legacy they had previously forgotten, and to reconnect the national circuit by regarding South Korea as the motherland and South Koreans as the Korean nationals.

Acknowledging Korea as their motherland with the emphasis on national identity, the Goryeoin group no longer regarded North Korea as the only motherland. Most of all, the largest achievement of the Olympics was that the ethnic Goryeoin enhanced their national self-esteem. Goryeoin said that they had previously lived not so much as the Korean ethnic group but only as the Soviet people, who hid their national identity by mimicking the subject national Russians in the Soviet society, but after the Olympics, they came to be able to display their identity as Goryeoin to other ethnic groups.

Like this, the two broken Korean nationals in the frame of the Cold War came to highlight their nationality and homogeneity through the Olympics, because it became the arena for Korea to display not only the state value as the host country, but also the national value of Koreans. According to the anthropologist Kang Shin-Pyo [82, p. 303-305], the host country is the host of an arena for festival, sparing no effort to show its particularity in harmony with the universality of mankind most effectively by most intensive reconfiguration in the shortest term, and he stressed that the Olympics had a large significance in Korean history as it played an important role of rediscovering and recreating the cultural identity of Korean themselves.

The Seoul Olympics' wave inspired the national pride of the Goryeoin group and their position as the Korean ethnic minority in the multinational Soviet society. Still, the Soviet dissolution and the independence of Republics brought a new change to Goryeoin who then should transform themselves to the citizens of a new state led by the indigenes.

Birth of an Independent Republic and the Indigenes

The Soviet dissolution in December, 1991 officially ended the Russian rule of Central Asia. The process of constructing the Soviet social-

ist state, a union made up of vast regions and heterogeneous multi-nationalities, aimed at a homogeneous society excluding other ethnic groups and races. That is, the Soviet people were educated with the title of “Homo sovieticus”, urbanized and assimilated to the complete proletariat class. The dissolution of this Soviet Union swayed the status of ethnic minorities including Goryeoin, serving as a factor of socio-psychological unrest.

Goryeoin, who have assimilated to the Soviet regime so quicker than any other ethnic group as not to liquidate the Soviet vestiges to date, are now adapting to the new-born republics’ process of state construction. In the Soviet era, the indigenes of each Central Asian republic and the immigrant ethnic groups like Goryeoin were the same second-nationalities in the process of Great Russianization. After the independence of republics, the Kazakhs who became the new subject nationals and the other ethnic minorities are in different positions, so that they are exploring how to establish a new relationship. As the same Kazakhstani citizens, the social position of the ethnic Goryeoin would depend on the Kazakh’s process of reintegrating the ethnic groups and restoring their national identity as the subject nationals.

Indigene’s state construction means the restoration from the past in which they had long been degenerated to the dominated nationality under the other nationality’s domination. That is, it pursues post-Sovietization to restore their national value damaged by the Great Russianization in the Soviet era. Kazakh’s national movement already began in a small scale in the late Soviet era. Following the collapse of Czarism and the Bolshevik Revolution, occurred Muslim-nationalist resistance movement against the dominant Communist power, that is, Bismarch movement that Muslim and nationalist powers allied with each other. After the success of the Bolshevik Revolution, Kazakh’s national distress and antipathy caused by Stalin’s oppressive policy became the motive to accelerate post-Russianization and the nation restoration movement.

Before incorporated to the Soviet regime, Kazakhs’ steppe had been conquered by the Imperial Russia: already by 1850, the Great Orda was finally conquered amongst three ordas, the representative tribal leagues of Kazakhs whose bases were the nomad groups of the steppe.

Kazakhs were originally the nomads who grazed a flock of sheep and goats; those tribes gathered in winter, moved again in spring, and in summer, scattered to the small groups of about 10 yurts (ger) for the typical nomadic life. Russia which had conquered the three ordas explored colonization by implanting their Russian culture, but could not change the traditional nomadic life of Kazakhs. However, with the Soviet emergence, Kazakhs became gradually converted into farmers as did Kyrgyzes, Kara Kalpaks, Turkmens, and Central Asian Turkish nomads. Their settlement as farmers was the result of the Soviet settlement policy.

The traditional lifestyle of nomadic Kazakhs was the mixed form of Muslim and nomadic customs. Since the 8th century when they received Islamic attack, they had been affected by Muslims and maintained strong patriarchal elements based on the tribal leaders. However, the Muslims in the Kazakh society are no more than formally residing based on Sunnites unlike the fundamental Muslims in Uzbekistan or Tajikistan. The traditional customs were also weakened by the dissolution of nomadic life and the urban Soviet life, but their vestiges are more alive in rural areas.

It is not so long ago that the Kazakhs were divided into separate ethnic groups forming a community in the Central Asian steppe. The ethnic formation of Kazakhs was derived from the historical change of Central Asian dominant groups. Including Kazakhs, the indigenous groups in each Republic are the mixed-ethnic groups made in the history of conquest between the powers of the East and the West since the ancient era.

The origin of Central Asian ethnic formation is Iranians who were the ancient indigenes in Central Asia. Beginning with the Iranian group, various powers dominated here such as the ancient Turks (Gokturks), Arabian Muslims, Mongolians, Mogul Empire, and khanate, thus forming mixed ethnic groups. The archetype of Kazakhs begins with the Kypchak tribal group, who were based on the ancient steppe Iranian tribes, the Sakas and the Usun, and later mixed with the Huns and the Gokturks [84, p. 174]. The distinction of Central Asian ethnic groups including Kazakhs was established by the 15th to 16th century, and when the feudal power at the steppe was disrupted in the mid-15th

century, the local powers arose to build Kazakh Khanate, whose residents were called Uzbek-Kazakhs or simply Kazakhs, naturally forming its ethnic group [84, p. 176].

In the mid-17th century, Kazakhs were divided into three ordas: the Great Orda (at the downstream of the Syr River around the Lake Balkash), the Middle Orda (at the central steppe), and the Small Orda (at the steppe north of the Aral Sea). As their powers waned, they came to be attacked and dominated by the Jungar. In the early 18th century, Kazakh Sultan requested Russia to protect them from the attack of Jungar, and Russia began to advance to the area and managed to dominate it by 1850 [84, p. 172].

Through the Imperial Russia and until the conversion to the Soviet Union in 1997, there had been resistance by the Central Asian indigenous nationalists and Islamites, but after all, the Soviet divided the republics within the arbitrarily set boundaries and decentralized the resistant ethnic groups. The Soviet Union was a union which nominally allowed each Republic to be independent politically and economically by the Constitution, but in reality, kept a thoroughly centralized form of state. Formally, it suggested all nationalities should keep their own language and culture, but actually, their religions were not allowed, their language was settled as Russian, the basic language for communication between nationalities. In the late 1980s, the Soviet Union was rapidly dissolved by the perestroika and glasnost of Gorbachev, and with the nationalist movement of each indigenous group, each republic came to welcome independence.

The tendency of Kazakhstanian state construction that returns to the construction of Kazakh's nation-state shows the negative sentiment toward the past dominant power. Since the forcible annexation by Czarism, the indigenes began to bear anti-Russian sentiment, because for centuries the products from all republics were redistributed preferentially to the Slavic republics, and the citizens of comparatively poor Central Asian republics kept complaints [84, p. 200]. Although the Soviet authority formally acknowledged the independent autonomy of republics, all commands were transmitted down from Moscow; as the executive officials or professionals for indigenous groups were mostly occupied by Russians, immigrant or indigenous groups were all stay-

ing at the second or third nationalities [84, p. 201]. For such republics as Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan, the secretary of the Party Central Committee was as a rule occupied by a Russian, and the vice secretary by an indigenous Kazakh or Uzbek. There were occasionally the cases of appointing an indigene as the secretary.

Also, the Soviet government intended to debilitate the indigenous power utilizing other ethnics. The compulsory migration of many ethnic groups at the border regions to the inland Central Asia during the 1930s to 40s had the purpose of stabilizing the border regions on the one hand, but had the effect of diluting the power of indigenes on the other. Due to the Soviet policy of debilitating indigenous power and Russianization, there was a concern that the anti-Russianism inherent in Kazakhs' sentiment would aim at a strong nationalist state right after independence. Yet, the communist officials at the late old regime maintained their ruling power controlling radical power, thus displaying the effect of suppressing the transitional situation. Revival of Kazakhs' national tradition, Kazakh language, and the like, is an important agenda for constructing an independent state; although not radical, it is ceaselessly promoted. Nevertheless, they are charged with the task of multinational integration, and these are all important elements that determine the status and position of other ethnic minorities and Goryeoin in Kazakhstan.

Nation-State Construction and the Status of Goryeoin

After the Soviet dissolution, the most importantly arising is the task of liquidating the Soviet vestiges and reviving the national identity of Kazakhs. However, their way of reviving the national identity cannot be only smooth, but blocked with the following problems that cannot be resolved radically: unlike other independent republics, Kazakhs did not account for the majority of the total Kazakhstani population; the main social constituents could not speak Kazakh; and the citizens consisted of multiple ethnicities who had been incorporated into the former Soviet regime. For Kazakhstani ethnic minorities including Goryeoin, confusing in the existing society is above all the reversed situation in which the subject nationals of the state changed from Russians to Kazakhs. The independent state Kazakhstan is practicing at

once the embracement policy to integrate ethnic groups and the basic task of promoting the indigenous nation-state construction.

The most distinguishing in Kazakhstani process of promoting a new «nation-state construction» were the policies of population and language. Against the process of realizing these policies in the early period after independence, there were complaints and resistance mainly by Russians, but the government’s flexible strategy of “Withdrawal and advancement” is enabling the intentional “State construction” consistently. In 1995, Kazakhstani government upgraded Russian to the official language by revising the Constitution; in 1997, it transferred the state capital from Almaty to Astana [85, p. 215], as a strategy to deal with Russians and Russian government that strongly resisted the national color of Kazakhs, also as a preventive measure against Russian requirement of separation and independence of the northern Kazakhstani regions where Russians densely live.

In order to respond the resistance of other ethnic groups including Russians against Kazakhs’ nationalist state construction, as well as to recover the proportional lack of Kazakhs in total population, Kazakhstani government attempted a policy of actively increasing the population of Kazakhs. The following table shows that the population of Kazakhs had stayed under 40% of the total population before independence, but after the independence, it continued to increase and came to go far beyond the half at present.

Table 4 – Kazakhstani Population Make-Up by Ethnic Groups (1970-2009)

Year Ethnic Group	1970	1979	1989	1999	2009
Total (ppl.)	13,026.300	14,709.500	16,232.300	14,981,000	16,009,600
Percentage (%)	100	100	100	100	100
Kazakhs	32.5	35.9	40.0	53.5	63.1
Russians	42.5	40.8	37.6	29.9	23.7
Germans	6.6	6.1	5.8	2.4	1.1
Ukrainians	7.2	6.1	5.4	3.7	2.1
Uzbeks	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.5	2.9

Tartars	2.2	2.1	2.0	1.7	1.3
Belarusians	1.5	1.2	1.1	0.7	0.4
Uyghurs	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.4	1.4
Goryeoin	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.6
Azerbaijanis	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Source - «Census of the population of Kazakhstan in 2009» [87]					

It is related to several large historical events that the population of Kazakhs had been under the half of the total Kazakhstani population. Multiple ethnicities in Kazakhstan began to be formed since the mid-18th century, and Kazakhs occupied the absolute majority until the early 20th century. However, the Great Famine and the Soviet policy of collectivizing farming in the early 1930s made millions of Kazakhs move away or leave for the neighboring areas; also, since the late 1930s, a number of immigrant ethnic groups gathered into Central Asia by Stalin's policy of compulsory migration, so that an official statistics [87] suggests that the percentage of Kazakhs dropped to 37.9% of the total by 1939. In this statistics, the population of Kazakhs in Kazakhstan was 3,627,612 in 1926, but 13 year later, it dropped to 2,327,625 by 1939 with 1.3 million people decreased, which suggests that so many victims and agonies were there from the late 1920s to the early 1930s. In the Soviet Union from the 1950s to 1960s, over millions of immigrants including Russian, Ukrainians and Belarusians moved to Kazakhstan, so that the percentage of Kazakhs decreased relatively, but their population was increasing.

Although the population of Kazakhs was not the majority in percentage until this time, however, after independence, European ethnics including Russians, Germans and Jews moved away, and Kazakhstani government's active policy of attracting overseas Kazakhs made its present percentage 63.1% as of 2009. The significance that the indigenous Kazakhs became the majority group is serving as a power to suppress the resistance of other Kazakhstani ethnic groups which had occurred in the early period after independence, and as a strong dynamic to accelerate Kazakh nation-state construction.

Today, the most percentages of population amongst Kazakhstani ethnic groups are shown in order by Kazakhs, Russians, Uzbeks,

Ukrainians, Uyghurs, Tartars, Germans, and Goryeoin, the last of which account for 0.6% (100,000 people) of the total population. Other ethnic groups that accounted for similar percentage with Goryeoin's one include Belarusians and Azerbaijanis. Despite natural increase, the demographic proportion of Goryeoin has undergone no special change to date since the Soviet era. This suggests that there has been the movement of Goryeoin population from Kazakhstan to other republics in the Soviet Union. Particularly, after compulsory migration, Kazakhstani Goryeoin domestically moved in the Soviet Union to Uzbekistan for cotton growing and land reclamation, so that today in Uzbekistan reside 200,000 people, two times of Kazakhstani Goryeoin. This is also in part because the Kazakhstani Goryeoin scattered to other regions in the vast Soviet area after the cancellation of residence relocation limit.

As the White émigrés moved away after independence, so Goryeoin moved to Russia or Uzbekistan which was still Russophone sphere, or the Far-East which was considered the hometown of their ancestry. This became a cause to decrease the population of Kazakhstani Goryeoin. According to the above table, the percentage of Goryeoin population was 0.6% in 1989 and 0.7% in 1999, the latter of which was higher; but this is because the large-scale migration of White émigrés lowered the total Kazakhstani population, and the actual Goryeoin population dropped from 103,315 to 99,665 [88]. In addition, Kazakhstani Goryeoin from Sakhalin who were born before 1945 continued to settle permanently in Korea, but did not influence the change of population percentage as a small-scale migration. At present, Kazakhstani Goryeoin represent 0.6% of the total population (about 100,000 ppl.), which is not so different a level from the previous figure [88].

The most problematic for the present-day Goryeoin is the matter of adapting to the new language, which has not been resolved in a short term while their adaptation to the change of economic system was so fast in the early period after independence. Having declared independence on December 16, 1991, Kazakhstan subsequently declared 'Kazakh as the sole state language of the independent Republic of Kazakhstan' and defined "Russian as the language for inter-ethnic communication", which was a shock of degrading Russian which had served as the official language. To reduce the confusion and shock in

the state, Article 7 of the Kazakhstani Constitution has specified since 1995 to date that the state language is Kazakh, and Russian is recognized as an official language [90]. Still, along with constitutional revision of linguistic policy, the state language policy was strongly implemented in a concrete level. Since 2001, the communicative function of Russian was minimized overall, but kept in a cultural sector, according to the announced decree of the president. On May 30, 2006, «Decree of the President of Kazakhstan on the State Program Operation and Development of Languages for 2001 – 2010 Years» augmented the action of settling the state language in state organizations, the legislature, the judicature, the military, health organizations, educational organizations, and so on [95, p. 309]. This was to prescribe that the overall official administration of the state shall be worked in the state language, and general citizens shall use the state language in a concrete level such as public offices or educational institutions.

This action is accelerating the revival of Kazakh by recruiting administrative officials based on the linguistic ability in Kazakh, making textbooks to establish the Kazakh history, renaming streets and places with Kazakh, and promoting the events to pay a tribute to the national heroes. In particular, it is a secure forward-looking policy of guaranteeing the state language of Kazakhstan to impose the “Duty of learning the state language” on all Kazakhstani citizens or the growing generation in any ethnic group. Since the mid-1990s, the government investigated overall educational programs and textbook production, thus incorporating Russian history into a part of world history, reducing Russian teaching time to 2-4 hours a week, but substantially increasing Kazakh teaching time. Also, to augment the use of the state language, it introduced Scholastic Achievement Test in middle schools, which includes the compulsory test of Kazakh as the state language, and the college entrance exam (EHT) includes Kazakh and Kazakh history as compulsory subjects [95, p. 312-313].

The independent government spares no effort to escape from the vestiges of Soviet language underlying the overall society toward the new state language, based on the premise that no one can be a member of the mainstream society without knowing Kazakh. The firsthand linguistic changes this researcher perceived for the recent years since

coming in this society are that the more people are speaking Kazakh than Russian on street, and that street names are increasingly adopting Kazakh instead of Russian. In this trend, for the Goryeoin who have been accustomed to Russian as the official language at the former Soviet regime, Kazakh remains as the most burdensome task to learn in the independent government's project to revive their national language.

The obstacle to Goryeoin's adaptation to the state language is the remnants of the Soviet language due to their linguistic assimilation as strong as losing their own ethnic language. The following table shows how much the present Kazakhstani ethnic groups are recognizing their own ethnic languages as the mother tongue as of 2009.

Table 5 – Ability to Speak the Mother Tongue by Ethnic Groups (Unit: 1,000 ppl., %)

Ethnic Group	Population by Ethnic Groups	Mother Tongue Speakers	Other Ethnic Language Speakers	Mother Tongue Speakers' Rate	Other Ethnic Language Speakers' Rate
Total(ppl.)	16009,6	14963,0	1046,6	93,5	6,5
Kazakhs	10096,8	9982,3	114,5	98,9	1,1
Russian	3793,8	3748,3	45,5	98,8	1,2
Ukrainians	333,0	52,5	280,5	15,8	84,2
Uighurs	224,7	190,9	33,8	85,0	15,0
Tartars	204,2	104,2	100,0	51,0	49,0
Germans	178,4	30,4	148,0	17,0	83,0
Koreans	100,4	36,1	64,3	36,0	64,0
Source - «Census of the population of Kazakhstan in 2009» [87]					

According to the statistics, 36% of Goryeoin chose the ethnic language as the mother tongue, but considering that they all actually use Russian as the language of residential society and almost cannot communicate in the mother tongue, the figure seems to be far from the

reality. This is to say that feeling the ethnic language as the mother tongue based on the affectionate sentiment for the motherland is distinct from the actual and objective ability of communication. Additionally, compared to the Goryeoin in collective settlement, those who have lived separately in cities are undoubtedly disadvantaged to speak the ethnic language. The following table shows how many Kazakhstani Goryeoin communicate mainly in Russian, neither the ethnic language nor the state language (Kazakh).

Table 6 – Percentage of Population by Linguistic Abilities of Ethnic Groups (over 15 yrs old, unit: %)

	Total Population	Kazakh			Russian			English		
		Speak -ing	Read -ing	Liter -acy	Speak -ing	Read -ing	Liter -acy	Speak -ing	Read -ing	Lite -racy
Total Population	100,0	74,0	2,9	62,0	94,4	3,4	84,8	15,4	2,6	7,7
Kazakhs	100,0	98,4	2,3	93,2	92,1	4,4	79,1	17,5	2,9	9,0
Russian	100,0	25,3	2,5	6,3	98,5	1,0	96,7	12,6	2,1	5,6
Uzbeks	100,0	95,5	12,5	61,7	92,9	10,3	68,3	10,7	2,3	5,4
Ukrainians	100,0	21,5	2,0	5,2	98,9	0,9	97,1	8,0	1,3	3,7
Uighurs	100,0	93,7	9,7	60,8	95,8	6,4	81,8	15,7	2,6	7,2
Tartars	100,0	72,6	6,3	33,7	98,4	1,7	94,7	14,2	2,3	6,7
Germans	100,0	24,7	2,5	7,9	99,0	0,9	96,9	9,1	1,5	4,4
Koreans	100,0	43,5	3,7	10,5	98,0	1,4	95,5	24,2	3,5	11,4
Source - «Census of the population of Kazakhstan in 2009» [87]										

This statistics shows the proportion of the state language, Russian, and English speakers amongst main Kazakhstani ethnic groups. For Kazakhs, most of them are not forgetting their national language and keeping the actual ability of communication. Uzbeks, Uyghurs, and Tartars, all of whom are the Turkish ethnic groups like Kazakhs, have

comparatively higher abilities in Kazakh than other ethnic groups do, whereas the Whites, including Russians, Ukrainians, and Germans, are poorer at Kazakh. Although it shows that 43.5% of Goryeoin understand the oral expressions of Kazakh, the reality is that only 10.5% have both abilities of speaking and literacy. Besides, considering there are rarer Kazakh speakers in cities than in rural areas, the Kazakh-speaking Goryeoin in cities would be seen as much fewer than the above average figure. This is because the Soviet intellectual class whose main language was Russian have lived more in cities.

For Goryeoin, those who have lived in Taldykurgan or other rural areas alongside many Kazakhs are comparatively better at Kazakh, but the Kazakh speakers in Almaty are extremely rare. However, the young generation of Goryeoin now would be seen as increasingly having higher ability of understanding the state language by augmentation of the basic Kazakh education in schools. The difference between the reality and the Goryeoin's common expression that "Kazakh is not a must-learn right now, and we don't feel difficulty now in daily lives without Kazakh" is shown in the change of their actual occupation, which suggests their new state language is serving as an obstacle and a burden.

The most direct cause of change in their occupation after independence is above all the conversion of economic system to the capitalist market economy by the Soviet dissolution. This sudden change of economic system made it difficult to operate the state-run enterprises which had been the basis of the Soviet economy, particularly drastically cutting the governmental support and purchase of farming machines, fertilizers, pesticides, and seeds that had contributed to the Soviet agricultural products, thus leading to the state-run and collective farms. For Goryeoin, a number of economically active people were concentrated in cities, and their favorite occupations were mainly teachers, public servants, and medical professionals. After independence, the economic confusion and difficulty in the overall society caused low pay and chronic delay in payment, driving out the comparatively highly educated Goryeoin elites to the occupations for livelihood and dispersing them to the small-scale market economy [79].

Table 7 – Population of Highly Educated Goryeoin in 1989 (Per 1,000 capita)

Classification	Kazakhstani Total	Goryeoin
Available Labor Population (16-59 yrs. old)	113	251
Male	107	245
Female	120	257
Labor Population	131	285
Male	121	276
Female	142	297
Source - «Census of the population of Kazakhstan in 2009» [87]		

In the trend of concentration on the public sector, many Goryeoin came to cooperate with or be employed by Korean businesses. For Goryeoin, they had already learned the business of private economy through “Gobonjil” (seasonal migrational farming) which had been illegally activated to overcome economic downturn in the late Soviet regime. The change of economic system also drove out the collective Goryeoin population in rural areas more rapidly. With this migration to cities, there came to remain few young Goryeoin in Ushtobe, one of their collective settlements, and there are now many traces of closed buildings and annexations of the former Soviet Kolkhozes.

In this way, Goryeoin’s occupational change after independence can be ascribed to the sudden change of economic system, but on the other hand, it can also be seen as an aspect that ethnic minorities are marginalized by linguistic policy in each independent republics. Unlike Uzbekistani strong policy of reviving the national language, Kazakhstan is promoting a comparatively mitigated and gradual policy, but the increasing weight of the state language is making Goryeoin gradually lose the reason to stay longer at official positions. All state and educational organizations are tending to adopt the official language policy to use Kazakh exclusively, which is a large burden to Goryeoin many of whom still remain in educational occupations, rather than public servants. Primary and middle schools, and universities are still operating both Kazakh classes and Russian classes, but all documents,

reports, and meetings are increasingly based on Kazakh, whose weight is also becoming heavier in lectures.

Kazakhstani policy of the state language not only applies to ethnic minorities, because some of the Russian speakers who represent the majority of Kazakh intellectuals already do not speak or be poor at Kazakh, their national language. Also for this group of Kazakhs, Kazakh language is a necessary language to learn.

The linguistic problem also encouraged Goryeoin to move to other areas where there is no linguistic burden. It was volunteer migration that they left for Russia, Ukraine, and Primorski Krai to find a new site for living after the Soviet cancellation of residence relocation limit in the late 1950s. However, the change of linguistic environment after the independence of republics led Goryeoin to relocate to Russophone areas, that is, Ukraine or Russian territories. Particularly, they moved to Primorski Krai regarded as their hometown, as well as Volgograd, Ural region, or Russian cities or rural areas.

Table 8 – State Languages of the Commonwealth of Independent States

State	State Language	Recital
Russia	Russian	Official and current language
Ukraine	Ukrainian	In Crimean ASSR where Russians live mostly, Russian is also a current language.
Belarus	Belarusian, Russian	Russian represents substantial weight.
Estonia	Estonian	Augmenting Estonian in policy
Kazakhstan	Kazakh	Parallel with Russian, gradually augmenting Kazakh in policy
Uzbekistan	Uzbek	Augmenting Uzbek in policy
Source - Lim Y.S. and Hwang Y.S. et al. Change of Goryeoin Society and Korean Nationals after the Soviet Dissolution (2005) [97]		

The Goryeoin who could not speak Kazakh were destined to lag behind in the public realm; particularly, they are confronting the structure that makes it difficult for them to enter officialdom in public in-

stitutions. The past in which they had led basic lives without worrying employment as everyone was guaranteed a stable workplace under the socialist regime was bygone days, but they had to adapt to the new system of private economy in which they should do economic activities themselves. The transformation from the socialist to the capitalist economic system became the basis of investment by many foreign enterprises. In particular, Kazakhstani government attracted foreign enterprises by providing the better environment for investment than other republics in Central Asia did.

