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The role of the *pristavstvo* institution in the context of Russian imperial policies in the Kazakh Steppe in the nineteenth century

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The institution of *pristavstvo* was introduced in the Kazakh Steppe in the first decade of the nineteenth century. This institution had different meanings and functions, from an individually held position (e.g., a *pristav* to the *khān* of the Junior Horde in 1820; the *pristavs* who accompanied the Kazakh delegation to Saint Petersburg in the first half of the nineteenth century) to an administrative-territorial structure (e.g., the *pristavstvo* of the Senior Horde; the Mangyshlak and Zaisan *pristavstvos*). Though the political structure of the Russian empire had included institutions analogous to the *pristavstvo*, it was not a conventional component of the Russian administrative system. Studying the features of the *pristavstvo* institution in the territory of Kazakhstan and analysing the transformation of the *pristav*'s function provide new insights on how the multi-ethnic Russian empire was managed. They will also help scholars to better understand the forms and methods the Russian authorities employed to manage their nomadic populations.

Keywords: *Pristav*; Kazakh Steppe; Russian empire; policy; administration

Introduction

On 31 January 1819, the Orenburg military governor (1817–1830), P. Essen, proposed that a main *pristav* be appointed to Sultan Shigai Nuraliev in the Bukei Khanate.¹ This *pristav* was to function in a manner ‘similar to those [*pristavs*] that existed among the Kalmyks’ (Zhanaev 2002, 201). Almost a year later, on 19 February 1820, at a session of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian authorities decided to assign a *pristav* to the *khān* of the Junior Horde (MIK 1940, 349–351). Similarly, the local-level Russian officials who accompanied Kazakh delegations to Saint Petersburg in the first half of the nineteenth century were called *pristavs*. Later still, in 1848, the position of *pristav* was introduced in the Senior Horde in order to govern the Kazakhs in the southern region of Kazakhstan. The institution of *pristavstvo* was responsible for the administrative-territorial governance of the Trans-Ilisky (Zailisky) *krai*, or region. Then, on 2 February 1870, the Mangyshlak *pristavstvo* was founded to govern the Kazakhs of the Adai tribe.

These aforementioned facts underscore how one term – *pristav* – was used in a variety of ways within the territory of Kazakhstan. These various uses raise a number of questions. Why did Russian authorities name the official appointed to the *khān* of the Junior Horde a *pristav* rather than an advisor or an assistant? How did the functions of the *pristav* for the *khān* of the Junior Horde differ from those of the *pristavs* for the Kazakh delegations to Saint Petersburg? How did their functions differ from those of the *pristavs* appointed to the Kazakhs of the Senior Horde? And, finally, what gave rise to the administrative structure of the *pristavstvo*, such as it existed in the Senior Horde, in Zaisansk, and on the Mangyshlak Peninsula?

As these questions underscore, the *pristavstvo* institution in the territory of Kazakhstan operated on a variety of levels – that is, from an individual state official to a larger, administrative-

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territorial structure. The questions also indicate that we need to explain the term *pristav* in greater detail. Though today the term is strictly associated with police functions, in the nineteenth century it had a much broader spectrum of meanings. According to V. Dal' (1998, vol. 3, 445) the famous Russian linguist, the word *pristav* came from the old Slavonic verb *stavit'*, that is, to place something or someone close in order to tutor or give counsel.

Perhaps based on this interpretation, Russian authorities began to use the term *pristav* to describe certain officials appointed in regions that had been newly incorporated into the Russian empire. In the first half of the eighteenth century, *pristavs* were appointed in Kabardia (1769), 'to the Kalmyk deputies' (1782), and to the Nogais (1793) that pastured in the territory that stretched between the Kuma and Kalas Rivers to the Caspian Sea (Butkov, 1869; Komandzhaev, 2010). And, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, a *pristav* was appointed to the 'Karanagais and other nomadic peoples' of the North Caucasus² (Arsanukaeva 2010; Abaikhānova 2011). On the one hand, the appointment of the *pristav*, who was initially required to perform the functions of a mentor or guardian, allowed the Russian authorities to establish a permanent Russian administration in these areas. On the other hand, the appointment of the *pristav* helped to prepare the conditions necessary for indigenous peoples in these regions to adapt to Russian subjecthood (*poddanstvo*). This was a so-called 'transitional system of governance', which permitted the Russian administration to take into account the particular traditions and lifestyles of the peoples of the North Caucasus and thereby create the proper conditions for their full integration into the empire.

Less than a century after the *pristavstvo* institution was approved in the North Caucasus, the Russian authorities decided to use this same system of governance in an entirely different region: the Kazakh Steppe. What impelled the Russian administration to use an identical system of governance in a different region? Perhaps the most important factor in this case was that the Kazakhs (like the Kalmyks, Nogais, and Kabardians) were pastoral nomads. The Russian imperial administration viewed the economic and social particularities of pastoral nomadism as defining characteristics that would shape the implementation of their policies. Also important was the fact that the *pristavstvo* institution was introduced among peoples in the North Caucasus (Nogais, Kumyks, Ingush, Chechens) who, like Kazakhs, practised Islam.³ Third, in the 1820s, the Kazakhs, like the formerly nomadic peoples of the North Caucasus, were in the process of transitioning to a system of general imperial governance. It was precisely in this period that administrative reforms related to the Kazakhs of the Junior and Middle Hordes were introduced as part of the broader legal administration of *inorodtsy* [aliens] (Slokum 2005) and the Russian administration had to use this system of governance in order to be gradually incorporated into the empire's administrative-legal system. At the end of the 1850s, the North Caucasus had already entered into the general civil administration, while the territory of the Great Horde was still a part of the empire's frontier strategy. That is to say, relations between the Russian empire and this part of the steppe were carried out under the umbrella of foreign relations and were often irregular. And a final reason why a similar *pristavstvo* institution was introduced in both the North Caucasus and the steppe concerned the fact until 1859, the territory of the Kazakh Steppe was the responsibility of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Relations. Accordingly, the introduction of some form of governance in the steppe was the responsibility of this agency (Marshall 2006).

Though similar, the systems of governance in these different regions were nonetheless distinct. The process of their introduction was influenced by geographic and historical conditions; in particular, the administration employed different methods to preserve the balance between the local population and the colonizers. As Burbank and Cooper (2010) have noted in their brilliant, recent monograph, these local conditions are what influenced the formation of different imperial repertoires. Furthermore, the authors' argument for the need to conduct comparative studies has

drawn my attention to the need to identify the general and particular dimensions of the formation and development of the *pristavstvo* institution in its relation to the nomadic peoples of the empire (i.e., the Kazakhs, Kalmyks, Nogais, Kabardians, and so forth). Accordingly, then, we must also ask particular questions about whether the activities of the *pristav* to the Kalmyk deputy differed from those of the *pristav* to the Kazakh *khān*. Additionally, we must analyse how the *pristavs'* activities in the North Caucasus and in the Senior Horde differed. Such an approach will provide an understanding of the logic and motivation of those involved in forming the imperial policies for establishing Russian administration in newly subjected territories.

Similarly, it will establish new goals for the study of the practices of imperial governance. After all, the Russian empire varied – but administrators used similar systems of governance in different regions and at different points in time, such as the *pristavstvo* institution in the North Caucasus and the Kazakh Steppe; the governor-general in the Volga-Ural region, the Kazakh steppe, and the Caucasus; and the ‘guardianship’ (*popechitel'stvo*) institution in the Lower Urals and Kazakh Steppe. Especially relevant here is the work of Dominic Lieven (2003), who singled out the fundamental differences in the Russian imperial administration in those territories that bordered Europe and those that bordered what he described as the ‘southern Asian belt’ (i.e., the Caucasus, Kazakh Steppe, and Central Asia), where, as noted above, the administration often used similar forms of governance. Also pertinent is the work of Japanese historian Tomohiko Uyama (2012), who compared the paths of different imperial polities, such as the British in India and the Russians in Central Asia. Uyama has shown the degrees of cooperation formed with the local population and how this helped them perceive the benefits of staying within the imperial structure and imbued them with respect for the symbols of imperial power. Lastly, it is important to highlight that all of these territories were located on the frontier. It is thus methodologically crucial to draw on the works of those who have studied the particularities of the Russian frontier, especially Thomas Barrett (1999) and Michael Khodarkovsky (1992).