In this change of regimes, some Goryeoin entrepreneurs grew by making favorable chances and amassing enormous economic wealth. All of the present-day representative Goryeoin politicians are related to enterprises as the former entrepreneurs or those on a concurrent office at present. Choi Yu-Ri is a Senator; Choi Victor is a member of the Majilis (the lower house); Kim Roman (advanced to in January, 2012) is a member of the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan and the president of Goryeoin Association. These are at once the representative politicians of Goryeoin and the chief executive officers of large firms. In addition, there are the Goryeoin entrepreneurs of great wealth who are distinguished in large-scale distribution, construction, finance, copper-mining, and the like. This suggests that the present-day success model in the Goryeoin society is changing from the Soviet intellectuals to entrepreneurs.

An increasing concern is that as Goryeoin show entirely different trend of occupation compared to the Soviet era, when they purported to become the Party executives and intellectuals as «Goryeoin Inteligenchya», they are now having more interest in business while lowering their will to education. This concern is now becoming the reality. «The Science, Technology and Culture of Kazakhstani Koreans» (2002) published by the Korean Scientists and Engineers Association in Kazakhstan (KAXAK) introduced successful Goryeoin in each field: it selected 613 intellectuals who were at the level of Goryeoin leaders, including 96 people born after the 1950s, 46 after the 1960s, and only 10 after the 1970s, which means the next generation of leaders are rapidly diminishing over time [85, p. 225]. The Goryeoin's positioning as intellectuals in the Soviet era became the past far from the

present. In terms of fostering future human resources, Kazakhstan is promoting such educational benefits as selecting scholarship students based on Kazakh students [85, p. 257], while the ethnic minorities are gathering more into economic activities, thus gradually increasing the gap between indigenes and ethnic minorities in the possibility of social success. Here, the linguistic barrier of a new state language is also adding the power to preventing ethnic minorities from entering the mainstream society.

Indigene-led state construction after the independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan yielded a social conflict and swayed the social foundation in the multinational situation. The independence was also an opportunity for the indigenes to «construct the nation-state» based on the recovery of national identity. In population make-up, Kazakhs had not represented the majority, but the outflow of other ethnic groups after independence lowered the total population and comparatively raised the weight of Kazakh population; also, the active policy of attracting overseas Kazakhs secured them as the majority group of Kazakhstan. The birth of the new state language and its policy had an effect of marginalizing the ethnic minorities from the mainstream society.

Since the early period after independence, the project of constructing the nation-state was so a sensitive matter that can alienate about 130 other ethnic groups, and actually yielded their resistance, schism, and conflict in the early days. If the state language augmentation policy led by the independent government was that which excluded ethnic minorities, the effort to make social integration by preventing inter-ethnic schism and conflicts caused by the exclusive policy was from a policy of embracement.

The concern of inter-ethnic schism by the effect of excluding other ethnic groups gave birth to the General Association of Nationalities in 1995, for embracing all ethnic groups. Each representative of ethnic groups becomes the member of the Association, which integrates various ethnic cultural organizations. This is an organization to gather the opinions of ethnic minorities, whose representatives can enter the Senate to represent their ethnic groups' interests by the revised Constitution as of 2007, which provided the opportunity of political participation for ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, some point out the ambivalence of

this organization whose function is to embrace the opinions of ethnic minorities on the one hand, but also to supervise them on the other.

Each cultural organization of ethnic groups under the Association is receiving the governmental support as a center of sustaining and succeeding their own tradition, language, and culture. However, some suggest a critical perspective that behind the cause of respecting and caring for the languages and traditions of ethnic minorities, there is a cold reality in which those who cannot speak the state language are being dismissed from the mainstream society. This perspective is grounded on multicultural criticism that “There is a hidden discrimination behind the surface of a policy decorated with multicultural consideration.” In this context, Goryeoin organizations ranging from the representative body like Goryeoin Association to the sub-organizations like Goryeo Ilbo, Goryeo Theater and Goryeo Cultural Center can be seen in another way: not so much as displaying the political competence, but as given the formal representation to appease the conflict with ethnic minorities alienated during the Kazakhs’ process of nation-state construction.

Still, the Kazakhstani revised Constitution in 2007 is actually taking careful approach to the problem of ethnicity for harmonizing ethnic groups, enlarging their chance to participate in central politics, and giving the chance to enter the upper and lower houses by eight to nine members from the Association. This careful attitude is more distinguishing in the Kazakhstani government’s religion policy. Since 2003, President Nazarbayev has held the World Council of Religious Leaders as the chairman, leading the regular meetings with religious leaders including Islamic, Catholic, Christian, Buddhist, and Won Buddhist leaders; receiving the international society’s attention, he is showing the will to social integration, displaying the harmony between the ethnic groups and religions in the country. This governmental will is from the reality in which there is still a source of schism between ethnic groups along with distinct dichotomy of religion into Islam and Russian Orthodox Church in Kazakhstan. For the distribution of religious population, the indigenous Kazakhs are mostly in the influential sphere of Islam, while Muslims are increasing in proportion to the Kazakh population. The following table shows the distinct difference of

religion between ethnic groups that except Russian Orthodox Church, almost all believe in Islam.

Table 9 – Religion in Kazakhstan

Religion	Population Rate by Religions (%)
Islam	70,2%
Christianity	26,2%
Buddhism	0.1%
Others	0,2%
No religion	2,8%
No response	0.5%
Source - Source - «Census of the population of Kazakhstan in 2009» [87].	

For Goryeoin, they are receiving the influence of religious open-door policy such as the influx of a number of Korean missionaries along with Korean businesses and the provision of opportunities to establish many churches. At present, many Korean churches are located in many Kazakhstan cities, and not only Koreans, but also Goryeoin account for a large part of the believers. Just in Almaty, over 40 Korean churches are registered now. However, many religious Goryeoin are mainly attending Russian Orthodox Church in which they have believed since their Far-East settlement before compulsory migration, basically having tended to distance themselves from Islam. This religious tendency strongly differs from the indigenous faith. Nevertheless, unlike Uzbekistan or Tajikistan of the same CIS (CHI) states, Kazakhstan is not dominated by the strong Muslim fundamentalism.

In terms of religion, the ethnic minorities as well as Kazakhs are displaying their pride in that they are at peace without religious conflict or discrimination in the multi-religious Kazakhstan: here, the government-led effort is contributing. President Nazarbayev who has led the triennial World Council of Religious Leaders since 2003 stresses the dialogue and reconciliation between ethnic groups and religions, showing the will to keep the social stability in the situation of multinationalities and multi-religions. This is not only to provide freedom

for religion, but also seen as displaying the effect of supervising and controlling the political movement of particular religions.

In the domestic and overseas press, the independent state Kazakhstan is discussed as the most economically open-door and forward-looking state amongst the CIS. Also, it evaluates itself and is evaluated by others as a stable state where ethnic groups are at peace without conflict or discrimination, watching the overt conflict between ethnic groups in the neighboring countries. Still, operating behind the various embracement policies to integrate ethnic groups is the mechanism of excluding other ethnic groups in the frame of projecting the Kazakhs' nation-state construction.

KEY QUESTIONS OF THE CHAPTER FOR READERS

1. Background of Koreans' migration into Far East, Primorski Krai from motherland;
2. Three phases of migration and settlement of Korean diaspora in Primorski Krai;
3. High autonomous and cultural activities of Primorski Koreans;
4. Primorski Koreans' initiative in the independence activities against Japanese rule of motherland;
5. Soviet Revolution, and the merging of the Korean independence army into the Soviet Union;
6. Persecution and Hardship of Compulsory Migration of Koreans into Central Asia; Soviet revolution and
7. Causes of compulsory displacement;
8. Vulnerable social status of Soviet Koreans, and rapid russification;
9. Soviet Dissolution and the Status of Kazakhstani Goryeoins;
10. 1988 Seoul Olympics and Emergence of a New Motherland-South Korea;
11. Birth of an independent state, Kazakhstan, and its Nation-state building;
12. Being new citizen in new Republic state;
13. Linguistic identity of Kazakhstani Koreans.

CHAPTER III

IDENTITY FORMATION AND DIVISION OF FORMER SOVIET KOREANS

This chapter examines the identity formation process of the former Soviet Goryeoin and their internal differentiation. Particularly, it reveals the background of heterogeneity and conflicts between two Goryeoin groups in the process of Sovietization. In the vast Soviet area, the Korean groups came to walk on the same way under the Soviet regime, but their migrations path and motivation were different, and only for this reason, they were differentiated into heterogeneous groups with each other. The encounter between the majority group who experienced rapid Russification due to compulsory migration and the minority group – the newcomer Goryeoin – who advanced to the continent to newly join the residential society caused the conflict between their heterogeneities.

3.1 Model Soviet Koreans

The migrant Koreans who dared to cross the northern border of the Korean Peninsula due to economical or political suppressions in specific periods had to live on receiving hospitality or sometimes discriminations at the host society where strange Russians ruled even though the place was close to the motherland. The Far-East Koreans had to manage unstable lives with vulnerable legal and social security as illegal immigrants at the host country. The Far-East Koreans settled down their basements at the unfamiliar host society before migrating to Central Asia, and had strong prides as patriots such as autonomously initiating Korean independence movement despite many difficulties. They played leading roles in overseas Korean independence movement against the aggression of the Imperialist Japan setting up the main base of movement, and their independence struggles were not short-term and temporary, but established the Provisional Government and the national independence army by participation of Korean intellectuals, militia, and farmers, as well as with material supports from rich farmers and patriots. In addition to the armed fights with Japanese military, they explored mutual assistance with the interna-

tional society, publicizing nationalist media and magazines translated into various kinds of languages including English, and fostered talent by establishing ethnic educational institutions, all of which were indeed multilateral concentration of abilities. The Far-East Koreans are also the central figures who occupy important pages in the Korean history of anti-Japanese independence movement.

After joining the Soviet Red Army that had suggested the hope of “Ideal world,” the Far-East Korean Independence Army remained only as a contributor to the Soviet construction, but their role of nationalist patriots was not permitted any more in the process of establishing the Soviet Union. It was because the hope for the new Soviet government that the Korean Independence Army shed blood to eliminate Japanese military and the White Army by allying with the Bolshevik revolutionary army (the Red Army). That is, expectations were inflated such as wealthy farmer’s lands would be forfeited and peasantries could be liberated from unequal structures, and thus all economic situations would be better. However, more miserable situations than the past were waiting for Koreans in reality. Under Stalin’s iron fist, the Far-East Koreans came to be expelled to the inland because they were considered as obstacles in the Far-East border region’s stability.

After the mid-1930s, the Far-East Koreans could not escape from grand purge and compulsory migration from Stalin’s reign of terror. Most Goryeoin intellectuals became the targets of purge. Positions of Goryeoin in the Soviet Union were very vulnerable legally and socially, and they had to willingly submit to the limit of residence relocation by which they could not go over designated regions. Every immigrant’s secession to other regions was guarded and controlled, and then such surveillance and control were enlarged to general residents since a state of emergency was proclaimed to whole areas of the Soviet Union when German Fascists invaded the Soviet Union in June, 1941[31, p. 220].

In the situation of national crisis by the war, Stalin produced and spread patriotic discourses such as “Fascists to defeat”, and “Anti-Fascist”, and thus the Soviet power allowed all the people to walk into the only way of becoming patriots shouting victory in the war with Germany. However, Goryeoin group after compulsory migration was

suppressed by governing authorities, and so feeling pity for the restriction of their participation in the war, they made every effort to become patriots despite limited legal positions.

As its traces, Goryeoin's writing of looking back on the sad situation at the time when they could not participate in the great patriot war (the Second World War) frequently appeared in the ethnic newspaper «Lenin Kichi». The positions of Goryeoin in Central Asia who migrated forcefully were legally classified as the «administratively exiled», but the comprehensive report on Goryeoin migration in October 1937 defined them as “special immigrants” [31, p. 220]. The degree of treatments and controls were different toward various emigrants. Germans or Poles who were branded as cooperators with the enemy German military, and the groups like Chechens or Ingush who compulsorily migrated by punishment on dissident seditious forces had to receive stronger controls than Goryeoin in the early migration period. Together with them, however, the Goryeoin positioned as special immigrants who were not allowed to join up the military had to be utilized as laborers belonging to the labor force during the War.

Before 1937, Goryeoin worked in the Red Army as backbone or high-commanding agents, but remaining in the Red Army was not permitted after compulsory migration. That is, they were deprived of the position of becoming soldiers, thus having no right to fight with Fascists in the Western or Eastern Front during the War. The trace of disappointment and complaint is remaining from Goryeoin communists and young communists whose applications for joining up the army were rejected. According to N.F Bugai, a Goryeoin scholar in Russia, there are a great number of petitions such as “Goryeoin have no problems morally and politically, and young Goryeoin hopes to be input to the front voluntarily” in the intelligence data of the Soviet People's Committee of Internal Affairs [31, p. 222].

Although deprivation of the right to participate in the war was considered the largest insults from Stalin, anyone did not complain it. As Goryeoin were not “perfect” citizens of the Soviet Union, their willingness to participate in the war was frustrated, but there were quite exceptions. For children to adults, Germany was engraved as the target to defeat as in “Crazy Hitler” and “Fascist as the enemy of the Red Army”,

and boys envied those who put on anti-fascist leaflets, and thoughts of having to punish Fascists in the front with guns were full. Some young Goryeoin submitted military-enlistment applications to the “Military Committee” by deceiving ages, and after receiving the notice of enlistment permission, left their homes stealthily and get on the trains for the front. They entered the army sometimes after changing their names like “Kazakh” or “Kyrgyz” ones by hiding Goryeoin names with earnest desire for saving the country. There were also several Goryeoin who entered the army by bothering to chase the Military Committee. In Goryeoin’s private collection data, there were exceptional documents that young Goryeoin’s aspirations were more easily realized than expected unlike the principle of prohibiting special migrants from participating in the war (Interview: Sept. 9, 2010; June 26, 2011; July 4, 2011). Those documents of enlistment permission on Goryeoin confirmed that Goryeoin students who were studying near the front line neighboring Moscow, Lenin Grad, Saratov, and Sverdlovsk joined up the army [38, p. 82-84]. This point showed a fact that prohibition on enlistments by classification of Goryeoin into «hostile» or «seditious» ethnics at the time was not applied nationwide over the Soviet Union.

Names of Goryeoin war heroes and soldiers are decorating pages of victory history of the Soviet Union. As for Min A.P. who became a war hero by participating in the war of the Soviet Union, his records on war participations are being exhibited in Kazakhstani National Central Museum, and his name remains in a street of Tashkent. Besides, names of bravery veterans are well-known such as Submarine Captain Han A., Staff Sergeant Choi as Intelligence Agent, Captain Chun S. as Infantry Battalion Commander, and Chung M. as Machine Gunner. Especially, in case of the female medical Master Sergeant Lim V., she was awarded many war prizes including «Red Star Order» and «Great Patriot Order» [66, p. 88]. Nowadays, «Officer Club» is being operated as memorizing Goryeoin war heroes at the «Great Patriot War». The military officers were composed of 48 people from captains to colonels at the Soviet era, and they serviced in such various fields as air forces, tank forces, rocket launching forces, search operation unit, and information & communication unit [100, p. 30]. Veterans wear the uniforms of military officers whose front are decorated with medals, and proudly

participate in important events such as the «8/15 Independence Day of Korea» and the «Victory Day of the Great Patriotic War», also strolling along parks and streets.

Meanwhile, most Goryeoin were invested to the labor front even though there were partially those who firsthand participated in the war. They were appropriated to other strategic industries such as the coal mine or metal, and composed of “Special migrants” who could not win main confidence. In the Karaganda Mine of Kazakhstan where many Goryeoin were invested, no less than 2,000 people passed away [66, p. 89]. Goryeoin also worked in the Volga River together with Germans, convicts, and prisoners of the war, and these sacrifices were recognized as dedicators after the war by becoming medalists called Labor Heroes in reward for participation in the labor front of the “Great Patriot War.”

Most men were mobilized to labor forces and weak old people and juveniles remained in Kolkhozes, but they nevertheless became merits in solving food problems of the army. As food matters were important tasks to feed soldiers who took refuges to Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan from European territories of the Soviet Union conquered by Fascists at the early war, government directed expansions of seeding areas in Kolkhozes and Goryeoin cultivated virgin soils, then acquiring good results from dedicated labors. As a representative Goryeoin, there was Kim Man-Sam, a foreman of rice growing in Kolkhoz «Avant-garde» in Kyzylorda. He harvested 15 ton per 1 ha and his fame was known throughout the Soviet Union; even «Songs on Kim Man-Sam» was made as well. His scientific methods of rice growing were widespread giving birth to many effort heroes who learnt techniques from him.

During the wartime, Goryeoin intended to save their state (USSR) by contributing capitals earned from dedicated labors to «National Defense Fund» that was a front-supporting movement. Many Goryeoin Kolkhozes deposited several thousands to millions of Rubles, assisting with various methods such as loan bond or products. As prominent phenomena, Goryeoin who contributed in large scales came into lines that could not be seen in other ethnic groups in the Soviet Union. Shin Hyun-Moon, Representative of “Dali Vostok” (Far-East) dedicated 120 thousand Rubles, Lim Pavel, a truck driver, 303 thousand Rubles to manufacture air fighter, and Choi Sergei, Representative of a Kolkhoz

in Tashkent, 1 million Rubles for manufacturing expenses on tanks and air fighters. It was told that Choi Sergei sent a telegram message while dedicating much money to the Soviet authorities such as “Please use this personal money to manufacture air fighters, and let the manufacturing time of the air fighter be lessened by labors of corresponding factories by using this fund so as to make large blows to Hitler imperialists by the Red Army” [60, p. 77].

During the war, sacrifices and efforts of Goryeoin appeared as wonderful results. For example, over 1,000 Goryeoin won medals as merits of “Dedicated Labors for the Great Patriot War 1941-1945” during 1946 to 1947 among total 3,861 medalists only at the Karatal Raion of Almaty Oblast. When looking into their high labor achievements during the wartime from the latter half of the 1940s to the 1960s and the number of designation of Goryeoin as Socialist Labor Heroes during the period of people economy recovery, they achieved outstanding records more than other ethnic groups. At the time, Hero medalists in the Soviet Union were composed of 201 Goryeoin, 165 Kyrgyz, 217 Tartars, and 230 Tajiks, thus it is found that Goryeoin represented much higher proportion than others considering every total population of each ethnic group that was 3.5 to 12 times larger than Goryeoin [44, March 17, 1990, 3]. In Uzbekistan, there were three people who awarded the titles of Socialist Heroes twice in history, one of whom was Representative Kim Byeong-Hwa at the «Polar Star» Kolkhoz. His name is being used in a street.

During the war, Goryeoin recorded marvelous harvests in rice farming at Kolkhoz and in cotton growing which they had never experienced. Goryeoin showed impressive results in any agricultural products. Particularly, many Goryeoin who cultivated onion, beet, vegetables, melon, watermelon, and the like in Kazakhstan awarded the titles of Socialist Heroes. In this way, Goryeoin proved patriots of the Soviet Union with wonderful patriotism and passions on dedicated labors rather than expressing angers from compulsory migration. Stalin’s absolute power and speculation that the enemies of socialism existed at any place was strengthened in the wartime, and all people’s abilities were concentrated in removing main enemies under the state of national emergency. All people stepped forward to struggles against ag-

gressions, and regarded sacrifices for victories as their respective duty. Not only at the forefronts, victories were also emphasized at the rears, coal mines, Kolkhozes and every field, with victory spirits boosted as large-scale labor heroism [60, p. 78].

Goryeoin began to receive recognition on their dedications from the host country by making marvelous performances to the state's requests and displaying voluntary loyalty despite the restricted environment positioned as forced migrants. Rather than betraying under the host country's oppression and persecution, Goryeoin made chances in the state crisis of the war. They could not leave their restricted areas, not be permitted any social or political activity, but restricted in joining up the army, and thus becoming equal members of the society would be seen impossible. The only possibility for hopeful life was laid in devoting to the assigned respective labors. Goryeoin expressed their excellent achievements as the result of efforts to win recognition as respectful ethnos with diligence and sense of responsibility.

According to postwar recovery and economic revival, the Soviet power of oppressive measures on migrants began to weaken and Goryeoin who became effort heroes in the wartime and the postwar restoration began to strengthen their positions in the Soviet society. After Stalin's death, the limit of residence relocation was released, and the ethnic oppression was recognized as illegal and a criminal behavior by a legal decree «on the Release of Restrictive Action on Special Residences by Legal Position of Special Migrants» along with the Stalin degrading movement at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party in 1956. Although perfect compensations or recovery measures on ethnic oppression were not made, partial recovery of honor was being made. Recovering the Soviet citizenships, Goryeoin could gain the chances of receiving high education at other areas. Goryeoin showed prominence in each sector. Han Baleri, a Goryeoin scholar, was proud of the fact that it is the only case of Korean diaspora in the world that Goryeoin took high positions and achieved success playing active roles in various fields such as government officers and politician, educators and scientific academic leaders, agricultural economy leaders, famous sportspeople, and artists [60, p. 81]. Their pride in getting the basis for survival by becoming members of the Soviet society while over-

coming extreme ordeals made Goryeoin describe themselves as «the faithful Soviet patriots and internationalists», and strengthened their self-esteem and significance of existence as the model Soviet Koreans.

3.2 Language and Naming

Goryeoin's opportunities of high education played a great role in quickly accelerating their adaptation and assimilation to the Soviet society. Appearance of Goryeoin resources in the Soviet society was derived from their active linguistic adaptation and assimilation requested by the society. Rapid assimilation to Russian language concurrently made naming and renaming to Russia-style names, and increased marriage rates with other ethnics. To the Soviet Goryeoin group, the way of guaranteeing survival in the host society was to become the "Entire Soviet people" requested by the Soviet power while having shameful and infamous collective experience called compulsory migration. Insisting their ethnic heritage was likely to be branded as "Nationalism", which was thus recognized as an obstacle to survival.

The Soviet Goryeoin's turn to Soviet language while neglecting their ethnic language was partially due to the tough linguistic policy of the Soviet power, and partially from their choice to secure survival. The linguistic policy promoted by the Soviet government was to adapt an important communicative and common language for effective state management of the Soviet Union composed of multinationalities along with extensive areas, and to enlarge the usage scope and role of Russian language. The Soviet power stressed the preservation of each ethnic group's language, tradition, and culture, and had a basic principle of not stimulating ethnic feelings. However, except for such indigenous languages as Kazakh or Uzbek, ethnic languages and schools of other ethnic minorities were not considered under the Stalin power. Goryeoin's ethnic language schools were abolished with the command called «Reorganization of Ethnic Schools» in April, 1938 [42, p. 186-187] due to the announcement of a law in March, 1938 that made Russian language education mandatory to all Soviet people, and also in December, 1939, a directive of abolishing ethnic publications called «On Ethnic Language Materials» was notified [42, p. 335].

At the time, there was an effort to establish more than 40 Goryeoin ethnic schools of education based in Kyzylorda despite the harsh environment of compulsory migration, but it was nullified by conversion to the schools where Russian was exclusively used. This measure not only applied to Koreans, but to other ethnic minorities such as Germans, Volgars, Dungans (Chinese Muslims), and Uyghurs.

The ethnic newspaper Lenin Kichi having survived under the oppression of ethnic languages was a means to propagandize the Soviet system and the Communist party's ideology, and Goryeo Theatre was also restricted in expressing ethnic arts, only staying at displaying and uplifting the greatness of the Soviet system in order to have pride as the Soviet people, and its ethnic color was originally blockaded. While the previous Korean writers who were active in Korean literary works in the Far-East were called ethnic authors, the Goryeoin authors in the Soviet period were called the Soviet writers of Russian works written in Russian language. It means that the vein of ethnic authors who endeavored to save ethnic literature and newspapers were difficult to continue in the Soviet period after compulsory migration [94, p. 32-33]. This clear distinction between ethnic and Soviet authors in Goryeoin literature was ascribed to the fact that the former could not reveal nostalgia for or ethnicity of the motherland any more through their works under the oppression after compulsory migration, thus finding no alternative than choosing to turn to the «Soviet ideology-type authors».

Even though the status of Goryeoin ethnos may have changed after Stalin's death, the status of their ethnic language had never changed at all. Although Lenin emphasized the equal policy on ethnic languages, he focused on spreading revolution ideology by crusading against illiteracy and distributing education. If Stalin's linguistic policy expanded mandatory education of Russian language, Khrushchev's policy in 1958 and 1959 brought the effect of solidifying the status of Russian, ensuring its linguistic position higher-ranked in functional and practical respects than ethnic languages, then making people naturally select Russian over ethnic languages. In Brezhnev period from the late 1960s to the 1970s, Russian education was structurally implemented from kindergarten, and the policy of solidifying the foundations of Russian language was fully carried out toward all people. By the linguistic pol-

icy fit to the Soviet ideology, Russian became the communication language between ethnic groups, “Socialist language”, and “Great Russian language” [101, p. 149-150].

Everybody had to be fluent in Russian in order to succeed in all fields including administration and education. The Soviet dual policy on ethnic groups and languages focused on making “Soviet humans”, thus settling down Russian language as a key part in each activity sphere that mediates all ethnic groups without exception. Nonetheless, a fact could be known from the next statistics that it took long time for Russian language to settle down as the first language in the Soviet society as shown in the slow increase.