Also significant for this research is the work of Ronald Robinson (1972), who exposed the mechanisms of collaboration between the local population and the imperial authorities in the British Empire. Granted various powers, the *pristav* in the North Caucasus and the Senior Horde was able to develop different forms of collaboration with the local population (through correspondence, receptions, awards, etc.) and thereby laid the foundation for establishing permanent administrative links with them. Of course, the process of building cooperation with the local population depended on the success of the measures the *pristav* introduced to ensure order and stability in his territory, especially considering the fact that the peoples of the North Caucasus, the Kalmyks, and the Kazakhs had an ambivalent perception of the *pristav's* actions.

These actions, which were designed to help build relations between the empire and the Kazakh Steppe in the nineteenth century, have hardly been explored in Kazakhstani historiography. An exception is the publication of a series of documents that chronicle some of the *pristavs'* activities – these documents include the journal (*dnevnik*) of the *pristav* Gorikhvostov, who served Shergazy, the *khān* of the Junior Horde (Shakhmatov and Kireev 1957), and the opinion of L. Plotnikov (1860), who accompanied the Kazakh delegation to Saint Petersburg in 1860. At the same time, the study of the operation (*funktsionirovanie*) and evolution of the *pristavstvo* institution in the territory of the Kazakh Steppe, along with its role in the policies of the Russian administration in the region, remains virtually undeveloped.

The objective of this article is therefore to analyse the *pristavs'* activities in the steppe by exposing their functions, determining their status, and assessing how they were perceived by the Kazakh elite and the general population. The study of the particularities of the *pristavstvo* institution will broaden our understanding of the diversity of the Russian empire's strategies of governance and administration.

The pristav to the khān of the Junior Horde: mechanisms of interaction and rejection

The first decade of the nineteenth century was one of the most difficult in the history of the Junior Horde. The first implementation of reforms in the steppe in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, namely the introduction of the Border Court (*pogranichnyi sud*) and Border Councils (*pogranichnaia rasprava*) under Orenburg governor O. Igel'strom, had not been effective. Russian authorities returned to the khānate system of governance in the Junior Horde. In a 20-year period (1790–1810), four different rulers occupied the seat of *khān* of the Junior Horde: Eraly (1790–1794), Esim (1794–1797), Aishuak (1797–1805), and Dzhan-tore (1805–1809). These *khāns* had little authority over or influence on the Kazakh population. Furthermore, they were not able to act as arbiters or guarantors of internal peace or in external conflicts with the frontier population. Evidence of this situation is the fact that both Eraly Khān and Dzhan-tore Khān were murdered by their fellow clansmen for political reasons. Acts like these assassinations incited struggle for the *khān*'s throne and increased inter-clan conflicts (Martin 2001).⁴

In this difficult situation, the position of the Orenburg regional administration rose in importance. Orenburg governor P. Essen and the chairman of the Orenburg Frontier Commission, G. Veselitskii (1817–1820), believed that the situation at the time stemmed from the weakness of Shergazy Khān (1812–1824). These Russian officials wanted to appoint the influential sultan, Arungazy Abulgaziev,⁵ to the position of *khān* (MIK 1940, 327). Furthermore, violating the Rules for the Khān's Council,⁶ Essen and Veselitskii appointed Sultan Arungazy as its chair, and *ipso facto* publicly demonstrated to the sultans and elders that Sultan Arungazy (rather than Shergazy Khān) had the Orenburg administration's support (Gorbunova 1998, 73).

However, after a prolonged debate at a session of the Asian Department on 19 February 1820, the Russian administration rejected Essen's proposal to replace the Kazakh *khān* or introduce the post of a second *khān* in the Junior Horde. The department believed that such government actions in the region could be a 'source of great unrest and strife'.⁷ It was thus decided that, to maintain tranquillity between the frontier line and the Kazakh nomadic encampments, the administration had to support the legal *khān* who had been elected by Kazakhs (MIK 1940, 349–350).

This naturally leads to the question of why, in this same time period, the centre pursued a different policy in the Middle Horde. The situations in the Junior and Middle Hordes were substantially different. In the 1820s, the Russian administration did not confirm anyone as *khān* in the Middle Horde. The *khān*, Vali, had died in 1819, and, upon the insistence of the general-governor of Western Siberia, M. Speranskii, no one had been appointed to replace him. Instead, the Russian administration undertook steps to reform the system of governance in the territory by introducing the Regulations for the Siberian Kyrgyz [Kazakhs] in 1822 (KRO-2, doc. 105). In the Junior Horde, by contrast, Shergazy Khān was alive and well, though the Russian government clearly understood that he did not possess any real authority. And, for his part, Shergazy Khān understood that his authority was 'insufficient without the help of the frontier command'; he would therefore agree to any terms that preserved his power, minimal as it was.

For this reason, the Russian government appointed a special official to Shergazy Khān.⁸ This official was called a *pristav*, and he was placed in charge of a staff 'similar to the Kalmyk [one]', that is, a Cossack detachment. The *pristav* himself was to remain in the *khān*'s encampment. In contrast to the *pristav* in the territory of the Kalmyks and Kabardia, he was not named 'main *pristav*' and he had no administrative authority. As an observer and guardian, the *pristav*'s main duty was to 'inspire in the *khān*'s soul the confidence that the frontier administration would always attend to the strengthening of his power'.⁹ Additionally, the *pristav* was required to keep a diary (*dnevnik*) in which he would report in detail on the daily life of the *khān* and include notes on his interactions with sultans, petty officers (*starshiny*), and the Kazakh rank and file.

Symptomatically, the instructions for the *pristav* to the Kazakh *khān* were developed by the chairman of the Orenburg Frontier Commission, Vasilii Timkovskii (served 1820–1822), who was among those who spearheaded the creation of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and thus the political strategies of the empire in the eastern regions. It thus seems that the Russian administration used a *pristavstvo* institution in the steppe that incorporated some aspects from the *pristav*'s work among the Kalmyks (i.e., an identical staff), and some from the *pristav* that had operated in Kabardia in the second half of the eighteenth century (i.e., observer functions). The *pristav* to the Kazakh *khān* was under the authority of the regional administration (i.e., the chairman of the Orenburg Frontier Commission and the Orenburg military governor), while the *pristavs* to the Kalmyks, Kabardians, and Nogais were under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 1802, at which point the position was placed under the military command in the Caucasus and granted more explicit military-police functions (Kudashev 1991). In the steppe, however, the *pristav* to the Kazakh *khān* had neither military nor civil authority; his duties were concerned with intelligence and reconnaissance rather than administration. Furthermore, it is important to note that Timkovskii supported a 'soft' form of governing the Kazakhs, that is through the means of so-called 'adaptations to the local circumstances' (Gorbunova 1998, 57). He therefore thought that the presence of a *pristav* to the *khān* of the Junior Horde was the optimal variant, given the socio-economic conditions of the steppe at that time.