Table 10 – Change of ethnic language proportion in the former Soviet Union

Year	ethnic language as the first language	Russian as the first language
1959	87.6%	10.8%
1970	87.7%	12.3%
1979	86.4%	13.6%
1989	69.1%	25.6%
1994	66.6%	25.5%
Source - Yoo S.M. Soviet linguistic policies' theories and practices in The Mirage of Utopia [101]		

According to the above table, how much each ethnic group preserved their own language was considerably various, and it was quite distinctive that the degree of losing the mother tongue was higher in Goryeoin than in other ethnic groups. According to the 1979 statistics [89], 55.4% of Goryeoin within the Soviet Union used Korean as the mother tongue, and 44.4% used Russian like the mother tongue, among the total 389,000 Goryeoin. This rate shows how strongly Goryeoin assimilated to Russian language compared to the rate of ethnic language used as the first language in the same year being 86.4% while Russian being only 13.6% in all the Soviet Union. Differences on assimilation

to Russian language by ethnic groups could be sensed more solidly from the statistics of quantified values. 92.1% Goryeoin within the Soviet Union used Russian as the first language or second language, but 49.9% Uzbeks, 54.3% Kazakhs, 26.4% Turkmens, 29.9% Kyrgyz, 30.4 % Tajiks used Russian language [27, p. 116].

Linguistic assimilation of Goryeoin was a basic procedure of becoming members of their residential society. Amongst old documents of the former Soviet Union, there were Goryeoin parents' letters that requested exclusion of their mother tongue in school education because it would be inefficient and burdened for their children to learn both Russian and the mother tongue at the same time. This letter states that Goryeoin parents had believed that their children had to receive the Soviet education with Russian language, thoroughly become the Soviet people requested from the ruling system and have the Party register in order to guarantee their successful future. Selection of Russian was from their passion and willingness to root more deeply as members in the Soviet Union just like their own patriotism shown by displaying miraculous performances at battlefield, industrial sites, and further farms where women, children, and weak old people remained under the Soviet crises, and then became merits on victories. Russianization was groped as the only way to survive with no room for resistance at the Soviet regime, and further Goryeoin had pride as constituents together with recovery of ethnic self-esteem in the postwar host country, and this could facilitate their affiliation to the society more thoroughly.

As the Soviet patriots, using Russian language as the main language, and becoming members of the Soviet Union, Goryeoin also had to have other names than the previous names used every day. Although naming or renaming in a Russian style had been partially done before compulsory migration, it was not generalized. Some Goryeoin who intended to acquire Russian citizenship at the Far-East had learnt Russian language attending Russian Orthodox Church and received Russian-style names, becoming Russianized from the early stage.

Dzhrylgasina R. S classifies the transition periods of Goryeoin naming as follows. He insisted that Goryeoin had ethnic names first during the mid-19th century to the 1920s, changed the traditional names to Russian names during the 1920s to 1930s, and gradually increased Rus-

sian naming during the 1930s to 1960s [27, p. 67]. Changes of Goryeoin that appear in the actual old documents show that the group was encountering a large turning point after tortures and crisis period of great cataclysms such as compulsory migration and the World War.

The old Soviet document data show that uses of Russian-style names were not commonplace affairs in Goryeoin society until the early Far-East Soviet regime in 1922. In the Korean partisan forces' list of Goryeoin corps officials [42, p. 94] who were incorporated to the Soviet Red Army, anyone of the 17 officials had not Russian names yet. Also, all of the total 21 Goryeoin Kolkhozniks in the fishery Kolkhoz «Trudryba» in 1938 right after compulsory migration kept their ethnic names [43, p. 137]. On the other hand, in case of another Goryeoin group at the similar period, five people amongst 26 Communist party members who had been oppressed or expelled during 1937 to 1938 and three amongst 11 Goryeoin teachers in Guriyev Oblast in 1939 were using Russian names [43, p. 146-147]. This shows that Russian-style names were preferred by intellectuals such as party members or teachers, but almost strange for ordinary Goryeoin.

As an exceptional case, there were evidences that many people in a Korean group did naming and renaming into a Russian style before compulsory migration. In the 1930s before compulsory migration, the large number of 21 amongst 69 parents-generation people used Russian names amongst total 43 households in the list of «Kazris» Goryeoin who migrated to Almatinski District of Kazakhstan for doing rice growing requested by the Republic among the Far-East Goryeoin [42, p. 176]. Also, children of parents who had Russian names had almost all Russian names, and children of parents who had ethnic names also tended to use Russian names partially or totally. This can be seen as a special case because they migrated to the far region from Korean collective villages of the Far-East, and the new migrated place was an interested and controlled region under the Soviet authority, and thus they had to assimilate more to the new residential society.

However, there are prominent differences between Goryeoin namings after the end of the Second World War and in the period of compulsory migration. During the Great Patriot War (the Soviet-German War) from 1941 to 1945, the number of Goryeoin who had

kept ethnic names was rather lower among those who awarded Effort Hero medals in Kolkhoz, industrial sites, or the like [43, p. 188-193]; also from 1950, pure ethnic names were very rarely shown in case of Goryeoin Kolkhozniks at «Kumzota» of Zambul Province, which means Russian names became generalized and without seeing their surnames, one could not judge the ethnic groups to which they were belonging. At schools or workplaces where they work with those who used different languages, it was hard and considered inconvenient to be called by their own ethnic names from colleagues or superiors. Thus, new Russian names were given by workplace's superiors or surrounding people, or made voluntarily, and Goryeoin recalled it as inevitable things.

It was shown in the transition period that naming and renaming into strange Russian were not all the way easy until they came to use Russian names naturally. This was because although it was easy to make Russian names that other ethnics can easily call, they had to add a new Russian patronymic (father's name), which they had never had before in ethnic names, next to the first name while keeping the ethnic surname. Sometimes they revised their ethnic surnames by borrowing Russian pronunciation considering other ethnics who would call them by the names but feel difficulty in calling Korean ethnic surnames. That is, although Kim or Park could be used as it was, surnames that were ended with vowel sounds like Suh, Lee, Oh and Noh had to be changed into Shegay, Nigay, Ohgay and Nogay by adding "- gay" which meant the family (ga, 家) of surname in Korean as in "Lee-ga" and "Park-ga" but made it easy for other ethnics to pronounce. However, this way of revising surnames considering the callers caused arbitrary transcriptions with no clear principle. As they make various transcriptions for one surname arbitrarily, there are some surnames of Goryeoin that makes it hard to know which is which. This is because they utilized similarly pronounced alphabets arbitrarily. For example of Yeom, it was expressed such as Яем, Пем, and Ем. The Korean scholar Ko Song-Mu indicated the cases of ethnic surnames whose origins cannot be known such as Non, Fvon, Khak, Khen, Agay, Dyagay, and Shigay [27, p. 67]. Goryeoin's naming and renaming showed hybridity as a third form that imitated Russian names distant from ethnic names while sustaining the trace of ethnicity.

In notating patronymics, there is a formulation of attaching “-vich” to men and “-vna” to women. Goryeoin sometimes made patronymics by applying this formulation to his father’s ethnic name, but they mainly selected the nearest pronunciations with Russian patronymics that had been used commonly. Same patronymics with Russian ones now are derived from these reasons. In an episode of the short novel «Green Passport» published in the ethnic newspaper «Lenin Kichi», a Goryeoin hero showed a conflictive situation that his own ethnic name was difficult to be called from the Soviet people, and also making a patronymic from his father’s name was not easy:

Kim Myeong-Sik was called “Kim Chik” because “Myeong-Sik” was difficult pronunciation for Western classmates at university. There was the name “Kim” in Russian names, even occasionally, so he was called «Kim Chik» like a nickname. Koreans ridiculed him because its pronunciation sounded like “Kimchikuk (Kimchi soup)”, but fellow students liked his nickname and enjoyed calling it so. After graduating from the university and the more and more gray hair, someone called him “Mikhail” borrowing the first alphabet of his forename as if he felt clumsy to call «Kim Chik», and put a patronymic “Ivanovich” as many Koreans used this patronymic favorably. Kim himself would feel much embarrassed by his name. He remembered that when he met people in other business place and exchanged names, they hesitated to call his name “Myeong Sik” because of difficulty to pronounce it and even forgot it commonly. Especially, when his son came to get citizenship, it was like a joke really. He had to fill a patronymic in the identification, but it must be “Menssikovich” following Russian lexicology. Thus, his son rejected this patronymic decisively because the pronunciation sounded like the Russian word meaning ‘urinate’ and nearly vulgar expressions if translated to Kazakh [44: Feb. 29, 1990, 4].

Goryeoin made their Russian names arbitrarily with pronunciations that could be called well rather than followed ethnic names which contained meanings of Chinese characters. Also, many Goryeoin women followed their husbands’ surnames by putting aside ethnic surnames since they married. According to Dzhyrgasinova R.S., following hus-

bands' surnames has been practiced since the Soviet regulation on marriage in 1967. [27, p. 70]. It was unveiled from interviews that over half of Goryeoin married women of the third migrant generation transferred to husbands' surnames. As they stated that they had not been forced to have husbands' surnames but chose them with their preference, the law of 1967 seemed not to have been effective continuously. Nowadays, it is common to see Goryeoin women who naturally follow the Russian tradition of using surnames of Russian or Goryeoin husbands.

I am Yeom Aliya Nikolrayebeuna. Though my father's surname is Kang, I am using Yeom that was my husband's surname. This way is not fixed in law, but a Russian family sustains only one surname ordinarily. So wife follows it generally. We are Russianized people. My mother's surname was Kim, but she changed it into Kang, my father's surname. My daughter-in-law and most of my friends also followed this way. This is common thing because our mentality is just the same as Russian one (Interview: August 5, 2010).

The use of Russian-style names has already been generalized nowadays except for the old generation from Sakhalin. They had already been Russianized linguistically, and disconnected with the motherland ethnicity having deeply assimilated to Russian culture. This was because receiving Soviet education and assimilating to Russian culture was valued as an important means to be deeply rooted in the Soviet society.

It is bygone for all ethnic groups to unexceptionally follow Russian names and be Russianized linguistically, and the coming era of new independent republics is going forward to escape from the Soviet legacy by the lead of each Republic's indigenes after the Soviet dissolution. Some new generations of independent republican indigenes refuse previous Russian-style naming. There were not patronymics in traditional Kazakh names like Goryeoin traditional names, and now it is apparently increasing that Kazakhs turn to follow their traditional way of not putting patronymics in names. The names of new generation without patronymics are increasingly visible among Goryeoin as well. A Goryeoin

boy who showed dance performance on the stage of 8/15 Independence Day in 2010 was introduced as the name of “Kang Timur.” Although main repertoires of Goryeoin’s event were Russian and ethnic songs before the independence of Kazakhstan, now the Goryeoin ethnic Chorus attempts to sing some Kazakh songs, which means they are entering into Kazakhstanization instead of Russianization.

3.3 Differentiation of Korean Ethnic Group

Oldcomer and Newcomer

Most Goryeoin joined in quick Sovietization along with linguistic assimilation. As Korean diaspora, Soviet Goryeoin piled up large merits for the Soviet society in spite of great ordeals from the upper power at the host society, and became heroes and patriots of the Soviet Union. However, the existing immigrants who were immersing to Sovietization came to face inevitable conflictive situations while meeting with new immigrants who had to newly adapt to the Soviet regime.

After Stalin’s death, Soviet Koreans met with a new turning point and began to move to many other places due to the release from residence relocation limit. While the Soviet society was getting stable due to postwar rehabilitation and Stalin was died, critical atmosphere on his cult of personality and dictatorship was coming out. The measures of limiting residence relocation given to the forced migrants in 1956 were released. The Soviet government regretted and admitted that all past suppressive and violent measures like forced deportation were wrong and criminal measures at an announcement on “Revaluation on the Special Migrants” in 1957. Although their achievements were recognized to some extent during war and postwar rehabilitation times, this new moment brought a large change of legal and social positions to Goryeoin who had been underestimated with limited rights under the rule of Stalin. As they could move freely to other regions within the boundary of the Soviet Union, Goryeoin young people attempted to have more chances of higher education and went to cities to find various occupations.

Although the Korean ethnic group in Central Asia was mostly composed of Koreans who settled down by compulsory migration, new-

comers came to this area for other reasons. The newcomer groups came through various routes: one group from Sakhalin; another group from North Korea who stayed in the Soviet area not returning to their country after serving as workers; other group from Ural or other areas who settled down since compulsory migration and then moved to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and the Soviet regions to find out better living conditions.

When looking into population of Goryeoin, a population of 25,000 is in Almaty and 100,000 is in Kazakhstan, both of which are mostly composed of the Primorski from Primorski Krai, and a few of which are North Korean natives and nearly 200 Sakhalinski. The current Sakhalinski Goryeoin in Russia have had chances to visit or return to the motherland permanently by the Korean government and Japanese assistances since 1989. The Central Asian Sakhalinski in independent republics of the former Soviet Union were also given the same chances. Most Sakhalinski in Kazakhstan who were born before 1945 chose to return to the motherland except for a few.

The Sakhalinski speak Korean very fluently and have strong emotional ties with Korea unlike the Primorski. They do not associate with the Primorski well, but work at Goryeo Ilbo or Goryeo Broadcasting, or play roles of brokers or do business between Kazakhstani people and Korean companies that entered into Kazakhstan, thanks to their fluency of Korean language. They keep strong solidarity through regular meetings and friendship activities within their group. The Sakhalinski in Almaty organized a Goryeoin group called «Hyang-uhoe» (Hometown-Friends Association) in Almaty Goryeoin Cultural Center in 2000, in which there are nearly 100 registered members including 10~15 active ones, although the number of members has been reduced due to permanent returns to Korea. It is in large contrast that there are quite some Sakhalinski who can speak Korean over 60 years old unlike the Primorski who almost do not speak the mother tongue. This is because ethnic schools of education have been operated in Sakhalin unlike the inland settlements where all ethnic schools have been closed since 1938.

The reason why both Goryeoin groups, Sakhalinski and Primorski, landed in Russian territory by external oppressive situations is simi-

lar, but chronologically different. The Sakhalinski were mobilized into Sakhalin as industrial workers under Japanese colonialism, but they came to have the same fortune as the Soviet people at last. As they confronted poor living conditions without room for the choice of education or occupation, they left the Sakhalin island for inland cities such as Khabarovsk, Tomsk, Novosibirsk, and Almaty, which were more developed comparatively rather than other places in the Soviet Union. In this way, the Sakhalinski put down roots in Central Asia after the previous settlement of the Primorski. It had not been the first confrontation that the Sakhalinski and the Primorski encountered in inland since the former were incorporated into the Soviet Union. There was a history that the inland Goryeoin became involved in Sovietization of the Sakhalinski who had been under the Japanese rule until the Second World War.

Until the early 20th century, Sakhalin was known as a Russian exile of criminals. As a result of Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War, Japan occupied South Sakhalin in 1905. Sakhalinski Koreans were those who mainly lived in the southern part of Korea, and was recruited or mobilized to Sakhalin as the labor force by Japan before and during the Second World War. As Japan was defeated in 1945, all Japanese were withdrawn with their troops, leaving the Koreans there. According to the 1946 Soviet Union statistics, 23,498 Koreans lived in Sakhalin. [27, p. 41]. They became stateless Soviet residents left in foreign country as different from their will, having no way to return to the motherland after being belonged to the Soviet Union. Sakhalinski Koreans without the normal Soviet citizenship had to visit police registration office once in every three months, furthermore limited in educational opportunities [52, p. 87]. They attempted reckless attempts to return to the motherland standing at the crossroads whether they had citizenship or not by the 1960s. In order to escape from stateless status, some attempted to acquire citizenships as an obvious way of becoming the Soviet citizens, or others did not stop writing applications for returning to South Korea without giving up the hope of homecoming. Particularly, some young Goryeoin were enticed to North Korea while grieving desperate future.

In my memory, I had a green certificate of residence to which «stateless» was manifested instead of normal citizen certificate in the Soviet Union. This stateless certificate was called «horse passport», which meant that its possessor had to move by controls just like horse's reins, and was liken to a state of not having freedom and rights. When writing applications on returns to South Korea, absurd affairs happened like being migrated to other places from the very beginning. They requested returns to South Korea and demonstrated repeatedly, but came to recognize its uselessness in the 1960s to 1970s, and thus those who select citizenship of the Soviet Union increased after giving up returns. Minors like us became the Soviet citizens automatically if parents got the Soviet citizen certificate (Interview: June 12, 2011).

With the certificate of residence indicating stateless person, young people came to have desperate days without the future because they could not get into university and join the Communist Party. North Korean authority lured with fair words that admission without examination to Kim Il Sung University, the top university, and nationality of North Korea were possible. Therefore, approximately 1,000 young people went to North Korea, but I understand that they became dead after being captured and their life and death were unknown because relations between North Korea and the Soviet Union became bad (Interview: June 14, 2009).

North Korean selections of young Sakhalinski ended in this tragedy. Regarding Goryeoin in Sakhalin who evaded Soviet citizenship, citizenship holders were enlarged a little during the Khrushchev administration, but they were extremely minor until 1956. In the 1958 survey, 1,008 people received the Soviet citizenship, 7,346 North Korean nationality, and 15,909 people wanted to remain as stateless status. In January 1988 statistics, a fact was found that considerable people insisted on stateless status to the end as 32,000 Soviet citizenship, 456 North Korean nationality, and 2,261 stateless people appeared (Kwon 1996, 88). A Sakhalinski delivers a message that his uncle could not give up the hope for homecoming until the early 1960s, thinking parents of the hometown.

My uncle in Sakhalin was always piling up baggage to the trunk, waiting for homecoming. He could not communicate with Korea directly. He wasn't able to come directly to understand each other with Korea. Through some efforts, he received a letter from his father in Korea through Japan at last. At that time, my uncle was crying without eating foods for several days. After all, he died in Sakhalin, not achieving his dream (Interview: July 1, 2011).

This Sakhalinski recalled his uncle's sorrows, saying with stress, "There are many people who abuse Gorbachev, but they have to give thanks to him." Sakhalinski Goryeoin's permanent returns to Korea, he insisted, were ascribed to the open-door policy of Gorbachev that accelerated the Soviet dissolution.

With the Soviet dissolution, the Sakhalinski is receiving benefits of permanent returns to Korea. This point is contrasted to the Primorski who could not succeed in homecoming due to many matters even though a part of them returned to Primorski Krai after the Soviet dissolution, and then remained as displaced people. Prior to the present benefits of the Sakhalinski, they had to be largely discriminated from the majority Primorski as the same ethnos at the closed Soviet society. Divisive lives between the two same ethnos were caused by the different history of migrant experiences from each other.

As Goryeoin in Sakhalin had no experience under the Soviet ideology and regime at the early transfer to socialist system, the Soviet authority regarded them as the target to infuse with socialist ideology, thus dispatching many Goryeoin in Central Asia who could communicate with them. Beginning with 107 Goryeoin in Kazakhstan and the Uzbekistan Communist Party in June to August, 1948, 2,000 intellectuals and experts of Soviet Koreans were dispatched during seven years [52, p. 88]. Most of dispatched Goryeoin returned in the 1970s, but a part remained in Sakhalin. Contacts of two Goryeoin groups in Sakhalin inscribed no good experiences to each other. It occurred because the early Soviet authority entrusted the role of searching out dissidents to the dispatched Goryeoin. Also, the inland Goryeoin occupying high-rank positions in educational organizations and working areas were those who could manage the Sakhalinski, who thus had antipathy

to receiving more discrimination from the Soviet authorities than the dispatched Goryeoin received. Disgraceful experiences in Sakhalin between the two same ethnoses were remembered equally when the Sakhalinski advanced to inland cities to seek out jobs and education.

In the Kanakhstani Goryeoin group, there was a minority from North Korea other than the above two groups that confronted each other. There were two kinds of groups in the Goryeoin from North Korea who settled down in the former Soviet area. One of them is a group of minor workers from North Korea who are not exposed well in the Goryeoin society. They were those who came to the former Soviet areas from the brotherly communist tie between North Korea and the Soviet Union: that is, those who remained after coming to the Soviet areas by contracts. Allegedly, North Korean hardships in livings reached to the extreme at the next year of liberation. At the time, North Korea dispatched young workers to various areas such as Primorski Krai of the Soviet Union, the Kuril Island, the Kamchatka Peninsula, Sakhalin, and Okhotsk for working at fishing grounds, woodcutting sites, and coal mines. They were dispatched mainly from 1946 to 1949, and the total number was 26,065 people [52, p. 86]. Most of them returned to North Korea after coming to this place and finishing duties, but some who remained and settled down were known as amounting to thousands ones [27, p. 42].

Another group is ex-N.K. students who had come abroad for study but took refuge to the Soviet Union. They are Goryeoin who did not return to North Korea while rising in revolt toward Kim Il-Sung's dictatorship and the cult of personality after presence of «Stalin criticism» at the 20th Communist Party Conference in 1956. The most representative person was Lee Sang-Jo, who served as North Korean Ambassador in Moscow in the 1960s. Particularly, students of movie, scenario, and music departments requested exiles and scattered to all areas over the Soviet Union, but later on, they gathered around collective settlements such as Almaty. Ten exile members called «10 Jin» did vigorous activities as artists, and played many roles between Korea and Kazakhstan after the '88 Seoul Olympics because of fluency in Korean language. However, they had many restrictions living as stateless people for decades. One day, they dreamt homecoming missing

their families and relatives, but they could not realize such a dream even though they waited long for the change of North Korea, so that they turned to acquiring the Soviet citizenship since around the 1970s. They were Goryeoin diaspora who experienced the sorrows of life such as political exile, stateless status, and frustration of homecoming, and aged people over 80 had been already dead at the time, except for three to four people.

Among the Primorski, there were those who participated in the project of establishing the Communist regime in North Korea just as being dispatched to Sakhalin. Dispatched people were not known correctly: it was recorded as 428 people as of January 1, 1949, according to Im Eeun [27, p. 42]. Goryeoin scholars estimated the number as about 500 people. The Soviet government used the Central Asian Goryeoin to solidify the Communist regime at the Far-East including North Korea, Primorski Krai, and Khabarovsk. The Goryeoin who then received the dispatch order to the Far-East considered the compulsory dispatch again as a large ordeal before 10 years passed after the migration in 1937 [66, p. 108]. However, the relationship between the Soviet Union and North Korea were cooled because the criticism toward Kim Il-Sung's dictatorship along with Stalin degrading movement flew out from Moscow. Aggravated relationship between the Soviet Union and North Korea caused directly bad influence on the dispatched Goryeoin: North Korean authorities made them select one nationality between Soviet Union or North Korea. Most Goryeoin selected returning to the Soviet Union, but others selected North Korean nationality. As the news on remaining Goryeoin in North Korea could not be known, it is said that they were oppressed altogether without any information of whether they were alive or dead. Regarding this ambiguity of the number of alive or dead Goryeoin, witnesses who had interviews with this researcher knew that half of the dispatched Goryeoin had not returned at the time. However, there was a testimony from some witnesses that nearly 50 people remained [27, p. 43]. This affair occurred in the same period when young Sakhalinski selected North Korea and accepted its nationality, and then contacts were disconnected while they were allegedly received oppression, leaving no information about their lives or deaths in North Korea. This accident remained as the most regretful on their motherland North Korea because

North Korean authorities did not continue to say regardless of constant ties between Soviet Goryeoin and North Korea [27, p. 43]. Among the dispatched Goryeoin, there were many people who took important positions in North Korea at the time and played large influences to Goryeoin society as intellectuals after returning to the Soviet Union.

The hometown of most Primorski was mainly Hamgyong Province of North Korea, and North Korea was considered as the motherland. By ties with the Soviet Union under brother relations, Goryeoin had regular cultural events, constant North Korea travels, and relative visits. They were conflictive with the Sakhalinski from South Korea due to the emotionally differentiated motherlands. However, intimacy with North Korea was weakened largely after more exchanges with South Korea that were highlighted in the Goryeoin society through the '88 Seoul Olympics than with North Korea. North Korea's difficult situations were naturally making Central Asian Goryeoin cease to visit.

Inner Mainstream and Non-mainstream: Primorski and Sakhalinski

In the society of Central Asian Goryeoin, there were two groups that sustained tensional relationships particularly: the majority group from Primorski Krai and the minority group from Sakhalin. Both groups did not contact nor associate with each other, but expelled counterparts as "Alien strangers." They differentiated themselves by calling counterparts with different names. Regarding the majority from Primorski Krai, they were called "Materikovi" which meant the inland Goryeoin as they settled down earlier since compulsory migration, or "Almatinski", "Tashigenski", and the like by extracting their residential areas. Goryeoin in Sakhalin called them "Continental guy", or "Continental fellow" in Korean language as depreciating words. On the other hand, Goryeoin in Sakhalin were called "Sakhalinski." Also, the inland Goryeoin regarded themselves as the «Soviet people» who came from Primorski Krai of the Soviet territory, but called Goryeoin in Sakhalin like "Domestic guy" for their origin from the Korean Peninsula as humbling tones peculiarly. In both same ethnic in-groups, conflicting heterogeneity was laid in recognizing each other implicitly while humbling or calling counterparts differently.

The twisted fates of both groups began since the inland Goryeoin's dispatches in the past so that the Soviet power used them politically in order to implant organizations of the Soviet regime. The two groups that encountered in Sakhalin had different dreams about the motherland, and attitudes and directions on the host country were not the same either. The Sakhalinski were largely contrary to the inland group who had hardened the basis of life desperately in the host country, strictly assimilating to the residential country. The Primorski were recognized as merits and patriots of the Soviet Union after the war while suffering from hardships called compulsory migration or deportation, and then utilizing it as a good chance, they were becoming the members of Soviet people; but the Sakhalinski were suddenly incorporated to the Soviet Union entirely unlike their intentions, thus eagerly waiting for the chance of coming back to the motherland, the Korean Peninsula. Even contacts with family in the motherland were impossible, not to say the difficulty of repatriation [93].

In the process that both groups have lived among the former Soviet people, most Goryeoin forgot their ethnic language, but the second-generation Sakhalinski could make full use of Korean language by which they are easily differentiated. This is because their parents of the first generation were not positive in becoming the Soviet citizens until the second-generation Sakhalinski were grown up, and also received influences from the motherland-oriented life. One Goryeoin of the second generation who dwelled in Almaty, Kazakhstan remembered the life in Sakhalin where she was born, graduated from a general college of education, and then lived until marriage.

Though I spoke Russian language outside and went to the Russian school, my parents didn't allow me to speak Russian language at home, but only to speak Korean language. We ate wild greens like bracken and fishes, and shared pork with neighbors after killing a pig at a large event. Outgoing was refrained because I was a young girl. When getting married, the parents-in-law (Goryeoin) said to their son that a spouse should be a Joseonin lady, not a Russian. As my husband kept it in mind, he seemed to get married with me (Interview: June 14, 2010).

Her memory was an ordinary scene that could be seen from general households of Joseonin in the motherland. This researcher's hometown is at the southern part of Korea, and I remember eating pork with neighbors when a large village event took place in the 1960s and 1970s in my early childhood, and can recall the same emotion as the Sakhalinski's from the southern part of the Korean Peninsula regarding dietary life and home atmosphere. After becoming incorporated to the Soviet Union, Goryeoin children communicated with ethnic language in daily lives even though they studied with Russian language in the school, and it could be seen that the Sakhalinski considered traditional living styles in child education or etiquettes together with foodstuffs to be important. They were reluctant to marry with other ethnics, insisting on their ethnicity, as well as rejecting the Soviet citizenship, because they recognized dwelling in Sakhalin as a temporary shelter.

Two groups accepted the host society as different meanings, and also led to divisive directions from the first stage positioned as dominant and dominated status to each other by the Soviet authorities. The Soviet authorities noticed Joseonin in Sakhalin as the target of special control because they had no experiences of becoming the Soviet citizens after the end of the Second World War in 1945. The authorities regarded the Sakhalinski as a «problematic group» who was tainted with a different ideology from socialism and spoke Japanese and Joseon language, thus not communicable at all. They needed measures for controlling and managing the Sakhalinski, thus forming a delegation for such activities named "Enlightenment agency." A full-scale enlightenment project began from 1948, and the most inland Goryeoin who joined the agency were the intellectuals working actively as teachers in colleges or schools after having completed high education, or taking main positions in each Kolkhoz or industrial site, as well as having the Party registers by joining the Communist Party [78]. As they could speak Goryeomal (Korean language) and Russian at the same time, they had merits of contacting with the Sakhalinski directly and mediating roles with the Soviet authorities. They were allotted to main high-rank positions that could govern local Koreans in Sakhalin together with special advantages of living with their families for the long-term dispatch. On the other hand, Koreans in Sakhalin were

workers who had been temporarily dispatched by Japanese colonialism, and worked as general labors mainly in coal-mines, state farms, and construction sites, and extremely few served as white-collar positions or government officials.

As the tasks of Goryeoin dispatched from the inland Soviet area were related to enlightenment and ideological education, they had to help search out ideological dissidents, and came to the stance of controlling the Sakhalinski at workplaces and schools; further, the Koreans in Sakhalin were disadvantaged in wages and employments. This fact served as a cause of the Sakhalinski's complaints. Dispatched Goryeoin who were able to linguistically communicate with the Sakhalinski took charge of the political managers of them at industrial sites or the responsible roles in educational organizations. The Sakhalinski, the targets of control by the dispatched Primorski who took high-rank positions, grieved over their unfair situation, say, "We have lived under Japanese oppression, but now controlled even by the same ethnos..."

As an accident that made the relations between both Goryeoin groups was more aggravated, the Sakhalinski who were close to Japanese and listened to the Japanese broadcasting were searched out and arrested by the Soviet officials on the charge of irreverent ideology. They came to have victim mentality that they had such disadvantages because the "Continental guys" snitched on them in the process of being handed down as "Dissidents." Other important complaints of the Sakhalinski after the inland Goryeoin was dispatched were laid in their lower wages and more unfavorable employment condition than those for the inland Goryeoin. As the Sakhalinski worked as laborers, not white-collar workers or officials, they always received lower salaries and further had to receive low wages even if doing same works. The Sakhalinski recalled the memory that they were branded as tainted with Japanese culture so that even their children had to receive more disadvantageous treatment such as lower positions in workplaces, unlike the inland Goryeoin who took main positions such as factory Manager or Principal. The first inconvenient memory and experience acquired in Sakhalin was sustained to the second encounter of both groups in the Soviet inland with each other.

After Stalin's death in 1953, the limitation of residence relocation was released since the early Khrushchev period, and Goryeoin began to search the better life condition while giving up repatriation according to mitigation of many oppressive factors. The Sakhalinski increasingly attempted to acquire the Soviet citizenship and enter the Communist Party; young people intended to search for college education and better workplace for new future at the broad inland, and a part of them gained jobs in the newspaper Lenin Kichi or Goryeo language broadcasting. The Soviet inland, however, was not only the land of opportunities but also the beginning of long tensional life.

About the Sakhalinski, the Primorski mentioned fundamentally different births and characteristic differences, on which one's discrimination of the other was based. The Primorski insisted the memory that their grandparents were honorable independence activists to Japan who also shed blood for the Soviet construction, and led relatively wealthy lives in Primorski Krai, as the basis of superiority to the Sakhalinski, most of whom were from "Poor labors." Regarding characteristic differences, they described themselves as close to "Russian" and the Sakhalinski as similar to "Japanese" or "Korean (South Korea)", smiling apparently but hiding different mind like the Japanese, unlike the frank and open-minded Primorski who had no secret allegedly.

The Sakhalinski who were much less in number than the Primorski after entering the Soviet inland, and marginalized and expelled in the superiority/inferiority structure, formed their own groups and meetings as a centripetal point, where they revealed the narrative of complaints and counterattacks as follows:

They had black eyes; the surname was Kim. They were the same Goryeoin who ate rice and soybean stew, but did not even meet with us. They used Russian names, acted like Russian people, and also treated us as if to direct us. Even though there weren't any law that forced Russian-style naming, they changed names so voluntarily. In fact, I could change my name like «Mila Ivanovna» in a Russian style, but didn't do so.

Those from Sakhalin use both hands when giving and taking things politely, but the people here (from Primorski Krai) use one hand only to do so. When I've been to a sort of birthday party, the kind women

saying no unnecessary things were from Sakhalin. The women here, after getting up in the morning, served only tea to her husband, and did make-up, not trying to set any breakfast for husband, as if he should eat in person (Interview: June 14, 2010).

The Sakhalinski were those who subjectively kept their own traditional culture, thus having polite courtesy, using ethnic names, and coming to tell chagrin of being disregarded from the inland Goryeoin who used Russian names and dealt with the Sakhalinski like treating subordinate staff even in the same-blood relationship. The sadness and sense of alienation that they could not belong to the mainstream Goryeoin group were deepened, and hatred to the mainstream was expressed as an image of arrogant «traitor» who easily changed their names in a Russian style and acted like Russians.

The Sakhalinski considered using Joseon language and names natural as Joseon people, but there were proper logics of having to adapt the Russian style to the inland Goryeoin. The Primorski fairly insisted, “This is the Soviet Union, so is it natural to follow a Russian style? How could I lead a workplace life with an ethnic name in this multi-ethnic country where others cannot call our ethnic names with difficult and strange pronunciation?” The Primorski emphasized themselves as close to “Russian,” and explained justice of following Russian naming and renaming together with one surname per one family.

Complete contrast was made between the Sakhalinski and the Primorski. The former laid values on the traditional image of women like wise mother and good wife, and the latter women identified themselves with Russian females who were free and open-minded, did not position her husband superiority, and was not obedient. Imitating Russian females, The Primorski women lost their traditional roles and virtues as women at home, and their attitude in assisting and helping husbands are indicated as problematic by the Sakhalinski.

Both groups in Goryeoin society made most keen confrontation in marriage issue. Particularly, the Primorski who preferred Russian girls as spouses and kept the principle that all about Russia are the best had to pass through severe fights if their children’s candidate spouses were the Sakhalinski.

Our etiquette, foods, and traditions could not be seen from the continental people, and they who had only Russian-style names had wedding and meeting among themselves, not getting married with ours who had names such as “Mi-Suk”, or “Gyeong-Ja.” Instead, they got married with Russians. A niece of my husband from Sakhalin associated with a continental Goryeoin and then had to permission on marriage, but it was very difficult due to the opposition of the continental Goryeoin family. At that time, I wrote an article to a newspaper because conflicting matters between the continental and the Sakhalinski were uneasy and hard (Interview: June 14, 2010)

When the marriage issue occurred between both groups, those who hold an oppositional position were generally the Primorski. The Sakhalinski were in the more difficult situation of having to wait for the counterpart's permission by becoming the weak, rather than opposing. Confrontation and discriminations on marriage wars between both groups were also working at public realms beyond private realms. In case of an institute operated by nominal name of nation, it is said that there were severe discriminations. “Although there was not discrimination in the newspaper company because all staff was intellectuals, the Sakhalinski could never enter Goryeo Theater and the like. Moon Kong-Ja, a Sakhalin singer, was exceptional due to her prominent competency, but there was not even one in the theatrical circles.” From these complaints, it could be seen that newspapers or broadcasting companies were exceptional to the Sakhalinski because mainly ethnic language abilities had to be displayed there. Newspaper companies had characteristics of translating after receiving articles written in Russian language mainly, and fluent ethnic language was put in priority in the broadcasting station.

Regarding the advantage of advancing to the inland, the Sakhalinski mention high-quality urban life, advanced educational environment, the better climate condition than the long winter and hot summer in Sakhalin, rich fruits of the inland, and the like. However, what the Sakhalinski confessed as the most desirable point of coming to the inland after leaving Sakhalin was that white people treated colored people without particular discrimination because of gentle characters.

Particularly, the stance of white ethnos including Russians was not to recklessly treat colored Kazakh indigenes in Kazakhstan and the like, because indigenes were regarded as a shield to Goryeoin group as the same colored people. In Sakhalin, however, discriminations from white ethnos were unusually strong to Koreans because amongst the ethnic groups in Sakhalin, Russians and Tartars were white people alike while the Sakhalinski Koreans were the only colored people. The Sakhalinski suffered from double pains: inside the otherness inside the Korean group and the marginalization from outside ethnos such as white people. They confessed these matters as bitter trials that they had to encounter before forgetting the memory of discrimination under Japanese colonialism such as “You do not speak Japanese language, and correspond to ignoble things that even eat green cabbages.” Selecting departure from suppressive structure of the dominant/dominated for the continent included the characteristics of escape as well. However, the marginalized Sakhalinski from the inland Soviet Goryeoin, who were the same ethnos but acting like “Russians”, were hard to be merged into the inland Goryeoin society while being pushed out to existence like “Aliens.”

KEY QUESTIONS OF THE CHAPER FOR READERS

1. Soviet Koreans as model of Soviet people during and after second world war;
2. Strong assimilation of Soviet Koreans into Soviet Russian culture in language and naming;
3. Inner diversity of Soviet Koreans - oldcomers, the Sakhalinski and newcomers, the Primorski;
4. Experience of being the controller and the controlled of Koreans under the Soviet regime;
5. Mainstream versus non-mainstream inside Soviet Korean ethnic group.

CHAPTER IV

IDENTITY POLITICS OF KAZAKHSTANI KOREANS

This Chapter represented the narratives of Goryeoin and explored the political process shown through the dissolution of internal schism and encountering with motherland Korean in the Seoul Olympics, and in their positioning as the citizens of a new independent state after having been turned over basis from the dissolution of Soviet System. It showed the former Soviet Koreans' process of struggle in which at the time when dramatic patriotism was revived and stressed, the relationship between majority and minority became reversed and the inner schism disrupted; as for the relationship with the mother country, the more closely they contacted with each other, the more distinct differences came to the fore deepening their conflictual relationship; and in the host society, with the obligation as citizens and the self-identity clashed with each other, they attempted to keep their ego by mobilizing the past experiences and memories against the external power.

4.1 1988 Seoul Olympics and Intensification of Soviet Korean Ethnic Identity

Stimulated by the 1988 Seoul Olympics held in their mother country when the Soviet regime was weakened at the late period, Soviet Koreans revealed their ethnic subjectivity by reflecting on their lives which had been "Russian" thus far. At the national reunion in the motherland, the two Korean groups' explosion of primordial emotion as "One blood" and emphasis on the national identity broke the ideological barrier that had masked Korea and Koreans. In the Goryeoin society emerged a movement to revive the lost nationality, and they identified with the motherland Koreans who succeeded in holding the Olympics and achieved an economic power. Soviet Koreans disclosed their real subjects not hiding the Korean identity in front of other ethnic groups. With the reinforced pivot of national centripetalism, they moved from schism to harmony inside the ethnic group, and the minority Sakhalinski became born again as those who disclosed themselves with stronger subjective voice in front of the majority.

Ethnicism Incited by the Olympics

It was not until 1988 Seoul Olympics took place that one could imagine the contact between Koreans and the Goryeoin as the former Soviet people. For in the dichotomous structure of communist/capitalist camps, Goryeoin had considered North Korea as a brother country of the former Soviet Union, with nostalgia for it as their motherland, while considering South Korea as a capitalist country, armed with an anti-communist ideology they should regard with hostility, rather than as their motherland where the Korean nation of the same blood live sharing history with them. Whereas the former Soviet Goryeoin had recognized Korea in an ideological frame, South Koreans even had not perceived the existence of Goryeoin until 1988 Seoul Olympics. Meanwhile, the Soviet people also had the last impression of South Korea as a devastated area seen from the Korean War in 1950.

The unchanged truth inscribed to the Soviet Goryeoin was that a capitalist country is a regime destined to fail that guarantees no future, and amongst many capitalist countries, Korea was stereotyped for them as the image of "The poorest capitalism." This closed ideology and stereotype began to be dissolved since the Soviet Performing Arts Company visited Seoul by the invitation to the World Culture and Arts Festival before the Seoul Olympics. This visiting arts company included the Soviet Goryeoin.

Curious of the communist arts, Koreans acclaimed the Soviet arts company. Watching the Soviet Bolshoi Ballet, enjoying Russian music and famous paintings, Koreans came to be fully absorbed in the new Russian culture. The Korean enthusiastic welcome to the participation of communist countries including the Soviet Union in the Seoul Olympics was due to the responsibility as the host country, and above all, aspiration for the success of the Olympics. Whether the communist countries would participate or not was considered a significant matter that bears the key of the success or failure of the Seoul Olympics, and its success arose as a national agenda [102, p. 199]. Following the precedent two Olympics in Moscow and LA, in which each oppositional camp had not participated by the extreme antagonism between the East and the West camps, the Seoul Olympics was also an arena highlighted as a mirror of the global situation. With the Olympics ahead,

all nationals concentrated their anticipation and interest on the Olympics, putting aside all the other political or social problems. Despite the anti-communist law and consciousness that were still alive in the Korean society at the time, Koreans' aspiration for the success of the Olympics overwhelmed the ideological bias toward Communism.

The influential power of the Olympics event not only gave an impetus to the development of relationship between Korea and different communist countries, but also prominently awakened the national consciousness of Koreans who had been ideologically confined. Along with a series of amicable policies and attitudes of the Soviet government reflecting the will to exchange and the open door with Korea, the remarkable development the same blood have achieved as well as the Koreans' warm welcome to their visit made a synergic effect to incite the seemingly lost nationalism of Goryeoin to revive.

In the field of meeting mediated by Russian arts, the Soviet Goryeoin and Koreans came to ascertain the primal feeling of bloody bonds from each other. Traveling in the main Korean cities and winning popularity that recorded the sellouts of entry tickets, the Soviet arts company included Goryeoin performers and drew more special responses from Koreans. The musical stage of the Soviet Goryeoin became an impressive scene like the «Reunion of dispersed nationals» [75: Kyunghyang Daily, April 9, 2007]. The Goryeoin vocalist Nam Ryudmila, telling the story of her grandfather who was shot to death by false accusation and the tragic history that all Goryeoin had to compulsorily emigrate afar in the presence of their native country, drew tears from all audience. The personal story of her grandfather told on the stage not only became the chance to ruminate upon the bloody history of the Korean nation who strove for the anti-Japanese struggle under the Japanese Imperialism, but also led Koreans to rediscover the part of another tragic history that they had not recognized and to share their pains and console each other.

The passionate feeling at the event of «reunion of dispersed nationals» in Korea spread over the Soviet Goryeoin society as it is. An interview reported in the Soviet newspaper «Lenin Kichi» described Korea as “The ancestral country over which Joseon people's blood flows”, and stressed the Korean compatriots' passionate welcome was from true compatriotism, not from simple curiosity.

(So much agitated as not to bear tears welling up, the woman vocalist sat silent for a while, then kept on saying again.) When I firstly came into Seoul, I sincerely felt the call from the native land welling up from deep in my heart, for the first time in my life. . . . For me who has the blood of Joseon people, so much a close feeling to mine that the people of my ancestral country showed is something indescribable, some kind of holiness. How warmly they welcomed us as if we were their daughters, this poor talker cannot describe it as it is! This time, I firstly felt such true and large happiness....

Dressed up in the latest fashion, frank and honest without any pretension or deception, all were so kind and optimistic I could sleep well. There was no reason to doubt their words, and as we saw and felt, about 80% of Koreans are all those who completely settled the necessities of life, while only 20% still feel the lack. So how high standard of living they have generally; isn't it easy to guess? Korea is already known as one of the ten industrial countries... [44: October 15, 1988, 4]

In addition to the Soviet performers, the Soviet Goryeoin athletes also used the consistent words of representing warm brotherly love such as “Favor”, “Care”, and “Sincere reception” in their newspaper [44: January 21, 1989, 4]. Also, the more impressively embellished words were about the prosperous appearance of Korea. The image of Korea seen through the Olympics broadcasting and the Soviet Goryeoin who visited Korea was the talk of all the Goryeoin society as «The rich Korea» represented by the women’s dress fashion, a world-class industrial country, and high standard of living. Goryeoin’s praises for Korea were exceeding those of the general Soviet press in terms of the levels of contents and attitude.

Meanwhile, although all the Soviet people envied the capitalist Korea, the ethnic newspaper’s expression of praising Korea was sometimes self-controlled. At the time, the Soviet Union was obviously keeping its ideology and regime, so that the people were primarily recognizing it as compulsory to describe and praise the excellence of the Soviet people.

The audience could not help being surprised by how high level the general Soviet performers are standing at. The Soviet producers’ choice

of Choi Svetlana (Goryeoin) as one of the leading performers for the dance program was also the surprising satisfaction for Koreans... The clear, soft, powerful and fluent singing voices of Sopranos Nam Liudmila and Lee Nelia moved the large audiences of Seoul, Busan, Daegu and Gwangju even to tears from not bearing admiration and the sense of attractiveness. . . . [44: October 15, 1988, 4]

The above passage is that which the «Lenin Kichi» [44: October 12, 1988] quoted from the Soviet Sports, a sports newspaper of the former Soviet Union. It does not include any appraisal for Korea, but only describes how much Koreans were moved by «the high-level performance of the Soviet arts company». This shows the general Soviet newspaper only stressed the excellence of the Soviet arts and people, but intentionally escaped the praise and appraisal for Korea, the capitalist country.

In contrast, the ethnic newspaper «Lenin Kichi» showed the exceptional attitude of delivering the feeling about Korea as it is through the interviews with Goryeoin athletes or performers. Without the support and implicit care of the Soviet authority, it would be impossible in the situation of continuing censorship on ethnic newspapers to let Goryeoin's favor and deep impression about the visit to Korea published as it is in their ethnic newspaper. This was to show the Soviet amicable gesture toward Korea such as intentional inclusion of Goryeoin performers in the Soviet arts company visiting Korea. These exceptional actions unprecedented in the Soviet history came from exploring a breakthrough in the contemporary pressures inside and outside to which the Soviet government could not run counter along with the open-door stream in the late period of the Soviet Union.

The former Soviet Goryeoin's parade of visiting Korea was not the one-time event for the Olympics. The eulogy of Korea published in the ethnic newspaper Lenin Kichi bore the brotherly love toward Korea and Koreans. Since the Seoul Olympics, Goryeoin's visit to Korea developed into a regular annual event thanks to the invitation of Korean government or institutions and to the support of the Soviet government. Many people's visit to Korea through sports and culture events became a proud pilgrimage event for the former Soviet Goryeoin, withering their memory of hostile South Korea inscribed by the firm ideological dichotomy.

From the Enemy «South Joseon» to Another Native Country

Under the dark history of the Cold War and the division of their native country, the former Soviet Goryeoin had been thoroughly severed from the half of their motherland adopting another ideology. However, the global sports event of 1988 Seoul Olympics showed the appearance of Korea that had been uninformed, through the Soviet press and television, and the Goryeoin athletes and performers who actually experienced the country delivered another realization that the Republic of Korea (a.k.a. Korea in short) differed from their previous belief stereotyped under the ideological regime.

At the time when the physical border of the 38th parallel divided Korea into the communist North and the anti-communist South, the South Koreans who were fully impregnated with anti-communism and the Soviet nationals of the communist leader state were those who lived in entirely different worlds from each other. The 1970s in South Korea saw the situation in which the term of «anti-communism» infiltrated so deeply into the public to everyday areas that the anti-communist spells of education and slogan dominated. This spellbound command brought about the dominance of dichotomous wariness and hostility against «the enemy different from us». The late 1980s saw much dilution of the anti-communist ideology and education, but still living was the anti-communist attitude and the National Security Law. On the contrary, the Soviet considered South Korea as an ideological enemy to the Soviet Union and North Korea alike, in light of their experience of the Korean War at which they supported the North Forces aiming their guns at the South, only remembering the tragic scene at which the country was broken into two pieces. As South Koreans framed the Soviet Union in their closed ideology of anti-communism, so the Soviet people defined South Korea as an “Anti-communist capitalist country.” This situation is well exemplified by a Goryeoin intellectual, who had fled to the Soviet Union from North Korea and remembered the Republic of Korea at the time as «the most strongly anti-communist South Korea» and «the poorest country, South Korea».

The Goryeoin who came back from visiting the Republic showed the historical change of utilizing the daring and frank words like “Ancestral country” or “One blood, one nation” in describing the country

which had never been called but “South Joseon as an enemy state,” even expressing no ideological color when mentioning South Korea and Koreans. «The praise for South Korea» was that which happened in the age of smothering up other voices than delivering the words of Goryeoin as the Soviet people loyal to the Party or the press announcement from the ideological brother country North Korea to break up “The U.S.-made capitalism, South Joseon.”

Although the Goryeoin press introduced Seoul citizens’ favorable responses to Russian cuisines and folk songs shown through the arts festival and the impression of Seoul in the closing ceremony in the manner of hailing how great the Soviet arts and the Soviet victory in the Olympics were, they kept their favor and cheering toward Korea [44: September 27; October 1, 1988, 4]. In particular, they published an article that emphasized the conflict between Koreans and Americans during the Olympics in favor of “Koreans of the same blood”, as well as a comment on the ethnic newspaper that described a Korean who was in favor of the Soviet rather than the U.S. It followed that the cause of cacophony between Korea and the U.S. was “the U.S. did not respect the people of South Korea, ignoring their tradition and giving them a national insult,” so that Koreans cheered for the Soviet athletes amongst the confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet athletes [44: October 5, 1988, 3]. Also quoting an article of TAS S (the former Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union), «Lenin Kichi» was reporting the news that about 500 Korean undergraduates rejected the U.S. athletes’ participation in the Olympics, crying out “Get away, Yankees!” [44: September 29, 1988, 4] This was also to accept Korea in terms of nationality and blood ties, separating Korea from the U.S. that had been their ideological ally.

The consanguine shouts of Goryeoin and South Koreans yielded a subtle change in the existing relationship with North Korea. The Soviet Goryeoin’s familiarity with North Korea, an ideological brother country as they call, was due to the fact that almost all Goryeoin had been emotionally connected with North Korea by their ancestral roots from Hamgyong Province in the North of the Korean peninsula. In spite of the Soviet oppression toward the Goryeoin dispatched to North Korea in the late 1950s, the goodwill events driven both by the Soviet and

North Korea maintained their constant amicability. For example, there was an instruction to Kazakhstan Goodwill Association, Kazakhstan Soviet Goryeoin Goodwill Association, and the Party Council of Almaty City that a goodwill and cultural exchange event celebrating the 20th North Korea Foundation Anniversary will take place from September 1 to October 6 in 1968. This instruction by the name of Konayev, Secretary of the Central Committee of Kazakkstan Communist Party, was informed to the publicity departments of such newspaper companies as «Sotsialistik Kazakhstan» or «Kazakhstanskya Pravda», along with the instruction of propogandizing for the North Korea's economic and cultural feats through the major newspapers and the administrative organs' newspapers, radios, and television broadcastings [78, p. 260-261]. These cultural events occurred within the frame of strong external consolidation in which the former Soviet Union as the communist leader and North Korea as the brother country mutually assisted each other in terms of ideology and regime.