According to the information from the documentary materials of the Central State Archive of the Republic of Kazakhstan from 1820 to 1822, the *pristav* attached to Shergazy Khān was Cossack Sergeant (*uryadnik*) Karsakov. On 12 August 1822, a new *pristav*, Colonel Aleksandr Gorikhvostov, arrived in the encampment of the *khān*.¹⁰ He was the last *pristav* to the *khān* and served in that position until 1824. Both of the *pristavs* were military men and had combat experience, but they did not know Kazakh; they therefore relied on interpreters (*tolmachs*). A. Gorikhvostov's primary translator was Dolgoarshinov,¹¹ but Sultan Mendiyar Abulgazin occasionally assisted Gorikhvostov in this respect as well. Thus, we see that the figures appointed to serve as *pristavs* knew little about the Kazakh elite and lacked the political experience and the authority to guarantee order in the Junior Horde. Additionally, since the *pristav* did not have close interactions with his Kazakh subjects, he 'did not gain the trust and love' of the Kazakh population (Zhanaev 2002, 204).

Indeed, how did the *khān*, his elite entourage, and the local population perceive the appearance of a Russian officer in the *khān*'s camp? First of all, Shergazy Khān believed that the *pristav*'s constant presence with his military detachment in the encampment served to undermine, rather than strengthen, the *khān*'s power in the eyes of his clansmen.¹² Shergazy Khān thought that the military detachment (*voennyi otryad*) should not be under the command of the *pristav* but under Shergazy himself. This would not only help strengthen his authority in the eyes of his fellow clansmen and rivals (e.g., Sultan Arungazy and Sultan Karatai) but would also help pacify the Kazakhs and restore harmony in the steppe (MIK 1940, 229). In fact, however, granting the *khān* a military detachment would not have allowed him to strengthen his authority; Shergazy Khān lacked the respect of his people and was, furthermore, under constant threat of invasion by certain Kazakh clans that pastured in his *aul* [village]. Twice, in 1817 and 1819, other influential foremen in the Junior Horde requested that the Russian government dismiss Shergazy and appoint Arungazy (MIK 1940, 314, 316, 322).

Against the backdrop of these events, the Orenburg administration directed the *pristav* to perform a variety of tasks. First, he was to secure the *khān* and his family from the intrusion of different Kazakh clans and rivals. The *pristav* was also responsible for conducting 'sustained observation' of the Kazakh population, with the aim of inhibiting their illegal travels across the Novoilekskii line. Such Kazakh incursions, which involved the theft of horses as well as the abduction of Ilets salt-mine workers and Russian settlers, had increased from 1821 to 1824.¹³

Third, the *pristav* was required to immediately inform the Orenburg administration of the location of the rebellious Kazakhs who supported Zholaman Tlenshi.¹⁴ Last, the *pristav* was asked to ‘secretly’ conduct an inquiry to ascertain which Kazakh clans participated in the theft of horses and the abduction of people into slavery (and, ideally, to determine the names of the clans’ *starshiny*). The *pristav* was supposed to involve Shergazy Khān, influential sultans, and *starshiny* in these searches for the Kazakhs who had attacked the line. All of the *pristav*’s attempts to find such guilty parties were unsuccessful; a picture formed of the *pristav* as ‘ineffective’ at preventing Kazakh incursions on the line. In the opinion of Governor Essen, the *pristav* was most often in the position of a ‘quiet spectator’,¹⁵ observing what occurred on the line, rather than an officer carrying out necessary service. However, Essen’s dissatisfaction with the *pristav*’s activities was unfounded: in reality, the *pristav* was not granted clear administrative powers. In particular, he did not have the right to prosecute or to arrest individuals. Instead, he was supposed to report, in a timely manner, his findings as to which Kazakhs were guilty and where they camped. This contradiction probably stemmed from the expectations that the regional administrations had for the *pristav*’s duties: to indeed serve as advisor to the *khān* and an observer of the events that unfolded in the territory of the Junior Horde.

The *pristav*’s reports to the regional administration from April through December 1823 bear out this interpretation of his responsibilities. In these reports, he used terms such as ‘convinced’ (*ubidel*), ‘presented’ (*nastoyal*), ‘saw’ (*uvidel*), and ‘heard’ (*uslyshal*); not once did he use the administrative terms ‘sentenced’ (*naznachil nakazanie*), ‘arrested’ (*arestoval*), or ‘decided’ (*vynes reshenie*).

Nonetheless, Kazakh incursions on the frontier line remained a thorny issue. Thus, in June 1823, a ‘special’ (but ultimately unsuccessful) commission was founded to examine the complaints from Russian and Kazakh populations of theft of livestock by Kazakhs between 1821 and 1823 (Sultangalieva 2012, 61–62).

Of further interest is the fact that, at the moment of the commission’s convocation, the Asian Department was actively discussing the Project on the Administration of the Junior Horde Kazakhs that had been compiled by Essen. The main point of this project included the liquidation of the *khān*’s power. *Pristav* Gorikhvostov himself thought that it was impossible to ‘eliminate disturbances and install tranquility’ by strengthening the *khān*’s authority because the influence of the *khān* only extended along the frontier line.¹⁶

In August 1823, Gorikhvostov ended his service as *pristav* in Shergazy Khān’s encampment. He had spent more than a year there and, on the basis of his observations on the *khān*’s role in the administration of nomadic Kazakh society, he presented a series of recommendations to the regional administration. These can all be found in his journal. First, he believed that ‘to this day, [the Kazakhs] do not recognize the authorities above them’ and would not stop their incursions on the frontier line if the Russian administration did not place barriers (*predragy*) to their actions in the steppe. In particular, reinforced fortresses were the only means to ‘completely control’ the Kazakhs. Second, considering the possibility of expecting order and organization with the participation of the imperial government, A. Gorikhvostov believed that eradicating disturbances and establishing peace inside the Junior Horde ‘through the power of one leader [i.e., the *khān*] would never be possible [given his] insignificant influence’. Third, the *pristav* noted that the regional administration was limited in their ‘correspondence’ with representatives of the Kazakh elite in the Junior Horde. According to Gorikhvostov, this correspondence remained ‘without benefit’, for all record-keeping (*deloproizvodstvo*) in the steppe was conducted by Tatar clerks. An illustrative example was the clerk Nigmatulla Feizullin, who, in Gorikhvostov’s opinion, kept the office of Shergazy Khān ‘in disorder’. This had a ‘harmful’ effect on the Khān.¹⁷

What were the reasons behind the *pristav*'s statements about Feizullin – a man who had served more than 25 years in the steppe, who had been awarded a silver medal from the Order of St. Anna in 1818 and, two years later, was granted the tax-free status of *tarkhan* by Tsar Alexander I?¹⁸ The root of the *pristav*'s concern was the fact that, on 29 March 1823, Shergazy Khān attempted to complain about him to Saint Petersburg through this same clerk, Feizullin. The *khān* was not pleased with the *pristav*'s presence in his encampment and the *pristav*'s ineffectiveness at strengthening the *khān*'s authority.¹⁹ The complaint did not gain any traction. The chairman of the Orenburg Frontier Commission informed the *pristav*, 'Knowing his [the *pristav*'s] great diligence toward His Imperial Majesty, I agree with you that the complaint is not well founded.' Furthermore, the chairman expressed doubt that the complaint could actually be sent to Saint Petersburg.²⁰ However, the very fact that the clerk was not in the *khān*'s encampment at that time troubled the *pristav*; he attempted to secure support from the regional administration and expressed his general opinion about the 'futility' of the Tatar clerks in the steppe, whose role the Russian administration began to discuss in great detail in the 1820s.

Shergazy Khān, fearing the consequences of the clerk's actions, took a dual position, telling the *pristav* that Feizullin might slander both the *khān* and the *pristav* because he was a truly 'sly person and could not really be trusted by any side'. Nonetheless, the *khān* believed that Feizullin 'deserved respect' because of his age and his long service record.²¹ This latter opinion perhaps most accurately reflected the truth. Feizullin remained with Shergazy Khān even after the abolition of the *khān*'s position in the Junior Horde. Furthermore, in 1835, more than 10 years after he was removed from power, Shergazy Khān again employed this same Feizullin when he attempted to complain to Count K. Nesselrode about other officials in the Orenburg Frontier Commission.²² Here, Shergazy's actions demonstrate not only that he did not understand the unity between the centre and the regional administration but also that he possessed a naïve hope that the political situation could be altered by sending complaints against the *pristav*, the chairman of the Orenburg Frontier Commission (G.F. Gens), and others.