Since the Seoul Olympics, Goryeoin took an exceptionally favorable gesture toward South Korea, nevertheless stressing that there was no change in the existing frame of favoring North Korea. The Soviet musician Nam Liudmila, who tearfully told the impression from visiting Korea, still did not miss the comment that "If I were invited to the festival of North Korea, I would be as welcomed as in the Seoul Olympics", mentioning that Goryeoin were invited to the 13th World Youth and Collegian Festival of North Korea [44: October 15, 1988, 4]. All the same, there was also an ambiguous expression that "North Korea is simple and orderly, but the Soviet Union where I live is better to live," which was formally favorable but rather implying a negative meaning of "Lagging behind South Korea" [44: November 29, 1988, 4]. Furthermore, this ambiguous expression developed into an accusation toward North Korea's closed policy as well. That is, it was a disclosure of the North Korea regime's misrule of limiting residential migration: a strong criticism in a Goryeoin writer's short novel that "The way in which the Soviet people were ruled under the Stalin regime is still progressing in North Korea" was disclosed in Lenin Kichi [44: March 3, 1990, 4]. This exceptional disclosure ceased with the sudden suspension of serial publication of the novel, which suggests that the oppo-

nents against this novel were dominant in the Goryeoin group. The writer of this novel was an exile who fled to the Soviet Union from North Korea so as not to give the voice against North Korea thus far.

Although the Goryeoin group included such an anti-North figure who gave a negative comment on North Korea riding the wave of pro-South atmosphere from the Olympics, the most of Goryeoin were those who had a tie with North Korea as their motherland. A Goryeoin who had visited North Korea in 1987 to see the hometown of his father where his relatives were still living suggests as follows:

About in 1887, my grandfather came over to Primorski Krai (Maritime Province) accompanied only by my father. My uncle, little brother, sister and her family were living in North Korea, where many relatives of mine are living. When I visited Pyongyang, I saw the well-established subway line and a big Kim Il-Sung statue. I also visited Moran-dong, Historical Museum, Observatory, and Kim Il-Sung Hometown, all of which were really good. In North Korea, snake-infused liquor and beer tasted best, but North Korean products in 1987 were not better than Soviet ones. North Koreans' lives were too tough. They can't eat rice but corn gruel. Things like Kimchi and soybean sauce are all rationed. Why I could not stay there was the discomfort of going over sleeping people to the toilet, because many people sleep together. Rice seemed to be run out; the 12 presents I prepared – caps, clothes, and watches – were not enough. I am only a salary man, so how can I prepare more? As I have no more presents to give, I just stayed for 20 days and came back. I was regarded as a foreign guest, so rationed my rice for a month as 500 gram per day from the North Korean authority. After coming back, I sent two boxes of presents that I didn't have there.” (Interview: May 23, 2011)

Unlike his father who had never forgotten the nostalgia for the motherland, he said his hometown is where he lives now, and he wants no more visits to North Korea; also, the economic difficulty of North Korea is ceasing Goryeoin's visit to the motherland. He added that his visit to North Korea was to replace his father's unrealized wish for visiting the motherland. As he recalled, his father, an anti-regime figure who had experienced a deportee, did not realize the visit to North Ko-

rea for which he had so craved. This anecdote suggests there has been a shift in generations and the difficulty of North Korea is gradually diluting the meaning of motherland for them.

For the Goryeoin in the late Soviet period, the achievement of the Seoul Olympics was that which enabled them to escape from the long and suppressive dichotomous view learned and inscribed by their residential country's ideology under the shades of the bisected ideological structure and the divided motherland. They did not criticize North Korea, but neither imitated the North Korea's negative criticism toward South Korea as it is like before. Usually, they showed a dual strategy of holding a consistent attitude not to stimulate North Korea while caring for South Korea. This strategy was also shown in the change of how they referred to South Korea. They referred to South Korea and South Koreans as "South Joseon (남조선)" and "South Joseon people (남조선 인민)" in the North Korean manner, but expressing them on their ethnic newspaper as "Korea (한국)" and "Koreans (한국인)", caring for the South Korean manner.

The total evaluation of the Olympics on «Lenin Kichi» praised for "the large victory of the Soviet Union" while expressing their courtesy and gratitude toward Seoul, the host city, as well as the pity for the North-South division and the wish for real harmony and unity [44: October 4, 1988, 4]. Since the Olympics, the ideology that had blocked the relationship with the motherland was losing its power, and as the exchange with South Korea increased and the room of favor for the country expanded, the Goryeoin society was coming to embrace Korea as a new native country.

Ethnic Language: from an «Obstacle to Success» to an «Ethnic Asset»

The biggest problem of Goryeoin performers at the impressive scene of «national reunion» in the Seoul Olympics was that they could not speak their ethnic language. While they described their visit to Korea as happy and satisfying, they also regarded it as the most disgraceful memory to have depended on an interpreter due to their ignorance of Korean language. Amongst Goryeoin, occasionally appears someone of the old generation who is proud of being highly fluent in Goryeomal (Goryeoin's Korean dialect). However, such speech is indeed al-

most impossible to communicate with native Koreans. A Goryeoin with whom I interviewed considered his Goryeomal speech as «fluent», but in reality, it was almost unable to communicate with this researcher. Given that Goryeomal is based mainly on Pyongyang speech, this almost impossible communication might be in part because I am not accustomed to North Korean speech, but it was primarily unsatisfactory to communicate with such Goryeoin who claim to be fairly good at speaking Goryeomal. This means Goryeomal has already strayed from the original native language. Like this, the ethnic language for Goryeoin is a dead language except for those from Sakhalin and a small minority of senior generation over 80.

Now, they are saying that one can see those who speak Korean in Kazakhstan only at a school or college that teaches Korean. Thus, the matter of ethnic language became recognized not as that of a part of Goryeoin, but more seriously as applying to almost all of them. In the atmosphere of «the national root finding» movement that suddenly appeared with the Seoul Olympics, the most prominently spread was the matter of reviving the ethnic language.

Goryeoin's loss of their mother tongue means their value and culture that have dominated their way of thinking are broken from that which belongs to the motherland. The continental Goryeoin consider the most significant turning point of losing their own ethnic language as the lack of their ethnic schools unlike the situation at the Russian Far-east right after the compulsory migration. In this period, their ethnic schools were converted to general Soviet schools, with their ethnic language becoming secondary for the Goryeoin group like the second foreign language. To make matters worse, all materials in their ethnic language had to be abandoned except those about great communist revolutionaries including Lenin. Before ethnic schools were converted to general Soviet schools, the condition for running the ethnic language schools was actually very poor as well. Namely, the compulsory migration dispersed Goryeoin into different areas, and the oppression toward them involved such problems as a small number of students, lack of teachers, absence of ethnic language textbooks, and the burden of bilingualism.

All these disadvantageous situations that came with the compulsory migration made the immigrant Goryeoin gradually turn their

backs on the ethnic language they had naturally used. This was directly opposite to the situation of Primorski Krai before the compulsory migration in which there were active national activities of anti-Japanese movement that established the schools, organizations, and forces for their nationality. Their ethnic language did not serve as any value for them to be accepted as a model Soviet people and establish a new basis of life; the only language for communication in schools, workplaces, and all affairs was the dominant language, Russian. Lacking the ability to speak Russian – the Soviet language – meant the impossibility of entering into the Soviet society to which they belonged. Besides, their experience of inconvenience as special migrants from the Soviet action of limiting their residence burned their aspiration to enter into the Soviet society as the more justifiable Soviet people. Thoroughly becoming a Soviet person and selecting the Soviet language was regarded as an inevitable choice without any alternative.

With the surging wave of ethnic revival movement since the Olympics, their past estrangement from the ethnic language became the target of self-criticism. As the loss of ethnic language was from the lack of their will, the failure to sustain and enliven it in any extreme situation was pointed out as their fault. Their reflection on the ethnic language was based on the following fact:

The second generation of Goryeoin has been never banned from using our ethnic language, nor has striven for keeping it. At the time, a practical consideration prevailed: the growing generation must learn Russian anyhow to go through education, become a Party member, and have success in life. So, the parents of Goryeoin students wrote the letter (to the authority) that opposed learning our ethnic language [44: January 21, November 18, 1988, 4].

A supporting ground of the above passage is found in a document at the time, which evidences that Goryeoin parents sent the central department a letter to object the school policy of teaching all subjects in their mother tongue, the policy suggested in October 24, 1955, by the authorities of Taldykurhan and Kyzylorda Oblasti, where Goryeoin densely settled [41, p. 296]. In fact, Goryeoin parents' letter to oppose the educa-

tion in their mother tongue did not appear right after the compulsory migration, but officially since the Khrushchev era emerged. After the death of Stalin, his policy of oppressing ethnic groups were explicitly criticized with the limitation of ethnic language education relieved, so that the school education cared for improving the weight of ethnic language, which, however, the parents of students who had received the Russian-based education and would take a college entrance exam ahead considered as retreating to a more disadvantageous condition.

A proceeding of the Politics Bureau of Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee on April 8, 1940 shows their policy of «In the schools at the quarters of ethnic groups such as Goryeoin, Uyghurs, and Tartars, the low grade education from the 1st to the 4th is based on their mother tongues and Russian, and the high grade education from the 5th to the 10th is based on Russian and a foreign language», which evidences that the languages of ethnic groups including Goryeoin could keep alive [41, p. 292]. Still, as the high grade students already became severed from the education of their mother tongue, and students who did not learn Russian must fall behind in the college entrance competition, the parents wanted to give Russian more weight from the low grade education. Also, the authorities accepted those parents' opinions, supporting them by reducing the burden of bilingualism (Russian and the mother tongue) for Goryeoin students, leading to the result of accelerating their avoidance of the mother tongue. In fact, the debate over what amount of weight should be given to the mother tongue and Russian was issued only in such Goryeoin-concentrated settlements as Kyzylorda or Taldykurhan provinces, and those who were dispersed into other settlements were already receiving Russian education without any room for choice [41, p. 292].

In this context, the Soviet Goryeoin's linguistic assimilation seems to have had no other room for choice as the fundamental means of survival in their residential country. However, this became the target of criticism while the discourse of ethnic language revival prevailed. They described themselves as "the opponents against our ethnic language", who turned away from their ethnic language by themselves despite the condition that if they simply have the will, they could keep the ethnic language alive. The emergence of Khrushchev brought again

the chance of ethnic language education increasing the weight in all education, but received poor response from all but a part of educators who strove for developing skills and textbooks to teach their ethnic language. This was because their ethnic language was primarily useless for the success in life, but only treated as possessed exclusively by a part of ethnic language educators.

However, the Olympics changed this situation: those who wanted to learn Korean increased conspicuously in all age groups of Goryeoin from students to adults. The useless mother tongue of yesterday came to emerge as a valuable national asset. Riding the wave of the ethnic language revival, Goryeoin intellectuals were newly defining the value of ethnic language in Lenin Kichi as follows:

Not knowing well the language, culture, and tradition of one's own nationality cannot be called the true Soviet nationalism and internationalism. (Yu, "Joseon People at the Soviet") [44: March 17, 1990, 3]

Although their blood is the same, if their language is different, it is probably hard to call them the same ethnos in a strict sense; any ethnic group who do not know the speech and writing of their ancestors cannot hand over their own cultural heritage. (Lee, "Language is the Fundamental Means of Developing Ethnic Culture") [44: August 2, 1989, 4]

If we do not recover and develop our own culture and language, the future generations must call the present generation to account. (Kim, "A Reader's Conception") [44: August 10, 1989, 4]

A gale of the mother tongue did not stray off the young generation of Goryeoin who have been more separated from the tradition of their motherland. They were the more Russianized generation who had no nostalgia for the motherland, treating their ethnic language as an exclusive possession of a part of the old grandparent generation. A young Goryeoin student at this time, now claiming the right to know about the ethnic language and culture, lamenting for the absence of a way to learn the ethnic language, contributed to the ethnic newspaper as follows:

A Reader's Letter: We study Kazakh through television and often watch such a program as to learn German (Guten Abend) as well. Jo-

seon people who live in this Republic should organize the program of Joseon language (Korean) study in the Kazakh broadcasting timetable, and think about such matters as publicizing the history, tradition, and custom of Joseon nation, not simply teaching Joseon language for all the Joseon people. . . . Joseon people who live in the Soviet Union have gradually assimilated to this country, so today's youngsters never know the Joseon language, nor even its history, culture, tradition, custom, and speech. The situation of Joseon people is much poorer than those of Kazakhs or Germans. In this direction, let me ask the whole newspapers to do their best. (Weban, the 9th grade of the 54th Almaty Middle School) [44: March 2, 1990, 4]

Goryeomal broadcasting began from 1985, but only for several hours per week, and its contents had no ethnic color, but staying at the level of delivering the Soviet news in the translated ethnic language like the ethnic newspaper. Meanwhile, the devaluation of the ethnic language was evidenced by the declining percentage of subscribing the ethnic language newspaper, and this caused disputes as well. At the time when the subscription was gradually declining, there was such a rebuke to stimulate Goryeoin readers' subscription as "those who do not subscribe a Joseon newspaper are those who neither subscribe a Soviet newspaper." Also, some stressed that one should refute a part of Goryeoin who think "we can know all through Russian newspapers, then for what should we read a Joseon newspaper?" by asserting that "On «Lenin Kichi», appear the faces of Joseon people that do not on Russian newspapers." Yet, these were neglected only as the words from a part of ethnic language admirers, not leading to the Goryeoin's will to learn their own mother tongue.

During the movement of ethnic language revival since the Seoul Olympics, the Goryeoin's will appeared in the form of demonstrating flexibility in the ethnic language newspaper to allow themselves to access and use their mother tongue more easily. For those who knew nothing of their own mother tongue, the ethnic language newspaper had no meaning, so that a section called "Let's learn Joseonmal (Joseon Language)" to explain Korean words in Russian was added on the newspaper for the youngsters who had no basis of their mother tongue.

In addition, there was a methodological turn as of January 25, 1989 that created a Russian appendix pages in the ethnic newspaper to care for Russian speakers, most of whom had not been able to subscribe the ethnic newspaper except for a part of Goryeomal speakers. Many changes of contents on the newspaper also attracted readers' practical approach and interest.

More seriously recognized was a situation in which young actors and actresses of the ethnic theater even expressed the ethnic arts with Russian [44: January 20, 1989, 1]. After the first and second generations, most actors and actresses do not speak their mother tongue. Formalized ethnically, but expressed in Russian, such arts were none other than the Soviet arts delivered to the Goryeoin who think in the Soviet manner. At the time, there were a handful of ethnic theaters in Almaty – the then-capital of Kazakhstan – including those of Uyghur, Russian, and Goryeoin, the last of whom had large pride in their theater but came to be conscious that it lost much value by failing to sustain their own ethnic language [44: February 3, 1989, 4]. According to a recent observation by this researcher in the Goryeo Theater, the mother tongue used in the ethnic dramas was so awkward the audience would hardly understand them without knowing the storyline in advance. Admittedly, this might be in part because I am accustomed to Korean and their local Goryeomal was so mixed with the Hamgyong dialect as not to be easily understood, but the problem above all was that those who do not know their mother tongue spoke the lines in the memorized language. In this situation, it was no wonder that the Goryeoin who did not know the mother tongue were limited to attract the interest in ethnic arts.

Goryeoin take pride in the Goryeo Theater as the ethnic theater that has sustained the spirit of ethnic arts thus far without failure even in the chaos of compulsory migration. Yet, after the main ethnic dramatists such as Cho Myong-Hui, Tai Chang-Chun, and Yon Sung-Yong, the post-ethnic generation was called the Soviet dramatists who wrote the Soviet works, instead of ethnic dramatists [94, p. 20]. As of 2007, a Goryeoin dramatist regretted that there was no successor to the present five dramatists – Jung Jang-Gil, Lee Jung-Hui, Choi Yong-Geun, Nam Gyong-Ja, and Jung Sang-Jin – who were the only dramatists writing in the ethnic language as the members of Central Asia and Ka-

zakhstan Literary Association [94, p. 20]. It should be noted here that amongst the five Goryeomal dramatists, all but one are from Sakhalin and show difference in the degree of conserving the mother tongue by local origins.

The actual consciousness of the ethnic language began to rise gradually since 1985 when Gorbachev was inaugurated as the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, upon the opportunities that a Goryeomal broadcasting station was born with the wave of reform and open door and a Goryeo Department was created in the National University of Education, Tashkent, Uzbekistan. This sign became full-blown since the Seoul Olympics: with the increase of demand to learn the ethnic language, Joseon Language Class was newly established in the Journalist Department of the S.M. Kirova National University, Kazakhstan [44: January 25, 1989, 3]. This class was an addition to the existing German and Uyghur Classes. On October 22, 1988, a Joseon language study corner was added to a "Joseonmal broadcasting program" which had reported about current issues [44: March 7, 1990, 4]. Immediately after the Olympics, the ethnic language revival movement reached the peak from various circles of the Goryeoin society, and the 1990s in Kazakhstan saw the establishment of Goryeoin Culture Center for ethnic language education. Since 1991, Korean Education Centers have been gradually born in the Commonwealth of Independent States, firstly in Almaty, Kazakhstan, so that the chance to learn the mother tongue increased in a full-scale manner.

Lenin Kichi, the ethnic language newspaper of the times that had been oppressed on the pretext of defining the ethnic color as bourgeois and anti-Soviet, entered upon a pivotal turning point from the previous role of staying only at a translated paper that propagandized the Soviet regime in the form of the ethnic language. Whereas the previous contents were so allowed within the closed frame of the regime and ideology that propagandized the Party such as praising for the victory of socialism and Leninism, encouraging the productivity of labor in the collective farm Kolkhoz, the new contents increasingly included the pages to narrate their national culture and tradition with the news of the Seoul Olympics. They showed various cultural traditions such as folk plays, traditional cuisines, the degree of kinship and titles, and

Goryeomal study, newly establishing the value of national assets along with Korean poetry and literature.

Since the Olympics, the voice of Goryeoin as the national subject became stronger and increasingly uplifted. They were strongly conscious of their own responsibility to introspect the fault of having lost their language and tradition, although they considered it to have fatally occurred in the era of idolizing Stalin. The ethnic language revival is not a simple revival of a language, but implies the return of national spirit and culture. The ethnic language revival movement they pursued was attempting to return to the heyday of national culture at the time based in Primorski Krai only half a century ago.

Speak-out of the Minority

In the distorted history of the Cold War and the division of Korea, Goryeoin have viewed their motherland in the ideological frames of communism/capitalism and North Korea/South Korea. South Korea has been regarded as the enemy state, and the Sakhalinski from the South have born a complex about their origin. A series of changes like the ethnic culture revival movement, reflection on the loss of ethnic language, and acceptance of Korea as another native country swayed the existing tensional frame of recognizing Sakhalinski as a South Korean identity in the Goryeoin society. This also suggests the possibility of weakening or deconstructing the structure of discrimination toward Sakhalinski, and of liberating them who had been shackled within the structure.

The success of the Seoul Olympics held in South Korea and the development of relationship between the Soviet Union and South Korea casted special meaning on the Sakhalinski Goryeoin. The visit or permanent return to the motherland, which had been an unrealized dream for the parent generation from Sakhalin, was eventually realized, and the reason and ground for disregarding the ethnic characters they had kept were also weakened. At the early settlement in Sakhalin, Primorski Goryeoin's stereotype about Sakhalinski Goryeoin who had neither understood the Soviet language nor adapted to the regime was like an invariable truth that they are «Unqualified», «Lowly», and «Japanese character». Now, the changed situation that enables the commu-

nication with Korea makes this fixed image and discriminative frame meaningless, changing the national heritage that had been left more in the Sakhalinski group into the envious one, thus reversing the power relation between both groups.

The Sakhalinski mainly utilized their real ethnic name known in their own network, while having another de facto Russian-style name used commonly in workplaces. For using the ethnic name was just like representing that “I am a Sakhalinski.” In the same context as Primorski Goryeoin previously chose the Russian-style name as an effective means of entering into the Soviet society as the same members, the Sakhalinski also preferred the Russian-style name used in workplaces. However, as confessed by themselves, it was also to hide their Sakhalinski identity from the majority Goryeoin group.

The Sakhalinski’s use of common names outside to hide their origin was trailing after the continental Goryeoin. As confessed by Primorski Goryeoin, given that they must be fatally different from the dominant national Russians no matter how they were proud of being a model Soviet people by imitating the Russians, they chose to attach a mustache in order not to let others identify them ethnically, i.e. whether they were Goryeoin or indigenes. If the Sakhalinski’s use of a common Russian-style name was to hide their origin from the inside of the ethnic group, the Primorski’s mustache was to hide their ethnic identity from the outside of the ethnic group, although there might also be another intention. Likewise, the Sakhalinski intended to escape a discriminating situation as much as possible in their workplaces by using a Russian-style name.

Escaping from the old shackle in which the Sakhalinski have hidden and been reluctant to use the real ethnic name, they now became proud of it. A Sakhalinski boasted in front of this researcher about not have changed her name in a Russian style although she could have done so at the time. In this reversal of all situations, the Olympics event held in Korea which Sakhalinski Goryeoin considered their emotional motherland was like a magic that dissolved the shackles of their origin. This magical power enabled them to give a grand voice in front of the Primorski who had always dominated the masterful position treating them as «Aliens». The Sakhalinski who could speak Goryeomal so as

to work for a “Joseon language broadcasting station” has still kept the excitement she felt 20 years ago as it is.

At the time when I worked for a broadcasting station, I watched the Olympics broadcasting on TV throughout the 17 days. I don't know how many tears I shed watching the Olympics then. (Seminar: July 14, 2008)

I hadn't known how so good Korea was. I watched the games held in Seoul and Busan; I could not go there, but totally into imagination. Goryeoin children who had watched the Olympics and wanted to learn Korean came to the station. Many people did not watch the Olympics, but also many children seemed to have done so. They came to ask for teaching Korean, but there was no blackboard, book, or nothing else to teach with. A child brought a chalk, so I taught using a door as a blackboard. This spread by hearsay, so I came to teach even Goryeoin housewives. We Sakhalinski speak original Korean, but the continental guys forgot our language. They hate us because we have a good command both of Korean and Russian. When Almaty Korean Education Center was established in 1991, they needed an interpreter to communicate with Koreans. They could barely say hello in Korean «Annyeong-haseyo». At that time, when they saw us have a good command in our language, the continental guys said with jealousy, “How can you be so good at Korean?” (Interview: June 14, 2010)

At the time, it was not so long since I came to Almaty and I did not know well about her, so that I could not figure out what was the meaning of her impression from the Seoul Olympics that she spoke out. I just read it as about the sorrow of the oppressed who experienced artificial break from the motherland for long time under the Soviet regime. When she was recalling with her tears the impression of “The proud motherland Korea” from the Seoul Olympics, and saying that she could for the first time speak out “I am a Goryeoin!” on the street, her trembling voice was speaking out the freedom from the dominant nation in the society or the oppression toward an alien ethnic group. Most of all, however, the meaning of the tears was to cry out “I am a Sakhalinski” toward the major Goryeoin group, as the tears of liberation from the oppression of origin within the ethnic group.

From their enthusiasm about “teaching the mother tongue” for the continental Goryeoin, the Sakhalinski tasted the reversal of power relationship with those who had criticized and alienated them. The «Superior being» confessed to the «Inferior being» that “It was so shameful only to smile without answering the questions of Korean compatriots because we could not speak the mother tongue”, which became the talk of all inside the ethnic group. This means that the Primorski who had been commanding in the ethnic group came to have a weakness as the “Goryeoin who cannot speak the mother tongue”, which was a reversal from the previous pride to a shame. The sense of victory the Sakhalinski felt was not only in the ethnic language: they took more pride in the fact that they taught the Primorski, who did not know well about Korean tradition and ceremony, how to set the table and make a bow on traditional holidays.

The continental guys sang Russian songs, and we sang our old pops and ballads in the party. Now it's changed, so we are sometimes married with each other. In the past, we often said to them, “Why don't you celebrate our holidays?” But now on a Hansik day, more of them visit the ancestral tombs than we do. They also celebrate our traditional holidays, visit the public cemetery, and celebrate Chuseok, the 1st Birthday, and the 60th Birthday Anniversary. In these days, we teach and observe how to bow to each other. As parents do first, their children also learn and come to be affected. The continental people seldom make Korean-flavored food. They put edible oil to all seasoned vegetables; also to cabbage kimchi, like that sold at Green Market. But now they learned and follow our recipe. The continental guys made steamed rice cake, but not the half-moon shaped one, even didn't know the 1st Birthday event and something like that. But now they celebrate the 1st Birthday, colorfully dress the baby on the 100th Day, and often invite us to those events.