The pristavs for the Kazakh delegations to Saint Petersburg

The work of M. Fisher (2004) examined the early-nineteenth-century visits of Indian diplomats and elites to London, where they were sent to demonstrate their loyalty to the ruling dynasty and at the same time to have their concerns addressed with regard to maintaining the authority of the Indian elite and receiving privileges for their service in the East India Company. In the mid-nineteenth century, similar delegations of elite Kazakhs were received in Saint Petersburg, where they not only expressed their loyalty to the tsar but also requested privileges in the form of ranks, medals, and awards.

Such awards and the personal visits to Saint Petersburg and Moscow, where elite Kazakhs were received by the emperor and other officials (e.g., the ministers of foreign and internal affairs), served as a way for them to try to assert and boost their authority in the eyes of their clansmen (Remnev and Sukhikh 2006). Thus, in the first half of the nineteenth century, the journey to Saint Petersburg became an important activity for many sultan-governors (*sultany-pravitely*) and honourable Kazakhs. For instance, Sultan Akhmet Dzhantiurin, in his request to visit Saint Petersburg, wrote that 'it would be a great pleasure to be in Saint Petersburg and to share this feeling with those people under his power'. The catalyst for Dzhantiurin's request was the fact that the ruler of the Western Division of the Orenburg Kazakhs, General-Major Baimukhamed Aichuakov, had the honour to be in Saint Petersburg in 1846 and was presented to Tsar Nicholas I.²³

Russian authorities supported the Kazakh elites who wished to visit Saint Petersburg; they viewed it as one method of convergence (*sblizhenie*) between Kazakhs and the empire – that

is, a way for the Kazakh elite to understand the empire's grandeur and wealth while also having their service recognized by imperial authorities. The Russian authorities carefully monitored the composition of the Kazakh delegations and assigned a special role to the officials who accompanied them. These officials were called *pristavs*.

Thus, on 14 January 1830, the commander of the Cossack detachment at the outer district of Karkaralinsk, Lieutenant Ivan Karbyshev, was appointed *pristav* to the Kazakh sultans of the outer districts of Karkaralinsk and Kokchetav who were dispatched to Saint Petersburg.²⁴ Similarly, from 20 December 1846, Provincial Secretary Nikolai Kostromitinov accompanied the Kazakh delegation of the sultan-ruler of the Western Division of Orenburg Kazakhs, Baimukhamed Aichuvakov, to Saint Petersburg.²⁵ From 21 December 1849, an official from the Orenburg Frontier Commission who served in the administration of Kazakhs on the frontier line, Staff Captain Mukhamed-Sharif Aitov,²⁶ was appointed *pristav* for the Kazakh delegation of the sultan-ruler of the Eastern Division of the Orenburg Kazakhs, Akhmet Dzhantiurin.²⁷ Lastly, in August 1860, the official Lev Plotnikov (1860) accompanied a delegation of Kazakhs from the Orenburg region.

All of the candidates for *pristav* to the Kazakh delegations were proposed by regional administrations (e.g., the Orenburg Frontier Commission and the Omsk Regional Administration) and confirmed by the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The main prerequisite for this assignment was experience and knowledge of Kazakh language and culture. Generally, all of the candidates were either senior translators or interpreters who had established positive reputations for their critical service in resolving disputes between Kazakh tribes, between Kazakhs and Cossacks, and so forth.²⁸ Most importantly, the Kazakh elite knew them well, which helped create an atmosphere of mutual trust and respect along the prolonged journey to Saint Petersburg.

The directions for these officials to fulfil their assignments were issued early, because the *pristavs* had to 'attend to the preparations for the journey' by finding a suitable, ready, and reliable crew and obtaining money for the whole delegation's travel expenses.²⁹ The *pristav* was also responsible for maintaining an official log (*shnurovaia kniga* in the original Russian) in which he would record all expenses and then draw up an official report. The instructions formulated by the regional administration included details not only about the *pristav's* duties but also about his conduct, which was meant to ensure the safe and secure travel of the Kazakh deputies to Saint Petersburg.³⁰ First of all, the *pristav* had to consistently and promptly notify the Asian Department and the regional administration about every point of the planned route. The Kazakh delegations could take either the Siberian or the Kazan route to Saint Petersburg. The *pristav* had the right to be immediately received by the governors of the provinces through which the delegation travelled, because he held an open order (*otkrytyi list*) from the minister of internal affairs. Additionally, two days prior to the delegation's departure from cities such as Kazan and Moscow, the *pristav* had to send a dispatch to the Asian Department. This would allow the minister of foreign affairs to successfully prepare apartments and crews for the Kazakh delegation in Saint Petersburg. Lastly, upon arrival in Saint Petersburg, the *pristav* had to be at the immediate disposal of the director of the Asian Department, K.K. Rodofinikin.³¹

All along the journey, the *pristav* had to secure all of the necessary provisions for the Kazakh delegation and be willing to halt their long travel at the sultan's demand. A second important aspect of the *pristav's* duty was that he had to demonstrate respect and even 'cater to all of the [sultan's] whims', so that he could be seen as a person, and not just an official figure, to whom they might be able to openly express their needs and desires. In turn, he would satisfy their requests to the best of his abilities. In accordance with the instructions, *pristavs* had to escort Kazakhs to stores and ensure that Kazakhs did not overpay or leave behind debts. Additionally, he was supposed to advise them on their purchases and suggest, for instance, where they could buy better and cheaper goods. L. Plotnikov (1860), who accompanied a Kazakh delegation in

1860, believed this an absolute necessity, given that 6 of the 10 Kazakhs in his delegation did not know Russian at all. Moreover, many of them had never even visited Orenburg or the Russian settlements along the line.

Of course, the most important project during the trip was to acquaint Kazakhs with the empire's grandeur, power, and wealth. They therefore employed a variety of forms of transport – from horse-drawn carriages, to railways, to large ships that had neither sails nor oars. As clearly outlined in each official instruction the *pristav* had been given by the regional administration, the route of each journey and the places for the Kazakh delegates to visit could change.

The administration typically evaluated the *pristav* highly for successfully accompanying Kazakh delegates to Saint Petersburg. The administration often recorded that they 'impeccably' fulfilled their obligations. For their diligence, these *pristavs* were awarded higher ranks, orders, medals, or monetary incentives. For instance, M.Sh. Aitov was favoured with the order of St. Anna at the third rank;³² N. Kostromitinov, with the order of St. Anna at the second rank (Artem'ev 1859, 13); and Karbyshev, with 1000 rubles in banknotes.³³

Still, others held opposite opinions about the *pristavs*' activities with the Kazakh delegations. The famous researcher Pavel Nebol'sin (1860) met with a Kazakh delegation in Saint Petersburg in 1860; the visit left him with the impression that the *pristav*'s tasks should be altered for future journeys. In particular, Nebol'sin found the need to entrust *pristavs* with initiating Kazakhs 'into the secrets of the greatness and prosperity of Russia' and to vigilantly supervise them excessive. In his opinion, it was petty to enforce such strict supervision over free, independent adults who should have been able to dispose of their time freely. Moreover, Nebol'sin compared the duties of the *pristav* with that of a tutor (*guverner*) and repeatedly underscored the *pristavs*' 'tutor-like' (*guvernerskii*) instructions and restrictions. Instead, he believed, the *pristav* should have conducted more educational work and explained in detail what the Kazakh delegates saw during their excursions to cultural and historical sites. Based on his observations from communicating with Kazakh delegates, Nebol'sin determined that they were more 'upset than pleased' with their experiences. As a consequence, the Kazakhs fell into 'apathy'. This was evident in the fact that 'some stopped leaving their rooms, some said that they were sick, and some gave themselves up to sound sleep'. Nebol'sin argued that, during their visit, the Kazakhs should have been acquainted with new forms of raising livestock (*skotovodstvo*), agriculture (*zemledelie*), and methods for supplying electricity, gas, and so forth. Furthermore, he thought that the delegates' visit to Saint Petersburg should be organized in a manner that would not only benefit their intellectual development but also change their livestock-raising practices (*skotovodcheskoe khoziaistvo*).