When my niece got married, the continental bridegroom side had been so disagreeable to the marriage; but as time went on, the husband's family regretted and now like my niece so much. They confessed that “We thought «there are many continental girls, but why should he get married with the Sakhalinski girl? », but now we think what is

different anyhow, as all of us are the same Goryeoin. We had been so blind as to object that much. Now we also learn many things from your niece..” The father-in-law had firstly objected, but now likes her so much, because she is courteous, polite and makes good Korean food. (Interview: June 14, 2010)

For the Soviet Goryeoin, it is true that their ethnic tradition was affected by the rapid loss of the ethnic language from the closure of ethnic schools, but it was not completely lost. By the time when they were keeping the collective life in each Kolkhoz, they were somewhat keeping their ethnic customs. Particularly, the rites of passage like the 60th Birthday Anniversary, the 1st Birthday, childbirth ritual, and nuptials were observed although they were more or less changed by the addition of Soviet practices. They were also keeping the trace of seasonal customs as the more simplified practices than the rites of passage. The main traditional holidays included the New Year’s Day, Hansik (the 105th day after the winter solstice), Dano (the fifth of the fifth month of the lunar calendar), and Chuseok (Harvest Moon Festival). Yet, as Goryeoin moved in a mass to cities since 1960 with the release from the limitation of residence and the shrinking of Kolkhoz, their lifestyles came to change largely and the ethnic rites became gradually forgotten and transformed according to the city life. Besides, the young Goryeoin in cities who held a majority assimilated more to Russian-style culture as well as to the language, so that nuptials or the 60th Birthday Anniversary were also replaced with Russian-style wedding reception. In this way, a majority of the urban Goryeoin went through the Sovietization and urbanization, with the old traditional ceremonies or customs becoming the remains exclusive to Sakhalinski and rural Goryeoin.

Their choice of spouse in marriage which was the most sensitive between both Goryeoin groups became also freer. Particularly, the Primorski side recalled it became already bygone rivalry to have fiercely objected the marriage with the Sakhalinski only for the reason of the origin rather than any flaw or defect as the future spouse.

As the exchange with Korea became more active in various areas, Sakhalinski Goryeoin were standing out with their capability to commu-

nicate linguistically. The Sakhalinski also showed their pride in speaking the “Standard mother tongue.” They emphasize that the mother tongue they use is much different from that in which general Goryeoin speak, instead similar to the standard Korean, so that many envied them who broadcast in Joseon language. This differed from the speech of the Primorski whose Goryeomal was mostly from the Hamgyong Province dialect so as not to communicate with Koreans; for the Sakhalinski, using the language of South Korea amongst the mother tongues became a source of pride. There is indeed no Primorski Goryeoin who could communicate with Korea now; but as the demand of Korean fluency increases, practical interpreters and translators have been assumed by the Sakhalinski. Also, they have established their positions as Korean speakers in Goryeoin Association or ethnic language newspapers which were acknowledged as the official channel to Korea. This reversal situation in which the Sakhalinski’s superior fluency in the mother tongue became envied by the Primorski cleared the humiliation and sorrow of the former who had not understood the Soviet regime long ago and been designated as the target of ideology education from the latter.

The long rivalry between both groups is now discussed as bygones, and the Sakhalinski were also saying that their grudge and resentment toward the continental Goryeoin was too lopsided. Besides, they confessed that their grudge against the continental Goryeoin, who they think should occupy the managerial position treated them coercively, was from their projection of complaint and mortification onto the continental Goryeoin. The Joseonin (Joseon people) left behind in Sakhalin at the time had met with the worst predicament: having tasted all bitters of life mobilized as the labor for the imperialist Japan, they were so left behind the neglect of the Japanese who removed after the War as not to return to their motherland; then suddenly assigned to the unfamiliar Soviet Union without any normal citizenship, but only with the certificate for stateless residence, namely the “Mal (Horse) passport” that made them trapped helplessly; and also treated like the «Japanese soldier captives» in the charge of ideological dissidents. There were no Japanese whom they could resent, neither meaningful was to resist the new power. Their mortification pointed toward another «weak» group of their residential society, the continental Goryeoin.

Materikovi (the continental Goryeoin) considered them as the Soviet people and us as the Japanese. They were in high positions, but we got low pay and discriminated, so we sorrowed. We found it unfair some Goryeoin are controlled by other Goryeoin. Particularly, when the Soviet KGB arrested many of us for Japanese spying, we detested the continental guys. But in hindsight, isn't it true they were also the victim of the Soviet authority, forced to work by their command? Although there likely were the continental guys among the spies who snitched on us, who can be sure that no one of us betrayed ourselves? (Interview: June 12, 2011)

This means that the Sakhalinski admitted that their past negative eyes such as grudge and resentment from the subordinate's standpoint toward the continental Goryeoin were not necessarily to condemn their misbehaviors. A Sakhalinski confessed that although the «continental guys» were likely to have snitched on them to the Soviet authority, thus making them arrested, it could rather be a misunderstanding. He also showed a tolerant attitude suggesting it was because the continental guys assumed the role in the position.

The past in which Sakhalinski Joseonin had to feel humiliated by the rule of continental Goryeoin was also recalled by the latter as very unfortunate as the Primorski had to be dispatched to Sakhalin and North Korea for the purpose of indoctrinating the Soviet-style system by the Soviet policy [66, p.108]. In addition, it was also accepted as oppression toward the Soviet Goryeoin that the many intellectuals had been purged around the compulsory migration, and that about 10 years later the high-level Goryeoin including intellectuals came to suffer again from the unwished migration. This follows that it was not the will of the continental Goreyoin but the power of the authority that engaged those dispatched to North Korea with Korean division and commanded thousands of people dispatched to Sakhalin to «ideologically remold» and manage the other same blood.

4.2 Expectations and Disappointments with Motherland Korean

The dissolution of the Cold War and the global wave of détente opened many unprecedented possibilities to the former Soviet Goryeo-

in. The entry of Korean leading enterprises like Daewoo and LG into the Soviet area made them realize the global economic status of Korea, and the prosperity achieved by the same Korean nationals also inspiringly raised the status of the ethnic Goryeoin in the affiliated society. At the same time, according to the great change of outside environment, Goryeoin was forced out to private economy and had to adapt to individual businesses like restaurant operation. Meanwhile, they also enjoyed the “special demand” from the motherland, participating in various sectors including those related to Korean enterprises which competitively entered into the Soviet area. However, as they could dream many possibilities, so they had to realize the limitation about “Korean dream” as time went on; for they found Korea and Koreans were not so warm as to accept the dreams of compatriots as it is.

Cacophony between Motherland Korean and Goryeoin in Economic Activity

The Kazakhstan area was inscribed in some Koreans as attractive for entrepreneurs and investors as a resource-rich country with its vast land, affluent oil and mineral resources. Particularly, as Korean investors and entrepreneurs in Kazakhstani resources and construction increase, some Goryeoin fluent in Korean naturally came to serve as brokers. Still, most of those who participated in these businesses do not hesitate to talk about the image of Korean entrepreneurs negatively. A Goryeoin who, as I heard, has been Korea many times from the early 1990s to date and experienced a number of Koreans with business for 20 years says as follows:

Koreans sweat workers like me. If I've done all things for them, they turn me away: so shrewd deception, very clever and smart. Not once or twice I've been fooled. As Korean entrepreneurs, they come to me and suggest a partnership. So trusting them, I participate in discussions like business meeting and negotiations. If the work becomes settled, they go away without news. Then, why do they take me to the discussions? For example, here is a goldmine. If they ask a material (relevant data), I find and give it to them. Then, they sell that in Korea; otherwise, they say “We'll do ourselves.” If the Korean government accepts the feasibil-

ity, they bring money for a test mining, but just pretend to do so and only get the money, then doing no work. . . . The clever and crafty ethnos are Hebrews, but they are also cheated by the Koreans. For this reason, the Chinese settled all over the world but not in Korea. We should be careful to do business with Koreans. (Interview: May 29, 2011)

Whether in construction or resource development, most Koreans who came into this area to earn money were branded as crafty cheaters, so deeply grugged. Interviewing with the Goryeoin fluent in Korean who have experienced Koreans for business, this researcher came to find most stories are similar with this. A Sakhalinski Goryeoin showed a distrust of Koreans, complaining that “When doing business with Koreans, they ask me for a data and I give it to them, then they turn me away. So we should not give them data to the last. So unreliable people they are.” Not to be excluded at the critical moment of business with Koreans, these Goryeoin has set a principle in their own way. This was also a weapon to counterattack Koreans.

At the same time, they hint that as they do not trust Koreans, so Koreans should not trust Goryeoin recklessly relying on the same look: with the image of “Those who exploit them and go away” and “Those who deceive for money”, Koreans were given an image of “Koreans deceived by Goryeoin”. This is to point out Koreans’ stupidity that they are so ignorant of the real condition at this place as to be cheated against the purpose of earning money when they come first: indeed, this researcher has frequently heard that Korean entrepreneurs or businesspeople were deceived by local people.

In 2006, a large construction company in Korea attempted an aspiring redevelopment project of \$1.2 billion worth in Almaty, Kazakhstan, but received large damage from the mutual counter-suits with the local developer company involving Goryeoin [76: Money Today, September 24, 2008]. Besides, other cases of this kind frequently occur, including a pending lawsuit or already bankrupt companies under economic crisis. Generally, the deceived Korean companies give a warning that “In Kazakhstan, fraud is occurring unbendingly toward Korean enterprises”, but other Koreans in the same industry are dubious of it: “It is not understandable that they promoted the project even without enough re-

search on the local condition.” However, Goryeoin regarded Koreans as ‘the cheated/stupid’ and themselves as “The more quick-witted/smart who can deceive Koreans more than they do.”

Also, the Goryeoin employees of Korean companies usually did not report good reputation of Koreans. Generally, Koreans were given such equivalents as “Those who came here to earn money” and “Those who sweat employees.” This is because Korean companies as capitalist enterprises are much different from the former Soviet workplaces in which Goryeoin have been accustomed to fulfilling the assigned time rather than to considering the efficiency of work, unexceptionally employed by the state-run enterprises. From the conception of a stable workplace involving no concern about dismissal, the capitalist entrepreneurs were regarded as those who ignored the local employees’ culture and exploited them at their will only with the logic of money; for the capitalist logic that businesses should compete with each other and salaries come from the pockets of business owners by the profits was unfamiliar to them who had never experienced it. This is particularly shown better by the complaints of Kazakhs employed by Korean companies. A Kazakh undergraduate who speak Korean a little is said to have worked part-time for a Korean company, but by the owner’s assignment of all kinds of chores, errands and cleaning that hurt the pride, come to quit the job and find out another. The local employee who hoped the company to give a consistent job believed it unfair that the capitalist employer assigned various kinds of chores regarding them as non-special employees.

Historical Re-evaluation on the Former Independence Movement Activists and the Scandals

Disgraceful affairs deepening the antipathy between Koreans and Goryeoin mattered not only in business or enterprise. As the independence activists in the former Soviet area become highlighted in the motherland Korea, their offspring came to participate in the re-establishment of the ancestral history of independence movement in Primorski Krai. In this lofty participation of the offspring of patriots in the Korean project, on the other hand, those who had another purpose came to engage: it led to a scandal by local brokers, the Goryeoin intellectuals, who received the related data from the offspring of patriots

and corresponded with the related scholars in Korea who were other main brokers. Referring to this scandal in the process of handing over the data of independence activists to Korea as «A fraud case by brokers», a Goryeoin confessed the following fact:

On the ground of publication scheduled in Korea, a Goryeoin broker received all data. But the provider, a descendant of an independence activist, came to hear from another Korean scholar, who frequently visited the former Soviet area, unexpected things were happening, in Korea: not that a book was published, but that the Goryeoin broker just sold off the data to Korea. (Interview: July 4, 2011)

According to the above, it was a fraud by the local Goryeoin broker toward the same Goryeoin. As a similar example, this researcher has also heard several times of the Koreans who fraudulently approached the data of independence activist descendants. Lee Liudmila, a granddaughter of Sir Lee Dong-Hui, testified that she had handed over her data to Koreans but not received it back:

When I visited Almaty Korean Education Center to learn Korean in 1995, I came to be known as a granddaughter of Sir Lee Dong-Hui, so was even to the Korean government via the Korean Embassy in Kazakhstan. Invited by Korea, I've been there totally about seven to eight times. In doing so, I've collected the data about my grandfather Lee Dong-Hui and put them in order. A Korean 'A' who was said to teach Korean and Korean history in Almaty National University came to ask me for the data, promising to give it back, so I handed over a number of data, including many handwritten records by Lee Yong-Il who is my father and a son of my grandfather. But he never gave it back. At the time, I had been invited by Korea, so I was too mad at having no data for the visit to Korea. I pressed him for giving it back, but he said he gave it to another 'B' in Korea for publication. And the 'B' said he was given it from 'A', so could not give it back to me. Too preposterous it was. A little solace for all that was the book was published in Korea. Later on, I said the data should be contributed to the Independence Commemoration Association. However, I don't get why he gave it to another without the

owner's permission, after promising to give it back to me. (Interview: July 22, 2010)

Long ago as it occurred, she has been still disappointed with and distrusted the Korean who arbitrarily dealt with her valuable data. As with this disgraceful affair, she showed her book *A Story on Lee Dong-Hui* published in 2003 [103, p. 52] that recounted how she had not received her data. Also, I heard from a granddaughter of the Goryeoin writer Han-Jin about such a story of 'data scandal', whose hero was the aforementioned "A." As a student of the Department of Korean Studies at Almaty National University, the Goryeoin granddaughter delivered her hearsay from her grandmother who is allegedly grudging "A" since having not received her data and books back from him. This kind of cases in which the Goryeoin descendants of independence activists or writers were deceived by Korean or Goryeoin brokers in the process of delivering their data were planting a lesson in their hearts: both the same ethnic Goryeoin or the same national Koreans are unreliable.

In addition to this arbitrary data disposal by Korean scholars and Goryeoin brokers, a Goryeoin suggested there was another kind of fraud: some brokers foregrounded a bogus descendant of Hong Beom-Do, a legendary hero in the anti-Japanese history. Hong is said to have been compulsorily migrated, thus living in Kyzylorda without a family and passing away lonely in his late few years of working as a gatekeeper for Goryeo Theater. Against this background, as it were, a person named Hong who pretended to be his granddaughter suddenly appeared and made a noise in the Goryeoin society. A Goryeoin historian who suggests himself has striven for identifying the truth gives a full account of this case:

There was Hong who suggested herself is a granddaughter of Hong Beom-Do, but it proved that she is not so, but their surname was only the same. Hong Beom-Do in his late few years led a lone and hungry life to the death, and such a granddaughter had never appeared, his close associates in Kyzylorda testified. They said even no such a family member attended his funeral. She was invited by a relative of Hong Beom-Do's eldest uncle who had lived in Pyongyang, but did not go there with

this and that excuses like illness. I visited Kyzylorda and asked her to go and check together. But when I was doing hard to identify the truth, Goryeoin brokers falsely accused me of trying to kill the granddaughter of Hong Beom-Do, so I was called by the police. I stated I had no such an intention as it is, so the police confirmed my innocence. They were conspiring to get Korean money by foregrounding her as the granddaughter of Hong Beom-Do. But as I tried to find the truth, they treated me like an obstructor and accused me. They are very malicious people. It was a fraud case, after all (Interview, July 4, 2011).

For this researcher, it is difficult to declare for sure whether the Goryeoin brokers conspired with her to forge a bogus granddaughter of Hong Beom-Do, as suggested in this testimony, or they were to help her with earnest belief, because it was not officially identified. However, had the self-styled granddaughter of Hong Beom-Do and the brokers conspired, it should be seen as a criminal case that aimed at the special demand from Korea.

The aftermath and lesson of distrust toward the same blood also operated between this Korean researcher and my informant. I intended to borrow data from a Goryeoin informant and photocopy them, but for the long copy time in a photocopy service shop, I came to wait with the informant. The owner justifiably said “I never put my data out of my hands”, never lending it to me and sparing no pains to wait for long time to guard the data. Disappointing as it was, this researcher could not help but understand it. In this behavior, there was an empirical lesson that the Goryeoin had learned from seeing and suffering thus far. He spoke out an experience of having suffered from a Korean professor. “I have once submitted a treatise to Korea, but the Korean professor snapped my contribution fee. I could not stand this, so requested the embassy to give the money back, and received it after all.” The Goryeoin’s preconception that their valuable data handed over to Korea always become ‘money’ spread the distrust toward Koreans reinforcing the stereotype “Koreans can do anything for money.”

As it took already many years since the Republic of Kazakhstan became independent, various Goryeoin entrepreneurs have appeared and adapted to the private economic system. In spite of distrust with Kore-

ans, the Goryeoin who are to earn money have much interest in working for the businesses of “Koreans who came here to earn money.” Also, their attempt to earn money in consistent partnership with Koreans “Who exploit and go away” is in progress. In this situation, Goryeoin make a distinct boundary with Koreans, producing such oppositional stereotypes as the former “Who are as smart as Koreans” and the latter “Who misunderstand themselves as smart” but are actually deceived by Goryeoin. This shows a completely different look from their early days of exchange with Korea when they envied the nation and took pride in the nationals as the same blood. Goryeoin found the limit of access to Korea, believed Koreans do not accept them as the same nationals but as inferior beings, and thus built up negative feelings beyond disappointment and displeasure.

Still, the younger generation of Goryeoin shows different relationship with the motherland from the older generation’s dynamic responses to it. They believe Koreans work employees hard but give much pay, so prefer to work for Korean companies, which are particularly more popular among the young who learned the mother tongue. However, this young generation is accustomed to the capitalist system without the experience of the Soviet era, having various identities of the residential society, which are both linguistically and culturally farther from the motherland. This is easily seen by the fact that many young Kazakhstani interested in Korea who want to learn Korean are not Goryeoin but other ethnics including Kazakhs. The young Goryeoin’s attachment to and sympathy with the motherland is lighter than those of the older generation; as their interest is light, so their displeasure or disappointment is not expressed, and they are close to the young like the other ethnics who live with the capitalist logic and diverse individual perspectives.

4.3 Becoming the Citizens of an Independent State

A process of struggle was revealed here in which the former Soviet Koreans attempted to keep their self-culture in the conflictual situation between their self-identity and the obligation of having a qualification as citizens of the new-born independent state experiencing the deconstruction of social basis during the time of regime transformation.

The Kazakhstani Koreans appear to accept the obligation of speaking the state language with no complaint, keeping a good reputation from and displaying unchanged favorable relationship with the indigenes. Profoundly situated inside, however, their stereotyped recognition of indigenes and self-consciousness of superiority over them collide with the obligation as citizens and the favorable sentiment: in short, the Korean subject showed double-faced contradiction and dualism.

The Politics of «Kind Kazakhs»

It was not simply the matter of adapting themselves to the new affiliated society but the complex situation to rearrange the society with the uncertainty of future that the dissolution of the previous regime became the shock for the Goryeoin who had lived as a model Soviet people. In the inter-ethnic matter, the previous Russian nationals' withdrawal and Kazakhs' new rise as the subject nationals complicated the position of Goryeoin who had strongly sided with and assimilated to the former dominant Soviet regime. Unlike the past in which both Kazakhs and Goryeoin were the same second-order nationalities in the Soviet era, the present situation is imposing a new positioning on Goryeoin. Despite the change to a democratic system unlike the past communist regime, the process of constructing a country based on the national subject leaves the non-subject ethnic group with the potential elements of exclusion here and there.

Although Goryeoin pursued Russianess by assimilating to the Russian-driven socialist regime, they have never raised a superficial conflict with other ethnic groups including the indigenous Kazakhs. Moreover, they had a certain amicable bond with the indigenes in terms of ethnic similarities such as the same colored race and patriarchal elements. Kazakhs also evaluated the ethnicity of Goryeoin as industrious and responsible. Both groups have no ethnic antipathy toward each other, but commonly say that they have maintained a reciprocal relationship together.

The ethnic reputation of Goryeoin had also been stricken with a blow of artificial engagement by the power of authority. In a way, the Soviet government utilized a powerless ethnic minority like Goryeoin as the leverage to obstruct the power of indigenes. For instance, the Moscow

government ingeniously utilized Eom Victor, the Goryeoin president of Tashkent at the time, in obliterating the Uzbek nationalist scholars to control Uzbekistan [84, p. 225]. The Soviet policy of weakening and dispersing the power of indigenous groups, although it cried out the harmony between nationalities, partly encouraged the conflict and schism between ethnic groups. That is, the history of Goryeoin, who had walked along the way of Russianism to incline toward Russia, speaking only in Russian, and striven to be loyal to and acknowledged by the Soviet government, might have alienated or excluded other ethnic groups.

A word for referring to Goryeoin, «Opportunistic» is widespread among other ethnic groups. The word also implies the non-subjective meaning that they sided with the dominant power. However, the Goryeoin attempted to interpret and define this word as the meaning of “Smart” and “competent.” That is, they appreciated by this word that they had lived so hard and been acknowledged with good results. This reputation of other ethnic groups in the residential country on the Goryeoin’s ethnicity was due to one’s exploration of survival in extreme situations and strong aspiration for being acknowledged by the Soviet society. As there was an exclusion of the same ethnic in-group by pretending to be the more superior in the Goryeoin group in the process of striving to become a model Soviet people, so it might well be inevitable to compete with other ethnic groups outside. However, while the indigenes’ antipathy against Russians who dominated over their land was alive, the immigrant Goryeoin had no cacophony with indigenes or other ethnic groups.

The ethnic relationship between Kazakhs and Goryeoin was shown by the belief that both share similar sentiment in their cultural traditions. When I interviewed Kazakhs, the most heard story was about Korean television dramas. Regardless of ages, many Kazakhs were deeply fallen into Korean television dramas; particularly, they pointed out the culture of “Elders first” and patriarchal atmosphere in the Korean family relationship they saw in the dramas were similar to their tradition. Kazakh nomadic culture is characterized by a cooperative group including about ten families that is operated for seasonal movement and maintains the mutual and common system in safety and production, so that traditionally the blood and the kindred were valued: for marriage,

a sustained tradition is to prohibit the marriage with relatives within seven degrees of kinship; a strong hierarchy was sustained in a family based on a patriarch and in a collective community based on the eldest.

Not only in terms of this commonality of socio-cultural sentiment, but also historically, Korea has been in deep interrelationship: the Huns, the ancient Turks who dominated the Central Asian area in ancient history, were leagued with Go-joseon, the ancient state in the Korean Peninsula, to counteract the Jin and Han Dynasties in the ancient China, and the Turks were leagued with Goguryeo to battle against the Su Dynasty. Linguistically, some scholars evidence the trace of Turkish in the official titles or various words of the ancient states in the Korean Peninsula. Also, the local Kazakhs or Kazakh scholars stress that they have linguistic and affective sympathy with Koreans. This recognition of historical and affective bond between both ethnic groups becomes an important basis to provide trust and spiritual stability with each other.

Even though few Goryeoins spoke Kazakh and showed the embracing attitude toward Kazakh tradition and culture, but most represented themselves as specially trusted by the supreme national leader:

Our president here (President Nazarbayev) is employing right policies and says us get along with each other. President allowed ethnic groups to learn their own languages and opened cultural centers to enjoy our songs, dances, and others at our will. We also had concerts together with other ethnic groups. Of course, they lord over us as the land owners. But they have the trust in us.

President Nazarbayev eariler said Goryeoin are already working in the farm but Kazakhs just got up and are sipping teas, so gave them a scolding. President is also a person, how can't he have no fault? Only Jesus has no fault. But he is doing well to motivate people. When he tried to move the capital to Astana, so many argued about it. But how good it is now after moving? A capital is the face of the country.

There might be complaints among Kazakhs. But we minorities like President so much. He said: you want to earn money, earn as you like, but observe the law. This time he cancelled the referendum but held a general election, he did so well. (Interview: June 14, 2010)

They agree with and trust in the president's policy. In particular, they stress the image of "President who does not discriminate by ethnicity", but also reacting sensitively to the concern of ethnic discrimination. This was also the trace of painful experience by the past ethnic oppression. Behind the expression of "Now is the best time and stable", there are the anxiety and obsession that this problem can arise anytime in future. Also, they were recalling the painful experience of having been rejected from their own motherland. When a number of Soviet migrants left for their motherland after the Soviet dissolution, Goryeoin were not accepted by South or North Korea, so that they had to accept their residential country as the homeland. Kazakhs's and Goryeoin's expression of the beautiful relationship between them and the trust in the present powers suggest the gesture of continuing to accept the reality, but contain the heavy and anxious reality.

This reality reflects on the politics of "kind Kazakhs to Goryeoin" that I frequently have heard of early on since coming to Kazakhstan. For me, the story that Kazakhs helped Goryeoin during compulsory migration despite their own difficulties was a fabulous, beautiful but true story that ignited my heart hotter than did any moving fairy tale that I heard in childhood. The well-wishing remark that the Korean delegates to Kazakhstan always say to Kazakhs at an official meeting is also "You are the kindhearted nation who did a favor for Goryeoin, so we would like to express our gratitude to you as the same blood." This story has been handed down as a truth to descendants, although by generation shifts.

However, not a few Goryeoin affirmed that this universally well-known and believed story was not true, unexpectedly. Regarding this, several Goryeoin indeed contended with each other in front of this researcher:

A: "When Goryeoin immigrated, the Kazakhs' village was mostly empty. Their livestock were all taken away, and due to the drought, they all had to move or go away. Even if some Kazakhs remained, they also had nothing to eat, so how could they help Goryeoin? Living Kazakhs almost moved away, and some Goryeoin could take the deserted houses or huts.

B: “The story has been there, so indeed some Kazakhs may have given breads to Goryeoin, if not all of them.”

A: “It’s likely not a truth, but just a flattery for Kazakhs.”

Researcher: “Why should they flatter?”

A: “Cause they had to get along with each other. In the Soviet era, they must never speak out their own ethnicity, but get along with each other.”

(Interviews: August 1, 2010)

The aforementioned “A” is a Goryeoin who researches the history of compulsory migration of Goryeoin with a large personal collection of data, and seriously asserted that the story of «Kazakhs’ help for Goryeoin» is a fiction.

For Kazakhs, under the compulsory settlement and collectivization policy since 1920s, they couldn’t sustain a living by the previous nomadic lives. They were banned from getting out of the area due to the collectivization, and for the nomads, the forced settlement was a hard way to survive. They were meat-eaters, but all lands and livestock were thoroughly managed and controlled, so there’s nothing to eat. They had to eat all livestock and even human flesh. The Soviet government exported all grains from all areas and the residents came to die hungry.

Stalin knocked down intellectuals. In 1930s, 500 Kazakh leaders were obliterated, and in December of the year Goryeoin were compulsorily migrated, the first minister of Kazakhstan, a Kazakh Baitursinov was shot to death. Whether they’re Kazakh or Goryeoin, all were far from others between ethnics, even within the same ethnics, suffering from fear and extreme hunger. In each village, one out of two was starved or arrested to death, and there’s nothing to eat. Their yurts (ger) and houses were all empty. When all Kazakhs had moved away, Goryeoin just utilized the deserted houses or huts.

How could the Kazakhs help Goryeoin in that serious situation? That’s not a truth. Kazakhs were in even worse situation than Goryeoin. Then, what’s the distorted story handed down? Because Goryeoin were afraid of dismissal from workplace, such a «story» is to flatter and cringe to other ethnic group, making no enemy. (Interview: August 9, 2010)

The claim of “A” including the Goryeoin who agree with it is grounded on the Kazakh history of sufferings which is well known. Before immigrants came into Central Asia by compulsory migration around the 1940s, there was an era when indigenous Kazakhs suffered from a series of misfortunes: the Soviet collectivization policy since the late 1920s and the drought in the early 1930s. During 1931 to 1933, the great famine and the Soviet ruthless administration made 1.75 million people – who account for 42% of all Kazakhs – the victims of famine and oppression, and over one million people crossed over the border [127, p. 44].

“The Goryeoin may say that Kazakhs are so kind to have given breads to Goryeoin, but behind them, in fact they laugh together,” says “A”. This means that the narrative of “kind and gracious Kazakh to Goryeoin” is regarded as a fictionalized story for a political remark, not the fact, thus it implies a self-portrait of the cringing non-subjective minority who flatter and cringe to the power.

The narrative of «kind Kazakhs» is in conjunction with the Kazakh’s character that has been known traditionally. The representative characteristics of the Kazakhs are patience, friendship, and tolerance, amongst others [116, p. 47-48]. The origin of this ethnicity is related to the lifestyle in which they had moved seasonally as nomads to seek after a steppe. Driving a herd of sheep on the endless steppe, meeting someone to greet during the long free time would be the happiest moment of the day [116, p. 47]. Not alienating anyone in the way of calling them other ethnos, but welcoming all gladly whether they are acquaintances or not is known as a traditional ethnic character of Kazakhs [119, p. 200].

Indeed, many Goryeoin testify that they had received help from Kazakhs: there are many stories of Goryeoin’s experience such as that one at the crossroads of life without any place to sleep in or stay at slept in a hut or room provided by a Kazakh and that one ate horse’s milk served by a local Kazakh but suffered from diarrhea. The past fact that Kazakhs helped Goryeoin in worst situation well reflects Kazakh ethnic character and is frequently recalled in public square making a display of friendly relations between the two nationals, on the other side in which the cowardly subject of Goryeoin who that the weak is obsequious to the strong lies behind.

The Politics of «Must-Learn State Language»

The new socio-political cataclysm piled up the problems which cannot be embraced as good feelings and amicable relationship between nationalities in front of the ethnic minority Goryeoin. In front of the independence of Kazakhstan, one of the prioritized problems for the construction of a new country was a policy of restoring the Kazakhs' national language. The Goryeoins seem to act in concert firstly and the most exemplarily, but are actually coping with the pressure to learning a new state language.

In Kazakhstan, most Kazakhs speak Russian except in rural areas, so that their communication with Goryeoin seems not so problematic for the time being. However, not knowing Kazakh goes beyond the meaning of impossibility in linguistic communication with Kazakhs. For the most distinguished in the process of constructing the state of the national subject Kazakhs was the linguistic policy that designated the state language as Kazakh. Also, as a number of Kazakhs have forgotten their own language for long under the dominance of other nationality, the senses of crisis and seriousness about the loss of their own ethnic language were recognized together.

Now in public institutions and schools, the incapability to speak Kazakh means dismissal, so that the Kazakh-handicapped cannot be employed from the first and should experience the obstacle against entering into a public realm. This seriousness of the new state language was also shown in this researcher's interviews with many Goryeoin. Unexpectedly, however, when I asked them whether they were actually learning Kazakh, most of them looked embarrassed: there were few of such actual learners. It is no wonder that the capability to communicate in the new state language is the most urgent matter linked to their future survival, but the older generation has more dual attitude to accepting Kazakh. In the same context as this frequent discussion of the necessity to speak Kazakh as Kazakhstani citizens and the matter of Kazakh education at the state level, the Goryeoin group looks like always striving for overcoming this problem based on their representative bodies. Thus, they occasionally raise an agenda focused on promotion and actualization of Kazakh education and adopt a resolution to reflect expert opinions and strive in cooperation. However, some also

point out that such resolution and effort have no substantial change in result.

Regarding this matter, this researcher came to witness a specific scene firsthand participating in a meeting between experts and people concerned. In July, 2010, a roundtable discussion on “Experience of Learning National Integration and Development of Korean Language Policy” was held in Almaty by Goryeoin Association with the support of General Association of Nationalities. The gist of this discussion was that taking a lesson from the language policy Korea had practiced to integrate around 7 million Koreans overseas in 140 countries, the ethnic minorities as Kazakhstani citizens should recognize the importance of state language and contribute to the state integration by fostering patriotic spirit. There, the representative of Goryeoin Association emphasized that they would make an active effort to educate and practice Kazakh from that time on and should learn the language, stressing the importance of Kazakh as the state language. To this remark, a person of the General Association of Nationalities responded sharply as if to have waited for it: “You people had already said the same remark 10 years ago, so what has been changed?” By this response, the audience was put to silence and a tense atmosphere hovered. At the place were those from the Practice Committee of Academic Department of the General Association of Nationalities, executives of the Goryeoin Association, Goryeoin scholars, experts and students, and Korean scholars and students studying there. Behind this overt scolding, there was an intention to point out that although they officially express commonplace recognition of the importance of Kazakh as the state language, they actually show no will to learn Kazakh unlike their remark.

This inactive attitude to the state language is generally widespread among Goryeoin. Besides, some old Goryeoin over their 60s affirm that it is no problem for them to be unable to speak Kazakh, although it would be good to know. Meanwhile, a Goryeoin intellectual of the old generation points out that Kazakh letters are inappropriate to be accepted as academic terms; most Kazakh sentences include a large proportion of Russian words; and Kazakh neologism is increasing.

It would be good in Kazakhstan to learn Kazakh. But to study international disciplines, Kazakh is not enough. Is there any reason to make new Kazakh words? Enough to use what we've used (Russian). (Interview: May 29, 2011)

As it were, Kazakhs are continuing to make new words as Kazakh have no words to replace academic terms or foreign loanwords. As regards this increase of Kazakh neologism, some described to this researcher how Kazakh scholars contemplate at a desk by mimicking their facial expression: “(holding a ball-pen in the mouth and rolling the eyes upward) what should I make for this in our word...?” Another Goryeoin insisted that he had grown up in Uzbekistan but not been able to understand Uzbek, and having lived in a city, never known even Korean, not to mention Kazakh, so that his mother tongue was only Russian. At the same time, he spoke out there is much difficulty in learning Kazakh even if one is to do so:

I was a teacher of foreign language (French and German), and once I saw my grandson's Kazakh textbook, I found it not well-made. In schools, history, geography, and literature textbooks are all in Kazakh, but even teachers don't know well, so don't teach that, and just rate marks roughly. Kazakh education now is abnormally done. Kazakh state language textbooks have only a series of words, even the grammar is hard to understand. Grandson is good at English or other subjects. The problem is not a student, but the teachers and textbooks to teach Kazakh. (Interview: August 5, 2010)

Rather, he took pride in the fact that all their family members prefer to learn English, thus during the family travel in Korea, all but him having spoken English due to poor Korean speech. Indeed, the fever to learn English in Kazakhstani education continues to become hotter in parallel with the policy of establishing the state language, which is the government's will to achieve the globalization of education under the flag of “Fostering global resources.” Not only a popular subject that all youngsters who aspire to learn, but also a mandatory subject to enter a college, English is even appearing recently in the questions

of major examinations. In these days, the students tend to regard the private or group extracurricular English lessons as basically needed, and the popularity of private English-only language institutes is becoming higher. Meanwhile, there comes another voice worrying that even some Kazakh youngsters who are poor at Kazakh have more interest in English.

Some also pointed out Goryeoin youngsters value English more than Kazakh unexceptionally, eschewing the Kazakh learning on various pretexts. An irony here is that most Goryeoin ascribe their incapability to speak Kazakh entirely to their own fault, admitting that the government has thus far provided enough time to learn Kazakh for ethnic minorities, even feeling sorry for the government's generosity. Thus, regarding the state language policy as natural, they were siding with the government.

Here is the Republic of Kazakhstan, so even if the president is not a Kazakh but another ethnic, we cannot stop using Kazakh. Not learning Kazakh is a non-sense, and who argues about Kazakh is a bad person. To work as a public servant in Korea, isn't it a duty to speak Korean? (Interview: May 15, 2011)

There was no Goryeoin who objected the idea that Kazakh should be the state language, and learned by the citizens as a duty. However, a Goryeoin, who had agreed to the rightness of the state policy of Kazakh language, whispered to me in April of this year with excited voice that there was an important announcement of President about the state language:

Right after the presidential election, President gave an important direction in the Convention of the Association of Ethnic Minorities (to ethnic minorities). He said "The old do not know Kazakh and it's hard to learn for them; also, things like documents (in the authorities) cannot be set to Kazakh blindly, so use dual language." So, we took breath. From now on, if someone asks me to speak Kazakh in shops or anywhere, I'm going to say, "Haven't you heard about the direction of President?" (Interview: June 12, 2011)

The president who understands the plight of Goryeoin who should learn Kazakh but feel it difficult to learn is expressed as a kind person; their repressed discontent casts grudge on the general unspecified majority; and these discontent and grudge also stayed at a soliloquy. Most Goryeoin feel internal discontent with and pressure of learning Kazakh, while there appear indeed active Kazakh speakers. Speaking Kazakh as an immigrant ethnic was the very target of interest. A case in point is a Kazakh speaker who graduated in agriculture and made so efficient a machine for onion cropping as to take out a patent. His trimming machine for onion was introduced by a television program, and it was an important source of pride that he spoke Kazakh by himself appearing in the program. He said that he had associated with Kazakhs in childhood and had much interest in Kazakh, thus feeling pride in having appeared in the television program due to his good Kazakh speech. That is to say, the reality in which few Goryeoin can speak fluent Kazakh highlighted his scarcity value.

A close uncle of his said that the uncle's daughter, grandson, and granddaughter's husband are all Kazakhs and all the family can speak Kazakh and Russian with no linguistic problem, boasting about the communication in Kazakh and the mixed-blood marriage with Kazakhs. According to his explanation, 70% of compulsorily migrated Goryeoin lived in Kyzylorda, a full-blooded Kazakh area where Goryeoin spoke Kazakh fairly well at the time, and a Soviet school student as he was, he came to learn Kazakh naturally associating with the neighboring Kazakhs.

Kazakhs and we are very friendly. We are the same Orientals, so have similar customs. Here is no discrimination of ethnos. In Russia, it is so discriminative. Though we don't speak Kazakh well, but there was no linguistic problem marrying with a Kazakh, because all urban Kazakhs speak Russians. Kazakh and Korean have the same root. Goryeoin, Kazakhs, and Uzbeks, aren't they all the Altaic ethnos? (Interview: May 23, 2011)

His opinion about Kazakh was as follows: it is not difficult for Goryeoin to learn Kazakh due to advantageous conditions that Goryeo-

in and Kazakhs are close to each other in terms of race while both languages belong to the same Altaic family and have easy grammars; also, the government policy of state language is quite right; besides, not only for the integration of multi-nationalities in Kazakhstan, but most importantly for Kazakhs who are not good at Kazakh, it is imperative to reinforce the Kazakh education.

As a constituent of the Republic of Kazakhstan, there seems now to be no room for discontent or reason to be generously understood in learning Kazakh. Controversies over the adequacy of Kazakh to academic language, textbooks and methods for education, and the problems of teachers all cannot become the justifiable reason of inability to speak Kazakh for Goryeoin, who accordingly do not express such discontent well. The reality of Kazakh's proportion is shown by the increased proportion of Kazakh not only in Kazakh classes, but even in Russian classes in schools, as well as in universities, where the commonly used language is moving to Kazakh unlike before among students, staff, and professors in the universities.

The Kazakhstani ethnic minorities' burden of learning Kazakh was lessened by the governmental consideration. According to them, if public servants give Kazakh-based documents during paperwork, the minorities can claim the right to receive Russian-based ones. Many Goryeoin say, as the president said, it is already late for their generation to learn Kazakh; they are not the active age group who frequent public offices for paperwork, so have few chances to utilize the state language; wherever they go, no one will argue with the old over not speaking Kazakh; thus, there will be no particular linguistic challenge related to Kazakh. Be that as it may, they are eager to keep away from linguistic conflicts in daily lives, just hoping the government will allow them to use Russian during their remaining years.

However, the majority of active Goryeoin population, educated in the Soviet regime, cannot escape from this burden. Not long ago, this researcher overheard the fact that the representative executives of the ethnic bodies were studying Kazakh hard. Amongst them, someone with a Kazakh family member is also said to learn much faster than others. For they recognized their position as the representative public figures of Goryeoin who should set a model, so that an unpracticed

promise became no longer effective and there is no room for withdrawal since the overt scolding last year. Compared to these public figures, however, the majority of general Goryeoin are practically passive in learning the state language.

Goryeoin's narrative of affirmative reception of the state language reflects their pro-Kazakh sentiment well and reminds of the welcomed exemplary citizens in constructing the state identity. On the other hand, while suffering from the pressure and crisis on the state language, they reject the obligation of practicing the state language and depend on the government's special care that allows the use of existing language, or hope for hazily moving off from the linguistic conflict moment encountered in everyday lives, hiding their substantial entities.

KEY QUESTIONS OF THE CHAPTER FOR READERS

1. Representation of diverse narratives in the contexts of political and social changes;
2. Dissolution of internal schism of Soviet Koreans in the contexts of the 88 Seoul Olympics and the fall of Soviet System in 1990s;
3. The two Korean groups' explosion of primordial emotion as "One blood";
4. Change in perspective on two mother countries: from the Enemy «South Joseon» to Another Native Country;
5. Restoring ethnic language: from an «Obstacle to Success» to an «Ethnic Asset»;
6. Speak-out of the minority, Sakhalinski;
7. Breakdown of expectation and cacophony with Motherland South Koreans in business sphere and in the re-evaluation project on the Former Independence Movement Activists;
8. Becoming the citizens of an independent state: the politics of «Kind Kazakhs»;
9. Becoming the citizens of an independent state: the politics of «Must-learn state language».

CHAPTER V

INTERPRETATION OF KAZAKHSTANI KOREANS' IDENTITY POLITICS

This chapter discussed the point that Kazakhstani Koreans' basis on which to construct the authenticity of self-identity with such resources as the past experiences, memories, and imaginations in their identity politics shown at the time of regime transformation is neither permanent nor essential. Also, it analyzed the origin of past experiences and memories the former Soviet Koreans had mobilized to essentialize the value and meaning of their ego, as well as dissecting how they define the ego and the others and produce differences to define the new other. This showed how the basis of ego is weak and variable despite their fierce struggle for survival to keep the ego in the variable context of external power and material base that govern the lives of the ego.

5.1 Vulnerable boundaries and the liberation of the minority

The repression of the Sakhalinski by the Primorski was indeed more intense in their negative feelings toward each other than in the linguistic or cultural difference disclosed by their narrative. That is, it was not so much an external difference, but also the representation of a sense of superiority or a sense of humiliation and shame they had experienced in the past. What they emphasized in the antagonistic narrative of both groups was about the characteristic and cultural differences like "The Soviet people" who had a Russian character speaking Russian well, "the Japanese-like people" who spoke Japanese well, and "domestic guys" who spoke Korean well. In these fixed images, their past experience of discrimination and contemptuous eyes toward each other had remained as the Primorski who «pretend to be Russians» and the Sakhalinski who are «like the character of Japanese, the detestable harmer and the enemy, and from South Korea, the enemy state that should be broken down». As time went on, by the way, the Sakhalinski became assimilated to the Soviet regime, but the discriminative eye toward them was not cleared off. They were emphasized by the Primorski even as the «Japanese» who have a closed and dual character with the

gesture of bending the right index finger. The strong's fixed eye and detestation toward the weak of this kind was the former's emotional response and cognitive violence with anger to the weak who could not display their subjective voices in front of the strong. Underlying this violence of the strong was their superiority as the offspring of the honorable independence activists who bloodily fought against the imperialist Japan as well as their memory of hostility toward the country.

The liberation of Sakhalinski was emotional, which means they were not so much liberated from their essential difference from the strong, but from the feeling of discrimination and repression framed by the «Formalized image» the strong produce. It was these antagonistic emotion and discriminative frame which had dominated their everyday that were absorbed into the «Primordial emotion» incited by the Olympics: “One ancestry” and “One blood”.

The Sakhalinski as the target of contempt were the past and another look of the Primorski. All their ancestry was the Joseon people who had left the hometown in the forcible or semi-forcible environment of oppression. The look of the Sakhalinski Goryeoin who did not undo their bundles to come back to the motherland, rejecting the Soviet nationality and adhering to their native custom, was no other than that of the Primorski Goryeoin who strived for the independence of their motherland, rejecting the Russian nationality and maintaining the traditional lives, consolidated by their own nationality. Also, why the Sakhalinski had to be imprisoned branded as “Japanese spies” was no other than why the Primorski had to compulsorily emigrate in the past from the Russian Far-East branded as “Japanese spies” and “dissident ethnos.” As the Primorski have desperately built up their basis of existence in the Soviet society, so the Sakhalinski who came into the continent have striven for entering into the Soviet society. A Sakhalinski intellectual's testimony that “In the 70s, I removed from Sakhalin to the continental Kazakhstan and joined the Party, so my future was promising, but the Soviet dissolution made me so downhearted” suggests that to go to the continent and join the Party was the formula for the success in life. This course was the same way through which the Sakhalinski and the Primorski passed alike, but only the times were different.

The Sakhalinski alienated as the Other by the Primorski may seem to be an entire victim. However, the conflict originated from their affiliated society's power that positioned them in the structure of the manager and the managed, which was considered unfair by the weak. Thus, both groups can be regarded in fact as the victims of power structure. Also, if the Primorski were dispatched to Sakhalin by the structure of the time, the Sakhalinski had become the Japanese positioned without any alternative, thus dispatched to Sakhalin as the labor force by the command of the imperialist Japan. Besides, while the continental Goryeoin's previous cross over the border from their motherland into Primorski Krai was formally voluntary, their movement was actually compulsive under the Japanese rule like the Sakhalinski.

The Primorski's contemptuous eye and negative feeling toward the minority, which was in the same condition by the outside structure as another part of the same blood, might be an arrow of despair in which the continental Goryeoin had to throw away all of theirs and ghostly devote themselves to become the Soviet people. This is similar to the unconscious complex as a side effect of the process of dependent subjectification that the post-colonialist Fanon pointed out.

According to Homi Bhabha, the dominated subject's mimicry of the dominant means resistance and subversion, but Fanon regarded it as the process of dependent subjectification. Treating the Sakhalinski as the Other with mythical dichotomy from the strong aspiration to become a model Soviet people can be seen as an unconscious symptom as Fanon suggests. The African blacks who had been colonized by France conceived the dichotomous idea between the superior and the inferior, civilization and barbarism based on the dominant culture, and according to this mythical dichotomy, a mimesis or mimicry of the dominant culture was justified. The continental Goryeoin strived for rapid Russianization by such a mimesis of the dominant culture: that is, they aspired for higher education than other ethnic groups in the Russian system, and despite the traditional ethnicity of shunning racial mixture, they married with Russian, naming in a Russian style with wives following the surnames of husbands. Still, there is an inherent contradiction behind this mythical dichotomy, which involves the neurotic alienation to destroy the self-presence. Behind the blacks' desire to

identify with the whites by attempting to possess French as their own language, there is inevitably such a pathological symptom of denying the value of the self, as Fanon pointed out.

The structure of the superior/inferior utilized in the continental Goryeoin's alienation of another subgroup as the Other was based on a stereotype produced in the process of constructing the basis of their survival. However, the «Superior» being is neither stable in reality as Bhabha suggested. It is also a self-contradiction in which the existence of the «Inferior» guarantees the existence of the «Superior». Also, as they strongly sided with the Soviet society, so they would probably feel nervous about being marginalized at any time as far as they were not the dominant nation. The frame of keeping them as the «Superior being» within the ethnic group was too vulnerable. The wane of the Soviet regime, the former basis to support them, as well as the international sports event of the Olympics disrupted the pre-existing tensional structure with the motto of «one nation», incapacitating the meaning of the «inferior».

5.2 Construction of Boundary with South Koreans

Kazakhstani Koreans' recognition of Korea is ambivalent. For one thing, the fact that their motherland Korea is an economically rich country serves as a resource of heightening their ethnic status in the host society. For the other, however, the closer mutual exchange and contact have been made between Kazakhstani Koreans and South Koreans, the more surging is the former's recognition of the latter as not so much homogeneous in blood as heterogeneous beings that cannot be harmonized with themselves. This is because Kazakhstani Koreans' expectation on the economically rich motherland was broken, and they interpreted and imagined the South Korean capitalist economic activities in a way accustomed to the socialist economic system.

Through the 1988 Seoul Olympics, Soviet and South Koreans made a dramatic encounter, opening the former's new perspective toward the latter whose state had been considered the enemy rather than the motherland. Until then, they were none other than those who had antagonistic ideologies under the Cold War and were broken with each other, but their encounter through the Olympics revealed, as Geertz

(1998) [8] suggested, the primordial absolute emotion based on consanguine homogeneity. The Soviet Koreans never spared praises and positive appraisals, expressing Korea as the ancestry's land over which the same blood flows and as the sacred country. Unlike their society which had to suffer from material poverty at the late Soviet era, the existence of the «Rich Korea» which was said to enjoy a high level of lifestyle as a global industrialized country became a solid underpinning to raise Soviet Koreans' ethnic status and let them squarely publicize their identity as Koreans. The dramatic patriotism they displayed also brought to close the value-consciousness of the superior and inferior inside the ethnic group, settling down the internal schism. Besides, the emergence of the new motherland changed their previous frame of recognizing North Korea as the only motherland. That is, giving South Korea a comparative superiority over North Korea economically, they chose the former rather than the latter as the target motherland to visit and contact.

Meanwhile, as the impression of patriotism did not last longer, the former Soviet Koreans had to realize that they cannot share the material affluence of Koreans and Korea is a cool-headed motherland that does not allow their hope to immigrate to the country. This means the frustration of their hope that the emergence of the new rich motherland might be a breakthrough to realize the dream of returning to the native country and to overcome economic difficulty. When the social anxiety increased by the crisis of the late Soviet regime and the dissolution of economic base, Soviet Germans and Israelis could realize homecoming with the support and consideration of their motherlands, but Soviet Koreans had no choice but to migrate again to the Maritime Province, their forefathers' hometown, giving up the dream of coming back to the motherland. Their emigration and settlement in the Maritime Province was neither with governmental financial support, nor successful with the opposition of indigenous ethnic groups who had settled there since their forefathers left. Eventually, they had to experience a barrier that obstructs their homecoming despite the existence of the motherland, followed by the sense of alienation that they were neglected by the people of «The ancestry's land».

The former Soviet Koreans' disappointment and frustration with the motherland never stopped here. Negative feelings about South Koreans were accumulated with the conflicts from economic activity spheres, and South Koreans were also considered not the target of reliance but one of wariness. This was because the Kazakhstani Koreans suffered from the side-effects and conflicts in the process of adapting themselves to the unfamiliar capitalist system, of which they had no experience since they had been accustomed to socialist system, thus targeting the South Korean entrepreneurs in the conflictual process. Although they preferred and boasted of working in a South Korean firm, they eventually came to have a sense of being victimized as those who were not treated as the same nationals but only the target of exploitation. Unlike the socialist system in which everyone was not anxious about unemployment but guaranteed stable occupations, the market economy imposed the burden of survival competition upon them, who had insufficient consciousness of the capitalist logic that one cannot survive without business profitability. They had expected an emphasized reception of blood tie as the same nationals from South Korean entrepreneurs in Kazakhstan, who, however, dissatisfied the expectation and became the target of criticism, defined merely as "Those who came here to earn money" and "Those who sweat employees".

A Kazakhstani Korean who has once worked as a cooperator in the business with South Koreans had stronger distrust toward South Koreans: that is, he established an ironbound law in business with South Koreans based on the consciousness that working as a business partner with a South Korean is likely to lead to undergoing a fraudulent case as neglected in a decisive moment. Although those who worked as a business partner with South Koreans were only a part of the whole former Soviet Koreans, many of them were concentrated on private economy in the time of transition to the market economy system, and with large interest in and dream of business with South Koreans, their disappointment raised the distrust toward South Koreans.