Lev Plotnikov (1860), the *pristav* who accompanied that particular delegation of Kazakhs, responded to Nebol'sin's arguments on the pages of *Russkii Vestnik* (the Russian Herald). He argued that he completely fulfilled his obligations as a *pristav* to that delegation: he observed precisely the requirements of the instructions that he had received from the Russian administration, which included 'neither direct nor indirect tips on the visitation of model farms, agricultural machines, [or] gasworks'. According to Plotnikov, these tips were not included because of the results of a journey of Kazakh delegates that had occurred more than 10 years earlier, in 1846. The instructions for this trip, which was supervised by *pristav* N. Kostromitinov, included visits to the kinds of institutions that Nebol'sin suggested. The Kazakhs on that particular journey found such visits tiresome (*utomitel'nyi*) and requested that, 'as a favour', the *pristav* save them from such demonstrations. Additionally, Plotnikov highlighted that Kazakhs' greater familiarity with agricultural implements did not have any practical results – that is, no one from the delegation improved their economy (*khosiaistvo*) on the basis of agriculture and industry. And, in principle, as of 1860, such agricultural practices had not been developed in the Junior Horde's territory.

In fact, the *pristavs*' service to the Kazakh delegations was difficult, even if it was only temporary. The *pristav* carried all of the financial responsibility during the delegation's journey from Orenburg to Saint Petersburg. Additionally, since the whole trip was organized at the public's expense (*kazennyi cchet*), they prepared detailed financial estimates for the delegation's support. For example, *pristav* N. Kostromitinov, who accompanied the Kazakh delegation in 1859, received cash in the amount of 7095 rubles and 17 kopeks. This sum had to be divided between all of the members of the delegation.³⁴

Of course, the presence of such a large amount of cash could provoke unwanted behaviours from those around the *pristav*. On 29 May 1830, the room of *pristav* I. Karbyshev, who was accompanying a delegation from the Karkaralinsk and Kokchetau *okrugs* (districts), was robbed. Some 6300 rubles were stolen, and Gavril Kostyletskii, the Cossack sergeant (*uryadnik*) who had been guarding the room, had been murdered. During the investigation, Sergeant First Class Anton Lebedev confessed to the theft (Erofeeva 2006). What motivated this Cossack from the Siberian Cossack detachment to engage in a criminal act while the delegation was still in Omsk? Most likely, his conduct (avarice, desire for gain, etc.) was not evident to anyone earlier; according to the report of the sultan from the Karkaralinsk *okrug*, Tursun Chingisov, to the director of the Asian Department, Lebedev had been included on the list of those presented rewards: he had been offered the rank of officer for the service he rendered on the journey. A month before the theft, on 29 April 1830, this request had been confirmed, and Lebedev had been granted 300 rubles from the state treasury.³⁵ What qualities compelled him to take this step? This question remained unanswered – all of the Cossacks (Lebedev, Furaev, and Kostyletskii) included in the delegation's escort knew Karbyshev well as the commander of the Siberian Cossack detachment. Similarly, Karbyshev knew them, and invited these particular candidates; he believed he could rely on their mutual support during the long journey.

The pristav to the Senior Horde

In the 1840s, the Russian Empire annexed part of the territory of the Senior Horde, the southern frontiers of which were located on the Ili River. The main areas of Semirech'e and southern Kazakhstan remained beyond the influence of the Russian empire; the majority of the tribes of the Senior Horde were under the authority of the Khoqand Khānate. To strengthen its position and to displace the Khoqandi and Khivan *khāns*, the Russian regime began to organize territorial-administrative units in this region. Nesselrode, the minister of foreign affairs, believed that, because the Senior Horde was far from the frontier line, and 'for many other considerations', it could not be administered 'in the same manner as the Middle Horde', even though S. Ablaihanov, a sultan, and other *biys* [judges] from the Senior Horde had twice (in 1832 and 1843) sent requests for the introduction of the *okrug* system of administration that operated in the Middle Horde (KRO-2, doc. 162).

Nesselrode's opinion was based on reports that the governor-general of Western Siberia, P.D. Gorchakov, had sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In these reports, Gorchakov noted that it would be premature to introduce the *okrug* system in the Senior Horde; he suggested instead that a 'trustworthy staff officer, in the form of a *pristav*' should be appointed to conduct 'political supervision' among the Kazakhs of the Senior Horde.³⁶ Most likely, Gorchakov's opinion about the use of a *pristav* in the Senior Horde was influenced by the experience he had gained serving in the Caucasus from 1820 to 1826, where he had become familiar with the *pristavstvo* institution that had been used in Dagestan and Chechnya. That is to say, what occurred is what the historian A. Remnev (2001) has described as the 'imperial administrative transit': administrative methods and technologies learned in different frontier situations travelled from one region to another. Graf Karl Nesselrode also considered the *pristavstvo* system the most convenient for the Senior Horde

because it had already been approved as a ‘transitional’ system among the Kalmyks and in the Northern Caucasus.³⁷ Furthermore, Nesselrode believed that in this context ‘gradualness’ and ‘carefulness’ were necessary, given the Senior Horde’s strategic location, from which ran ‘main trade routes to the western regions of China, to Kashgaria and Khoqand’ (KRO-2, doc. 212).

Thus, in 1848, at the fortification of Kopal, the position of *pristav* to the Senior Horde was established under the commander of the Siberian Corps, i.e., the governor-general of Western Siberia, P.D. Gorchakov (1836–1851).³⁸ In fact, the *pristav* to the Senior Horde was a part of the military apparatus for administering the Kazakh Steppe. This was the first administrative unit the Russian authorities created in the territory of the Senior Horde. The attempt to develop permanent administrative connections with the local population required the creation of a *pristavstvo* bureau³⁹ headed by the *pristav*, with a staff of three senior sultans,⁴⁰ an interpreter, and a clerk.⁴¹ The composition of this staff, in particular the positions of the senior sultans, clearly reflected the *pristav*’s need to enlist the support of influential sultans and, through them, as Nesselrode underscored, to ‘bind [*priviazyvat*] more and more Kazakhs of the Senior Horde to the Russian government’.⁴²

The first *pristav* to the Senior Horde was the commander of the ninth division of the Siberian Cossack line, Stepan Abakumov. He attempted to draw into service a great number of representatives from the Senior Horde’s influential elite and strong clans, such as the Dulat and Uisun (Moiseev 2003, 28). The possibility of cooperating with the local population depended on the success of the *pristav*’s actions. He therefore attempted to organize appointments and meetings with *biys* and sultans from different *volost*’s [districts]. Abakumov paid particular attention to Sultan Rustem,⁴³ who, according to the *pristav*, exerted significant influence on neighbouring Kazakhs as well as those located within the Dulatov *volost*’, his home region. In the *pristav*’s opinion, Sultan Rustem’s ‘noticeable influence’ was due to his shrewdness, good sense, fairness, and valour. Accordingly, the *pristav* believed that Rustem’s counsel to his fellow Kazakhs could be ‘useful to our government, since he [Rustem] was able to prevent unauthorized departures from different *volost*’s that were displeased with one another and were prepared to riot’.⁴⁴ Russian authorities thought that Kazakh leaders’ qualities could be successfully ‘used to benefit the government’ and help them in further tactical actions in the advance toward the Central Asian khānates, for the ‘monitoring of order’, and for the ‘quick transfer of information about all occurrences’ in the steppe’.⁴⁵

In annual reports, the *pristav* was additionally required to include information about key issues such as the location of the Dulat and Uisun clans’ encampments, the Kazakhs’ nomadic routes, their inter-clan relations, and the possibilities of maneuvering among them.⁴⁶ This information was critical not only for assessing the possibility of Russian troops’ advancing into the territory of the Senior Horde and the Central Asian khānates but also to prepare the conditions for other aggressive state actions in the region. For instance, the *pristav* attentively studied the geographic conditions of the terrain to support choosing the right locations for new, strategic military fortifications that might serve as springboards for Russian military incursions.⁴⁷ On this basis, the *pristav* had to gather information about the location of the encampments of the tribes of the Senior Horde, inter-tribal conflicts, and the possibilities of manoeuvring among them and attracting influential sultans into service so that they could be leaders of the Russian state’s policies in the region.