For the Koreans from the Maritime Province, the descendants of anti-Japanese independence activists experienced disgraceful scandals with South Koreans and this accelerated the bad reputation of South

Koreans. In the process of rediscovering independence movement led by the Korean government, the descendants of independence activists did not receive their data from South Korean brokers or former Soviet Koreans, and this became a fraud case agitating the Goryeoin society. Their distrust of South Koreans left behind a lesson that the data in the hands of independence activist descendants should not be handed over to South Koreans credulously on any sweet inducement. While it became a large concern in South Korea to rediscover the sacred history of independence movement by the Soviet Korean ancestry that had been hidden since the Bolshevik Revolution, the independence activists' descendants had indeed a disgraceful stained memory with South Koreans.

The former Soviet Koreans rejoiced over and took pride in the economically developed look of South Korea as if it is their own look, and giving comparative superiority to South over North Korea, they showed a dramatic gesture of acknowledging their motherland as South Korea more than North Korea. Now, however, they indeed find no connection with South Korea other than the surface symbol of a rich motherland. They point out South Koreans who ignore them, put on airs, and even deceive them, are actually never smarter than them, but as stupid and silly as conversely utilized and deceived by them. These arbitrary interpretations and misunderstandings due to the difference of regimes yield the sense of alienation, disappointment, and hurt from the motherland which allegedly does not accept them as the same nationals, and intensify the boundary that inevitably brands South Korea and South Koreans as the other.

5.3 Significance of Indigenous Language for Kazakhstani Koreans

The fact that Kazakhstani Koreans explore their own internal subject comes to destroy the positive sentiment with the indigenes they have piled up and to challenge the power. The hidden ideology that is so invisible from outside defines Russian as the self-language and the indigenous Kazakh as the other, which not only serves as the pretense to disregard the practice of the duty to state language, but also justifies the status of Russian as the self-language.

Stereotyped Ideology of «Illiterate and Civilized»

In Kazakhstani Koreans' linguistic conflict in front of the obligation of state language, there are deeply inscribed ideas of «illiteracy and civilization» from their own historical experiences and memories since settlement in Kazakhstan in 1937. Although both Koreans and Kazakhs under the Soviet power were treated like second-class ethnic groups who could not surpass Russians, the dominant, Koreans were active assimilated into the Russian and sidestepped from the indigenous culture. That is to say, they who were apparently Korean kinship related nevertheless pursued mimicking Russianness, regarding the indigenous, even their own language, as the other, thus defining themselves as “Those who are Russian-like.”

In the Soviet era when universal Sovietization was promoted and nationalism ruled out, revealing ethnic color or appreciating other ethnic groups were prohibited. When the ethnic pride of Soviet Koreans increased with the event of 1988 Seoul Olympics at the late Soviet era, the Soviet Koreans spoke out their momentarily. A Soviet Korean intellectual wrote in «Lenin Kichi», the ethnic Soviet Korean newspaper (Aug. 23, 1988), “When Russian dominated Kazakhs, Central Asians had no autonomous state systems and the literates represented no more than 2%. But the area of Kazakhstan came to develop splendidly by the Soviet regime, and transformed from the previous periphery based on nomadic lives to a large industrial and agricultural center.” Although indigenes regard their history before independence as a colonial history when they were dispossessed their territory and sovereignty by Russians in the era of Imperial Russia, the Soviet Korean shows the same viewpoint as that of the past dominant group or powers that Kazakhs could escape from illiteracy through the time. That is, it shows the «Orientalism» that Kazakhs were the uncivilized who had led nomadic lives without letters and advanced in civilization because of Russians.

The hidden ideology that is so invisible from outside regards Russian as the self-language and the indigenous Kazakh as the other-language, which not only serves as the pretext to disregard the practice of the obligatory state language, but also solidifies the status of Russian as the self-language. Although Kazakh was designated as the

state language and is used by an absolute majority of Kazakhs, such reasons why it could not be learned are emphasized as the flaws of grammars and textbooks, Cyrillic letters loaned from Russian, the lack of linguistic originality, the lack of proper words which are thus in the making, and incompatibility with global studies. As a consequence, the indigenous language is limited to a language of inferior existence which has just escaped from the world of illiteracy. This production of difference becomes a justifiable ground to sustain the self-language rather than the indigenous language which seems full of flaws.

Obedience to Power and Intrinsic Resistance: the Double Ego

In the condition that indigenes rose to the leading nationals of the state and the status and power of indigenous culture were reversed, Kazakhstani Koreans are walking on the tough road of separatism from the indigenous language that became the state language. However, they do not exercise subjective resistance to the dominant power. Always hiding their internal subject that rejects the practice of the state language, their external looks become patriotic citizens who fulfill the state obligation. This is because disclosing their internal subject comes to destroy the positive sentiment with the indigenes they have built up and to challenge the state power.

For Kazakhstani Koreans, the state obligation is considered a «sacred duty» to observe without exception, since they have lived as the subordinate subject or the «subaltern» to the dominant power. Their outcomes of mimicking the dominant nation led to their pride on the one hand; the past scars left in the extremely forcible transformation of their identity also became the part of themselves on the other. The shock and terror, with which they had to be relentlessly oppressed, purged, forcibly relocated and arranged by the dishonor of anti-regime and nationalism, thus irresistibly to discard the ethnicity and be reborn as Soviets, are inscribed and operating in the unconscious. Anyone who divulged the misery and tragedy of forcible relocation to his or her family, neighbors, or any others had to be the target of punishment as an anti-regime element or a nationalist. With this gag law becoming a specter for the Koreans to date even after the Soviet dis-

solution, many research subjects showed reluctance with anxiety when talking on the story of forcible relocation.

When Kazakhstani Koreans say of the requirements of the supreme ruler, they stress that he or she should be «the person who does not discriminate ethnic groups, if nothing else», and when discussing ethnic relations, they say not so much of accusation as of appreciation and good points of other ethnic groups, repetitively emphasizing “They should be on good terms with other ethnics”, which is a trace of scar on ethnic discrimination and exclusion from the dominant power. Kazakhstani Koreans are described not only as the general reputation of «Diligent and highly responsible ethnics» but also as «Opportunist», and their Korean politicians as «Flattering people», which means they are non-subjective beings vulnerable to power. Vulnerable beings unconsciously mimic obedience in front of the «sacred duty of the state language». In their egos, however, the «sacred duty» is rejected by the pride in the self and the power of «Superior feeling» by the strong dichotomy between «civilization and barbarism».

The Koreans who are weak and non-subjective beings due to the past scar do not reject or complain of the governmental policy on the state language, but rather support it as a natural policy and hide their real ego. Inside the ego, the dichotomy between the «Russian-like» superior ego that speaks Russian and the «illiterate or barbarian» of non-Russian indigenous culture effectuates «othering» of the state language, learning of which is thus disregarded by the Koreans. The difference of other-language that supports the superiority and rightness of self-language is continuously reconstructed and reproduced despite the external pressure.

The Koreans’ identity shown in the process of maintaining the authenticity of their linguistic identity was not so much essential as political a process to exclusively essentialize their self-culture according to the contexts, and in this process, it turned out to construct more solid boundary between two cultures by producing stereotyped images about the self and the other with the materials of invisible elements such as collective memory, experience, and imagination.

KEY QUESTIONS OF THE CHAPTER FOR READERS

1. Identity politics as an essentializing process;
2. Identity in the imagination and the narrative in certain context;
3. Infirm boundaries between the two groups of Koreans, and liberation of the minority;
4. Vulnerable «Superior» being in reality;
5. From «One blood» to rebuilding boundary with South Koreans;
6. Stereotyped Ideology of «Illiterate and Civilized»;
7. Non-subjective being with double ego - explicit and hidden subject.

CONCLUSION

This paper explored a new positioning of Kazakhstani Koreans between the motherland and the changed environment of the host society in encounter with the great transition ending the Soviet era; and microscopically highlighted the cultural geography of the process in which the structure inside the Soviet Korean group was disrupted and reshaped.

Traditionally, nations or ethnic groups have often been described as unified and homogeneous collective communities. Yet, entering the postcolonial period that escapes from the grand powers, international boundaries weaken and various identities rise, so that a question arises on defining nations or cultures as the fixed frames of recognition. The former Soviet Union had strongly integrated individuals and groups with the Soviet power, but entering the post-Soviet era, various voices of beings inside came to the fore.

According to the aforementioned contexts of external environment, this research noticed the dynamism inside the former Soviet Korean group and intended to develop the following discussions on ethnic identity:

- the real subject of the former Soviet Korean group is not so much essential, but a process of essentialization based on the belief that it is a holy given;
- the exclusive boundary between majority and minority has vulnerability as it is made or dissolved according to the contexts;
- the differences that maintain the frame of boundary between the self and the other are reconstructed and reproduced;
- the construction of differences for the majority's making otherness is easily connected with invisible elements of sentiment and involves the violence of recognition.

Base on anthropological approach as an in-depth research methodology, the study explored political process of identity by representing, interpreting and analyzing many voices within the ethnic group, and concluded as follows:

1. Kazakhstani Korean, as a minor ethnic group is a diverse and dynamic community while from an outsider's view it has easily seen as integrated, homogenous and calm one. The cultural significance

of Kazakhstani Koreans was detected by exploring a space of dynamic struggle inside which is a tense atmosphere and the various meanings and values of life conflicting with each other. The schism, conflict, and harmony between Kazakhstani Korean group and motherland Koreans; the major and minor group is entangled with collective memories through various contexts of external environment and the past scars and experiences of Soviet Koreans.

2. The study showed fluidic identity and the weakness of boundaries repeating the construction and disruption of boundaries among subgroups by magnifying heterogeneity in a specific context and strengthening homogeneity in another context. The former Soviet Koreans' identity has endlessly swayed in the contexts of historical events: as the host society's regime dissolved, the social and material bases to which they had rooted was completely deconstructed; they were affiliated as citizens to a new independent state; and South Korea which had been none other than an enemy state emerged as a new mother country. The schismatic structure formed between the oldcomers and newcomers since the initial settlement in the Central Asia. But the conflictual structure between both ingroups were dissolved into a «Primordial emotion» as «One ancestry» and «One blood» motivated by the Olympics, and the seemingly solid exclusive boundary proved to be vulnerable unexpectedly. In respect of the relationship with homeland, as Kazakhstani Koreans' expectations of «one blood-line» toward South Koreans fell off in reality, they started making boundaries with motherland Koreans. South Korea is described as that which might be the surface symbol of a «Rich motherland» by the Kazakhstani Koreans, but indeed have no connection with themselves.

3. The differences between the self and the other have been continuously constructed and reconstructed by different experience, memory and sentiment. The majority's base of othering toward the minority was continually reproduced. The initial dichotomous base between both ingroups was «Soviet construction heroes» as seen in the oppositions like «Soviets» vs. «Capitalism-saturated Japaneses», and the honorable independence activists who fought against the imperialist Japan versus the «Lowly» laborers. After the minority assimilated to the Soviet regime like the majority, the dichotomy was moved to the

difference regarding the motherland's ideological division and characters. The majority as those from North Korea, the communist brother country, was opposed to the minority as those from South Korea, the enemy country. Also, the majority's character alleged to fundamentally differ from that of the minority was defined as "Russian-like" as open-minded and open-hearted, while the minority's was defined as «Japanese-like» as closed and double-faced.

4. The emphasis on authenticated identity by the majority was more related to emotional element rather than to cultural difference which is believed as a given one inherently. As the external structures were changed, the majority's negative and unfavorable feelings to the minority were strengthened or neutralized by emphasizing the narratives of 'aliens' or 'one blood ethnicity' Both ingroups were the same ethnic group who walked a common way under the Soviet regime, but settled with each other background of migration and had to be located differently in an artificial vertical relationship by power. This unfavorable experience became a beginning of developing antagonistic relationship between them. The past memory of the strong's «Superiority» and the weak's «Shame, humiliation, and sense of being victimized» made from the first encounter between both same ethnic ingroups was not obliterated. The differences by which an ingroup suppressed and excluded the other ingroup were pointed out as ideological, cultural, or characteristic elements, but under the surface operated uncontrollable negative sentiment, showing the intensification of differences with formalized images.

5. Unilateral claims about the superiority of the self culture easily led to violence and schism. The liberation of the weak implied the escape from this contemptuous eye and constant cognitive violence of the strong. The weak had to have the deep scars of disgrace, and could not resist the strong's unilateral fixed eye that have marginalized them with the gaze of contempt from the mainstream of Korean ethnic group. The majority ingroup who settled first in the host society gave an absolute value to the «Russianness» and treated the Sakhalinski as inferior aliens who were not qualified as the Soviets, thus the Sakhalinski had to be marginalized from the public sphere and excluded from the candidates married with the majority Soviet Koreans.

6. The ethnic Koreans as a minor group have been the weak, non-subjective beings, who concealed themselves from the strong and could not speak out their subjective voice to the outside realm in their residential society. They seem to follow the state policy nominally, foregrounding themselves as Kazakhstani citizens, but behind the look of patriots is situated a sense of crisis on their self-identity as the former Soviet Koreans. Inside their subject is hidden an internal ego that resists the state language, thus yielding double-faced attitude and contradiction. The non-subjective attitude to the self linguistic identity has originated with past deep wounds from fearful experiences and memories of extremely being repressed by the Soviet power.

This paper has attempted to disclose the diversity and represent many voices of an ethnic group as subjective existence rather than describe it as integrated and homogeneous and to develop discourse on ethnic identity analyzing narratives into how to interpret their lives and which value they grant to themselves. However, this study has limitations to illustrate relations between Goyeosaram and other ethnic groups, and it recommends further research on Goyeosaram's cultural topography in more expanding context.

Firstly, studies on correlation between many surrounding ethnic groups that shared and influenced the lives of former Soviet Koreans besides the leading ethnic group of the Kazakhs and Russians who were the dominant ethnic group under the Soviets need to be developed. Because the way Goryeoin lived has been with a history of many other ethnic groups who also experienced the painful deportation under Stalin rule along with Soviet Koreans and walked the same path as a Soviet maintaining relations out of need or competition with them. Currently, the Goyeosaram has a sense of insecurity for a potential ethnic discrimination or conflict as particularly after independence there has been a reorganization of social basis in a situation which has achieved a reversal of power between the people of colored and white. The attempt of in-depth study to explore how to compete, conflict and harmonize with different ethnic groups is a important key to communication between the current Goryeoins while being more increasing status of Kazakhstan natives and Turks such as Uighur, Tatar, and Turkish as the same colored people with Goryeoins.

Secondly, it is necessary to conduct additional research regarding the division or conflict inside the Goyeosaram explored and mentioned in the process of this research. There is widespread mistrust and division regarding the central power within the present group of anti-Japanese independence movement descendants. That is, there have been many voices calling for a proper reevaluation of Korean history with complaining that representatives who seize the hegemony of the current independence commemoration descendants are unqualified people distorting history. This is related to past unsuccessful experiences and unfortunate fate of resistance groups which ran counter to groups that actively joined the Soviet powers leading to disorganization of anti-Japanese independent units forced to involve in division of the reds and whites after the Bolshevik Revolution in the process of Soviet construction. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there happened unfavorable scandals on a criminal level involved with Korean brokers and Goyeosaram brokers in Goryeoin society, which were buried in history instead of disclosing the truth during illuminating the history of the independence movement initiated by Korea with descendants of Goryeoin independence fighters who played a pivotal role in the anti-Japanese independence movement overseas not escaping from armed struggle. Therefore uncovering the truth by conducting a further re-illumination study on the achievements of their ancestors of former Soviet Koreans is required.

Thirdly, another aspect to consider in the Korean Diaspora is that Goyeosaram who once shared the same space now have the fate of being independently separated due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Currently there are 500,000 Goyeoin mainly residing in Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and the Ukraine. The physical boundaries within the former Soviet Union resulted in transnational migration and separation of family members or relatives caused another kind of trial and social problems. In addition, it is important to reveal the differences between their cultural geographies of dispersed Goryeoins who have been differently positioned in each different structure of independent countries.

Finally, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, some Goyeosarams rose up as the rich who possessed hegemony in the Goryeoin society

having chances of preoccupation of economic realm in the transitional period from a socialist planned economy to a system of market economy. On the contrary, the majority of Korean ethnic group have been pushed to the private economy in order to earn a living from the existing public and stable workplace in the process of the state building of the independent nation and transformation in economic structure. It will be worthy to explore the scene of Goryeoins' economic activities while Goryeoins have been marginalized from private economic surroundings in the phenomenon of economic polarization.

Anthropologists try to introspect themselves having others become the mirror in order to communicate with others. According to Stuart Hall, culture is not something static that we can describe or is explained by huge dominant theories, but a dynamic process requiring intense struggle [20]. Anthropologists learn culture by participating in that struggle place. The task of researcher laboring over to represent cultural geography displayed in the space of everyday life stained with the distinct experiences and memories served as a valuable work even for him enabling them to reflect upon their own lives.

KEY QUESTIONS OF THE CHAPTER FOR READERS

1. Identity based on the belief that it is a holy given;
2. Vulnerability of exclusive boundary between majority and minority;
3. Reconstruction and reproduction of differences to maintain the frame of boundary between the self and the other;
4. Construction of differences for making others that connected with sentiments and involved the violence of recognition;
5. Necessity of further study on oversea Koreans with cultural anthropological approach.

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MYONG SOON-OK

Identity politics of Kazakhstani Koreans (Cultural anthropological approach)

ABSTRACT

Traditionally, anthropology has attempted communications with other world and pursued self-reflections constantly. In the situation that global village became smaller by compressed space-time, the boundary of a state that have been believed as a unified, independent, and separated space was weakened, new terminologies were come into being such as globalization, trans-nationalism, and postmodernism.

Goryeoin as minor ethnic group are easily seen as a homogeneous community. Unlike defining Goryeoin as the homogeneous russianized Koreans in the existing researches, the Goryeoin have suffered from deep-seated schism among diverse inner groups, and from renewal pain of fitting for citizens in new independent country. Futhermore they spurted despair and resentment to motherland and made noise with homeland Koreans in Kazakhstan.

The study intends to interpret the significance and value of Goryeoin's lives by exploring inner dynamic and diverse cultural topography. Based on conducting field work in their activity sphere, attempting to communicate with them will provide important clues for the future research and understanding them

The study establishes following tasks so as to identify the dynamic identity politics of Goryeoin as an ethnic minority in the new external conditions of the Soviet dissolution and Kazakhstani independence: 1) To discuss theoretical background of terms on ethnos, nation and diaspora, and cultural-anthropological methodology with the conduct of fieldwork: participatory observations; in-depth interviews; informal interviews; 2) To examine the settlement history of immigrant Korean as an ethnic minority, and then identify limitations and positions in the host society according to the social change; 3) To explore the historical process of Goryeoin migrants' identity formation, and then examine the inner variety and differentiation process of the group; 4) To

represent Goryeoin narratives, and interpret and analyze their cultural significance from experiences and memories.

To explore the dynamics and fluidity of identity in Kazakhstani Goryeoin, the study analyzed Goryeoin's narratives represented and interpreted by their memories and experiences through the researcher's participatory observation and informal interviews.

Beyond the previous superficial studies on Goryeoin society that stayed at utilizing document-based data or questionnaire survey, this study provides scientific novelties and originality analyzing the inner depths of Goryeoin society through anthropological research.

This study results showed the identifying process as the "site of struggle" making conflicts and divisions, achieving harmony, and compromising among them with continuously construction and reconstruction by different experience, memory and sentiment.

МИОНГ СУН ОК

Политики идентичности корейцев Казахстана
(Культурно-антропологическое исследование)

АННОТАЦИЯ

Традиционно антропология всегда стремилась установить коммуникацию с мирами других и постоянно осуществлять само-рефлексию. В ситуации, когда «глобальная деревня» становится меньше в результате сжатия пространства и времени, границы государства, полагаемые ранее едиными, независимыми и четко очерченными, размываются, появляются новые терминологии, такие как «глобализация», «транснационализм», «транстерриториальность» и «постмодернизм».

Корейцев (Goryeoins) как малую этническую группу обычно рассматривали как гомогенное сообщество. В отличие от определения корейцев как гомогенных русифицированных корейцев в существующих исследованиях, действительные корейцы испытывали глубоко укорененные деления внутри своих групп, а также неудобства от процесса приспособления к гражданственности в новом независимом государстве. Кроме того, они выражали отчаяние и обиду к своей Родине, и поднимали шум в отношении укоренившихся корейцев Казахстана.

Данное исследование стремится разъяснить значение и ценность жизни корейцев через исследование внутренней динамики и различий культурной топографии. Проведенные полевые исследования сферы их деятельности, стремившиеся установить коммуникацию с ними, могут стать важными положениями для дальнейших исследований и понимания их.

Исследование ставит целью определить динамику политик идентичности корейцев как этнического меньшинства в новых исторических условиях распада Советского Союза и независимости Казахстана, и ставит следующие задачи: 1) Рассмотреть теоретические основания терминов «этнос», «нация» и «диаспора», а также применить культурно-антропологическую методологию с

осуществлением полевых исследований: соучастующее наблюдение; глубокое интервью; неформальное интервью; 2) Исследовать историю расселения корейцев-иммигрантов как этнического меньшинства и определить ограничения и положение в титульном обществе в соответствии с социальными изменениями; 3) Исследовать исторический процесс формирования идентичности корейцев-мигрантов, а также процесс внутреннего разделения и дифференциации группы; 4) Представить Корейские нарративы, проинтерпретировать и проанализировать их культурное значение, исходя из их опыта и памяти.

Объектом исследования является динамика и подвижный характер идентичности казахстанских корейцев.

Предметом исследования являются корейские нарративы, представленные и проинтерпретированные в их памяти и опыте с помощью методов соучастующего наблюдения и неформальных интервью.

Результаты этого исследования показали, что процесс идентификации является «местом борьбы», создающим конфликты и разделения, достижением гармонии и компромиссом между ними с непрерывным строительством и реконструкцией с помощью различного опыта, памяти и настроений.

МИОНГ СУН ОК

Қазақстандағы корейлердің жеке куәліктері
(Мәдени-антропологиялық зерттеу)

АННОТАЦИЯ

Антропология әрдайым дәстүрлі түрде басқалардың өлемдерімен коммуникация орнатуға және өзіндік рефлексияны жүзеге асыруға тырысқан. «Ғаламдық ауыл» кішірейген жағдайда және бұрын біртұтас, тәуелсіз және шекаралары айқын бөлінген мемлекеттердің шекаралары кеңістік пен уақыттың тарылуы нәтижесінде әлсіреп, «ғаламдану», «трансұлттышылдық», «трансаумақтық» және «постмодернизм» секілді жаңа терминологиялар пайда болуда.

Корейліктер (Goryeoins) кіші этникалық тобы ретінде әдетте гомогенді қауымдастық қарастырылған. Зерттелген жұмыстарда корейліктерді гомогенді орыстанған кәрістер деп анықтаумен салыстырғанда, нақты корейліктер өз топтарының іштерінде терең тамырланған бөлінулерден өтіп, сонымен қатар жаңа тәуелсіз мемлекетте азаматшылдыққа бейімделу үдерісінен қолайсыздықты сезінді. Одан басқа олар өз Отанына және Қазақстанның тамыр жайған кәрістеріне қатысты ашынушылық танытты.

Бұл зерттеу корейліктер өмірінің мәні мен құндылығын ішкі динамика және мәдени топография айырмашылықтарын зерртеу арқылы анықтауға тырысады. Олармен байланыс жасау мақсатында жүргізілген далалық зерртеулер болашақтағы ізденістер мен оларды түсіну үшін маңызды болып табылуы мүмкін.

Зерттеудің мақсаты бұрынғы Кеңес Одағы мен тәуелсіз Қазақстанның жаңа тарихи жағдайындағы азшыл этника ретінде корейліктердің бірегейлік саясатының динамикасын анықтау болып табылады. Осы мақсатқа жету үшін төменгі міндеттер қойылады: 1) «Этнос», «ұлт» және «диаспора» терминдерінің теориялық негіздерін қарастыру, сонымен қатар

далалық зерттеулерді (тікелей қатысқан бақылау, жан-жақты сұхбат, бейресми сұхбат жүргізу) іске асыру үшін мәдени-антропологиялық әдіснаманы қолдану; 2) Этникалық азшылық ретінде кәріс-иммигранттарының қоныстану тарихын зерттеу және әлеуметтік өзгерістерге сай олардың қоғамдағы жағдайлары мен шектеулерін анықтау; 3) Корейлік-мигранттардың бірегейлігін қалыптастырудың тарихи үрдісін, сонымен қатар ішкі бөлінісін және топтық дифференциациясын зерттеу; 4) Корейліктердің нарративтерін (тарихи және мәдени жағдайын түсіндіру) беру және олардың тәжірибелері мен ойларын негізге ала отырып, мәдени мәнін талдау.

Зерттеу нысаны қазақстандық корейліктердің бірегейлігінің динамикасы мен өзгермелі сипаты болып табылады.

Тікелей қатысқан бақылау мен бейресми сұхбат алу әдістері арқылы олардың жадысы мен тәжірибесіндегі ұсынылған және түсіндірілген корейліктердің нарративі зерттеу пәні болып табылады.

Зерттеу нәтижелері анықталған процесті әртүрлі тәжірибе, есте сақтау және көңіл-күй арқылы үздіксіз құрылыс пен қайта құру кезінде келіспеушіліктер мен бөлімдерді жасау, үйлесімділікке қол жеткізу және олардың арасында ымыраға келу «күрес алаңы» ретінде анықталды.

**Identity Politics of Kazakhstani Koreans
Cultural Anthropological approach**

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