In 1851, the captain of the Siberian Corps, Mikhal Peremyshl’skii, was appointed *pristav* of the Senior Horde. His name is associated with the regulation of relations with China, which considered the land along the Ili River part of its territory.⁴⁸ On 12 September 1851, more than 50 delegates from China arrived at the Karatal’skii picket, wishing to pass along the territory of the Lepsy River. The *pristav* explained to them that those lands were already ‘Russian property,

upon which the subjects of Russia pastured', and he refused to let them pass into the territory of the Senior Horde. In connection with this event, the *pristav* received instructions from the State Chancellery of Foreign Affairs. The Chancellery noted that the *pristav* should 'observe the old system of affairs since they [the Russian administration] had not yet strengthened their influence [in the territory of the Senior Horde], and to act as cautiously as possible without having any clashes with them that would lead to new reasons to complain. If they reappear in Karatal, do the same as before.' Most importantly, in his conversation with the Chinese delegates, the *pristav* was not to be concerned with the question of borders. Instead, he should continue to watch the movements of Chinese subjects in the steppe and track the frequency of their visits to Semirech'e.⁴⁹

In the mid-1850s, the political situation in Semirech'e changed. Perovskii's successful military march and seizure of the fortress at Ak-Mechet in 1853 opened a new route for advancing into the Trans-Ili territory. The general-governor (1851–1861) of Western Siberia, G. Gasfort, proposed to unite the Syr-Darya and Siberian military lines. In spring 1853, construction began on a new picket between the Kok-su and Ili Rivers, and in the same year, *pristav* Peremyshel'skii founded the Ili picket on a site near the confluence of the Talgar and Ili Rivers. In spring 1854, Verny Fortress was founded on the Almatinka River; this became the main point for spreading Russian influence in the Chu and Talas River valleys (Ledenev 1909). Then, on 19 May 1854, the Kopalsk external *okrug* was founded, which later became part of the Semipalatinsk Region (*oblast'*). At that time, the *pristav* came under the authority of the governor of the Semipalatinsk Region and could only appeal to the governor-general of Western Siberia or the commander of the Siberian Cossacks in special circumstances.⁵⁰

On 3 November 1856, Emperor Nicholas I signed a decree redesignating the post of *pristav* of the Senior Horde as the head of Alataevskii County (*okrug*) and thereby demonstrated the strength of Russia's position in the Trans-Ili territory.⁵¹ In this case, the *pristavstvo* institution fulfilled the role as an intermediate link to the general imperial system of governance.

At the end of the 1860s, the Russian authorities once again used the *pristavstvo* institution in the trans-boundary regions of Kazakhstan. On 8 August 1867, the Russian imperial administration created the Zaisansk *pristavstvo* and removed Chinese officials from among the nomads. This paved the way for the Kurchumskii and Bukhtarminskii Kazakhs to become Russian subjects (Semenov 1903). In fact, the creation of the Zaisansk *pristavstvo* was the result of the success of Russian diplomacy, in particular the signing of the Chuguchakskii Agreement with China in 1864. According to this agreement, the precise demarcations of the Russian–Chinese border in Central Asia were determined to lie at Lake Zaisan (Stepanov 2001). In 1869, the southern part of Kokpektinsk County (*uezd*) became a part of the Zaisan *pristavstvo*, and only after 25 years (in 1892) was the Zaisansk *pristavstvo* itself converted into an *uezd* (county) (Semenov 1903).

In 1870, the Mangyshlak Peninsula was separated into the Mangyshlaksk *pristavstvo* within the Urals Region of the Orenburg governor-generalship. The reason for this was the particular military-strategic importance of the Mangyshlak Peninsula, which bordered Russia (across the Caspian Sea), Khiva in the south, and the Caucasus in the west. The Mangyshlak *pristavstvo* existed for 11 years, from 1870 to 1881. Specific instructions determined the rights and duties of the *pristav* in this territory. For instance, the civilian and military populations were managed according to the Regulations on the Military Administration in the Regions of the Orenburg and Western Siberian Districts. Similar regulations existed in the Zaisan *pristavstvo*.

On 2 February 1870, under the threat of revolt from the Kazakhs in the territory of the Mangyshlak *pristavstvo*, military control was introduced. Through a special decree, the *pristavstvo* moved from the Ural Region to the commander of the Dagestan Region. On 9 March 1874, in accordance with the Provisional Regulations on the Administration of the Transcaspi-

Krai, the Mangyshlak *pristavstvo* became a part of the Caucasus Military District. With the establishment (6 May 1881) of the Transcaspian Region, which included the Caucasian Military District, the Akhalteke Oasis (a part of Turkmenistan) and the Mangyshlak *pristavstvo* were converted into the Mangyshlak *uezd*.

Thus, in the nineteenth century, in both the territory of the Kazakh Steppe and the northern Caucasus, *pristavs* decided issues of a political and ideological nature. And, most importantly, they instilled thoughts about tranquility, the elimination of theft, and obedience to higher authorities and were generally responsible for supervising the territory under their authority, commanding troops located there, and settling Cossacks. Once it became evident that the *pristavstvo* that had been the primary mechanism for governing the mountaineers of the North Caucasus and the Senior Horde had become obsolete, the Russian administration created new institutions in the form of the *okrug* and *uezd* systems (as in the Alatauiskii *okrug* and the Zaisanskii and Mangyshlaksii *uezds*).

Conclusions

Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the *pristavstvo* institution was gradually transformed in the Kazakh territory – i.e., the *pristav* transformed from a special official into the manager of a particular region. It can be said that the *pristav*'s functions expanded over time from diplomatic missions (such as conveying Kazakh delegations) to special assignments (such as serving as *pristav* to the *khān* of the Junior Horde), and finally to an administrative post such as the *pristav* to the Senior Horde and the Zaisansk and Mangyshlaksii *pristavstvos*. Here it is important to note that the *pristav* system could not become an independent administrative-governmental institution in relation to the populations of the North Caucasus, the Kalmyks, or the Kazakh Steppe. The transformation of the *pristav*'s functions in the steppe reflected the stages for realizing Russian imperial policies.

First of all, in the first decades of the nineteenth century, when the Russian authorities began struggling to find effective and acceptable methods of administration in the steppe while they still had a weak effect on the Kazakh population, the solution was found in the appointment of the *pristav* to the *khān* of the Junior Horde. This was an intermediate link necessary for introducing administrative reforms that would change the *khān*'s power in 1824. The *pristav* to the *khān* fulfilled administrative functions (e.g., giving directions, conducting surveillance, controlling the activities of the *khān*, and attending sessions with the *khān*'s council), political functions (e.g., completing directions, sustaining surveys, and gathering data), and, finally, police functions (e.g., conducting inquiries and sending guilty Kazakhs to the frontier line).

From 1848 to 1856, the *pristavstvo* of the Senior Horde reflected the intermediate stage of incorporating southern Kazakhstan into the empire. In creating this territorial-administrative structure, the Russian authorities attempted to secure the Russian administration's influence and role in the governance of the region. They did this by appointing a special official, the *pristav*. Administrative, judicial, and diplomatic functions were all placed within the hands of the *pristav* in order to fulfil the mission of merging southern Kazakhstan with Russia.

The strategic locations of the Zaisan Region, which bordered China, and the Mangyshlak Region, which bordered Khiva and the North Caucasus, had an effect on their territorial and administrative characteristics. In particular, these *pristavstvos* played a key role in the formation of the Russian Empire's new state boundaries. The territorial-administrative structure of the *pristavstvo* was a temporary model for governing separate regions of Kazakhstan in the process of creating a single administrative system of provinces (*guberniias*), regions (*oblasts*), and counties (*uezds*).

As a form of indirect governance in the North Caucasus and the Kazakh Steppe, the *pristav* system did not develop into a strong administrative institution. It was rather a 'soft' variant, adapted to the nomadic populations who had become Russian subjects.

Ultimately, in the interest of quickly advancing the institutions of governance, Russian authorities used the same techniques in the steppe that they had tested elsewhere, in the different regions of the multi-national empire. These institutions were not carbon copies – that is, *pristavstvo* institutions were not simply mechanically implemented. Rather, the authorities took into account specific differences, such as the level of Russian influence in the region. It was for this reason, then, that the *pristavstvo* system had different durations – about a century in Kabardia (1763–1860), a half-century in Kalmykia (1782–1834), nearly 40 years in Chechnya (1817–1857) and Dagestan (1819–1857), 25 years in the Zaisanskii *pristavstvo*, and a mere 10 years for the *pristavstvo* to the Senior Horde.

The duration of the *pristavstvo* institution in various regions draws attention to the fact that the very longest experience was in Kabardia, which was the first springboard for realizing the different aspects of the *pristav*'s activities. This is where, in other words, the Russian administration realized the possibilities of introducing this transitional system as a step in the process of integrating various regions into the general imperial system. The *pristav* system was a necessity in the empire; it reflected the emerging political forms and levels of relations between Russia and the mountain and nomadic populations of the North Caucasus, the Kalmyks, the Senior Horde, and the Mangyshlak Peninsula, in the transitional process of including all of them in the legal and administrative system of the empire.

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Archives and abbreviations

GAOrO: Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Orenburgskoi oblasti. [State Archive of Orenburg region] (Orenburg, Russia)

KRO-2: Kazakhsko-russkiye otnosheniya v XVIII–XIX vekakh (1771–1867). Sbornik dokumentov i materialov [Kazakh-Russian relationships (1771–1867). Collection of documents and materials]. 1964. Alma-Ata: Nauka.

MIK: Materialy po istorii Kazakhskoi SSR (1785–1828). 1940 [Materials on the History of the Kazakh SSR]. Vol. 4. Moscow-Leningrad: Akademiya nauk.

RGIA: Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv [Russian State Historical Archive] (Saint Petersburg, Russia).

TsGA RK: Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Respubliki Kazakhstan [Central State Archive of Republic of Kazakhstan] (Almaty, Kazakhstan).

Notes

1. Today, the word *pristav* is associated with police and judicial functions and typically translated as 'bailiff'. In accordance with the legal reforms of 1864, only court *pristavs*, or bailiffs, were recognized – these were officials responsible for executing a court's decision in civil cases. Bailiffs included those appointed to the *mirovoi s'ezd*, the district courts, appellate courts (*sudebnye palaty*), and the Cassation Department of the Senate. In this form the court *pristavs* continued to work through the beginning of the twentieth century. They were abolished by the First Decree of the Council of People's Commissars on 24 November 1917.

2. ‘On the assignment of a special *pristav* over Karabulak and Chechens’, 10 October 1848, *Full collection of laws*, 1849. Coll. II. Vol. XXIII. N.22641. St-Peterburg.
3. In 1827 a new ‘*ustav* for the administration of the Nogais and other Muslims pasturing in the Caucasian *oblasts*’ was introduced. This *ustav* legally included the *pristav*’s position in the administrative system of the Caucasus and defined the *pristav*’s legal norms and relations.
4. In 1806, Sultan Karatai showed up to claim the throne and encouraged activities against both Dzhantore Khān and the Russian authorities.
5. In 1816, the majority of the Kazakhs from the Alimuly and Baiuly tribes (about 100,000 *auls*) acknowledged him as *khān*. At that time, Sergazy Khān’s power spread through about 4000 *auls* (Erofeeva 1997).
6. The Khan Council was created in the Junior Juz in 1809, but its power was nominal and the Russian administration in 1812 appointed a new Khan, Shergazy. In this year the Rules of Khan Council were created. According to them, the chairman of the Khan Council must be Shergazy Khan.
7. RGIA, F.1291.Op.81.D.44a Vypiska iz zhurnala Aziatskogo komiteta [Extract from the journal of the Asian Committee]. L. 90–91.
8. An analogous situation occurred among the Kalmyks when Catherine II, in her ukase of 19 October 1771, eliminated the *khān*’s authority and appointed managers for the *uluses* [unions] and accompanying *pristavs*. Later, a main *pristav* was appointed to the Kalmyks (Komandzhaev 2010, 74).
9. TSGA RK, F.4. Op.1.D.263. Predpisaniya pristavu Mladshego Jhuza za April–December 1823 g [Instructions to *pristav* of the Junior Horde for April–December 1823]. L. 4.
10. A. Gorikhvostov was a graduate of the Cadet Corps in Saint Petersburg and participated in the Patriotic War of 1812; see Volkov (2009).
11. Mukhamet–Rakhim Dolgoarshinov was a provincial registrar and an interpreter for the Orenburg Frontier Commission from 1808.
12. TSGA RK, F.4.Op.1.D.261a Journal pristava polkovnika Gorikhvostova pri khane Men’shei kirgiskoi Ordy Shergasy, 1822–1823 [Journal diary of *pristav* colonel Gorikhvostov under khan of the Little Juz Shirgazi Aychuvakov, 1822–1823]. L. 21.
13. TSGA RK, F.4.Op.1.D.268 Predpisaniya pristavu Mladshego Jhuza za November 1823 [Instructions to *pristav* of the Junior Horde for November 1823]. L. 2–5.
14. Jolaman Tlenshi: foreman (*starshina*) of the Tabyñ tribe of the Junior Horde, leader of an uprising (1822–1825) against the administration of the Orenburg governor-generalship.
15. TSGA RK F.4. Op.1.D.263. Predpisaniya pristavu Mladshego Jhuza za April–December 1823 g. [Instructions to *pristav* of the Junior Horde for April–December 1823]. L.31.
16. Based on the *pristav*’s observances, wealthy Kazakhs tried to pasture farther from the line, and poorer ones had to pasture along the line with the mercy of the *khān*.
17. TsGA RK, F.4op.1D.261a Journal diary of *pristav*. L. 30, 38, 43.
18. A Tatar of Seitov Posad, N. Faizullin began his service under Jantore Khān (TsGA RK, F 4.Op.1.D.243. Delo o nasnachenii pri khanah i sultanah mull, pismovoditelei o nagrazdenie poslednikh [Case of the appointment of the mullahs and the clerk beside the khans and sultans and their award]. L. 4).
19. TsGA RK, F.4.Op.1.D.267 Predpisaniya pristavu za September 1823 [Prescriptions of *pristav* for September 1823]. L. 3.
20. TsGA RK, F.4.Op.1D.263a Journal diary of *pristav*. L. 8.
21. TsGA RK, F.4. Op.1.D.261a Journal diary of *pristav*. L. 30.
22. TsGA RK, F.4.Op.1.D.325 Delo o poyezdke v Sankt-Peterburg deputata ot khana Shergazy Aychuvakova s zhaloboy na chinovnikov administratsii Orenburgskoy Pogranichnoy komissii. 21 May, 1836 g [Case of the trip to St. Petersburg of deputy from Khan Shergazy Aychuvakov with the complaint to the administration officials Orenburg Boundary Commission 28, May 1836]. L. 12–14.
23. TSGA RK, F.4.Op.1.D.3519. Delo o poyezdke v Sankt-Peterburg sultana pravatelya Vostochnoy chasti orenburgskikh kirgizov Akhmeta Dzhanturyina 1849–1850 g [Case of the trip to St. Petersburg of Sultan ruler of the Eastern part of the Orenburg Kazakhs Ahmet Dzhanturyin 1849–1850]. L. 1.
24. Ivan Karbyshev was in this position for six months, and the delegation returned to the Kazakh Steppe at the end of July 1830 (TSGA RK, F338.Op.1.D.410. Delo o poyezdke v Sankt-Peterburg sultanov i biyev Karkaralinskogo i Kokchetavskogo okrugov 1830 g [Case about a trip to St. Petersburg of sultans and biys of Karkarala and Kokchetav districts]. L. 238).
25. Collegiate assessor Kostromitinov served as a counselor on the Orenburg Frontier Commission. He carried out the duties of the *pristav* twice (GAOrO, F.6.Op.10.D.6057/b Delo o nagrazhdenii chinovnikov i sluzhashchikh Pogranichnoy komissii. 1848 [Case about the rewarding of officials and employees of the Boundary Commission]. L. 5–6, 22–27.

26. Mukhammed-Sharif Aitov was from a family of Tatar nobles in the Orenburg *gubernia*. From 1820 to 1856 he served as an interpreter for the Orenburg Frontier Commission (Sultangalieva 2008, 13–22).
27. TsGA RK, F.4.Op.1.D.3519 Delo o poezdke v Peterburg sultana pravatelya Vostochnoy chasti orenburgskikh kirgizov Akhmeta Dzhanturyina [Case about the trip to St. Petersburg of Ahmed Dzhanturin]. L. 49–50.
28. TSGA RKF.4.Op.1.D.2786 Formulamy list shtab kapitana Aitova [Formulary lists of staff captain Aitov1855]; GAOro, F.6. Op.10. D.6057/b Delo o nagrazhdenii chinovnikov i sluzhashchikh Pogranichnoy komissii. L. 22–27.
29. TSGA RK, F.4.Op1. D.3519 Delo o poyezdke v Sankt-Peterburg sultana pravatelya Vostochnoy chasti orenburgskikh kirgizov Akhmeta Dzhanturyina. L. 49–54.
30. TsGA RK, F.4. Op.1.D.2983 Delo o poyezdke deputatov ot kirgiz Bukeyevskogo khanstva [Case about the trip of deputies from Kirghiz Bukeyev Khanate]. L. 89–94.
31. TSGA RK, F.338. Op.1.D.410 Delo o poyezdke v Sankt-Peterburg sultanov i biyev Karkaralinskogo i Kokchetavskogo okrugov. L. 175.
32. TSGA RK, F.4.Op.1.D.3519 Delo o poyezdke v Sankt-Peterburg sultana pravatelya Vostochnoy chasti orenburgskikh kirgizov Akhmeta Dzhanturyina. L. 138.
33. TSGA RK, F.338. Op.1. D.410. Delo o poyezdke v Sankt-Peterburg sultanov i biyev Karkaralinskogo i Kokchetavskogo okrugov. L. 238.
34. TsGA RK, F.4.Op.1.D.2983 Delo o poyezdke deputatov ot kirgiz Bukeyevskogo khanstva. L. 89–94.
35. TsGA RKF, 338 Op.1.D.410 Delo o poyezdke v Peterburg sultana pravatelya Vostochnoy chasti orenburgskikh kirgizov Akhmeta Dzhanturyina L. 238ob.
36. TsGA RK, F.374 Op.1.D.1669 Delo o prinyatii kirgizov yusupovskogo roda Bol'shoy ordy v poddanstvo Rossii i osnovanii na reke Karatal okruga [Case about adoption of Yusup tribes of the Great Horde to the subject of Russian Empire and settlement on the river of Karatal region]. L. 108–113.
37. In the mid-1830s, Kalmyks was transferred to the general civil administration and the *pristavstvo* institution was transformed into a trusteeship institution.
38. On April 1847, Graf Nesselrode wrote the draft of instructions for the *pristav* of Great Horde (TSGA RK, F.374.Op.1.D.1669 Delo o prinyatii kirgizov yusupovskogo roda Bol'shoy ordy ... L. 108–113).
39. Some 2021 rubles were allocated for the salary of the *pristav*, while the sultans were allocated 1023 rubles, and the interpreter, 142 rubles (TSGA RK, F.3.Op.1.D.342. Raskhodnyye dela na zhalovaniye pristavu i sluzhashchim pri nem. 1848 [Expendable cases on salary to the *pristav* and his servants, 1848]. L. 19
40. In 1853, the following were a part of the administration: senior sultans Ali Adilov, Tezek Nuraliev, and Dzhangazy Siukov; clerk Neratov; and interpreter Bardashev (TSGA RK, F.3.Op.1.D.341. Vedomost' zhalovaniya za January 1853 [The payroll for January 1853]. L. 1–2).
41. TSGA RK, F.3. Op.1.D.342 Raskhodnyye dela na zhalovaniye pristavu i sluzhashchim pri nem [Expendable cases on salary to the *pristav* and his servants]. L. 19–20.
42. TsGA RK, F.374.Op.1.D.1669 Delo o prinyatii kirgizov yusupovskogo roda Bol'shoy ordy L. 108–113.
43. Here the *pristav* meant Rustem Abulfeizov, who was appointed to the position of administering the Dulat tribe on 17 April 1847.
44. TSGA RK, F.3.Op.1.D.324 Zhurnal sekretnykh bumag, kantselyarii pristava [Journal of secret papers, office of the *pristav*]. L. 1.
45. TsGA RK, F.4.Op.1.D.2512 Alfavitnye spiski sultanov-ypravitelei, biiev i svyasannaya s nimi perepiska [Alphabetical lists of rulers of sultans and other biys and related correspondence]. L. 25.
46. TSGA RK, F.3.Op.1.D.335. Delo ob assignovanii sredstv na sodержaniye pristava i sluzhashchikh pri nem [Case about appropriation of funds for maintenance of *pristav* and his servants]. L. 9.
47. TSGA RK, F.3.Op.1.D.2. Perepiska so shtabom otdel'nogo Sibirskogo korpusa ob otpravke ekspeditsionnogo otryada za Ili [Correspondence with individual headquarters of Siberian Corps on sending expedition detachment over Ili]. L. 6–7.
48. The Chinese government, knowing about the construction of Kopal and other fortifications in Semirech'e, sent a note of protest to the Russian government, claiming that the territory was under the control of the Qing Empire (Moiseev 2003, 28).
49. TSGA RK, F.3.Op.1.D.330 Raport pristava o poseshchenii kitayskimi chinovnikami Bol'shogo zhuzha, 12 September 1851 [The report of *pristav* about visit of Chinese officials of Great Jhuz, 12 September 1851]. L. 1–7.
50. TSGA RK, F.3.Op.1.D.546. Perepiska s voyennym gubernatorom Semipalatinskoy oblasti, Tomskoi kazennoi palaty, Kopal'skim okruzhnym nachal'nikom i drugimi o poryadke sbora poshlin s tovgovtsev stanits Zailiyskogo kraja. 1854–1856 [Correspondence with military governor of Semipalatinsk region,

Tomsk exchequer, chief of Kopal district and others about collection of fees from merchants stanitsa of Zailiysk region]. L. 7–8.

51. Full Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire. 1856. 31 (31095), 973. St-Petersburg.

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